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I NTRO D L:CT I 0 �.; 
Fashioning a law of preclusion that ::;cnsitivdy accornmodates 
individual and institutional intcresls as v:cll dS tht: policies and s truc­
ture of the substantive .la\v is a diff-icult cmerprise even in a ·wholly 
domes tic n;utcxl. The enterprise is cousidcrablv more dif-11cult in 
an interjurisdictional context. The full bith and crc·ciit clause of the 
Constitution and its implementing -:talu�e: i·uve 5implified the task 
l·n 1.11tPfJ
. Ul"!.S d !.Ctin • o ·.•i r·o·�,,,. il-l\' ( ;J1'··:l.l 'Y '(' " '•" J· L·d0Tl ' '···r··t� ,,, .. '") l·. ·n· ·• s � � .._ � '-J.ll\.\.1 .._,._.__,.._J - - � • l .:_:, .J . cl t. L  ... .l lG . . l'- ... ·' � JJ -�'-- l c.;, ._ 
seemed. Thm, in the st<ltc-st<:tc cr:;;1flguration. lhe <ms;vers to most 
q lJestion" h av,·· rcr pyqn· vr·ars ·:�· pl·· �� :n·,, d ,.],>·•r J.,.s :1 , .... ,.,,lt rp(· o unl·-� • \.. <J .._ ' .I, ) - (_..l. .. ,' • •- c: '- 1 <(._ � t,J ._, ..._,. _1. '·• '- •-- ·' \._. ( \ • • ' ._ A \_. ._) 1_.1. ' '\.._,. • b 
tion of judgments ,,.;1s the least in1purL.111t-�and perhaps the rnost 
welcome-part of a course in codiict of :aws, one the:n could as '-Veli 
have been entitled -,vorkers' cornoen:<lticm . � j 
�I'he a11s\vers ha\·e ai'l�·\·avs 1-JCC11 cc;usic1ercd)l\ .. lc�)S clear in cases 
were neglectetl. In rccen_t years. 11c:�.-.-eYcr, i11tercst 1r-1 this brancl-1 <)f 
l
.
l1 telJ. l'fl.SCi.J;� ·i"n " 1 l''l'e·c·'t"Sl.O'� ] ·, a ..; ierl •n J'l··--;!P·cc·� ; ,, '-' " 1'; 1· , . , " s-nl1-t"' nf t . .�.cL .. l..._l (._.ll r-· ...___ _,1 ... {.. u t._\. .• 1_.._, _J ' v· �--·'·' ... j ...  , .... , � J""::_:, .. .. ..  '- v ... 
l··Ls '1"11 ' ',�·Le'," \.P,<. i'd :tr·r'· < o··i' '11")'' {'l"l'lt'' i-t·l · n';() ' " t n Pl·of'e-,-�'"" R r''1'"l' - v .J ...... ..... ) - � .... ... ··- ... .• \. . � '· l 1,_ -- t ..._j • u- . (..., .. ·- •J .i \ J_ .) ,J \) l ..i v l (..l lo 
Sn: 1...;.�-�- C:::):---.:�;T_ �u-1.. I\·. � l. c;,ta/r(f inj�·a ��t)tc ���: ?�....:. { . S . ( : . � i 7:H� (I q;�2). f!ldlfr·,-/ 
inj?-a n<.)tC b; n:fro rex� �lct-:::np;n1�·1ng- n�)t::· . ....; ':21-�:l. 
'2 
-t:Hl ( l �ll:l). 
• 
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Degnan. By focusing attention on sources of law and demonstrating 
how federal law may bear on the issues, his 1 976 article'� dispersed 
fog that, in this area as in others involving the relationship between 
federal and state la'.Y, rolled in 2fter E�ie Railroad v. Tompkins.4 
Moreover, there is now available a work that, within a comprehen­
sive treatment of preclusion, elaborates Professor Degnan's pio­
neering study ·with discriminating intelligence.5 
Professor Degnan's signal contribution to the study of in­
terjurisdictional preclusion was to remind us that the full faith and 
credit statutet' speaks to the recognition of the judicial proceedings 
of state courts in subsequent proceedings in federal courts as well as 
in the courts of other states. That perception, coupled with the per­
ception that the "Erie problem" is in fact a collection of discrete 
problems whose solution depends upon the source of putative fed­
eral law, enabled Degnan to demonstrate that the jurisprudence as­
sociated \Vith Erie's progeny has no place in one area of 
interjurisdictional preclusion where ir had assumed prominence. 
Thus, the statute and not Erie's progeny directs a federal court sit­
ting in diversitv \Vith respect to the preclusive effects of prior state 
judicial proceedings, '..vhether those of courts of the state where the 
federal court sits or thr)se of some other state_! Of greater import 
and interes[, Degnan's work made it clear that the full faith and 
credit statute must be reckoned with whenever an action in federal 
court is preceded by stale judicial proceedings claimed to have 
preclusive effect. Degnan himself did not pursue these issues, but 
they have been the center ol the Supreme Court's attention in a se­
nes of cases decided during the past few terms. 
Interjurisdictional preclusion is a multi-lane highway, and Pro-
Degn�HI. Fi-r!nal!:nl l?,•sfud/,r:la. S', Y.\LE L..J. 741 (! <)7()). 
�)0-1 u.s. ii-I ( 1 :rls 1 
_:::, Spe lg c:. \-\'RIGJIT . . -\. \In.LEH & E. c:onPFi<. FEDER.-\L PRACTIC:I:: & PROCEDL'RE 
§§ 4466-4472 (l�J81) [hciTi:1;llter cited ;Is \\"RH:IIT. \.II!.LU< & (:ooPERJ. 
6 28 L:.s.c:. � 17218 ( 1 �lS�i I"hc :>tatiitc prr,Yidcs: 
7 
The .-\C!:; o!" the icgisbtLIIT or ;Ill\" State, TC"rriton·. or Posscs:,inn of 
the l.:nited Statc.s. or U)p;cs thereof". .-; h a l l he aiiLhcnticatcd bY affixing the 
seal of such State. TnritiJr': or Possession thereto. 
l"hc records and judici;d proceedings o!" ;1111 court oi an' such State. 
TcrntOl"\" or P<hscssiun. or copies t.ht'l"C<.>L shJil be pr(nTd or ;Idmittcd in 
other cuuns ,,·itln:l t!w !."nilcd St<Itcs ;mel as Territories and Possess10ns 
by the attc.;t;nion nf t!J,· clerk and seal of the C<'Llrl annexed. if a -o.eal 
exi:>ts. tGgcthcr "·ith a c;-rtific�Ill' uf cljudf;T of the coun th;1l th'� said at­
testation is 1n p;·upcr illrm 
Such .-\ct:'. rcc(lrds ;!!HJ judici;d proceeding:; or copies thercnL S<l au· 
thentie<llcd. shali h<t-.c lite s;unc fidl liith ;md crcdir Il1 c1·cr• cour! ,,·ithin 
the Lnitecl States <IIHi 1h Te-rritories c:nd Pn:;::.t·:;siCn"Li ��'theY h;we by la11· 
or u�ag·e in the \()�!n..;, I)C sue!: SL:ttc. !'l'rri{OI'\. nr Po:..;sc�sion rrotn \\·h it-h 
t.hcv arc taken. 
St't' Dcg·nan . .  \11/;ro nott: :), tlt 7:)(-.L�<). 
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fessor Degnan travelled it in more than one direction. Neither the 
full faith and credit clause of the Constitution8 nor the implement­
ing statute appears to speak to the preclusive effects of the proceed­
ings of federal courts. Degnan described how the Supreme Court 
hurdled that barrier to arrive at the obviously sensible conclusion 
that state courts are not free to disregard the proceedings of a fed­
eral court claimed to have preclusive effect.9 Moreover, he recog­
nized that, simply because federal law imposes that obligation, it 
need not also answer the question of the preclusive effects of federal 
judicial proceedings. 10 In a section of his article that has proved 
influential, Degnan argued that, just as uniform federal law governs 
the scope and effect of federal proceedings adjudicating matters of 
federal substantive law (a clear, if not clearly reasoned, proposition 
in Supreme Court opinions), so should it govern the preclusive ef­
fects of federal proceedings adjudicating matters of state substan­
tive law. 11 Thus, in his view, the federal-state configuration is the 
mirror image of the state-federal, permitting him to propose a gen­
eral rule applicable to both: 
A valid judgment rendered in any judicial system within the United States 
mwt be recogni::.ed by all otherjud1czal systems within the C'nitr:d States, and 
the claims and issues precluded by that judgmmt, and the parties bound 
thereby, are determined by the lmu of the system which rendered the 
judgment. 1 � 
"[E]ven the most luminous analytic framework"1" can blind us. 
Once the gains it permits are secure, the framevork invites refine­
ment. vVith respect to interjurisdictional preclusion, it is an appro­
priate time to survey those gains and to reexamine the areas where 
there is still room for debate, and hence for progress. 
In this Article, I argue that Professor Degnan's proposed gen­
eral rule, as applied to both the state-federal and federal-state con­
figurations, "moves too fast and far" 1 1 in the directions he chaned. 
Applied to the preclusive effects of state judicial proceedings in fed­
eral court, as it has been bv the Supreme Court in recent years, the I ' 
rule risks the sacrifice of policies animating federal substantive law 
and indeed of federal substantive rights. Perception of the ri�k to 
8 "Full Faith and Credit shall be gi1en in t'�llh Stale to the public :\cts. Recorck 
and judicial Proceedings of CIL'l'\ other Stale . .  \nd the Congress n1a1 b1 general Lt'.l:i 
prescribe the \lanner in 11·hich such .\ns. Rccorcb <md Proceedings �h;:dl he prm·cd. �u•cl 







SPe Degnan. supm note �\, �tt 7 ��-:->0. 
See /d. at 75G. 
Sa !!I. at 755-73. 
!d. at 77�1. 
Chayes. Thr Rffld (;amt. S7 H.1R1·. L Rn. 1-+1. 7:1:' ( 1 91-l). 
Hanna 1. Plumer. :180 l;.s_ 460. � 7() ( 1 CJti:',) (�·Lul<m. J. con�·urringl 
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federal la1v posed by application of domestic state preclusion law 
helps to explain doubts, hesitations, and peculiarities in the 
Supreme Court's recent decisions, as it helps to refine the rule. 
Neither the full faith and credit clause nor the full faith and credit 
statute directs application of domestic state preclusion law. The for­
mer does not apply in the state-federal configuration. The latter 
does not choose domestic state preclusion law; it refers to the do­
mestic state solution, which is determined exogenously and may be 
governed by federal law_!.''> 
Applied to the preclusive effects of federal diversity proceed­
ings adjudicating matters of state law, as it has been by some lower 
federal courts, Professor Degnan's rule risks the sacrifice of state 
substantive policies and rights as >vell as of the articulated federal 
policy against different outcomes on the basis of citizenship. Other 
federal courts, as \Vell as scholars and law reformers, have recog­
nized that the rule is too broad in this context. They have not, how­
ever, adequately addressed the issues. 16 
Professor Degnan's general rule was the product of an insuffi­
ciently general approach. I believe that the best hope for further 
progress lies in that direction. But there are formidable obstacles, 
both to the development of a more general approach and to its ap­
plication to the law of preclusion. 
Problems of inte1jurisdictional preclusion are problems in the 
relationship between federal and state law. Because the putative 
federal law of preclusion is federal common law-I believe I can 
demonstrate that, apart from the Constitution and except when a 
federal statute provides a rule of preclusion, that is all it ever is-we 
are likeiy to confi·ont vigorous disagreement concerning the stan­
dards of pertinence and validity of judge-made federal rules. But 
the scholars who have skirmished on the question of a federal com­
mon Ia-.\· of ''procedure" in federal diversity cases have tended to 
neglect the battle of which it is but a part. 17 The Supreme Court has 
decided reiatiYely few cases implicating a federal common law of 
"procedure" in diversity cases. The Court has, however, spoken 
often on the question of federal common law. It would be surpris­
ing if Wt' could learn nothing fron1 those cases in this context. As to 
I:'> '),.,. test accompanying note,; :) ](::\ .. . t(j 1 .  
IIi So· tnji-a tc:�L <JCCC>mpam·ing notes ?J:'J .. 3 1 7. 
1·; Si'l'. e.g . . E h .  J"h,· fnPjm·.,sib/;· .1 /rtlt of Eric. 87 H.-\R\. L. RE\. 693 ( 197-!): Redish S.: 
Philiip;. Eric awl ilu· Huies of nnn1uu .·lrl: lu Strn-rh of ihr . ·lppmpuotr Dllnnl!!o. 91 H.w\·. L 
RE\·. �):)() ( l 977): \\.esten & Lehlll;m. h ThnP Ltji'for Erie ajln the Drnth of f)j;,;'lstl,rl. /() 
\ItcH. L R:·\. :ll i (1�180): Rcdi;;h, C:outnuung t/11' Eric Dr·batr.· .! Rr·.,jJOI/51' to fl'ri/('11 ru•d 
Lehn:u;,, ·.;(< \l1cr:. L Rt·\'. �Flq (l!i�\l): \\.cstcn, .!fin ·Iifr•jor Erie .. -.-i RtjJI:. 78 \liCII. L 
RE\. �171 ii :180). Iii! I ·''�' Bourne. l'"r>dnlll Coti/111011 !Jiil' 1111d th!' Eric-B\Tcl R u!r. l:!  l .. B.\I.T. 
L. Rn. -L2G ( l qSJ) 
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both groups  of cases ,  however, the role played b y  t h e  Rules o f  D eci­
s ion Act must be identified .  ts 
Once one recognizes that the full faith and credit statute s tates 
or chooses only a domestic referent and not domes tic s tate preclu­
sion law, i t  i s  not apparent why a general approach to federal com­
mon law should not also accommodate problems concerning the 
preclus ive effects of s tate judicial proceedings. The analysis must  
confront,  hmvever, the tendencv of courts and com mentators to 
treat problems of federal lavv in  domestic s tate l i tigation, or at  least 
those to which a procedural label can be attached, a s  sui genen:sYJ 
If I am right that a traveller on all lanes of the  interj urisdict ional 
preclus ion h igrnvay must  consider whether there i s  pertinent and 
val1d federal common law, and that a general approach to that ques­
tion is both  possible and fruitful  ·whether or not the  Rules of D eci­
sion Act provides a common vehicle, rhe remaining roadblocks are 
specific to the nature of preclusion rules .  
As a concession to the s hortness of life, we are dravvn to charac­
terization , particularly in delirniting the proper spheres of federal 
and state iaw. Professor Degnan \YOuld have us assimilate preclu­
sion law to proccdure.:!0 But rules of preclusion, like many legal 
rules, res i s t  confident characterization. Emphasis on the changes in 
the l�.:gal land s cape that made po�siblc modern do:nestic preclusion 
bw or preoccupation \virh the stimuli for more recent. developments  
in that laVv· rna" cause us ro lose sid1t of the como] ex of l)olicies  and ' (._)" 1 
values that inform the basic rules and to vie1-v history in our own 
image. lVforeover, single-minded altention to policy analysis may 
cause us to forget that legal rules, including preclusion ru les , have 
effects as well as purposes. We mav be \Villing to accept. the costs of 
applving the same preclusion rules to all acUudications of domestic 
substantive law, against the bJ.ck.ground of which they were formu­
lated. Reference to <l domestic la\Y modeL hO'\vever, may cause us to 
ne�rlect the additional costs that <�ttend the apolication of such trans-
�· • 1 
substJ.ntive [.>reclusion ndcs to cldjudications of rhc laws of other 
;lll' i c:d� i rtl' o·1 s �} - -·· • • ....  l _ .._ . 
In n·i·' \'1. C''l' \.., (>lcj·l '!" '>(_-!\. t I.'' !1 ":'1 l i'>"(1Jt'l"') C0,-,1'1' 1 "·1 1 '·i 'I' ·� D"]\'" 1. S ana' ..!.. - - .1 ) • l l.J l (;l \ � - (_ .I - '- ·- � (1 .  - .• 1 .... . . \_I I (. \ (.,. d I .._) .__ r_ 
analysis under the Rules of Deci�;ion Act support the accepted (but 
P�'C\"ldt_·:-:;: 
"The !;t-\  ·" nC the :--:c':cral st�u C'\. l'�ccp! ·.·:h:..-rc lh�_· ( :t)ll.' t i! 1 n ion or t rt:�i­
i.Jcs of tht· t�nitcd .\tJ�l·:• or .\.c!:� :Jf" (�ongn:s:-: utilcT'>•:i�c rcquirc or pre:-­
.,-iclc. sh�di ht· rc�-�1rdcd :.!�;niles (J! dtTi�ll)!: in C!\·ii �lCfJotts i;: the court� nf 
the L;nitcd Stau.:s. 1n (C:I.'\CS \\·hlT1._' t h e'.· ;q.Jply 
�g L� .s.c·._ � 1 GS:? (I :1�.;;�). 
Sr•t iJ!/if! text 'tCC()l1lp:tn\·ing nni'-·:-: :·; l�-().,7 . 
. i..;.;, ... I)cg·l��in . . \ujn"�' r:: )i c :L _iJo.r_,.!it:. 
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unreasoned) conclusion that uniform federal preclusion law governs 
the interjurisdictional effects of federal judicial proceedings adjudi­
cating matters of federal substantive law. Neither, however, sup­
ports that conclusion to the extent urged by Professor Degnan, or 
the commentators who have modified his general rule, where a fed­
eral court adjudicates matters of state substantive law in the exercise 
of diversity jurisdiction. As to the interjurisdictional effects of state 
judicial proceedings, both Professor Degnan's general rule and the 
Supreme Court's recent cases are misdirected. The correct inter­
pretation of the statute focuses attention on the domestic preclusion 
solution, which may be furnished, pursuant to traditional federal 
common law analysis or analysis under the Rules of Decision Act, by 
federal common law. The full faith and credit statute makes the do­
mestic solution the national solution. 
Simplicity and predictability are important in the lavv· of in­
terjurisdictional preclusion as in other areas of law. Professor 
Degnan's general rule has these great advantages. The benefits may 
be purchased, however, at a cost too great. We need a law of in­
terjurisdictional preclusion that is sensitive to the complexity of our 
federal system and to the fact that preclusion rules have effects as 
well as purposes. Ironically, symmetry of a sort is attainable: in 
both the federal-state and state-federal confi.gurations, we are left 
with mixed regimes of federal and state lew.·. 
I 
CREDIT To JuDICIAL PROCEEDINGs; SouRcEs 
OF LEG.\L 0BUG:\TIO!"\ 
A. The Constitu tion 
Article IV, section l of the Constitution directs dnt "Full Faith 
and Credit shall be given in each Sta te to the public Acts, Records, 
and judicial Proceedings of even other State'' and proYicies thaL 
Congress mav urescribe their manner of j)ro of and effect.�' 1 Con-, ' l 
gress '<; power under article IV is limited lo the inle1jurisdictionai 
effects of state judicial proceedings; it does not extend to the preciu­
sive effects of those proceedings in the same state. The meag-er his· 
torical evidence suggests that, in providing a nonn of respect and 
empO\\Tring Cono...,Tess to flesh it our, the h·amcrs suu;:-ht "not 
• Ll ...__ t._} 
merciv to demand re:�pcct from one state for anor_her, bul rather to 
give us the benefits of J unihec! nation bv altering the stat us of 
otherwise 'independent, sovereign states.· "�� 
Article l'/. seuion 1 provides no guidance on problems of in-
:2 I Sec sujml :tote;-; Cor the text of' the full bith �llH.l credit c!�tttse. 
Ree�e :Z:John:.-z>Il. Fhr ,\r.)jJf' ��/Full F(ti/lt our! C:u·r/illoj;.·,.<s_:,"ii,'f'!fl.\. ·iS) (�OLl'\i. L. -!-(F\. 
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tei:j urisdictional preclusion in  mixed state a n d  fed eral configura­
t ions .  Firs t ,  it makes no mention of the "public Acts , Records,  and 
j udicial Proceedings " o f  the federal government .  Second,  by  i ts 
terms .  the section imposes no obligation upon the federal govern­
ment to give full faith and credit to the public act s ,  records an d j udi­
cial  proceedings of the states .  
B. Federal Statu tes 
The first Congress i mplemen ted and elaborated the full  fai th 
and credit clause, requiring that duly authenticated records and j u ­
dicial proceedings o f  the courts of any s tate have " such faith and 
credit  given to them in every court within the United S tates ,  as they 
have by law or usage in the courts of the s tate fro m  whence the said 
records are or shall b e  taken . " :2 �  In  so providing,  a C ongress closer 
than any to the framers ' purposes ,  and one that had enacted legisla­
tion resolving doubts concerning the existence of lower federal 
courts , remedied the second omiss ion noted above in connection 
with article IV_ :!-I I t  did not ,  however,  remedy the firs t .  Nor,  i t  is 
generally agreed, vvas  the gap regarding federal j udicial proceedings 
wholly filled by  a supplementary statute passed i n  1 804 . That legis ­
lation made the provi sions of both the 1790 and 1 804 s tatutes appli­
cable to .  in tn a l1a. the j ud icial proceedings " of the respective 
terri tories of the United S tates ,  and countries subj ect  to the j u ri sdic­
t ion of the United S tates . ":!5 
C . The Special Problem o f  Federal Court s  as the 
Rendering  Forum 
After a. b rief survey o f  S up reme Court decis ions declaring an 
o b ligati o n  on the part of the state courts to respect  federal j ud icial  
proceedings ,  Professor Degnan concluded that the Supreme Court 
" •vas \VZ�ntonly righ t" and not "wi l lfully vvrong in  doing what i t  
did . ' ' :! l >  \Vhat the Court appears to have clone,  in  some cases , was to 
i �; ) _  U i  l ( l \)-i 9 )  ( q u o t i n g  S h errer 1 .  S herrer,  �)34 l ' . S .  3 -4 3 .  3 5 5 ( 1 9-i- X ) )  Sti' also uifm 
tc\:l  �('comp::unin g note,;  ��� 1 -� �) .  
'.!:; .-\ct  ot �- L:l\  �6. 1 7� 10 .  c h .  ! I ,  I S t a L  1 2 � .  
:!-I Sa \lcEi mode 1 Cohen.  38 L. .S .  ( 1 3  Pel . )  3 1 � . 3�6 ( 1 83 9 ) :  Degn:m. suj;ra no te  3 .  
< l l  7 -U--t-t . Th:t i  i s  not  t o  s :� ,· 1 h a 1  an. I'. ' . * I i s  t h e  onh source o f  con s t i t u i i on a l  a u t hori tY  
t <n lcgtsLI I i o n  prcscr ibtng the effect  o l' s ta le j ud g m e n t s  i n  fed cr:tl co u n s .  
:2 "' /,ct  of \ Lt r .  :2 7 .  l .'\ 0-l . ch . 5 ( ) ,  :2 S t a t .  �\l 8 .  2 q q _  
l 1  w o u l d  b e  l i u le m o re- ch:m a n  a c t  o f '  b l i n d  heroism I < >  co n l cnd t h<H i'cd­
cr :d  c o u r ts atT i n cl t t cicd ;1 , t h e  cou n s  of '  a countrY " s u bj e c t to the jurisd ic­
t i o n  o f  i. l t �· l ' n t t cd S t :t tcs . . .  The rc· n d i t i o n  ui '  t his p h r a s e  as rc Cernng to a 
" j:; n s s c s s i u n "  < > f ' thc- l ' n i tcd S 1 :u es in 1 h c  preset : t  cod if ica t i o n  n f  t h e  J u c! i ­
, · i a l  Cndc seem-; l ' l  rc! lcct a m uch more probable n: tcrp rer; t l io n .  
. 
1 0  \\. R i l : l \T ,  \ i ! LLFY :!..:.: ( �OOPJ-:R,  Sttj;ro n o t e  �) . § ---1---J- bS.  �ll () �-, 1 I L l 0 .  
� � >  Degn; i l l .  ::ujnt' n o t e  � L  (It 7 --t- n .  
1 986]  I:VTERJURISDICTJO,\'AL PRECL USION 74 1 
attribute an obviously sound result to the ful l  faith and credit stat­
ute,  a reading i t  wil l  not  bear.  A few of  the cases are worth another 
look, particularly because ,  upon reexamination,  a firmer basis  for 
the Co urt ' s  conclusion need not  be left to the imagination .  The full  
fai th and credit  s tatute has nothing to do with federal j udgments ;  
the obligation to respect them is  a derivation  of federal common 
law. 
The firs t case Professor Degnan discussed is  Dupasseur v .  Ro­
chereau . 27 The language he deemed relevant ,  however, speaks to the 
ques t ion of the preclusive effects to  be given the proceedings of  a 
federal court ,  not  to the source of the basic obl igation of  respect .2:--; 
For analysis address ing the lat ter quest ion,  i t  is necessary to look 
elsewhere i n  the Court 's  opinion.  In  holding that it had j urisdict ion 
to hear the case, the Court  opined : 
Where a S tate court refuses to give effect to the j u d gm e n t  of a 
court of the U n i ted S tates ren dered upon the point  in d ispute,  
and with  j u ri s dict ion o f  t h e  case and the part i e s ,  a ques t ion i s  u n ­
doub tedly raised w h i c h ,  under the act of l 8G7 , m a y  be b ro u gh t  to 
this court  for revis ion . The case would be one in whtclz a titlr or righ t is 
claimed undn a n  a u thority exercised under the Cn itrd Stairs, and thr deCI­
sion zs against th e Iitle or righ t so set ujJ. It would th us be a case a rising 
under the laws of the [ ·,uted Sta tes, es tabltslung the Circuit  Cou rt and vest­
ing i t  with jzrrisdictwn ; a n d  h ence it would be within the j u di ci a l  
power o f  the United S ta t e s ,  as defined by the C o n s t i w t i o n ;  and i t  
i s  clearly w i t h i n  t h e  chan o f  appel late  power gi\en t o  t h i s  c o u rt , 
over cases a ri s i n g  i n  a n d  decided bv the S ta t e  courts .  
The refusa l by the  row is of one State to gi<'e ef ect to the  dmsions of !hr 
cou rts of rznother Staff is a n  mfmzgemen t of a dijfnm t m"!lde of the Co nsti­
tution .  to wit,  the fi rst  s ect ion o f  article fo ur:  and the r ighL t o  br ing 
such a case before us by writ  of error under t h e  t11·entv-f ifth s e c ­
t ion o f  t h e  Jud iciary Act , o r  the act  of 1 8 6 7 ,  is  based on lhe refu s a l  
of the S tate court to g i v e  val idi ty  a n d  ef ect to  the ri ght claimed 
under that art icle and s e c t i o n .  
I n  ei ther case,  th erefore,  11·hether the \·al i d i t\ or due e ffec t of  
a j u d gment o f  the S tate court ,  or that  o f  a j ud gment o f  a U n i ted 
S tates court , i s  disal lowed bv a State court , the Cons t i tu t ion and 
laws fu rn i s h  redress by a fi n al appeal to th is  coun.:! � 1  
'2 7  88 L S .  ( :2 1 \V a l l . )  1 3 0 ( I H7.'"J ) .  T h e  c o rrect  cLue o f decis iun i ,;  fou n d  i n  '2 :2  L E d .  
5 8 8 .  
2R "The onh effeCL t h a t can be _ j u s t l l' c la imed fo r t h e J Ucl g m e iH  i n  t h e  C: I IT U J t  Court 
of the L' n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  i s  such a s  would be long to j u dgments  o f  the S t a t e  court s re ndered 
under s imi lar  circumstance s . · ·  Dupasseur. 8 8  t: . S .  a t  1 3 5 .  quotrd in Degn�\ 11 .  supm n o t e  3 .  
a t  7 4 5 .  
�� >  DlljHl5Jeur. 88 l! .S .  a t  1 3-! ( e n 1 p h a s i s  added ) .  - r h c  C:o u r l · s  rel iance on �1ri . I\. in i t s  
discussion of s t a t e  court judgmen t s  demons t ra tes t h a t  t h e  e n t i re d i ,; c u s s i o n  concerned 
the bas ic  ob l i gat io n of reS[JCCt .  S!'e \. !cElmoyJc  1 · .  C o h e n .  3 8  L S .  ( l �) Pet ) 5 1 :2 . :1 2-l - :? :1 
( 1 839)  (ar t .  !\ ' , s 1 is s e l f�exccut ing as to b�t s i c  o b l i ga t i o n )  . .  -\ rece n t  s tu d e n t  nor c sni-
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I n  the first  paragraph, the Court sugges ted that the obligation of 
respect for a federal judgment flows from the federal statutes that 
created the lower federal court and vested it with juris di ction. I n  
later referring to " an infringement of a different article of the Con­
stitution" (than article IV, vvhich concerns only s tate judicial pro­
ceedings ) ,  the Cou rt may have intended to suggest that article I I I  
i m poses the obli gation (upon the creation by Congres s of lower fed­
eral court s ) .  The latter i s  not a necessary interpretation, however. 
The Court may have had in m i nd that disregard of an obligation 
derived from federal statutes , as of one derived from article I I I , 
>vould constitute an i nfringement of the s up remacy clause of article 
VI. :lO  
However i mprecise the Dupasseur Court's as crip ti on of an obli ­
gation of respect for federal judgments was at the time, the notion 
that federal juri sdictional statutes may be the source of policies to 
be given effect by the courts comes as no s urpri se today. A grant of 
j urisdiction to the federal courts would be an empty ges ture if their 
determinations of right and duty could be reexamined without re­
straint by the state courts.  In an alienage diversity case like Dupas­
seur, for example,  of ·wh�\t  use Lo the plaintiffs was the p romi s e  of an 
unbia sed federal forum if the p rom i se could be broken at will  by 
s tate courts in s ubsequent l itigation ? This mode of anal y s i s  is con­
genial to a modern reader; we shouicl not assume that it was beyond 
the ken of the Court in the nineteenth centurv. In anv event. the I �· . 
Court i n  Dupasseur did not mention the fu l l  fai th and credit s tatute, 
either i n  i t s  discussion of the obligat ion of res pect for federal j udg­
ments or in s tct ting the rule that s t ate law governed the preclus ive 
effects o f  the j udgment involved in that case. :' >�  
The Court did, however, rn ention the full faith and c redit s tat­
ute i n  Embrv v. Palmer, :�:..> the c a s e  " m o s t  often cited for the rul e  that 
s tate courts mmt give full faith and credit to federal adjudica­
tions . " :\ :\ E"m biJ invol ved the effect of a j u dgmen t  of the Supreme 
Court of the Dis trict o f  Columbia in subsequent p roceedings in the 
(J l ls h· m i s i n t C !)J lT i o'  !his sect ion or tht· !JI!j){t5St'il! C o i i rL \  o p i n i o n .  Sn· :\ o r e .  E r i c  <'l llrl ihr 
Pi!'CIIISI C 'i' Ejii·r/ of Frrlnol Dn•t!S! IY ./Ildl!,lll!'l ! i.l . s :) C o L t : \ 1 .  L. R n . 1 :10 5 .  1 5 ! :) ( l �lt::i :'J ) .  
:>o r_· . s .  Co c:sT. a n .  V l .  c l .  :! .  But sr·e J'lwcnix hrc & I-Ianne I n s .  C:o .  1 .  i "enncsscc.  
l l.i ! l".S.  1 7-J. .  I S S i 1 H9ti ) .  11 h cre t h e  C o u n  o b :; c rYccl t h a t  ' " the C o m t i t u l i o n  pro1 idcs  
1 ha t  fu l l  b i t h  an d cn. : d i 1  sh�: l l  h e  g i 1cn · ·  r o  kdcr ; l i  j u cl gm c m :; .  
C u n gr c.;s " ;;  p011·er to · · co n s t i t u t e  Tri h l m,ds i n ferior t o  t h e  s u p reme C•:JLi n . · · LI S 
C.o';sr. J rt . I .  ·�' S . is another p o s s i b l e  sou rce of t h e  has ic  o b l i ga t ion o[ rcspcc 1 . 
:{ l .\,., .. lJ'LfHtsst,'lr. �R L: . s  (� l \ f a l l . )  at 1 � 5 ;  ui_/1Il r ext accorn p a n yi n g n o t e ():� .  
�� :.! 1 0 7 l_ . . S. :� ( l :)�i :) J .  ·rhc correct date of dec i s i o n  is fo u n d  ! ! 1  'l. /  L. FcL �)- H ) .  Pi 'o-
fc'ssw· D�·gn;m i s  correct ! h:; l t h e  ct s c  is · ·ca:; i ! l· m i:;unclcrswod . · ·  Dcgn:m.  s;:j;rrJ n o lc �L 
e � l  i..J. t i . l'nf< l rt t m�; ! ch . t he Llcls  h e- s u 1 n :n :nizcs .  /d. "· i t h  n . 2�l.  a rc not ; h e  bns oi '  !:.'mbrr. 
b m  r:1 t lwr  o i Pc:t1H' 1 .  O l t11:1 . 20 C o n n .  5-U ( ! 8 50 ) .  dl>m,ml ! i! 1:-min r .  1 0 7 L . S .  ;H 1 1 - 1 2 . 
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courts o f  Connecticut .  Having determined t h a t  i t  h a d  j urisdiction , 
the Court  n o te d  that  the ful l  fai th a n d  credi t s ta t u t e ' s  provis ion for 
the effec t  to b e  given s tate  j ud icial p ro ceedings was founded o n  arti­
cle IV,  s ection l ,  ' \vhich , h o wever, does n o t  extend to the other 
cases covered by the s ta t u r e . " :o ·l The Court  cont inued : 
The power to prescribe " h a t  effect  s ha l l  b e  given r o  the j u d i cial 
p roceedi n gs of t h e  courts of the U n i t e d  S tates i s  conferred by 
other p rov i s i o n s  o f  the Const i wtion [ than article IV.  § 1 ] . such as 
those wh ich declare the e:xtent of the j udicial  power of the United 
S tates . which a u th o ri z e  J. l l legis lat ion necess ary a n d  p roper fo r ex­
ecut ing the p o wers vested bv the C o n s t i tu t i o n  i n  the gO\·ern m e n t  
of the United S tates , or i n  any department o r  officer thereof, and 
which declare the s u p remacv o f  t h e  authori ty o f  the nat ional  gov­
ernment w i t h i n  the l imits  o f  the C o n s ti t u t i o n .  As part of i ts gen­
eral authori t y ,  the power to give effect t o  the j ud gm e n t s  of i t s  
courts i s  coex t e n s i ve w i t h  i t s  terri t o rial  j u ri s d ict ion . T h a t  t h e  
Supreme Court  o f  rhe D i s t r i c t  o f  Columbia i s  a court o f  the U n i ted 
Sta tes , resu l ts fro m  the right of exclus ive legislat ion over the D i s ­
tr ic t  which t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  has g i v e n  to C o n gres s .  , ·J ccordingly, the 
j udgmen ts of the co urts of the Cn ited Sta tes luwe in;_•(mably bet>n recog n i:ed 
as upon the samf' foo ting, so fa r as con cerns the ob!Jgation created by them, 
with domestic jucfg'�nen!s of the States, whneT.'er ren dnPd and wh erever 
so ugh t to be enforced. '' '  
According t o  Profe s s o r  D e gn a n , " [ t] h e  Court ' s  re:J s onin g lS 
perplexing:  i t  sugges ts that: because the statute req u i res s tates  w 
recognize j ud gments of terri torial court s ,  a n d  because Lerri torial 
courts are court s  'of the Uni ted States , '  the s ta tu t e  thereby requires 
the s tates  t o  recognize the j u d grn e n ts of a ll ' couns of the Uni ted 
S tates . ' " %  Perhaps s o ,  a l tho ugh the C ou rt ' s  holding may have 
been only that the D i s tri c t  o f  Colum bia i s  one of " th e  respec tive 
territories of the Uni ted S ta t e s "  or one of the " countries s u bj ec t  to 
the j urisdict. ion of the United S ra t e s "  contemplated by the s tatute . '1 7  
Alternatively,  the C ourt rnay n o t  h a v e  b een relyin g  o n  the full  faith 
and credi t  s tatute at all . 
How then explain the broad language a t  the end of the  q uoted 
pas sage; H m\· indeed.  g i ven that  o n e  c, f the c a s e s  the Eill bry c o u rt  
ci ted in support o f  the broad ianguage 1vas  Tu m b u !i , ,  Pay.\ O il . :l :' I n  
Turn but! t h e  Court , a l b e i t  w i th o u t referring to t h e  supplemen tary 
E Iii I'·'·'· 1 01 c · .  s .  �ll �J. 
frf. <t l 9- J Q  (CElphdS lS  CJd c\ c d )  
r>egi : ;nl , .\· lljJlfl ntHC �� - d f  ·i�} -t� . 
:1 7 SeP !�ole .  C:on�1u5J;. ·utrss (U:d i:jF·r··t t{Judgn:ot l.'- tr·; Bt/;{t( 1! 1-'rf!tro/ und .\la/;' C1u:rt.�. � I  
U .S . C. C. .-\ . Rep.  -+ 7 8  ( l ii 9 7 ) .  SH also :--.: o ; c.  i?.t.\ jlidva/(i (/ ,  <7 Ftdo !il Qur.\/tfl ! i . :! :1 r l'.F. · . .  : . .  
R F.\' . -i-1 3 �  -l -L)  ( 1 9  I � ) L � u ggt..?S L i i l g  t h a t  s !. ; i t ll t c  co\·crs only  judgn:cn r. �  p f  s L-l t c s .  i c�T� t o­
ries,  ;:;nd Dis lr in oi C: o i u mhu ) .  
: I S 
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legislation of  1 804,  h a d  said that " the a c t  of Congress does n o t  ap­
ply to the courts of the United S tates . " :l \ )  Moreover, even in the ab­
sence of  s tatutory support ,  the Court in Turnbull had posited an 
obl igation on the part of  "all o ther courts c f  the country" to respect 
the proceedings of federal courts .4° Finally ,  if  the C ourt in Emb1)' 
was interpreting the full fai th and credit  s tatute to cover the j udicial 
proceedings of all federal courts ,  the rule it  announced as to preclu­
sive effects was problematic on i ts face .  The Court went on to hold :  
The rule for determ i n i n g  what effect shall  be given to such 
j udgments i s  that declared bv this court ,  i n  res pect to the fai t h  and 
credit  to be given to  the j udgments o f  State courts  i n  the courts of 
other S tates , i n  the case of M ' Elmoyl e  v .  Cohen,  1 3  Pet.  3 1 2 .  3 2 6 .  
where i t  was said :  "They are record evidence of  a debt ,  or  j udg­
ments of  record, to be contested o nly  in  such way a s  j u d gm ents o f  
record m a y  b e ;  a n d ,  consequently ,  are conclusive u p o n  t h e  de­
fendant  i n  every S tate,  except for s uch causes a s  would be suffi ­
cient t o  set  aside the j ud gmem in the courts of the S ta t e  i n  which 
i t  was rendered . "4 1 
The federal court that rendered the j udgmen t at i s sue in Emb 1)' 
was not  s i tuated within the terri tory of  any state .  The courts o f  the 
Dis trict o f  Columbia could ,  however, be ass imilated without s train 
to the status of courts of a s tate and thus provide  a referent of the 
sort con templated by the statute .4�  What of o ther ,  geographical ly 
d ispersed,  federal courts ? D omestication so as  to fi t  the statutory 
model was and is  m ore difficul t . 43  In sum,  Embl)' need not  be read 
:-\ � )  
-!0 
- I I 
Turnbull. 95 U . S .  a t  4 2 3 .  
!d. 
Embl)'. 1 0 7 U . S .  ;}t 1 0 .  
4 :2  T h e  Embry C o u r t ,  luv i n g  a s k e d  . .  ,,·hat  c;1uses 11·mdd ha'  e b e e n  s u f lic ient  t n  t h e  
D i s t ri c t  of C o l u m b i a ,  accord i n g  t o  the I a,,· t hen i n  force, t o  have a u t h o rized 1 t s  c o u n s  1 0  
set  aside t h e  j udgment . . .  id. , fo u n d  t h a t  one o f  i t s  p re,· ious d e c i s i o n s  s ta t ed " t h e  ! �11,. 
p revai l i n g  in the Distr ict  of C o l u m b i a .  n o t  by re:1 s o n  of anv l oc:d pecul iari t \ . b u t  hec� t tsc 
i t  was a general  princip le  o f  e q u i t v  j ur i s prudence . . .  !d.  a t  1 1  ( c i t i n g  \I a rine i m .  C o . ' · 
Hodgson,  I I  U . S .  ( 7  C ra nch) 332 ( 1 8 1 3 ) ) .  
4 �1 That i s ,  i f  the ful l  fai t h  a n d  cred i t  s t a t u t e  i s  t h o u g h t  t u  a p p l v  w !ed u�d : mlg­
men t s .  u n d e r  t h e  statute w h ere i s  one w look for the gO\ ern i n g  l �m· : to lhc 1 �: ':, t iL i i  
"·ould be appl ied in s u b s e q u e n t  proceedings i n  t h e  rendering court or in such JFucced­
ings i n  some o ther federal court ) Th is  p robl e m  w o u l d  disappear if  t h e  s t a t t i l e  clw:;e the 
rendering court  as the refere n t ,  as t h e  Court has occasional h .  a l b e i t  carc l o s h . ,; u g­
gested . See. e.g ,  \! i l l s  v .  Dunce, I I  L. S .  (7 Cra n c h )  -+ R l ,  -18-l ( 1 8 1 3 \ .  But t h e  ::; t �l l u t c  d i d  
n o t  ( a n d  d oes n o t )  s a \  t h a t ,  s a  supm t e x t  accomp;mving n o t e  2 3 :  n o t e  G . .  \ l t h < > u g h  t h e  
choice o f  referen t s  makes no difference a s  t o  s ta t e  cou rt j u d gmen t s ,  \\·c cannot ; : s s u m c  a :  
t h e  s tart o f  the analvs is  t h a t  t h e  same l a w  ,,· i l l  be applied to  federal judgmen t s  1 1 1  a l l  
federal court s .  T h e  purposes o f  t h e  exercise  a r c  preciscil- to d e t e r m i n e  ·.dH;th cT t h ;l l  
propos i t i o n  i s  true and w h e t h er t h e  ful l  fai t h  a n d  cred i t  s D t u t c  speaks t o  the  pro b l e m .  
But W' Case Comme n t .  4 I LL .  L. RE\·. :) i 5 .  5 1 6- 1 8  ( 1 9 1 0) ( s t a t u t e  a p p l ies to f"cc! cr; d j u d g ­
m e n t s  and req u i res appl tcat ion o f  uniform fed e ral preclusion h ,,. Ill c c rt a m  
circumstances ) .  
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as relying on the ful l  faith a n d  credi t  s tatute,  a n d  there i s  g o o d  rea­
son not to d o  s o .  
T h e  p o i n t  i s  not  t h a t  t h e  Supreme Court h a s  never sought ref­
uge in the ful l  fai t h  and credi t  s tatute,  for i t  surely h a s ,  and n o t  that  
the " Court has  consis tently a s sumed that the implementing s ta tute 
of 1 790 required such recognit ion, "-'-' for i t  s urely has not .  Rather,  
the point  is  that  the Court  has  consis tently reached the same res u l t ,  
w i t h  or without t h a t  refuge :L '  In Dupasseur and Turnbull, and per­
haps in Emb1)' i t s e l f, the Court relie d  n o t  on what Congress h a d  s a i d  
in so many words,  but  on \vh a t  t h e  "national  government" might  d o  
within i ts  const i tu tional  preroga t ives  and w h a t  i t  w a s  necessary t o  
do . Having " suppl [ ied] " o n e  " el li p s i s "4 G  in the s ta tute  expl ic i t ly ,  
the Court  i n  Em bry reco gnized that another had already been sup­
plied . Even taking Profe s s o r  Degnan ' s  v iew o f  Embry, the C o u r t ' s  
exercise in s tatutory i nterp retation merely b l e s s ed an anteri o r  exer­
cise in federal common law. 1\iloreover, with or without the s tatute ,  
the Court  did n o t  l imit  i tself  to declaring an obligation of respect  for 
federal j udgmen t s .  
Dupasseur, Embry, a n d  the cases following them were n o t ,  how­
ever, the only i n s tances of "j udicial  legis lat ion"-1 7 concern i n g  fed­
eral j ud gments during this  p eriod . Federal common law,  in the 
sense o f  j ud ge-made federal law that i s  binding on both fed eral and 
state court s ,  i s  not  exclusively a p o s t- 1 9 3 8  phenomenon.48  In t h e  
area of in terj uris dictional p reclusion,  the S upreme C ourt went  be­
yond a federal rule o f  respect  for federal j udicial  proceedings and 
references to s tate law for preclusive effects long before 1 9 3 8 .  In 
Deposit Bank v. Frankfort, 4D fo r examp l e ,  the C ourt announced a fed­
eral common law rule of preclusive eiTect  for proceedings o f  a fed­
eral court determining federal righ t s .  Th-: C ourt refused to p e rm i t  
the Kentucky s t a t e  courts t o  a p p l y  s tate  l a w  s o  as t o  deny p reclusive 
effect to the j udgment of a Kentucky federal court holding that the 
bank had cons t i tutionallv p ro tected con tract r ights  under a s tate 
s tatute. I t  s tated :  
-H Degn a n .  supm n o t e  3 .  at t"l 5 .  
· 1 5 See I H \\' R I G I IT. \ l n.LER & COOf'ER .  sujmt n o t e  0 .  § 4 4 6 8 .  Zi t G.'i l .  
-H> Embry .  1 0 7 L: . s .  at 9. The Embry Coun \l aS rd c rri n g  to t h e  LJ i lure or t h e  o t a t u -
tory l Z�nguage cons istentlv  t o  refer t o  terri t o ries �md cuun tnes sub jeC t  t o  the  j u ri s d i ct i o n  
of t h e  U n i ted S D t e s .  
-f 7 Cost iga n ,  The f-Its/on of thr . l rlojJilol; of Snilo l l  I of. l > !tc!P n ·  oj the [ '11 1 /NI Siczlt·s Consil-
lutwn ond o Com1rlrmiwn of the EjJi>rt on }lliZfl. llll' l l /5 of !he!! SPC!wn and of hdnal f.(!!, ls ia tlo l l .  ·1 
Cou.;:-c  L R r-:\ .  n o .  -t 8 3 - o 4 .  489 ( I  �! 0-i ) 
-I H See. e.g . .  Tullock ,._ \ l u h ane.  1 8-l L . S .  4 9 7  ( 100:2) ( fcderJl ]a,,. gcn crn s  in st::t te  
c o u n  a c t i on o n  Ceclera! i njunct ion b o n d ) :  Bourne. SI!/Jm note 1 7 . at 428-38:  H i l l .  Thr E r i e  
Doctrine in Bolllu uptcy, iJ(j  H.\R\·. I . .  R E \ . 1 0 1 3 . 1 0� 3  ( J q S C.\ ) .  
-1\l 1 9 1 U . S . 499 ( ! 90 3 )  
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I n  our j udgment the adj udicat ion of  the Federal court reiied 
upon here, al though based upon the j u dgment o f  a s tate court  
given a s  a reason therefor ,  i s  equally effectual a s  i t  would have 
been had the Federal court reached the conclus i o n ,  as u p o n  the 
original question, that  the He\l·i t t  law const i tuted a b inding con­
tract b e tween the part ies . Any other co nclusion s trikes down the 
very foundation of the doctrine of  res jlldimta , and permits the 
s tate court to deprive a p arty of the benefit of i ts most important 
principl e ,  and i s  a vinual abandonment of the  final  power of the 
Federal cour ts to protect al l  \1·ho corne before them relyin g  u p o n  
rights guaranteed by the Federal C o n s t i tu t ion and e s tabl i shed by 
the j udgments of the Federal  c o u rt s . "''1 
The Deposit Bank case ,  together with Stoll v. Gottlieb, 0 1  in which i t  
was cited,  m ay provide the key t o  what Professor Degnan regard s a s  
" th e  puzzli n g  s uggest ion" i n  Stoll that  " b ecause there was a federal  
question involved (bankruptcy) [ in the fr.:deral j udicia l  proceedings ] , 
' [ t] h e  problem b efor e  the S up reme Court of I l l i n o i s  was n o t  one of 
ful l  fai t h  and credi t  but o f  res judicata . ·  " c, �  For,  "vh en j uxtapo s e d  
with Dupasseur, those cases hel p  to i l luminate t h e  various r o l e s  o f  
federal common lavv in connection with federal j ud gment s .  
Although sugges ting tha t t h e  federal sta tu tes e s ta b l i s h i n g  t h e  
lower federal cour ts a n d  vest ing them w i t h  j uri s d i ct ion require re­
spect  for the proceedings of federal courts , the Court held in Dupas­
seur that s ta t e  rules govern the p reclusive e ffects of the j u d gment o f  
a federal c o u rt �whose j urisdict ion i s  founded on al ienage diversity . 53 
In o ther cas es ,  including Deposit Bank a n d  Stoll, federal interes ts re­
quire federal preclusion rul e s .  Both regimes o f  preclus i o n  rules , 
federal and s tate,  subsu m e ,  t o  the ex lent  that thev i m p lemen t,  the 
basic fed eral obl igation of respect  for fed eral j u dgm ent s .  To t h a t  
extent,  both regimes of preclusion lavv a r e  b i n d i n g  u n d e r  the 
supremacy clause.  "Res judicata "-federalized in o n e  case and fed ­
eral i n  the other-s eems as g o o d  a way to describe t h e m  a s  any .  
The Court in Stott gra s p ed this  point  as to federal preclus ion rules ,54 
but i ts reliance on the full  fai th and cred i t  s t a t u te fo r  n o n fed eral 
question j udgments prevented ful l  un derstan ding ." '  That reliance,  
al though n o t  surpnsmg" m l i gh t of the history,  i s  indefen s i b l e .  
'0 0  
5 1  
!d. at :) 2 0 .  See infm text accompanving nutes 7 "2. - 7  � • .  
30�· l_I S .  I GS ( l 9cl 8 ) .  
?> �  I)egnctn ,  supra n c .' tc  �) , at  7-l�� ( q u o t ing Stoll. 305 r..: . :..; _ a l  i 7 l ) . 
' '1 88 C . S .  (2 J W (l i l . )  l �1 0 .  l �E1 ( 1 S 7.5 ) .  !f / !Oied rc:-.: i  ; �cc · c ! illpaming- note  6 3 .  The 
last  sentence in the q u o t;H ion hcips t u  clarifY hu''  q :.J t c  l ;_,,,. -; u h , u nH::s .  ! Jy  1 rn plem enting.  
the b a s i c  o b l i gation of  rcsp�'C i .  
_:") .:J St'e also Ba!d\\' i n  Y. l o\\.J S t �l l e  -rr�\·c ! i n g· \len ' s  .-\ss ·n .  :�s:1 L: . s .  5 � � .  5 2-t -� �) 
( 1 93 1 )  ( s u gges t i n g  that  fecicrcd preclusion Ln,· S:C> '.  c: rn s  ! .•: s u e  of ,· zd i dit \· of" d i \ers i t.\ 
judgment ) .  
-"> f"> Set S t o l l \ .  G o t t l i eb .  3 0:l C . S .  i 6 :-l . i 7C ( l �);', ::-; 1 ,  r;::n ted t W i t'  ( ifJ .  
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The statute plays n o  part m an a nalys i s  of the obl i gations imposed 
by federal j u dgmen t s .  
I I  
THE PRECLU S IVE E HE CTS O F  fED ERAL jUDG!VIENTS 
I n  treating the law governing t h e  precl u s i ve effects of federal 
judgmen t s ,  Professor Degnan told a s tory l ike thi s : "li 
Prior ro 1 93 8 .  when Enc was decided and the Federal  R u l e s  o f  
Civi l  Procedure became effe c t i '  e ,  federal  courts were required,  i n  
common l a w  a c tions ,  to apply t h e  p rocedural l a w  o f  t h e  s tate  i n  
which they s a t .  During that p eri o d ,  :m el  probably for that  reas o n ,  
t h e  Supreme Court cleciclecl t h a t  the preclusive effects o f  fed eral 
j u d gments were to be the same as t h o s e  of s tate  j udgments in t h e  
s ta te i n  which they were rendered.  c, , 
Aft er Ene and the Federal R u l e s .  the fe deral court s  came t o  
reali z e  that ,  " [a] t l east  i n  m;Hters o f  exclusin· federal jur isclic­
tion , "'>x federal preclu s i o n  lav; s h o u l d  govern fe deral j udgments . 
B u t  they were con cerned about  t h e  i m p l ications o f  Ene fo r the 
preclusive effects  of cl ivers i tv judgments and s l m1· to reali z e  t h e  
i m p l i cat ions for preclu s ion law of the nea rly comp lete rej ect ion o f  
conformitv i n  t h e  Federal Rules . 
S t artin g about  1 95 1 .  c o u rt s  have i n creasin giv recogni zed t h a t  
preclu s i o n  l a w  i s  l argely a rdkx of p ro cedural l a w  an d that  t h e  
Federal Rules speak directly LO s o m e  aspens of p reclu s i o n  a n d  
indirectly L o  o t h er s .  E v e n  when the  Ft:cleral R u l e s  do n o t  s peak 
" a u t h o ri tat ively , " 0' J  Erie j u risprudence has no role  t o  play.  The 
ful l  fai th and credit s tatute do es not a pp ear t c  con template p ick-
5G Srr Degnan, supm note '1 . at 7 5 5 - 7 1 StP olso Rt sT.\TE C.t E :\T (SEco>m) O F  Ju oc-
ME:-;Ts 9 87  comment a ( l  CJS � ) ;  C .  WR!C:Hr. Lw· O F  F E D E RAL CcwRTS § l OOA, a t  695 (4th 
eel.  i 983)  ( t e l l i n g  large!:. s.nne s t o n ) .  
'> 7  Profcs:iOI.· Degnan glosses '-> I  cT t he pro b l e m  ul t h e  decrees o l  federal courts  s i t ­
t ing i n  equ i t v .  1d1ich ,,·ere f ree  to a p p l v  t heir < J \,·n procedure.  Sel' Degnan , sujnn n o t e  3 ,  
a t  746 n . :Z O .  7 5 6- 5 7 .  l t  i s  t rue that " [ t ] h c  fc1' ca c <c s  m 1d1ich the fed era l adj u d i ca t i o n  was 
a decree in e q u i t 1  . el icited n o  spcnal  n o t i c e  u f  the  problem o f  gm crni n g  l a 11 . . .  RE­
STATEM E c;T ( S t.C:!J .'•iD )  O F  . f t ;DC ,lENTS � 8 7  C O in i l l C l l l  a ( ]  C)i) � ) .  but t he fact  t h a t  the Court  
did  n o t  Y a n  i t .s ' ' f-'proe<.ch i n  t h ose c a s e s  bel ie'  the n r ; i ! O n  t h a t  the :- u urcc o f  p reclus ion 
l a w  fol l o w t·d t h e  s u u rcc o C  proccdu r<l l iail· . Sec B t g c' i m,· '.' . Old Dominion Cop p er Mining 
& Smcit ing Co . . :.? 2 S  l' . S .  1 1 l ,  l 29<Hl ( 1 0 1  :2 ) :  n o t e  fi5 and accompam i n g  text .  
Professor Schofield had cnt i cizcd du: deus :on dli rmccl IF the C o u rt i n  BtgP!ow for fai l ­
ure t o  inark t h e  chs t Jnct ion . .  S>c Case C�on1 1 n en t .  s uj;rn ! J U t e  --� .'_Jl ( for a u thorship.  co rn p are 
id. at 5 � :2  \\· i d 1  Schof lei cL S w i l"1 \" . l \- s n n :  [ O/ /(1(/t Slo lr� L(i�i ' 1 1 1  .Stale nnd 
Fedcm/ C:u tu/.1 . -± ILL.  L .  RE\· .  533  ! l lJ i () J )  H u i  ''i clw ! ic ld  took t h e  v i c\' thJt  t h e  federal 
e q u i t y  decree in  ques t i o n  no t o n l y  rc:-:.ul t :_·cl frcn n proceed i n gs con d u c Led a c c o r d i n g  t o  
fedcr�1 l  equ�r.\· n rocedure b u £  �1upl ied (_1 d t s c;·t.:_· � c  l(·dcr;_d equi t\ '  j ur i snruclcncc.  Stt' Case 
Corn :ncn t .  \ ' / [/)/�(! n o t e  -f ?, ,  �i t 3 l �)� -rha t  \\-�!:-; n ( ) (  t he '-. ' it:'\\" o r  tl.l (' ( �Cll._;rt .  SttJ Blg_Pirn1 1 ,  2 2 5  
U . S .  Clt l l :J -30 .  
I1cgn;_! n ,  ;;ujJrrl note :� . a t  7 {) 0 .  
! d .  0 t  7 6 3 .  
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i n g  a n d  choosing among federal a n d  s tate p reclus ion rules . t;o 
M o reover, a t  some p o i n t  the power of the federal  courts final ly  
"to decide the force o f fed eral adj u dication s " 6 1  i s  a fed eral const i ­
t ut ional  ques t i o n .  Rather than engaging i n  t h e  d ifficu l t  business  
o f  determ i n i n g  what that  point  i s ,  we should read t h e  Rules  of 
Deci s ion Act not  to apply .  
The s tory i s  artfully told, but i t  does not persuade .  As an his torical 
account ,  it assigns to the S upreme Court in the years prior to 1 93 8  a 
view of preclusion law i t  did not  hold ,  and thus i t  sees in that  year a 
great divide that did not  exi s t .  As a doctrinal account  and prescrip­
tion ,  the story fails to integrate the approach suggested for preclu­
sion with the approach taken by the Court  to o ther problems 
involving the relationship be tween federal and state law,  essentially 
wishing away a s ta tute and a body of doctrine by  resort to dubious 
cons titutional premises .  
I t  may be, o f  course,  that  Professor D egnan ' s  conclusion-fed­
eral preclusion law governs the effects of all federal judgments-is a 
good one .  Informed j udgment  on that quest ion requires , I b elieve, 
engaging broader themes , agains t  an historical background m ore 
fai thful ly  rendered . 
A .  The His tory 
We have seen that in  DujJasseur, G:.! the S upreme Court ,  without  
referring to the full  fai th and credit  s tatute ,  pos i ted an  obligation in 
the state court s  not  to disregard federal j udicial pro ceedings . Hav­
ing es tablished the basic obligat ion,  the Court  considered the 
preclusive effects of the federal j udgment before i t ,  ·which was en­
tered by a federal court in Louisiana si t t ing in  al ienage diversi ty j u ­
risdict ion .  Again \vi thout reference t o  the statute ,  t h e  Court 
reasoned:  
The only effect that  c a n  be j u s tl y  claimed fo r the j udgment  i n  
t h e  C i rcui t Court of the U n i t e d  S tates ,  i s  s u c h  a s  w o u l d  b e l o n g  t o  
j u d gments o f  the S tate courts rendered under s i m i lar c ircu m ­
s tance s .  Dupa s s eur & C o .  were ci t izens o f  Fra n c e .  and b rou g h t  
the s u i t  in the  Circuit  Court o f  the U n i ted States  as such c i t i z e n s ;  
and,  conscquentlv,  t h a t  court,  deriv ing its  j u ri s d ic t i o n  s o l e l y  from 
60 SN id .  ;t t 768.  Prof{s;or Deg·na n ' s  argument is  s urpri s ing.  gi\·en that he recog­
nizes  the dubiet\  of apph· i ng the s ta tute  to fed eral  j udgmen t s .  See 1d. at 748-49.  \lore­
OYer, the <J rgul1 ! c n t  appare n t l Y  :.� s s u n tes that the sta t u te req u i res a monoli thic  n.:ginH.: of 
s tate  l aw as to s t a t e  j u d gm e n t s .  One of the maj o r  purposes of  th is  .-\rt i c l e  i s  to d e m o n ­
s trate t h a t  that  a s s u m p t i o n  is  erro neous .  Ser 1 11jm t e x t  accompanying notes 3 1 8-46 I .  
Other cons ide rat i o n s  m a\' . o f  course.  sugges t the wisdom o f  a s i n gl e s o u rc e  or preclu­
sion la1,· . Sr:c infm t ext  accomparw i n g  notes 202,  2 -t S--!9.  
r ;  I Degnan, supm note 3 .  a t  7 7 0  n . l 3 8 .  
ii:.! 88 U S . ( 2 1 Wal l )  1 30 ( 1 8 7 5 ) .  
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the cit izenship of the part ies ,  was in the exercise of j urisdict ion to 
adminis ter the laws of the S tate,  and i t s  proceedings were had in 
accordance with the forms and course of proceeding i n  the S tate 
court s .  It  i s  apparent,  therefore, that  no h i gher sanct i ty or  effect 
can be claimed for the j ud gment . . .  rendered in s u ch a case 
under such circumstances than i s  due to the j u d gments of  the 
S tate courts i n  a l ike case and u nder similar circums tances . I f  by 
the laws of the S tate a j udgment l ike that  rendered by the C ircuit  
Court would have had a binding effect  as agains t  Rochereau, if it 
had been rendered in a S tate court ,  then i t  should have the same 
effect ,  being rendered by the Circui t  Court.  If such effect i s  n o t  
conceded to i t ,  b u t  i s  refu s e d ,  t h e n  due valid i ty and effect a r e  n o t  
given to i t ,  and a c a s e  i s  made for the interposi t ion of  t h e  p ower of  
reversal conferred upon this  court .  63 
749 
Professor Degnan quotes parts of this  passage as support  for his  
hypothesis that ,  prior to 1 93 8 ,  the preclusive effects of federal j udg­
ments were governed by state law, because federal courts in actions 
at  law were required by the Conformity Act to apply,  roughly, state 
procedural law .6·1 Fairly read,  the passage does not support the hy­
pothesis ,  which in any event is  too broadly formulated . 
According to the Court in Dupasseur, the preclusive effects of the 
federal j udgment involved in that case had to be the same as those 
of a s tate court j udgment " rendered under s imilar circumstances , "  
because the rendering federal court,  " deriving i ts j urisdict ion solely 
from the cit izenship of the parties ,  vvas in the exercise of j urisdiction 
to administer the laws of the S tate ,  and its proceedings were had in 
accordance with the forms and course of proceeding in the S tate 
courts . "  Important to the conclus ion were the ground o f  federa l 
j urisdiction (alienage diversi ty) , the subs tantive law applied ( s ta te) , 
and the procedural law applied ( s tate) . ;\lorcover, if  the order of 
precedence established in the sen tence leaves any doubt as to which 
federal source of s tate law was uppermost  in the Jus tices ' minds, the 
headnote ,  wri tten by the author of the Coun's opinion , provides ad­
ditional  basis for inferrimt that it w a s  nOL the Conform i ty Act . t ''' 
v . 
(i :> !d. at 1 3 5 .  St·e sujno n o : e  "J3 .  
b·l See Degnan,  supra note 3, a t  7 ?'> ll ;  stt ol.•. (, td.  a t  7 4 5 - -t G .  In both p l a ces . rhc quula-
t ions omit  the language ,  . .  ,,·as i n  the exerc i se  o f juri .,d ic '  ion  t o  admin is ter the bw:; oC the 
State ."  Apparen t lv ,  the omiss ions foo led r hc a u ; hur of '  the !'\ore ,  mpm note 2 9  . .  )>r 1d. at 
1 5 1 8 .  
ti!'> The heaci notes  t o  Dup11s.i!'il!' ''-ere \\Ti t tcn b ;  J usl lce il!·adlcy.  author o f  th e C o u rt 's  
opinion.  Headnote 3 proncies i n  rc le, ant  pan:  " Ir j urisd ic t ion  o r  the  case was acquired 
onlv lw re�1s on of t he c i t i zenship o f  the panics .  and the swte  ]a,,.  a l on e  was a d m i n i s tere d .  
t hen o ; J l ;c such  Y;J l id i t \· and e f l 'ect em be c l ;u m cd fo r the J U d gment as w o u l d  be clue ; o  
the judgmem of the S tale Courts u n der l i ke cirn:mstanccs .  · · Oupasscur ' .  Rochcrc:.lu .  
2 2  L.  E d .  588 ( 1 8 7 �1 ) .  SrP rd5n Deposi t  Bank '. . Fr:mkfn n .  I �) ]  l' . S .  4 �l9 , 5 1 6  1 1 903)  (case:-; 
i n  which ' · r:o h i gher s a n c t i l >  o r  eA.ect  can be )!,ivcn t(l a judgmen�  o f  t h e· Circu i t  C : o u rt  
. t h a n  to  s t a te judgment s  . . [ <J r c  ct s c s  i n  ,,·h irh i the  co urt cleri'  :_· s Ii. S  j u r i s d i cl H) n  
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The Court ' s  opinion in Dupasseur, careful ly  crafted to address 
only the preclusive effects of a judgment of a federal court s i t ting  in 
alienage diversity, thus supports  nei ther an attempt to ass imilate 
preclusion l aw to p rocedure, nor the notion that state law p rovided 
the measure of preclusive effects  for all federal j u dgments ,  prior to 
1 93 8 .  It  is  true that in  the Crescent Cz!)' L ive Stock case66 the C ourt  
appeared to extend the rule s tated in  Dupasseur to  cover the preclu­
s ive effects of a federal j udgment on a matter of federal lav,: in the 
courts of the s tate in vihich it  sat .b7  The case i s ,  however, ambigu­
ous . 68 O ther cases in  which the Court invoked the broad formula­
tion involved j udgments of federal courts sitt ing in diversity ,  albeit  
not  a lways within the same s tate . 69 
On at least  some occasions vvhen the Court was unambiguously 
called to decide whether the preclusive effects o f  a federal j udgment 
aciju dicating matters of federal l :.:nv are delimited by the law applied 
in the courts of the s tate vvhere the federal court i s  held,  the C ourt  
applied an independent federal rule. Thus ,  in  determining the ef­
fect  of a sale of propertv under the order of a dis trict court exercis­
mg bankruptcy jurisdiction ,  the Court held:  
\Vithout examinmg i nt o  Lhe  decis ions of the S tale courts o n  
t h a t  s ubj ect. i t  is sufhc ient  to sav that  i n  construing the effe c t  o f  
fi·o m  t h e  c i t i zenship () 1 t h e  parties  and i n  t h e  cxcn· i s c  of  t h e  j u r i ·; <l ic t i o n  t o  adminis ter 
t h e  laws o f  the S t;He 11 hcre the proceedings arc had" ' ) _  Bigclo11 v .  Old D o m i n i D n  Copper 
Mining & S m e l t i n g  C < l ,  22:'> l' . S ! 1 1 . l 2CJ -30 ( I () i 2) ("The C' n i t c d  St ,l t cs COL!rl 1vas in 
t h e  exercise of j ur i s d i c t i ( ) n  l O  : td m 1 11 i •; t c r  [ s t a t e  l a l\· 1 .  s m ce i ts  jurisd tcuon depended 
sole lv  upon di1-ersity oi c i t i zensh i p  I t s  j udgment i:; . . e nt i t led in the courts of a nother 
S t a te to the same fai th  and .: rcrl i t  1•. h i c h  ">I Ould : l < .Ltch ' ' a j udgment of [ the rendering 
s t a t e ]  . . ) ;  1 8  W E I C HT. M rLLFE .'\: CooPE R .  y:,jno  !iOLc 5. � 4'-!68.  :; � 6:-lS ( "The S upreme 
Court afftrmed [ the lOI\t-r cont t ' >; J ' ; cl g rn c n l  i n  . ru l ing  t h J t  the dlcct  o f  the 
federal juclgmcni !llLt: i t  he f l lGt s u ;·cd �J\ .> I ell '-' l;; -_1·. i n ;; S '. :l lCnH:' n l  l i 1 a t  looks hoth lO the 
fac t that stale s ubstant i \-c  l a's cor: � d > ! lcd  th.c �h L ion : tnd t o  ; hr� Llct  that  under Lhe (�on­
formi ty Act procedur'-' i ! l  t h e  icckLd n H < rl  lud htT i l  dr<t\\"\ 1  ! rum slJ LC' pr;• ct icc. . " )  
(foo tnote onl l tt ed } ; :·ll!j;r;i n o � c  S 7 .  F r J J ·  Ltng-u J g·c sug-gest ing t h�!t the (�ourt associated t he 
concept or · · �trl.n.ini .s u�· n n g " "  :-lf �"tl-'-' L i 1-l. -.,\- i t h the  R u les  o f  DcC l\ tUn .-\ c t ,  see () wings \· . Hul l ,  
34 U . S .  ( 9  P e L )  h0 7 .  (i'.!:i r i :-; ' ' :"• l i S H '- . .  ] . ;  
6 G  Crescent  (�i tY  i .iYc _,; l oc k  Cu \ B u ( c h c� ·< t � n i o n  S L-tugl H cr-}--! {JU:O:e (� o . ,  1 � 0 l: . s _  
1 4 1  ( 1 88 7 ) .  
G 7  St:r id. �tt 1 --i- ()--+ 7 :  Dcgr L t l '! .  t i i. '� ! c  �) . : li.  7-!- 7 -48 ( \\-1H __ ' !'C' .  l -:O\\"C\· cr, ! h e re arc 
errors in describ1ng s c q l l e n ._- t ·  , _ _  · \  c n t:-; dnd (:uLl l ' l  - �  o p i n ic n L  For the n tH u n: of t h e  
federal j udgn1cnt  i rn· o h: e d . :' c c  (j,.-_., rrn/ / . ' l 'l' Sto:-!:. l �0 L'  .S .  ; l l  l :)  7 .  
GH Crt.�rP.' ! I Ci!Y f. i ; ': ,\/1 •0�-- � �� () r_ · _ �) .  at l --l i )--� 7 zcitfl l,-/ .  ;_t t 1 5 1 .  
6D _\'er. e. g . . Higcln,,· \ · .  (i l d  U : > l : ! l l "i l \ <1 ( : ( >pper \ l i n i n g·  8.,: S rn e h i n g  C:o . . :?�5 l . S .  I !  1 
( 1 9 1 �2 )  ( d i H�::TciH �: l �H_t_' J . l-Lt n ; · -. _-� ( _ 1.: ''-.:H · t H� tnk \· _ l:�. rn u nt .  I 7 t )  t : . s .  t-)�} 0 ( 1 900 ) ( ddl'crc n t  
s late) ; Iv1 e t c a l f  \ ' .  \\' �H e rt o v: n .  l :) J  l · . s  ;: � ·; l !_ i :;�1J--t ) (.':!�nne �; LH c ) . In .�-;toli ;_ Cr_; fflie!J . t h e  
Court o b stT\·ccl th� : !  t 1  j ndcr ! i h c: i 'u l i  i:j_ i :_ : l �: ;: ! d  (' l 'c d l r  �LH U f ;__-' ] t h e  _ judgrncr: t �  Ztn d. de­
crees of th e fcJ.crt-d c c : u n :--- H1  ;; _c.: !_ c l. U_· ;J rc d c c L - i r:..: d \. .: )  h�n-{_: t h (.· s �unc d i g n i t y  i 1� d ! r...' c o u n s  
of t h a t  s tate �1 s thn-..:c o f '  i f ." o '. \- ! 1  u _l t : � · L;,:. l n  : 1  1 d-:. �. ·  C:� :" c  � �nd u n der si �n i i a r  �_· i n_ u : n1 s t:. u 1 c e >: . " 
30�1 t: . s .  l G:�} · j 'j (/ ( 1 � J 3 X )  ( J 'un I H) i ('  ·: ; n l i � U·ci ; ( d rcL � nl ) .  l 'h c  c :o u n  ; [ 1  _ ..."J,io// \\T!'J t  o n  t o  
dist inguish fcder-�t l . ! u d g ! 1 ; c i l t �; 
panya1g: n o ! �_-- : �  �) l - :;-+ 
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this sale under the order of the Dis trict Court of the United S ta t e s ,  
i t  must  be decided by t h o s e  general principles w h i c h  govern b ank­
ruptcy proceedings under that s tatute ,  rather than the code of  the 
S tate in regard to voluntary sales of mortgaged property between 
individuals . 7 0  
75 1 
In that case,  the Court had p reviously observed that  the result  o f  t h e  
state court 's  decree w a s  " a t  variance w i th the policy of a s tatute 
whose main purpose was to  s ecure an equal dis tribut ion of an insol­
ven t  debtor 's  p roperty among al l  his  creditors . " 7 1 
The question was more s tarklv put ,  and received ful l  dress at­
tention,  i n  Deposit Bank u. Fran,lifort . n The Court fou n d  that t h e  rule 
stated in Dupasseur w a s  intentionally l i m i te d  to cases " wh erein the 
court derives i t s  ju ris diction fro m  the ci t izenship of t h e  p arties  and 
in the exercis e  of the jurisdict ion to a d m inis t er the laws of the State 
where the proceedings are had.  " i �o Having d i s tinguished Crescent 
City Live Stork, albeit  unpersuasively,i-! the C ourt art iculated a view 
of federal j ud gments in fed eral quest ion cases , and o f  preclusion 
law, that  s imply does not fi t  i n  Professor Degnan ' s  s tory: 
But i t  is equa i !v  well  s e t tled that a right clairned under t he 
Federa l Cons ti tutio n .  fm a l l y  ac1j udica ted i n  t he Federal couns , can 
never be taken awav or impaired by s tate decisions . The same 
rea�:cning 'shich permits  to the S ( a tes the righ t of final adj u d i ca­
t ion upon purely s tate q u est ions  requ ires n o  less  respect for the 
final decis ions of the Federal cuuns of ques tions of national  au­
thori tv and jurisd ic t ion . �- ., 
Th e Court's  emphas is  on the s o u rce of the subs tan tive law ap­
plied by the rendering cou n- s tate law in Dupossew and federal  law 
in Deposit Bcm !{--is surpris ing onl y to those who have been habitu­
ated to t h inking about precl us ion la\v as procedure and to thinking 
abou t procedure disembodied from rights u n der t h e  ::; ubs :antive 
law . In the n ineteen th ccm urv ar; d bevond,  proced ure '.v as imbued 
with nCJt ion'.-. of t l·l {·· i rn " ' e> r � ·:p ·· r· ··· n f  ' '' C Ll r i ' l 'Y 'P ' ·-1 " " c- ' ,.. '. tl· r · o s· clb st �1n ->... 1 _, 1 -' _. lc -.. 1 ..._ ,_ v ..__ . ..___ _ '- (::} L £ ! '-.1. tJ t ...J l ..._ ...__ . l b  , "---"-
7 0  
7 1  
Factor" ' 8..: - l "cl d crs ' I n s .  C> } .  \- . \ f u rp ln · .  1 1 1  L . S .  '/ 3 :-3 ,  7--L) ( 1 8 .�-n . 
!d. a! 742 
7 ' 1 1 9 !  t .S  ; ; [  ) ] : ; 
7---I- St!' itl. · .r h c  Li_n gu���-c ['; 1 , t n  (.'i.-'V.! ' l!/ f. , -,_ .!' .'S!nr/; t p : o t c d  t he:·:: \\-�1>' l lTc ie,·ant  to 
r.hc proh l c� n  b ct�. H-c t h t· C o u ; · !  1 n  /]l"t n /,· . 
7 :1 
lJ . S .  273 . � �f(L�) l { I  �)O t } )  ( i �  ...:dcr , \ l  cn• : r ': d ecree t o  bt· g !\ ·cn " t h e  f 'urcc �H 1 d  ctfc c t  tu \\'h ich 
i t  is  e n t i t l ed u n d e-r  t he p r i ; H · l p l ·  .: �:. o f  ; ;:d;,ro io a \  :.:.ct t lcd L h l '-'  c:: , u rt .  cspcci�d ly  i n  \'i c\\· 
of the Ca.ct t ha t  t he c o n t rO\"c• r- -.; ;,  l L \"() t '; ::_:d ngh l s  prut::· (· � cd Ln· t h e· c:o n s t i tu-
t io n .  _ . . ) _  1 g  \\' R r c i l · l· . .\ i J L ! _ E F  . .  \.: C�uoPl·_ i;: ,  _., ! i /J i ·o l lO l C' _o.:, __ � --t -- H JS , a t  f) �l ( )---;) 7 .  B u t  f)t'/Jo.�-1/ 
Bank hardly " rn ; tdc  c:-� p l i c i t  . .  t i t c  n d c  " LILH fCd.t·r::d ru l e�; � n c �1 :' u rc �it ! c·ast  t n u :-: t re:-� Judi -
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tive rights . 7(' Moreover, the "very foundation" of p reclusion law , 
"i ts  most  important principle ,"  was the protection o f  the " rights  
. . .  es tablished by . . .  judgments . " 7 7  This idea  was s o  s trong that  
the Supreme Court permitted a successfu l  defendant  i n  a patent in­
fringement suit  to enjoin the plain tiff from b ringing subsequent 
sui ts , based on the same paten t ,  against  those who sold the product 
manufactured by the defendant in the firs t  sui t . 78 As  expressed by 
the Court in a more conventional context :  
This doctrine of  res JUdicata i s  n o t  a mere matter of  practice or  
p rocedure inherited from a more technical  t ime than o u rs . I t  i s  a 
rule of fundamental and substantial  j u s tice ,  "of p u b l i c  pol icy  and 
of pri\·ate peace , "  which should b e  cordial ly  regarded and en­
forced by the courts to the end that rights once establ ished by the 
final  judgment of a court of competen t j urisdictio n  s h a l l  be recog­
nized by those who are bound by i t  in  every way, ·wh erever the 
j udgment i s  enti t led to respect . . . .  7�1 
I n  sum , no monolithic rule regarding the preclusive effects of 
federal judgments exis ted prior to 1 93 8 ,  and thus that  year marked 
no great divide .  The cases that p rescribed a federal obl igation o f  
respect for fed eral j u d gments and defined whether federal o r  s ta te 
law governed their preclus ive effects mav pbusiblv b e  read as aooly-�.. I I � 1 
ing federal common law , binding throughout the land by virtue of  
the  supremacy clause .  Even i f  the cases are not s o  v iewed , there can 
be no doubt  that. long before Erie and the Federal Rules , the 
Su preme Court had held that  federal preclusion law governs at  leas t  
some ques t ions  of the effects to be accorded federal judgments o n  
mat ters o f  federal substantive law . During t h e  s a m e  period ,  the 
Court req u i red that the preclus ive effects of federal a i ienage and 
divers ity j u d g m e n t  on matters of  s tale substantive law fo l low s tate 
law. The Court ' s  a rti culated con cern in both contexts was to pro­
tect rights conferred b-v· the substan tive l a w .  
An assertion that a propos ed change in  the  law is evolutionary, 
not revolutionarY, is  a standard pall iat ive of the law reformer.:-l0 The 
fact that i t  is  not so i s  insufficient  warrant for the status quo .  
vVhatewr t h e  history with respect to t h e  preclusive effects of feder-al 
7 f i  Srr· S .  S ubr in .  T h e  F i e l d  C o d e  � m d  Federal  R u l e s  o r  Civ i l  Procedure:  The Fa ma:-;1· 
a n d  Rcal i t 1  of Proceclur:J! Cont inuity .'i :? ( u n p u b l i s h ed manuscr i p t )  ( " 'Th e majo' .�u:li of 
the F i e l d  Code •,,·J s  t o  faci l ! l ;t t c  the '"· i ! "t .  c c o n o m i czd . zmd predic t a b le cnf<!rccm c n t  < >f  
discrete ,  careCul ly  art icuLu cd righ t �  . . .  ) .  
7 7 Deposi! Bank. ! 9 1  l- . S . a t :l�O.  
7 :-l  Sa !\.csslcr ' . E ldred . 2 0 6  L S .  ��:) ( I  �)0 7 )  Th e A>ss!n Coun 11 :JS not concerned 
,,· i t h  t h e  prccl t t s ivc effect o f" t h c j t t d g-m t·n t . b u <  r a t h e r  ,,· i t h  the r ig-hts  c s t a h l i shcc! t ; ,  i t .  St'!' 
1ri .  a t  2S8-f.lJ 
7 ' 1 Han Steel  C o .  \ .  R a i l road S u p p h  Co . . 2-t-1 l.' . S .  2� ) -1 . 2 J<J ( El l  7 ) .  
�10 See Hazard . Nt<'l .>ill lii!, iht Snoild Rest :.i l c n t ent  nfjudgniC ll h :  !ssur h rdu., ion our/ j-(,._ 
iaiet! hnhlrm.l. ( j () C o ;c; u L l . . R EI . :)6 1 . :)Sf) ( i �l8 i L 
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judgmen�s, _ the law of the future should fit within the context of 
which tt ts mescapably a part. In this case, the context is federal 
common l aw. 
B .  Preclusion Law as Federal Common La•v 
1 .  Federal Com m o n  Law and the R u les of Decision Act 
In espousing a general rule of federal preclusion law for federal 
judgments, P1�ofessor Degnan suggeste_
d t�at th� grant of )udic_ial 
povver to decide cases and controversies m article III 8 1 ' ' tmphes 
some binding effect" and that " it seems inappropriate that some 
other sovereignty-the states-should have ultimate authority to de­
termine what binding effect the j udgment has and on whom. "82 H e  
argued that " i t  i s  i n  the nature of the judicial power to determine its 
own boundaries" but conceded that there is a " possible limitation of 
federal courts' power to give force to their own adjudications . . . if 
the Congress ha[s] acted affirmatively and unequivocally to reduce 
it. "t-n Professor Degnan found no need to face the issue because, in 
his view, C o n gress had not made the attempt. 
To treat the effect of diversi tv j u dgments as a mat t er amena­
ble to [common l aw ]  rulcmaking by the federal courts i s  not i n ­
consistent w i t h  t h e  command of the Ruies of  Decis ion A c t  that  t h e  
" laws of the several s tates . . .  be regarded as rules of  decis ion . " 
. . .  I h  the terms of the Act ,  s tate rules of decision are applicabl e  
only where there i s  no cons ti tutional or s ta t u tory requirement to 
the contran , and on l y "in cases where they a p p l y . "  That the 
power w decide the force of  federal adjudications i s ,  ln extremi:,, a 
defining element of a rt i c l e  I I I  j u d icial  power gives reason to find 
that cYcn in iess extreme i n s tances the laws of the severa l  s ta tes 
do n o t  ' ' ;1pph ' . \Vithin rhc terms of the Rules of Decision Act 
i tsclf.S ' 
Professor Degnan's argument is curious. Article III  may be the 
ultimate source of the obligaL ion to respect federal judgments.K'  If 
so, article III  rn av be thought to require a limi ted number of federal 
preclusion rules to protect the basic  norm of respect. �"H; But th e no-
------------ -------<--------- -- ---
8 i l' . S .  CoNST.  a n .  I l l .  
H �  [)egnan. suj;ro n o t e  :3 . a t  7 68-G�J .  �ei ther  t.radi t ionai  federal connn o n  l �1. w analys is  
nor an:l lysis  under the Rules o i  Deci :; i (Jn .-\u pres e n t s  the polar choices posi ted bv Pro·· 
fes s or D C' g-tJ <m .  Both leJH' " u ! t imatc  a u t h u r i t ,  . .  in fed eral hands where, as here,  !ccleral 
interes ts  3re !rnpiic::i tcd .  S{'t1 ;,�fi·a tt::-�l �1 c t nn1p�n l y i n g  n o t e s  1 05-29.  
8:> Degnan . . wjmt tw ! c  3 .  a t  /b�l - 7 0 .  
K -t  1!! J l  770 n . l :\S .  
K :�l S?f' suina te�t acco1npanying n o i es 29-JO.  
s r;  Sfr' r nji·o t e x :  <>t c o nlp:tn:; ing n o t es 1 -1 0--l i .  En:n �·· n  Pmfessor Dcg·n;i n · s  ·; ic 1' o f  
t h e  n·! e\·ancc of <tri idc l l l .  the argument  dr)c;; not g e t  o n e  \ tTl. far .  SrP 1 8  \\ " ;� ! C l !T . 
\ l tU.ER  ,� C o o r n : . ·' "fi i ll n o l c  :'> , s -l -HiG .  d l  i i:!O ( ' "The min imum ITci u i rcmcms rnand:,_ i cd 
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tion that i t  is  also a grant  of  p ower t o  the federal courts ini tially and 
finally to determine a l l  matters relat ing to the preclusive effects of  
their j udgments is  wishful thinking.  The inheren t  p owers o f  federal 
courts , in the sense of powers that are insulated fro m  congressional  
override ,  are l imited to those " necessarv to the exercise of al l  
others ."8 7  Tested by that demanding s tandard, an  assert ion of  in­
heren t p ower with respect  to most preclusion rules s imply comes 
too late in  the day . A s  to divers i ty j udgments ,  the federal courts 
managed tolerably wel l  under the regime of Dupasseur v. Rochereau 88 
for more than one hundred years . The switch from the C onformity 
Act89 to the Federal Rules ,  whatever i t s  significance for sub-consti­
tut ional law, cannot transmogrify a p ower that was not regarded as 
inherent in  the sense of being " shielded from direct democratic con­
trols "90 into one that i s  so  regarded . If anicle III  j udicial power 
does not  include the p ower,  as against  a contrary l egis lative direc­
tion ,  to determine the rules of evidence in federa l  court,9 1 it re­
quires m ore than an "abs tract" argument to dist inguish rules o f  
preclusion .9� 
hy the case or contrO\ ersY ! i m i tat ion . . do not  begin t o  exh<�us r the ful l  bo(h of prc-
c\ ! �:; i o n  rules . ' " ) .  
W' U nited S ta r es v .  Hudson & Goo dwin,  ! l U . S .  ( 7  Cranch) 32 ,  34 ( 1 8  J 2 ) .  Sre 
:Viic; ;aelson \" . t: n1 tcd States,  2 66 (.; . S .  4 2 .  f i5-67 ( 1 9'?4 ) ;  Eash v. R iggins Trucki ng I n c . ,  
7 :0J J F . '? d  557 ,  560-64 ( 3d  C i r .  1 98 5 ) ;  B t 1 rhank.  Sm/( t1ons 1 11 the  PmfJD 'i'!l .·/mellllntents to the  
F"pt/rm/ f?ules o( Ci,·i! Procedure: Some Q11estions . J bnu/ Pmnr. l l  HoFSTRA L. REv.  997, 1 004-
(';(1 ( 1 983)  [ herema ft er cited as Sa net/om ] ;  Bttrb a n k .  Ti:P Ru/,"s L!!r.h!ing .--let of 1 ?  J .f. 1 30 U .  
P .-. .  L REv.  1 0  J :'i , 1 1  I 5 t J . 4 5 -"> ( I  9 8 :2 )  [hereinafter c i ted zt \  l?u!P.I Enuhling .·lct J .  
He'. Ser supm text accompanving notes 3 ! ,  .'! �1- 5-L ()2 .G5.  
s : 1  .\c t  oC Junc l .  l :-\'7 2 .  ch .  255,  § 5.  1 7  S t el l .  1 f) C) , l �) 7 .  
�H)  R o a d\\·ay Express .  I n c .  \ ' .  Piper� .:i4 7 lJ .S.  7 :J2. 7b-l- ( l 9R0) . 
� � -1 Sef \/ance Y. ·Terrazas.  444 Ll . S .  � 5 2 .  ��6�--G6 ( 1 980) ;  lisery ,. _ -rurnt.'·r Elkhorn 
.\ i i n i n g  Co . .  428 U . S .  I . �) I ( i  976) ( cl ictt; m ) ;  Burbank.  h't+s Dwbiwg .·l et . S.' ·/Jm nutc 8 7 .  at 
l l l 6 n . ±5.7 .  
���� l)egnan . supra note 3 .  a r. 7 6 8 .  ()bser\'l' l h �·- t  c:ungrcss 's  at_�kno\vlcdged cont rol 
over :; upervison coun rulemaking bY the Supreme Coun . sn . •' ._[', . Sib bach \ · .  W i l son & 
c , . ,  3 ! 2  U . S .  l ,  9- i O  ( 1 94 1 ) .  is n o t  dispos l l i Y C .  s�F Burbank.  Rule.\ Enablillg .·!rt . .\lljil rt 
n n t z.· R 7 ,  ar. 1 1 83  n . i.�R . . -\ d i s r in c t ion s h o u l d  a b u  ht· d ra�.·.-n bct\\'Cen t h e  po\·;cr o f � 
feclt ..·ca l court to fashion l-ul c s  in t.he conLcx i o f �� c;J s c  { l r  controver:'y <t.nd i t :;.; po.,vcr t.o 
g<>';'::rn pracl ice and procc:-dure p rospcctin:h' throu::;h !ocal  cou n rules.  Congress has 
reg•l lated local  ndemaki n g  b 1  the federal  c o m Lo; �: ince l 7 8�i , and ;he s ta t utes h �n c  a ! ,,· � t \  s 
rcq;. : ired consistenc\ 11· ith acts of Congres s .  SN '.!:-\ L · . s . C.  � :.'07 1 ( l DW2 ) :  Burb:t n k ,  Saw­
!;rJn> . s!if'm note 8 7 ,  �a l 004-05 n . 30.  
lf,  a s  Professor I)cgnan n1ai n t �1in s .  prec l u s i o n  1 s  � l  !.)pccit:�  o r  rel lex o f  proced u re .  
h<)\\' d o c s  o ne square \\" l lh  h i s  (� i 1 (1 lysis � h e  c :ourt · � � �cquicscencc.  Cron1 L h c  begirn� t n g· o f  
the Republ ic .  in cnngre�si,Jnai  regulal inn o f  : h e  proced u re o f  t ht.� federal cour� .-.; i n  �H·­
! i n r ; :;, (! t lJ \\. t h rough direct ion .�� l O  l'o l lo\'1. s t.�i. t e  L·t ;  ... -� S:·,, Burba n k .  /l u /Ps /::.'n ohling .-/(/ . . ' d tjJu; 
J ! O l. C  67 .  Jt 1 0'3 li--! O .  Cj. Tlioma:,;  \ . . -\rn ,  l O ll S .  C : .  · � 1 )/.i .  ·1 7 !  i i D85)  ( " E\ Cll :1 s e n s i b le 
�1nd cfhrient  u � :::- of the su p crYisnr�: pn,,·er. ho ... \· c ·. - c: r ,  i:-: l l l ·. - ;· d i d  ; i ' i t  con H ict5  \': i : h  con s t i tu­
t l cn-: ; : 1  o r  statut ory p ro\· i s io r ! s . " ) .  CJ nly rarely I Ll ')  ;_ he c: c /Uf l  bcdked �l. l those direc t i o n s .  
Si't'. l".g . \Judd \· .  B u rr011 s .  9 1  L' . S .  4 ::? 6  ( ! S / 5 ) ;  Hc;Ton -.· .  S m • t hnn l';� c .  C •.!.. � S :i l' . S .  ( ) I 
i. l :J :\ 1 ) .  '-iced!ess t o  >i il\ . connn c n t a t o n  S \ IH Vt i l i c t i c  I ( )  Frnkssor nc:,;-nzm \  (( l il c lu� ion 
n1 �.d..:.c tht' lHust of t h o :-:t· r;lrc occasion.'-' .  a t lc 1np1 i n g- \ c) gt· nc;·a l i z c  frc·nl h o l cl i n g· .'.; d L :t ! .  ; t �  i n  
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Deprived of i t s  cons t i tutional prop ,  Professor Degnan 's  argu­
ment for ignoring the Rules of Decision Act93 also collapses . Yet ,  
he has not  been alone among commentators in  wishing the Act away 
in the context of federal common law. Moreover, the S upreme 
Court itself has been less  than clear in articulat ing the relevance of 
the Act to inquil"ies regarding the relationship between federal and 
state law, no matter what the context .  
One answer to Professor Degnan' s  treatment of the Rules of 
Decision Act,  a t  least  in diversi ty  cases ,  is that  the Court appears to 
have had that  s tatute in mind when i t  t ied the preclusive effects o f  
federal al ienage a n d  diversi ty j udgments to state law . ')-! Moreover, 
the language of the Court in Dupa.sseur v. Rochereau was not that o f  
freedom t o  choose t h e  governing law.95 But  t h a t  is  not  a sufficient 
answer, if  only because the Court has recently evinced a will ingness  
to  dispense wi th  precedent rooted in the Act ,  albeit  in nondiversi ty 
cases .% If, as I contend,  the Act  is  pertinent ,  i t  is  necessary to rec­
oncile iVi th i ts  requirements cases ,  b o th pre- and post- 1 93 8 ,  in 
,,,hich the Court has held that federal preclusion Ja,v governs the 
effect:; of a federal judgment .  The task i s  not ,  I think, a s  difficul t  as 
has been assumed, al though taking the Rules of Decision Act  s eri­
ously has implications for federal common law. The arguments re­
quire a brief survey of wel l -p lowed terrain . 
The CoL•r t ' s  decision in Erie Railroad u. Tompkins �17 involved a n  
interpretat ion of the Rules of Decis ion Act,  one that i t  sa id was c o n -
Henan .  :1re carc i'ul h· l i m i : ed to " the ess ent i : l i  character o r  fun c t i o n  o f  a kderal c o u rt  . . .  
283 U .S. a t  9- L Srt'. P.g . •  Hazard, Reflc·tliuns 011 lhr Sub.\I!IIICC of Finality, 7 0  C O R ';r::u .  L R n·.  
64 2 ,  G+! n . l 4  ( 1 98 5 ) .  But SI'C Bt!l·bank . . ljiPI1l'l)rds: .-! Responsr· lo Pmj[•ssor 1-!(Ut .•rl a n d  r: 
Com menl 011 � fa rrcse. 70 COR:\ELL L R E\·. ();", 9 .  G60-G l & n n . 6  & 1 8  ( l CIH S j :  .\ 1/fn o tex t 
accon1 panying no tes s �) - 8 7  . 
..-\ruck I I I  is n o t .  ho\\c1·cr .  i rreJeyzu l l . '.Ye haH· noted t h e  role i t  rn;l:-· p ia:- in impn:; ­
ing a b;1s ic  obl iga t i on w respect fed eral  .J ud icial  proceed i n gs .  ! n  addi t ion .  t o  t h e  exrent  
t h a t  preclus ion rules c a n  be a s s i m i l ated ro  ru les  gcn-c;- n i n g  the conduct  nf  l i t ig;; t i o n .  1.hc 
federal court s ha1 ·e the p011Tr to fas h io n  them i n  the a bs t:nce o f  congress ional  <H r thoriza­
ti on . See. r g .  £\ prnle Peters o n .  2 ') 3  l' . S .  ;100 .  3 1 2 - 1 4  ( 1 02 0 ) :  Eash \ .  l{ :gg·in:i Tru d. i n g  
I n c . ,  7 5 7  F.2d !-! 5 7
. 
563- ti-! ( :l ei C ir .  I �Jf\.5 ) :  Bu rba n k . Sane/ron.<. supm n c . l e  8 7 .  ; ; t  1 00-t-Oi ) :  
Merri l l .  The Cuiii !IIU!! l.mc Pml'f'l:< oj Ft>rlno/ C:o;u ts. ')2  F C H ! .  L RE\ l .  2 4  ( ; l )S :1 ) .  Cf 
Thomas I .  _.}, rn ,  I Oti S .  C t .  -l GG. -1 70 ( 1 9FIS) ( ' ' l t  cannot be dou bted th�t l  the  Cf>\ ! r t�  o r  
a p p c;:!l s  ha 1 e  supervison· p0 11·ers t h a t  perm i t .  a t  r h c: l e a s t .  the prnmul gat \c•n of p roce­
d ural mles  gove.-ri i n g  the management o f  l i t i g a t i o n . " ) .  A.n d  i f t h; ; t  j ,  s o .  o n e  need I>< l '. be 
concerned.  a t  lea-; r  a b s t ra c t h· .  about the separa t i o n  o f  powers i m p l i c ;: :. i r: n s  u f  judge­
made ru les  o r  preclu s i o n .  B u t  the analog·:- i o;  fbi\Cd .  :m e! i f  Co ngress h ;J :; s p oken 011  L h c  
subj e c t .  t h e  :;rgu m �:.-n t  gets  u s  n o1,· hcre.  
'):3 Sep s•I/Jlit ! ex t  :rccomp:m1 1 n g  n o t e  S-i . 
� ) --1- Stf' .i' ! tjna note {):1 Jnd �1 ccorn p�n1 y i n g  lC\: 1 .  
9'1 /)uj!OS.I!'/1 1 ,  8 K  t' . S .  : 1 !  I :.J S .  (jliOI!'d st ,jJIO text  accunrpam·; ; ; g  note l)') . 
9{i Si'? ]) e J C m t c l l o  -, _  l r l l crn:l t ional  l:l hd . ()f Tc:t m s t ns .  - l ! i2  L" ') .  l :i l .  i :':>D n . I :l 
( I lJ8 3 ) ;  t iljm text  acrom p; tn \ i ng n o t e,; l 09- 1 0 . 1 1 3 -? I .  
'l 7 '>04 t s 6-1 n �u :; J _  
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s ti tut ionally compelledY" So long a s  federal courts exist  and have 
j urisdiction to adj udicate cases in which the Constitution requires 
them to apply s tate law, that law may be said without  l inguist ic s train 
to govern "of i ts  own force. "99 In such cases the Rules of Decis ion 
Act is  redundant .  
Long after Erie, there was widely shared uncertainty as to the 
reach o f  i ts  constitutional holding. 1 00 The Court ' s  persis tent fai lure,  
in divers i ty cases ,  to disaggregate the problems in  the relationship 
between federal and state lavv that  i t  resolved b v  reference to tha t  ) 
case ensured confusion .  Moreover, in addressing those problems,  
the Court  rarely referred to the Rules  of Decis ion Act .  1 0 1 
In the same period ,  the Court \Vas called upon to declare the 
!inn is of the holding in  Erie . That case could be read as speaking to 
the const i tutional power of the federal government . 1 02 I t  was thus 
natural  for the Court to neglect o ther possible cons traints on fed-
� lt-1 SrP /d .  at  7 7 -80.  
'1 � ) For 1 ari o us uses of the not ion of state law go\'CTning " o f  i t s  own force . · ·  see Han. 
Thl' Rrla!ions BP!a•ecn Stale and Federal Law, 54 COLll'vL L. R£1· . 489. 5:.29  ( 1 95 4 ) ;  i\1ish k in , 
T/tP l 'rniou.,ntss of . . Frdnal Law · ·_. CmnjJelenrc and DisoP//Oii 111 the Choice of .\'ational and StolP 
Ru!esjin· DN;swn. l O S li . 1'. 1 .  L. R£1· .  7 9 7 .  799 ( 1 9 5 7 ) :  l; nited S t a tes v. Li t t le Lake t-.l i s ere 
Land Co . . -+ 1 :.2  L . S .  <', 80 ,  592-93 ( 1 9 7 3 ) .  For the refinements  at t h e  beginning of the 
s e n t ence, s e c  Wes ten & Leh m an .  supra no te 1 7 . at  3 l ?i - 1 6, 3 5 G- .5 8 ,  3 8 9  8..: n . 2 2 fl .  
1 0 0 Sre Bernhardt \ .  Poh graphic C o .  of Am . 3 5 0  U . S .  1 9 8 . 20'2 ( 1 95() ) :  E l v .  sujmt 
l l O t L' J 7 . dt 7 ()().()(-i . 
! O l  Set \\'e�ten & Leh m a n .  sujJm note 1 7 , a t  :1 7 1 - 7 2 .  
! O :.!  liul .vr. t g  . .  \!i s h  kin . . 'io111e Fur!hn l.asl f l 'ords 0 1 1  Erie-Th1• 7/; read, 8 7  HAR\· .  l .. R �-:1.· .  
i ()82 1 1 () 7 4 )  ! h ereinafter c i t ed a s  Los/ J l 'ords j .  Professor .'l'lishkin rc;1ds Enc  �1s being 
;unnut ecl h :, a percept ion of  cons t i tu t ional  l i m it a tions  c•n Ccckral  tnn11,1klng b, ·  t h e  fccl­
n;t!  c n u ns i n  addition to those on federal la\\·making· !w C o n gres s .  Sf't td. a t  l 684 n . l (! :  
s o ·  ul.w \ l i s l l k i n ,  sujmi n ote 99, at 800 n . l �) . I agree " i d1 him that t h ere arc s u ch l i m i t a­
t i n n s .  l H t t  Ene need not be read t o  speak to the i .s s u e .  ;,t least  for t h e  n:;,<. o n  gt1. cn h 
i'r·. ; f 'cs so;· \, l i s h ki n .  I t  ma1 · be t rue t h a t  · 'even b,· then comcmporarY q ;md arcL. Cot ; grc.'-'' 
"·u uld  hal'<.: been seen as having po,,-cr to prescribe a substant ive  rule of l iabd i t 1.  fur t h e· 
s p e c i fic ;;ccident  i n Fuf . "  ;\ l ishkin . Last l l 'ords. supra . �It 1 68-t n . l 0 .  Sl'i' also. !')!, . . E h .  • l!jmi 
n u i t: 1 7 . a t  /03 1 1 . 6 � :  Fri c ndh· .  In Pmisr o/ Erie-. ..f wl of the .\'ru: Fu!em( (.'O i!'iiif!!l Li!<l' .  3 9  
'-: . Y . l' .  L. RE\' .  :-l8 �l .  397 n . 6t) ( i 9t)-l ) .  But ,  oth er explanat iom Cor t he Court's l ;:nguagc 
�:� ide.  i t  is t t o l  c l e a r  tha t t he Coun lhou g h t  C:ongre:;s then k.J.d .  or th<n i t  nu 1,· ha s .  t i ; e  
j)U\\'t'r t o  pres cribe :;uch a rule appl icable o n h  i n  federal  c ou rt s ,  w i t h  t h e  s ! ;:. tcs  ktY i n g  
' C1 Il <  u r- r t n t  _ jur isdic t ion and rcm;� i n m g  fi-et· 1 0  apph· their 0 '.->":1 r u i e s .  Th;; t .  u !  ,·o u r , c  . 
•. ,·o u ! c! be' the s ta tu ton· CCJ U iYalent  of the " federa l general  c o m m <m lav.- · ·  ln nishcd in Eru·. 
J O·l L S .  at 7 0 .  in the :;entencc i mmediateh p rece d i n g  t h : : t  c u n t m e n t i n g  on d 1 e  i JOhCT' 
o f  C . n n grc; :; .  It is unc lear 1\·hether Professor ?\ l crri l l  s hares t l ! i s  v i e•,,· of Eur. ('olli/H!U' 
\ 1<-rri i l .  suj.;m note 9 � .  at 1 4  u•ith /d. a t  1 ;) . 
I am a\\ a re t hat Prima Paim C o r p .  , . _  Flood & C : o n k ! m  \t fg. C o  . . J88 � · . s .  :J ( h  
( l �H) / ) .  nLty be thought  to  s ugges t pU\\·cr iu  (�cJ I � grcss t o  regu l a t e  i n t c;·�a ;Hc <. c. � l n nH. : r c c­
t hrough i<:gL.;L, t ion a p p l i c a b l e  o n h· in !Cdcral  coun . S,•,• 1d at -+ 0 5 .  B u t [ } , ,,. r� uc:; t t o t: \l';ls 
! cfi "up in the Jir . · ·  irl. �I t -l-:?-4 { Black,  .J . . d isscnl. i il �· .! . and the  (�nurl suLsequcnt J _�o · �ui cl 
l l ! ' <1 l'lbi g\ ioush held that  at least  cert a i n  pro, i s i n w  of t h e Federal  .-\ rbi t r:.i t ion . ..1 •. n <!;T 
b m cl i n g  i n  s t a l e  courb.  Sou t h land Corp. \' .  Kea t i n g  . ..f(i.'i t _ : . s .  i .  i U- i ti ( ! 1) :�-+i \ 1 ( •1'('­
U i c' l ' .  tt ·; c c m s  clear that .  1..-hat cn•r C on gress ' -; acti l < i l  i n tent .  ;t coli l d  kt-. <' n·-; t ;· i r. t cd i h' 
.-\u 's <l p p i i cd, d i t '  to federal c o u rt s  m t h e  cxcrci>c o! i t s  po 1·;cr t o  rcgu l ; l tc  t he ·  P �' ' ' 'Tdu;·c 
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era! common law, including t h e  Rules of Decis ion Act . 1 03 A t  leas t i t  
was not surpris ing when the  occasions for declaring Erie 's  l imi t s  d id 
not involve the exercise of federal d iversi ty jurisdict ion,  and g1ven 
that old habi ts die hard. 
In recent years , the Court and most  commentators have recog­
nized that the reach of Erie 's  consti tu tional holding is short even in  
diversity cases . In other word s ,  s tate law rarely governs "of  i ts own 
force . " 1 04 The Court has not  made clear, however, whether the 
nonconst i tu tional constraints on j u dicial lawmaking in divers i ty  
cases derive from the Rules of Decision Act or from some oth er 
source. When called upon to decide whether federal common law 
governs in  nondivers i ty cases , however, the Court has recognized,  
albeit  begrudgingly, that the Act  does have a role to play . The rea­
sons for the Court 's  ambivalence become clear when one considers 
the his tory of federal common law after Enr .  
I t  is commonplace tha t  the  quest ion whether federal common 
law or s tate la\Y governs involves a two-step inquiry . 1 05 The firs t 
of the federal  court s .  See td. at 25-29 (O"Connor . . J . .  d is -; e n t ing ) :  Westen & Leh m a n . 
supra no te 1 7 . � I t  'i 5 6 .  
I a l s o  a gree ,,· i t h  Professor \l i s h k i n  that  ' " wh e re C o n g r e s s  h a s  . . s poken i n  r crm;; 
which arc n o t  only  unambiguouslY c o ns i s t en t \\· i th  an un cl c rlvi n g  cons t i t u t i o n a l  p n n n p k  
b u t  anual h �t ffmllat i vclv rcs t:ltc i t s  mea n i n g :mel i mp l ica t i on s and t h u s re i n f o rce i t­
proper cons t ru c t  ion of th e congres s i o nal lan guage should be m o s t  hospt tab le  to gt'  i n g  
it ful l  r;mge · ·  \iishk in .  /.a.1i l l .ordl. 511pm. a t  1 () 8 ( i .  I a m .  t h crcCore. puzzled 11 l l \  he kl'i 
given short s h ri ft to the R u l es of Decision .-\ct  i n  h i s other ,,·ork on fcdcr�d comt•ton b w .  
See Mishkin . .  < l:Jmr n o t e  9 9 .  ; J l  800-0 1 n . 1 6 . 8 1 -l:  n .G-l: : injia n o t e  1 08 and accompam ing 
text .  .-\ fl ll d i n g- of fed e ra i l a 11· m a k i n g  compet ence does  n o t  exhaust  c o n s t i t u t ional n l l l ­
cerns a b o u t  t h e  separat ion of J lOI\Trs .  So· Merri l l .  supra n o t e  9 2 .  a t  20 . . -\ n d  takil l g  t h e  
R u les o f  Decis ion :\c t  serioush·  11·i l l pt-c\·ent  the . .  t·gregious abuses · · th a t . i t  i s  c o m m o n  
grou nd , would b e  u n c o ns t i t u t i o n a l .  Sec 'vVcsten & Lehm a n .  supra no te 1 7 . Zi t �� ··tO--t l .  
The En1' Cunn knew t h e  di !Terencc between . .  !Cdcra i gen era l common l a11· . · ·  .1n Lnr. 
304 U . S .  at 7 13 .  and . .  federal co mmo n b\1·. · · !-! i n d erl idcr 1 .  LaPiata R i 1 c r & Chern Cicek 
Ditch Co . :W-J. U.S r):_> . 1 1 0 ( !  <J3 f� i .  I n  s ta t i n g  th a t ' " [ c ]xccp t 1 11  maucrs g<li "Cmed b'> t h e  
Federal C om t i t u t i on ('I" b Y  .-\ cts  of Congress, the  bw to be ap p l i ed i n  <.ill\ c'1' e i s  t h e  1:1 1'· 
of the Sta t e . · ·  l:.nc. 3 0-l U . S .  ; t t  7 8 .  t he Court m a :-· h aYe i n tend ed to addre:;s  t he J S S \ i l'  t h : t :  
concerned Profnsor \! ishki n .  Compare ja1· .  Ongi11.1 o/ Fn!nrtl Common !.me: Prn"l Tu•o. l :1 :-; 
U .  P.·\ . L. 1-'. E': i 23 1 .  1 3 1 3  ( 1 98 5  l ( ' " '\ot  a ,,·o rd i n  i:"nl' spoke t o  the prohlems t o  come i n  
cases such a s  Clnnjidd Trw! . · · 1  ;eith id. a t  1 3 1 9- 2 0  ( i m pl i c i t h  recn gn i z i l l g t l t < t t  
quoted l a n guage does speak to t h os e pro b l e m s ) .  The Court"> f() r m u l a t i o n  is .  i n  ' 'm 
eve n t .  remi n iscent  o f  the Ru l es of Decis ion .-\c t . I n  nei t h e r  ca .<>e n eed the Lmg·uage u ., �·d 
be i n t e rp reted · · m  �� crd bbed or ,,·ooden fas h i () n . · · R o b cn5on v .  W cgnLm n .  -l:)ii l " . S .  
584 . 59R 1 ! 97 8 )  (Bbckmun, .J . .  d iss en t i n g ) .  Se!' Fri e nd l y . supm. a t  4 0 8  n . 1 l C) _ i)u !  >!",' C .  
W R I C J n .  S! i,lnrt n o t e  5 6 .  ·� tiO. a l  3 8 8 .  
t O :I . 'iN'. l'.g. . Clcarlie!d Trust  C o .  ' . l: n i t cd  S t�Hes .  :\ 1 8  l; . s .  363 ( 1 9-J. cl ) .  There t h e  
Coun u p h e l d  t h e  a pp l i ca ti on of ntle'  dc1-c!oped t)\ t h e  federal  courts  pr i o r t o  /:. /If. Srt 
id. at 3 ti 7 .  Liui .iff lY Ocnch.  D u h m e  & C u .  1 .  Federal D epo si t l n s .  Corp . . :\ 1 3  L . S .  + -1 7 .  
465 - 7 :) ( 1 9-l 2 )  (jackson .  J . .  concurri n g ) .  
I 0 -1  St'e. e.g . .  Hanna 1 .  Plumer. 380 L.S . .f 6 0 .  4 7 1 -7� ( i 963 ) :  Eh-. ' ufn" note 1 7 .  �1:  
700-0(i: s:,j>m : c x l  accompan; ing note 9 9 .  
I O :> St••· .� ''" l'l'il/y .\ i i s h k i n .  su,tmt n o t e  99.  Ser also Lni r c d  S t ;-H e s  \ ' .  K i m b e l l  Fonds .  I n c  . .  
-! 4 0  l" . S .  7 i :1 . 7 2 G-�9 1 1 9 7f) J .  O t h e r  i mp o rt a n t  "''·orks  o n  fed eral co m m on L111 mciuci c  
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s tep looks t o  whether there is  federal competence t o  p rovide a rule  
of  decis ion .  At one level , the  issue o f  competence requires an exam­
ination of the const i tutional p rerogatives of the federal government .  
A t  another level,  the inquiry requires an examinat ion of the p rerog­
a tives , bo th const i tut ional and s tatu tory ,  of the federal courts . Par­
ticularly in the early years following Erie, the C ourt  tended to 
conflate the nvo level s and h ence to leap from a conclusion of fed­
eral power to one of j udicial p ower. 1 0G 1v1oreover, in i t s  enthusiasm 
for a legit imate,  a l though hardly new, species of j udicial  lawmaking, 
the Court a t  t imes treated the second s tep of the inquiry-whether a 
uniform federal rule or s tate law " adopted as federal law" should 
apply-cavalierly, if i t  paused a t  that  s tep a t  all . 1 07 
M ore recently ,  the Court has appl ied the b rakes .  The Court  has  
p aid some attention to the second level of the first  s tep o f  the in­
quiry-the relat ionship between the federal courts  and Congres s .  
But  i t  h a s  applied m o s t  o f  the braking force a t  t h e  second s tep .  In­
creasingly, the Court ,  ·�vhile asserting that a m a t te r  is governed by 
federal law, has determined that there is no n eed for a uniform fed­
eral  rule .  The result  i n  these cases is that s ta te  law governs ,  as  fed­
eral law.  unless i t  i s  Cound Lo be h os tile to  or inconsis tent with 
federal in teres t s . 1 °K 
And what  i s  the relevance of the Rules  o f  Decis ion Act?  I n  a 
1 9 7 3  deci s ion,  the C ourt sugges ted that ,  where the firs t  s tep of the 
inquiry (federal competence) i s  sat isfied ,  " th e  Const i tut ion or  Acts  
of Congress ' require'  otherwise than that  s ta te l aw govern of i t s  
Friendh· .  supm note l 02.  a nd H i i l ,  "lfl'' Lmu-.\lokmg Power of !hr J·i'riPml Courts: Conslitu!ionai 
Preemp!wn.  i:i7 CoLU\l .  L RE\ . 1 0 2-i ( l 9G 7 ) .  For a n  int cre s t i n g recen t art i c l e ,  taki n g  a 
generai app t·oach to l'edcr;t l c o m m o n  l;n,· ,  see :\·!erri l l ,  sujna n o t e  9 2 .  
I O<i Sa, t' .g . . Board o f  Co u n t v C ornm 'rs \ .  United S ra te s ,  308 L; . s _  343 ,  3 4 9-50 
( 1 D�9) ; Ro:- al Indemnit1  Co. \ .  lin i t.ed States .  3 1 3  l' . S .  289 . :! 90 ( 1 94 1  ) : Clearfi eld Tru s t  
C o .  1 .  t:ni tcci S u t e s .  :) 1 R U . S .  3 6 :-s . 3 G i:i-G7 ( 1 94 3 ) .  B u t  St'i' D ' Oench. D u h m e  & C o .  ' · 
Fcdc: a l  Depos i t  I n s .  C u rp . ,  3 !: !  L: . s .  -147 .  46:1-75 ( 1 94 2 )  U <:cks o n .  J .  concurri n g ) .  Sl'e 
inj!-a note l 0 8 .  
1 o ·; Stc. c g  . .  D e i t ri c k  ' . Creane' . ;) ()q C . S .  1 90 .  200-0 1 ( 1 94 0 ) ;  D'Oench . Duhme & 
C o .  •: . Federal D c p u s i t  I n s .  Co rp . , 3 1 5  U . S .  44 7 .  4 5 1 - �J9 ( 1 94 '2 ) ;  Clearfield Trust  C o . ' ·  
L n i t t�d States . :.1 1 0  L . S . 3G:l .  % 7  ( 1 94 3 ) .  
I OH Sn'. r.g . .  Lni tcd .S : a i es \ . K i m be l l  Foods. I nc . ,  -1 4 0  L' . S .  7 1 5  ( 1 9 7 �) ) :  Wilson '- · 
Omaha Indian Tribe.  4 -l :! U . S .  ():13 ( 1 9 7 9 ) ;  C i t\ of �l ilwau kee ' . I l l i n o i , ,  4 :) l U . S .  3 04 
( l 9i'l i ) :  Tcx<h Indus . . I n c .  v .  R a d c l iff P. !atcrials .  I n c ,  4 5 1 l' . S .  6 3 0  ( 1 98 ! ) .  Sa u fso C .  
\\' R I C  l iT,  .111jJm note :) 6 .  � 6 0 .  <H �)9 3  q :  Trans amcric� \ l o n g·agc .-\ el l isors,  I nc , . _  Le11· i s .  
4 -!'l l: . s .  l i ( 1 9 7 9 )  (pr i1a te righ t o f  act ion ) :  B rci\ln .  Of . l t' ! l < ' l.\111 o l! !l Ene-ThP fllij!ilcrllion 
Dortrinl' \ lmj;hm!Jon:. }!il' ihi' .\.o tw,· o n rl Role rf !he 1-'Nirm/ Cuw'/.· . .  (i�) I m1·.·'· ! . .  1\i: .\ ' .  (i 1 7  
I l 9S .J.) 
Profe,sor \ l i s h ki l l  J U s t t f i ecl lack nl' �; pcci l i c i r:- a s  10 the b o u n dari('s ()[' fcclcra l _j u d i c i;ll  
compctt:'nce o n  ! h e  grn t t ; J d  that "in :nam· area s ol' unc!oubt ed L:cl erai compet;:ncc.  a d o p ­
t i o n  of s t a l e  !a\1· . :, i n ci i c ; l l t� d .  Jnd l'u n c t i o nal l \' t h e  areas o f  competence ma' "'e l l  s h a d e  
o ! f  irnpcrcc p t i h h· i n t o  t h , ; s e  "·here s t <t t c  �a,,. gc.1\'ern� o f '  i t s  o 1,·n ! 'orce . "  \ l is h k i n . siljim 
n o t e  99.  at 800 n .  1 5 . 
1 986] li\TEPJUR!SDICTIONAL PRECL USION 759 
force. " 1 0
9 Ten years later.  the Court observed that ,  when the sec­
ond step of the inquiry yields the conc lus ion that a uniform federal 
rule applies ,  " then the Rules of Decis ion Act  is inapplicable by i ts  
0,vn term s . " 1 1 0  
The fir s t  o f  these decis ion may b e  thought  t o  suggest  that  the 
cons ti tu tional holding of Erie not only l imits  the interpretation of 
the Rules of Decision Act but exhaus ts it . In any event ,  the Court 's  
approach deprives the Act of any role in  defmin g  the circumstances 
in which i t  is appropriate for the federal courts , as opposed to Con­
gress , to make law. But  there is  no h i s torical warrant for the sugges­
tion that Erie ' s  consti tutional holding exhausts the Rules of Decis ion 
Act ,  whatever confusion about the reach of that holding may have 
fol lowed in its wake . The Act  is not confined to cases in  which s tate 
law governs "of i ts  ov;n force . "  1 1 1  Moreover, the language of the 
Act requires federal j udges to jus ti fy federal common law by refer­
ence to a cons titutional or s tatutory source that  either expl ici t ly  or 
implicitly authorizes-"provides" for--or implicitly and plausibly 
calls for-"requires "-its creat ion . 1 1 :! 
The quoted s ta tement from the second decision i s  correct ,  and 
its negative pregnant is that ,  if  a uniform federal rule is  not  required 
or provided for by the Consti tution or acts of Congress .  the Act is  
not " inapplicable by i ts own term s . " The Court was unwil l ing to 
1 0�1 U n i ted .S tates \ L i t t l e  Llke I\lisere Land C o . ,  4 i �  t: . s .  580,  592-93 ( ! 9 7 3 ) .  Ser 
also U1� i ted S ta tes ' .  F ..i mbell Foods . Inc. ,  440 U . S .  7 1 5 . 7 '.!.7 ( 1 979) (quoting Little LakP 
.\lim e ) . 
I I  O De!Co<;tel lo  1·. I n tt>rn2ti o n a l  Bhd.  of Teamster,,  ·1H2 l; . s .  1 5  L 1 59 n . 1 3  ( ! 98 3 ) . 
I l l  Sr". e.g .  '\!cClun; 1 .  Si l l iman,  2 8  u . S .  (3 Pet . l  2 7 0  ( 1 8 3 0 j ;  ?. lcl\i iel  v .  Holbrook. :17 
U . S .  ( 1 2  Pel . )  8-i ( \ t! 3 8 ) :  Campbel l v. HaYerh i l l .  ! 5 5 U . S .  6 1 0  ( 1 89 5 ) .  See also H i l l ,  Slrlfe 
Proceduml Lml ' iu Ftdem! .\.on Diz •t>rsily Litzgatwn, 69 H.-\ r<v· . L R H .  66, 78-83 ( 1 9 5 5 ) ;  Note.  
Thf Law . lpphed in Diz ·nsliy Cases.· The Rules of Deuswn . � r: and t/,e Erie Doctri11e, R5 Y,vLE LJ. 
678, 680-90 ( 1 976) . rhese sources document the applica t ion of the .-\ct lO matters, such 
as statu tes of l i m i ta t i o n s  and evidence.  as tu which federal c o mpetence is  i ncl isputa h ! c .  
The;· a l s o  m a k e  cle�1 r  t h a t  � 1111 ::u tempt to confine the R u l e s  of Decision ,-\ct  to que> t i ons 
of s u b s t a n t i \'C L 11' i s  ahi,to rica l .  Col!ljJare Haz:ud. supro n o t e  �l2 .  a t 64 5 and \l crri l l ,  :. up.>r; 
note 92 . at 3? 1(•/ih Burbank, wpm note 9?. <ll G6 l .  
I I � " I n  a much-:1dmi red concurr i n g  opinio n : ·· C : .  \h: .tCHT. sujHa n o t e  :">6 ,  § 60,  : 1 t 
389. but  (JllC t h a t .  :n thi'  ;1 s p e c t .  is much i g·! lOred,  J t is t icc  jJckson obs erved: 
1 do n o t  unders t a n d  Jusrice Br�1ndels 's  s tJ ternent . . t h Zl l  . .  -rhcrc is no 
feder:.d general  common l a w , "  to clem· that the common law ma1· i n  
proper cases be an a t d  t o ,  o r  t h e  b a s i s  of. deci s i o n  of federal quest ions .  
I n  i t s  con text  i t  means to m e  o n l v  t h d t  fede ral  c o m t s  m<t1 n o t  a p p l v  their 
o·sn notions o f  the  common lav,· at  1·ariance '' i t h  applicable sta!.e deci­
sions except • · il 'llcrc l lw con s t i tu r i o n .  trea t i es . or s t a t u t es of the Un i ted 
S t ates  l s o i  require or pro1·i d e . · ·  
D ' O ench,  Dt ;hmc .:'-: Co.  1 .  Fedcr�t l  Deposi t  l n s .  Corp . . 3 1 5  U S  -l-i 7 ,  - Ei9-70 ( ! � 1-t:l)  
Uackson . .J . .  cc-n c1. 1 !T!ng) . .  Sn� also \ [crnll .  :;11prr; n n i e  9?.  a l  � 7 - 3 2 :  u?fro n o l e  i 2 l .  
" [T ] rcat ies  d t h '!  L n i tcd S t a t es . "  2 8  i.! . S . C .  � 1 65 :.:  ( ! 9H 2 ) .  are omi u ed !HTC :t:ld 
else,,·hen: fo r t'C<; n o m l  \Jf n:pr<:· s s i o n  o nlY . Cf Erie R . R .  ' Tompk i n s .  � l04 U . S . ().! . 7g 
( 1 938 ) . quo .wl S!ijm; n o t e  1 0:2 .  
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accept that  conclusion and ,  by argumentation reminiscent of the  
kitchen s ink ,  s truggled to avoid i t . 1 1 3  We may quickly dispense ·with 
the Court ' s  sugges tion,  based on language in Erie, 1 1 4  that the Act i s  
confined to diversity cases . 1 1 -" That sugges tion finds no support  in 
the l anguage of the Act ,  in  his tory, or in the C o urt ' s  own fumbhngs 
·wi th  the Act  in nondiversi ty cases . 1  ] (; The fact  that  considerations 
requiring application of s tate law i n  diversi ty cases are not relevant 
to the elaboration of a federal legi s lative scheme 1 1 7  tells us nothing 
about  the relevance of the Rules  of Decis ion Act in  the  la t ter con­
text .  S imilarly, the fac t  that  " neither Erie nor the Rules o f  Decis ion 
Act can now be taken as  establ ishing a manda!OI} rule that we apply 
s tate l aw in federal interstices " 1 1 8 does not  answer the quest ion 
whether the Act  speaks to the circumstances when the fi l ling  of 
those inters tices with j udge-made federal l aw is  permiss ible .  I t  i s  
true ,  of  course,  tha t  where federal l awmaking competence exi s t s ,  i t  
I I �  See Del Costello v .  In ternational B h d .  of Teams t e r s .  -! G2 L' . S .  1 5 1 ,  1 59 - 6 1 n . l 3  
( 1 98 3 ) .  For o th er crit icism of De/Costello, see Merr i l l . supra n o t e  9 2 .  a t  :3 l & n . l 3 8 .  
I 1 4  ' ' [T]he purp ose o f  the sect ion was merely t o  make ccrL<1 i n  that ,  i n  a l l  matters 
except those i n  which some fed eral law is  con tro l l i ng . the fed e ra l  c o u n s  exerci s i n g  j u ri s ­
d i c t i on i n  d ivers i ty of cit izenship cases 1vo uld appl v a s  their  r-u l es of d c c i s t o n  t h e  la11· o l  
r h e  State,  unwri t ten a s  wel l as written . "  Erie R.R.  v .  Tompki m .  c)(Jc! l ; . S .  6-! , 7 2 - 7 �  
( 1 9 3 8 ) .  
I I !'> Sec DI'/Costello, 462 U . S .  at 1 60 n . l 3 .  
; 1 t ;  The Court explicitly rejected a n  attempt t o  restrict  the :-\ c r ' -;  a f.> p l i ca b i l i t v  i r  
C a m p b e i l  v .  Haverhi l l ,  1 5 5 U . S .  6 1 0, 6 1 4- 1 6  ( 1 89 5 ) .  Sre also DriCostd!o . H):! L' . S .  a t  l 7 c 
n . l (Steven s ,  J ,  d is senting) . The De/Costello Court ' s  a t te m p t  t o •  d i spa t ch Cllli!jJbtll anc  
other cases on the ground thar  they were d ecided before Ent. i n  ·s i l l c h  i t  hac! recognizee  
t he res t ricted purpose of t h e  Act ,  i s  u npersuasive.  Set id. a t  i bO :. l c) . The Lnt' C o m  
relied o n  t h e  "·ork of C h arl es Warre n .  See \Varren , Xe w  Lt:�!t ! o n  tit,· fhs!on of tltr· Ftrlna 
Judlnl'lll' �-let of ! 189, 3 7  HAR\ . L. REV.  4 9 ,  5 1 - 5 2 .  8 1 -8 8 ,  l 08 ( I  ()� 3 ) .  otrd in l:.nt. :\04 C .. � 
at 73 n . 5 .  Although the original congressional grants  o f j u n:;cl i c t i o n  magn i hed the i m  
portancc of di,-crsi tl' c a s e s ,  \Varren ' s a t tr ibut ion of a rcstric i 1 e  pt :rpose i n '  .-,f..-ed p u r  
spec u l a tion . rhetoricalh usefu l i n  aid of t h e au thor's  elfon r. o  dcnwn'l r�t tc  that  t h  
Court erred in Swift v .  Tyso n .  4 1  U . S .  ( 1 6  Pet . )  i ( 1 84 '2 ) .  S<'r \\ ' :uTCil.  supm. �: t H �l -8'" 
Professor Goebel pos i ts n o  such restricted p u rpose.  Srr J C o t·: ti E I  . . H ISTORY O F  T i l  
S c P R E M E  C o t.'RT O F  THE Ul\tTED ST ..... n:s :  A NTECEDENTs .-1 :-m B E G l � 'd >:c;:  r o  1 80 ! .  a t  :'JO� 
O:l  ( O l i ver Wendell  H o l m es Dc, ise H i s torv o f  the Supreme Cr.Jur: o !  t h e  l_' mtcd StJlc  
i'\o .  1 .  1 97 1 ) . For o ther rnore recent  h i s torical  \\'ork cas t i n g  chu b t  O i l  Warren ' s  conclt  
sion on this m a t r er.  as  w d l  as o n  uthers .  s e c  F l et c her , TIJ,· Coli'rrt! C:o.'l! l!ln.'l !.ml' 111111 .\niir> 
3-1 af !he judie/my �-!rl of l /89: The Ew mpie of .\ lam'i' lnstn ltWi' �) / H.-\R\ · .  L R r:'> . l :'i l  
( l 984 ) .  Set· also infra note 1 2 1 .  
A l t h ough he noted that ' ' f t ]h c Court has no t  ex tend cci t h e  d o c t ri n e  uf  FnF ii. Co. 
'fotlljJfnns h cvond cliversi tv cas e s , "  D ' Oench.  Duhme & C o . " ·  Fcdcra l Depos i t  ! n s .  C o q: 
3 1 0 U . S .  4 -! 7 ,  4 6 7  ( 1 94 2 )  (concurrin g opinion ) ,  J u s t i c e  Jacb.c; n  d id  ; : c . r. IJ '.ll' s t i cnl  t l  
i.1roadc;� appl icabit i tv o f  t h e  Rules  o f  Dec is i o n Act. Set u!. :J !  �l i1 .1-li i i .  r; ;;u!;•r;' .1 11/"r' n o  
1 1 2 . .  '!er also Hazard , supra note 92 ,  at 643 ;  B urban k .  supr:: n r) t C  9�.  :l l ti S D ;  C mri c .  C 
Bla:i"g 'Frat!\. jurige Fnenrlly and Fedcraljw isdtrtion, 1 3 3 L' . P.1 . L F:t:\  . .  i .  i� ( l �)t\-� ) :  Wc:' l <  
8..: Leh m a n ,  51:,L>ra n o i e 1 7 ,  a t  3 6 7 - 6 8 .  A s  to the " o l·t-cn c o u n i C'red h eres\ . .  t h �n l:�r;,. 
l i m i ted t c• d i\'er:;ity c a s e s .  see.  e.g. , Fri endl v .  supm note 1 0 '2 .  �l i �\0 8 - f ili t< . l ':.! :.? .  
i ! 7  Src Dr/Co.\ !el!o , 4 6 2  L' . S .  a t  ! GO n . l 3  (quot ing Holmberg 1 . .  \nn h !·,:ch.  T? 7  L 
3 9 � .  3'H ( ! 9-1 6 ) ) .  
i l :·l !d. a t  1 6 1  n . l 3 .  
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is a federal question whether the federal courts may, under the Con­
stitution and acts  of Congress ,  fashion federal rules . 1  1 �) But  one of 
those acts i s  the Rules of Decision Act .  Federal common law cannot  
plausibly be deemed one of the  "Acts of Congress " referred to  
there, 1 � 0 the best  hope for those who do not  s imply wish the s tatute 
away or confine i t  to diversity cases . 1 :.> 1  
The real problem with taking the Rules o f  D ecision Act s eri­
ouslv, as an original propos i tion,  i s  that the s tandards for the crea­
tion of federal common lavv suggested in  the Act may be thought 
inadequate to the needs of the federal government ,  including those 
of the federal j udiciary .  l'vloreover, in l ight  of what transpired after 
Erie, the Act is  an embarrassment b ecause it is a reproach . But those 
days are gone,  if not wholly forgotten . The C ourt i s  now more re-
I 1 9  Cj. .\'l i s h k i n .  sujHa n o te �19 ,  a t  80� ( " federal j ud i c ia l competence t o  choose 11·h ich 
law shall govern " ) . 
1 20 But see W es ten 8..: Lehman . sujJm note 1 7 . at :\ 69-7 1 :  Wes ten . supra note I 7 .  a t  985-
88 .  I a gree 11· ith Professor Redish 's  cri t i ci s ms o f  Professor  \Vesten's  p os i t i o n on t h i s 
issue. 5iee R e d i s h .  supra n o te I 7 .  a t  96�-6-l . � JG8 n . 60.  Sec rd.w C. W R I G HT, supm note 56.  
§ 60 ,  a t  3 8 8  n .4 .  
This  i s not t .o  s a 1· tha t federal common law t hat i s  i t sel f va l id  under the R u l e s  o f  
Decis ion A.ct mav nen:r serve as a 1 a l i d  .so u rce o f  po l i C\ in  l'cd eral common la11Tnaking. 
See 1\lerri l l , supra note �)2 ,  a t  58 Il . � -i ·l .  r;tw!ed infra note 1 89 .  
1 2 1 For o th er t ec h n iq ues to anJ i d  confi·o n t i n g  t h e  Rules o f  D ec i s ion .-\ c i .  s e c  
M i shkin , 5ujmz note 99.  at  800 n . \ 6: '�ote. ihl' Fedna! Cn!llii/011 /_me. 82 l-IAR\' . I . . R Fs.  
1 5 1 2 ,  1 5 1 5  ( 1 960 ) ;  supra note 1 0 � .  H a v i n g  p oi n ted out  the  Ha11·s i n  the J.rgu me n t tha t  
feder;1 l common l a w  sho u i d be read i n to th e excep tio n clause of th e R u l es o f  Decis ion 
Act ,  .1 er  mJHrl note 1 20 and ;1cco m pannng text.  Prof(::;sor R ed ish achie1't's the same resul t  
by m a n i p ulating the l ;mg uage " i n  thl' ClSCS \I· h e-re t h C\  ap ph . , . s,"(' Red is h . . l i ljJm n o t e  1 7 . 
at 968 n .60 .  
Professor F letch er a rgues tkt t the .-\ct  1,·as original ! :· 1 ic"Tcl as an embodi n1cnt o f  a 
broader /e.\ lao prin c i p l e . St'l' Fletcher .  slijHrt note 1 1 6 .  jJa.uim . So vie11-cd ,  the .-\n i m ­
ported ch o ice ;l!l lon g bodies o !' la11· n o t ,  i n  m o d e rn  term s , exclus ive!:· federal or exclu­
sive/\· s tate .  See nlso R .  R R I D\1' !-: LI . 8.: R.  W H nTF. N .  TH t:: co�;STITL'TIOX ,\, d) THE co�t � i ()X 
L-'1.\\' 78-97.  99 ( 1 9 7 7 ) .  But ProCessor Fletcher is  carefu l  to d i s t i n gu i s h  b etween j ud ge ­
made " general com mon ia1,· .
. , 1d1 1ch 1\'aS no t binding on t he s ta t es . and j udge-m;; d e  
federal la11', 11·h ich .  t o  th e c:-: t e n t  i t  \\·as t hought  to e x is t ( : t  hoth deba t ed p oi m ) .  II'JS 
supreme . Sa Flctchcr . .  wpm note l l G .  at 1 5 � 1 -':!.' i .  Set iilso Ja ,· .  Ougtm of FNif'!al Conlllt'i!l 
Lmc. Pori One, 1 3 3 L. P.1. L .  R EI · .  I OO :l ( 1 9 S .'i ) ;  j a 1 , .wpm note 1 0 2 (both s upp ort i n g 
Fletcher's conclu s i o n  in t h i s  regard) . . -\s su m i n g  contemporaneous \'i C\I'S or the  :\c t  
shou ld  be imputed t o  t h e  C on gress  t h a t  passed i t .  n o th i n g i n  Prof'cssor Fl etcher's  a c ­
coulll detracts J'rom t h e  1· i c1, , t:�ken h e re .  t h a t  the Act . ..;peaks direct ly  t o  t h e: c i rcu m ­
s tances in 1,·hich feclcrai  couns can rashion o 1· apply  j udge-made ru ks of Ceclera! l a 1,· 
b inding o n  the s t a tes . Bnl srP _j;l\ .  s up w note 1 0 :2 ,  at l � G3 -ti 7 . \l oreover.  on t h a t  <.J:; sump­
tio n .  changes in the \\·a:- i n  "·h i c h  \IT t h i n k  <l h o u t  l ;lll· mean that  the language " i n  the  
cases wh e re t he�· apph . . n c J  k: nger " k; � \TS u s  ;m o u t .  . . Redish .  su,tFo n o t e  1 7 . a t  961' 
n .60 .  :'<or do va rio u s  s u t c m e m s  tu t h e  effect  tkl l  t he .-", c t  :s ' · mcrch· decbra t i n· of t he 
ntl e  -,,·h ich wouid exis t in the absence  of t h e s ta tu t e" lean" us an out .  .\lason ... . t . ll l t ed 
S tates.  ?60 U.S .  5-tS .  559 i 1 0:?:> ) .  Co111jiare \ l ishkin.  supm note  �19 ,  a t  30 1 n . l ti ( i n ,:oking 
s u c h  s ta t e m e n t s  : 1 s  reason t o  1 in,· .-\c t  as o n h· · ·an expr e s s i o n  of an und erh· i n g  po! iCI " ) 
;utlit R. B R i D\I'E l . l .  & R .  \\.H tTTt·: :.; . ' 11/iii; ,  at l l  0- l l  ( exp iam i :1 g such s t ;J tcmcnt s in h i s t \ > ri ­
cal  contex t ) .  F(Jr zuw t hc-r ·; imdz:r  usc  () [  such s ta tements  b1·  Profe.s '. o r  \ l i o; h k i n . see 
\ l i sh ki n .  I.asl l l'or ds  . .  < itf!!O note l 0 2 .  : t t  I 1.)83 n .0 .  
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s pectful o f  Congres s ' s  prerogatives a n d  of state l a w ,  a lbei t  usually a t  
the s econd s tep o f  t h e  traditional inquiry. 1 '2'2 The C ou r t  need n o t  
apologize for past  trans gress ions ,  b u t  i t  s h o u l d  s e t  i ts h o u s e  i n  
o rder.  
The traditional two- s tep inquiry i s  not  neces s ary to p ro tect fed­
eral  i n teres ts ,  and i t  may have led to a misall o c a ti o n  of lawmakin g  
within the federal government.  I f  the Con s ti t u t i o n  o r  acts of Con­
gres s ,  fairly read,  provide for or require federal c o m m on law, s t a te 
law d oes not apply.  The same is true whether a uniform federal rule 
i s  called for or a p articular s tate rule is  fou n d  to be hos ti le to o r  
inconsistent with federal i nteres ts . i '.! :l I n  o ther c a s es where the Con­
st i tut ion does not s o  ordain , state law applies , n o t  " o f  i ts  own force" 
a n d  not b y  judicial grace or borrowing, but  b ec a u s e  Congress has 
b o rrowed i t . 1 2-l The considerations that have prompted the C o u rt 
to eschew independent choice of law rules in d i v e r s i ty cases,  a resu l t  
n o t  required by the C o n s ti tu tion , 1 '2 5 are n o t  p ertine n t  outs ide t h a t  
contex t .  T h e  s a m e  is t r u e  with res p ect  to t h e  fre e d o m  of the federal  
courts  to determine the law of a part i cular s ta t e . 1 '.! ti 
The only reason to l eave the Rules of D e c i s i o n  Act " a  d e rel i c t  
. . .  o n  t h e  wa ters of t h e  law" 1 n i s  to avoi d h i gh l i gh ting p a s t  m i s ­
take s .  That seems an i n si gnifica n t  b enefi t  m easured again s t  t h e  
c o s t s ,  not  just  those inevitably incurred w h e n  t h e  federal courts fai l  
to take seriously a n  a c t  of Congres s ,  p articularly one t h a t  imposes 
l imits  " on the couns themselves , "  1 2 >� b u t  also t h e  c o s ts of cont inu­
ing doctrinal uncerta inty .  There is good reaso n  not to in terpret the 
Act " in a crab bed or wooden fash i o n , "  1 :.: � 1  b u t  i t  i s  t ime to rescue i t  
fro m  the open seas . 
2 .  Cases In which Fr:dera! Law Fum/shes the Rules of Deczsion 
As we have seen. even prior to Erie and th e dual  revolution i t  
i n i tiated,  ; :w the Supreme Court had appl ied fed eral law t o  d eter­
mine some questions regarding the p reclusive effects  o f  federal j ud i ­
c i a l  proceedings . T h e  proceedings in q u e s t i o n  i n volved 
d eterminations of federal s ubstantive righ t s .  1 : >.  1 Since Erie, it has b e-
1 ��  Sre supra tex t  < tccompam ing no te  1 0 8 .  
1 �3  Set /1/ji-a tex t <I CCOlllj):t m ing n o t <_'S 1 7 :1 - 7-t . 
1 �-! See Wes ten & Lch m:.m . supm note 1 7 . :11  :1 l .'i - ! 6. :.1 5 6-59 . 
1 � 5 See. e.g . .  Fricndh. su;nn n o t e ! 0:? .  at -l O l -0 2 :  H <t� t .  1 11(n o l lOLe  D� l .  :1l :i l 5 . 
1 '.!G Sec \1ishki n .  supm ! !Ole 'J� J .  a t  SOli- ! 0 .  
1 � �  Dice 1 .  Akron.  Ct! ! t n n  & Y< > tmgs t < mi! R. R . :3-t :.! l_: . s .  3 5 ' 1 .  ;)ti.S -G9 ( 1 9 52)  ( Frank-
furter ,  j . ,  concuiTing· & dissen t ing) . 
1 � 8 lvl ishkin .  !Jl5! 1 l 'ords. sujJrn note ! 0 2 .  �-ll. ) (}8 7 .  Sr'' \·upra n o t e  i O� .  
1 '2'1  Robertson 1 .  \Vegm:nm . 43(i L· .s _  :Ji-l-L 59R ( l <J 78 l f Bbckmu n .  J . d issen t i n  g ) _  Sl'r 
1vlcrril l .  supra i i Ote 92.  :1; �; l - C\2 .  
. " 
1 30 SrP [!,tllrmflr Fr iend l Y .  su/H<l n o t e  l O�! . 
1 :1 1 Sn ';u;na t ;:xt ac, omp:n�\ ing n o t es 70-SO .  
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come widely accepted that federal preclusion law governs a l l  ques­
tions in such cases .  1 3� 
When considering the law that govern s the preclusive effects of  
federal j udgments adj udicating matters of federal substantive law , i t  
,vould seem necessary to advance a n  approach that i s  consis tent with 
the Court 's  general approach to federal common law.  The view that 
the Rules of Decision Act applies only in divers i t y  cases or  the view 
that its exception clause is  triggered upon finding that there i s  fed­
eral lawmaking competence does not p rovide an escape. But analy­
sis under the Rules of Decision Act should lead to largely the same 
results as  traditional federal common law analysis if the Act is  "used 
to give expression to important federal interes t.s " 1 3 'l p lausibly 
grounded in the Constitution or  acts of  C ongress and if  the tradi­
tional analysis takes separation of powers serious ly .  
Article IV, section 1 of the Constitution auth orizes Congress to  
prescibe the effects of s ta te j udgments in other jurisdict ions;  i t  does  
not  provide any authority with respect to cases  dornestic to  one 
state . I 34 The Court has never maintained that art icle IV has any­
thing to do \Vith  the interj urisdictional effects of federal  judg­
ments,  1 35  and a fortion, i t  does not speak to d omestic preclusion 
rules , whatever " domestic" means when federal j udgment s are con­
cerncd . 1 :lG The federal government ' s  interes t  th<H the judgments of 
its courts be respected is fairly inferabl e  from other provisions of 
the Cons ti tution or  laws of  the United S tates . A federal common 
law obligation to respect such judgments is  binding under the 
supremacy clause .  Moreover, to  the extent that they provide the 
measure of that federal obl iga t ion ,  the rules adopted to govern the 
preclu�ive effects of federal j udgn1ents ,  wh ether  fu rnished by fed­
eral or s tate law are also binding under the suoremacv c iause . 1 :" But u I , 
the source o f  those rules remains to be determined .  
Congress ' s  consti tu tional power t o  create subs LanLive l aw en­
tail s  pov;er to  define the preclus ive effects of federal  q ue s t i o n judg­
ments . Congress  has o n ly rarely exercised Lhat power. � '�·" In  the 
case of puta t ive federal common la\·V rules o f  preclusion that  are 
binding i n  federal and state  c o urt alike ,  s t 2 t e  i n tere s t s  arc impli-
See znfro tc;;t accompanving n o t e s  205- l 0 .  
Robenso n  \· . v\'egm a n n .  -t. :l li t: . s .  :'i8-L 59S ( ! 9 7d)  m L , c k m u n  . .J. . (h sseming) . 
1 :q SPt' '11/JIII t e x t  accomram· i n g  n o t es 2 1 - :2 :2 .  
I :> s  See. e g .  Dupasseur  v .  Rochueat t  . .  s ::-;  l: . s .  ( �2 1  \\ "a l l . J Ll O .  l :\4 ( l fl 7 5 ) :  Embn \ .  
Palrner. I 0 7  U . S .  3 ,  �J - 1  0 ( 1 tl83)  . . 'itc also Sllimt t ext  acc;•mp�·: m i l l g  t lOl t:S 2�) -30 .  3·+ - 3 5 . 
1 '> G  Sre .1 '1/H<I t t:xt accompan;mg note' -t. ! --t.:� .  
1 �� 7 St'f S!lj;m t e x t  accnmpam·ing n o te' -l 'f .. 5 :) .  
l 3B See 1 8  \\' R iGHT. :\ I I !.LEE & CooPER ,  sujJm note !;. � +Hili. :n b� l :  l-hzard . . wpm 
n o t e  92.  Jl fi--i :l . l do nut here con s i c!n Cnngres s ' s  poi;·cr 1 : n d n  ;m i ·.· ! c  l l l .  Scf' w(ra texl 
accompanying no ii:.·s 227 -3 1 .  
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cated. Moreover, a s  demonstrated later in this Artic le ,  the Federal 
Rules of Civil  Procedure do not provide federal preclusion law, be­
cause the Rules Enabling Act does  not  authorize Federal Rules  o f  
preclusionY1H I t  i s  important ,  therefore, t o  analyze,  rather than 
merely to accept ,  the widely s hared view that federal preclusion law 
determines the effects o f  federal judgments adjudicat ing mat ters of 
federal subs tantive law.  
a .  Preconditions to Preclusion . There is l i t t le  difficulty in conclud­
ing r hat  uniform federal law governs two matters typical ly regarded 
as preconditions to the application of preclusion .  The validity o f  a 
judgment i s  thought to turn on the existence of subj ect  matter j uris­
diction and territorial authority in  the rendering court and due no­
tice to the defendan t .  Final i ty is  a concept that ,  as i t  has been 
developed,  has no fixed referent outside of the law o f  preclusion 
and, at  l eas t in recent years , no  fixed meaning within i t .  1 40 Save for 
any cons t i tutional cons traints ,  neither validi ty nor  final i ty need play 
a part in dcmestic preclusion law . But i f, as i t  appears , there i s  a 
federal common law obl igation not to disregard federal j udgments ,  
i t  requires as a corol lary that the federal courts have  the power to  
define the  conditions precedent to s tatus as a "judgment" having 
the po tential for preclusive effect .  Moreover, the need here is  not  
simply for federal law-in-reserve, act ing only as a check against hos ­
ti le or  inconsistent s tate law. The nature of the  p roblem demands a 
uniform , and uniformly federal, so lution . 1 •1 1 Under a tradi t ional  
federal common law analys i s ,  there is  federal competence and a 
need for uniform federal law.  Under the Rules o f  Decis ion Act ,  uni ­
form federal law applies because the  Consti tut ion or ac t s  o f  C on­
gress--whichever is  deemed the  source of the  bas ic  obligation-
1 :l ' 1  Set uifui text  accompanying notes l 82-9R.  
: ·H l  F o r  t reat m ents o f  v a l i di tv and fin a l i t 1· from a domestic  perspc ct i n::- . s e e  R E sT,.\TF­
.\l E '\T (SEco:-.�n)  oF .JLTJGMENTS §§ l - l b  ( 1 98 2 ) :  1 8  \-\'R IGHT, M I LLER & CooPER. sujn o note 
'i .  §§ Hn--t-!34 . 
1 -1 1 These demen ts of p reclus ion Ja,,· are so closelv  t ied t o  the bas ic o b l igat ion o f  
respect that  a regime o f  borro\\'ed s la te l ;n,· ,,·ot t ld e n t a i l  serious r i s k s  of evas io n o f '  t h z t t  
obl i ga t i o n ,  as 11·el l  a s  admin i s t ra b i l i t v  problems for t h e  S upreme C o u r t  and fo r l i t igan t s .  
Sec 1 11[m text  accompanying n o tes l -!-! -7(i .  Th e r isk  o f  evasion seems panicularh· grea t i n  
connect ion l,·ith the quest ion o f  val idi t1· . 
[ T [ hc quest ion of v a l i d i t v  often arises in a con tex t in 11·hich t here i� also 
serious doubt about  the q u a l i t1· o f  t h e  adjudicat i o:: in o t h er respec t s .  :\s a 
res u l t .  it o ften can b e  said with  equal  meaning t h a t  a j udgment o u g h t  ro 
b e  <tl oided because i t  is  inval id a n d  that i t  ought  to be regarded a s  im·a l i d  
because i t  s h o u l d  be a1·oided.  
R F. sT.\TDIE :\T (SECO�D) O F  Jt·oc:\tDiTS ch.  2 ,  m t roduct orv note,  a l  :?0 ( 1 �)8 :! ) .  
For ;: case suggest ing t h a t  federal p rec lus ion la1\· gol' t'l'ns a ques t ion o f  \'J ! i cl i tv of'  d 
d i n-rs i t1  judgmen t .  sec Baldwin 1 .  l ema S t a l e  Travel ing \len ' s  .-\ s s ' n ,  :! 8 3  l.' . S .  :)'2 :!  
( 1 9 :3 1 )  
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require otherwise  than that  s ta te law apply.  Under both approaches ,  
the federal solution is  one that binds federal and s tate courts  al ike.  
b.  Claim Preclusion . The same reasoning applies to one aspect 
of claim preclusion.  Tradi tional claim preclusion doctrine required 
that, in  order for a j udgment to bar another action by the p laintiff 
on the same claim, the judgm ent must have b een "on the m erit s . " 
The Restatemen t (Second) of judgments has discarded this label , but  i t  
retains  the  notion that some j udgments do not  constitute a b ar . 1 4� 
Again ,  there i s  nothing in the nature of things that requires ex­
ceptions to the doctrine of bar. Except as constrained by the Con­
stitution , j urisd ictions are free to defme those exceptions u nder 
domestic law. The basic obligation to respect federal j udgments 
would b e  meaningless ,  however, if  courts in  subsequent proceed­
ings were free to define those j udgments that can preclude .  Uni­
form federal common law rules,  binding throughou t  the country, 
are necessary . 14 '1 
The analysis becomes more complex with respect to the rest of 
claim preclusion . At a t ime when the concept o f  a cause o f  action or 
claim was narrowly formulated  and closely t ied to the source  of the 
right under substantive law asserted in the action in the rendering 
court, 1 H federal preclusion law could be jus tified by reference to the 
underlying federal substantive law. I n  the event of a federal j udg­
ment in such circumstances ,  i t  was not for the s tates to alter the  
federal rights thereby determined . The mode of analysis ,  focusing 
on federal j udgm ents as repositories of federal rights ,  was that used 
by the Court in Deposit Banlt v. Frankfort . 1 45 Moreover, l i tt le vvould 
have been gained in distinguishing between federal law on the front 
l ines and federal lavv held in reserve .  There was a high degree of 
homogeneity in  preclusion law throughout the country a t  that 
t ime, 1 46 fos tered by the Supreme Court's invocation of or reliance 
on " general common law . " 1 47 
The modern tendency in domestic preclusion law, reflecting the 
enhanced procedural opport unities available  to l i t igants in the ren ­
dering court and enshri n ed i n  the Restatement ( Second) of judgments, is  
1 4 �  Sre REST.·\TEMENT ( S E C O N D )  O F  .J u uc;:.rENT5 � 20 ( l �J 8 2 ) :  see also 1 8  \V R I G i iT .  
M I LLER & CooPER,  supra note 5 .  � §  -l -i cl5A+± 7 .  
1 4 3  Sre sujJm n o te l �  l .  The concl t ! S ion  tha t  u ni form fecle;·al >ti les  arc req u i re d  dues 
n o t  automatical lv  fol i ow fro m  the percep t i o n  of a federal i n teres t .  Sa supui n o t e  S:l.  
1 44 See REST.\TEI\!ENT ( S u� o :--; n )  o r  J t'DC\ IE1\TS § �-+ comment a ,  a t  \ 96-9 7 ( 1 98 :2 ) .  
1 4 5 1 9 !  U . S .  -199 ( 1 90 3 ) . Ser supm t ex t  accompanymg n o t es �9-50 & 7 '.!. - 7  5 .  
l -l li Sa Rr:sT.\TD! EKT (Su:o:\D)  oF J t : nc;. rE:\TS § 8 7  comm e n t  a .  at 3 1 5  ( 1 013:2 ) .  
1 4 7 See. r g , Gcls ton  \ .  Hon.  l t.i  U . S .  (3 \\'heat)  2 � 6 .  3 1 5 . 3:20-2'.!. ( 1 8 1 8 ) ( fedcr�d 
ques t ion j u d gment ) :  Supreme Lodge . Knights  of l'v t h ias v. l\lncr. '.!. G 5  U .. ') . 30 ( l 9'.!.·1 ) 
( cl ivcrs i tv j u dgmen t ) :  I S  \\ .RIGHT. \'l i i .LER & CooPER,  sujna note  5 ,  � 4AG8 ,  at l.i:> 2 .  l n  t h e  
famous c a s e  o f Crmn·,,cc l J  \ . Count\  o! Sac.  94 U . S .  cE> I ( 1 8 7 7 ) .  i t  i s  i m possible t o  he S ll! ('  
from the o p i n i ons t h e  prec i s e  nature o f  t he ; t c t i o n  cl a imed to h;n e prccl u s i \T cft.('Cl . 
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away from a narrow formulation of the concept o f  "cla im" for pre­
clusion purposes . 1 ·Hl Nonetheless ,  in this area, as in p reclusion law 
generally, there appears to be  less homogeneity among American 
legal  systems than once obtained. 14 '1 In  any event ,  rules of  claim 
preclusion, l ike a l l  preclusion rules ,  are " [l ] egal rules which impact 
s ignificantly upon the effectuation of  federal right s . " 1 50 Under 
traditional federal common law analys is ,  they must  .therefore " b e  
treated a s  rais ing federal ques tions . "  1 5 1 The next s tep u nder that 
analysis is to choose between uniform federal rules of claim preclu­
sion or s tate lav; adop ted as federal law (meaning that t here is  power 
in the federal courts to choose the s tate law and to check any rule o f  
s tate law found t o  be  hosti le  t o  o r  inconsistent with federal inter­
ests ) .  Under the Rules of  Decis ion Act,  the two s teps m erge, and i t  
is here that the <1pproaches appear t o  diverge . 
So long as preclusion law affects substantive r ights ,  there i s  a 
federal interes t  in the definition of the federal righ ts adj udicated in  a 
federal judgment .  I t  is not  clear, however, whether that interest re­
quires uniform federal rules .  Even if preclusion law i s  less  homoge­
neous than it once was , s ti l l ,  i t  is difficult  to j us tify uniform federal  
rules on the basis  of a priori predictions of adverse effect of s tate law 
on federal interes t s .  1 "'� Moreover, modern claim preclus ion law may 
foreclose unadjudicated assertions of rights over a broad range o f  
legal sources , and ,  i n  the present context,  those sources need n o t  b e  
federal . 1 ·, :; Even when ali s ources are federal, a s  for ins tance when 
the putative fed e ral rule o f  preclusion would foreclose subsequent 
assertions of  legal righ ts under a federal s ta tute different from that 
which v.ras relied upon in the firs t ac tion . uniform federal rules can 
rarely be justified by reference t o  the policies animating the s tatutes . 
I t  is obviously irnp o s s i b!e to make that  case when the rights  fore­
closed arise under s t ate s u b s tantive lmv.  
H t->  
1 49 
1 50 
Under tradiLi.onai federal common la\v analys is ,  ·when s tate law 
Set REST.Hi·:\ t r: :.;r ( :iF.co :--; : 1 )  O F  . J L' UGC. lr:�;Ts § 2� ( 1 98 2 ) .  
See id. § ':3 7  c o m m c· n 1  a .  
Burks \" , La�ke! . -l l l  L. S .  -t 7 l .  -! 7 7  ( 1 9 70) . 
!d. 
1 5 :2 Co?lfjJare 1.._: n i 1 ed S r t.1 1 cs Y .  K i n l b e l l  For,ds ,  I n t. ,  ��--!0 L: . s .  7 1 5 , 7�9<i8 ( 1 9 7 9 )  (bor-
ro11·ed s L a r c  law ,,·o: .dd not  h i nder admmi .•; t ra r ion of federal  loan progra m s )  <nih DdCos­
tel lo \" . !n terT;a t ion< l i  'Jhd. uC T c a :n ,; tn"> .  -Hi2 l. ' . S .  1 ?i l .  l fi  l -G9 ( ! 983 )  (borTOII"Cd s l a t c­
�latutcs uf l i rniL11 ioru ' · u ns �! t isL lc t. ury \\.:h icles t(1r t h e  cn f()r(Clnent of fCdcr;.;l.l LJ.\\-· " ) .  
I ;:, :-, SPt REST.-\TF\1Ei<T C� Lco:-� u )  O F  . J L : nc.\t E:"<Ts � :2S  con1 n1t.:·n t e ( 1 98 2 ) :. C�crner , . _  
\"lar�thon () i l  (�i"J . ,  .:);) �  f . :� d  :1 3 0  (6th C� ir .  l 9 7R )  ( per curia tn ) :  tn(ro n u t c  �99 . 
. A� to the s cpar�HC p r r • b l -�Tl-: of . . s l a t e  q u c s l ions . . dc�..· ic !ed as an i t iciden t of fed e rai 
q u cs lion 1 i t ig�l l i o n . · · l t  ha :..:. Lccn ·;,uggc � t c d  t h ;-t l  ' ; t h e  c icar n g-h l tif fcd cr�·d r.._ o u rts  to i n s i s r_  
o n  t h e i r  o w n  pre c l u :..: iun n ..dc �-� �- � s  t o  t h e  federal qu csr. io n s n1ay  c:-:!rry c_y:er 1 0  inc l ud�� < i l l  
quest ions  in a uniri)rtn hod\· � :r d o c t ri n e . ' '  l K  \\. H J L HT.  \ ! n . L E R  8..:: ( :ooP F. R .  St tjnii note :"") ,  
§ 4 4 7 2 ,  a t  7 :S ��. u ·�) n ! r ; n !_ \_.. f '· !l1 l t t ·:: d ) .  
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is borrowed as federal law, displacement occurs only when a particu­
lar state rule is  found to be hostile to or inconsistent with federal 
interes t s . 1 5-1 But the anterior inquiry-whether a u niform federal 
rule i s  n ecessary-is not cabined in the same way. A uniform rule o f  
federal common law m u s t  b e  consistent with federal substantive in­
teres t s ,  but scope i s  given for the consideration of the values of uni­
formi ty i tself. There are, in other words,  s i tuations i n  which " the 
very application o f  varying s tate laws would i tself be inconsis tent 
with federal interests . " 1 5" 
Ranged again s t  the considerat ions favoring borrowed state law 
are problems of admini s trabil i ty for the federal courts that  such a 
system would entai l . Preclusion rules are characteris t ically trans­
substant ive .  A trans-substantive body of federal preclus ion law im­
perfect ly accommodates p articular federal substantive schemes;  
trans-substan tive bodies of state preclus ion rules are even more 
worri some.  Although federal and state j ud ges al ike are obli ga ted to 
adjust  preclusion rules that are inconsistent with federal substantive 
policies ,  i %  federal judges are likely t o  be more sensi tive to disso­
nance than are their s ta te counterparts ,  particularly in connection 
with claims h·i thin exclusive federal jurisdict ion.  The rendering 
court does not  determine t h e  p reclusive ef ects o f  a federal j udg­
ment,  157  and some of the c ourts tha t de t ermin e them are not federal 
court s .  If  a s t a te court decided the preclusion question applying 
borrowed state la.'N, i t  is  not clear that  discretionary review by the 
Supreme Court would be an " [a ] dequate m e a n s  . . .  to insure fair 
treatment  of . . . federal in teres ls . " 1 "'8 
In terj urisdicr ional preclusion rule�; a lso implicate problems of 
adminis trabi l i ty for l i t igan ts . Preclusion rules affect li t igation s trat­
egy . It  is therefo re import a n t  that l i tigants know what the ruies are.  
Before fi l ing <: complaint asserting fcderai rights in a federal court. ,  
or  in  respon,;,e t o  t h e  successhd remm ai of such a case to federal 
court, the plain tiff should be able r o  predi c t  wi th considerable assur­
ance the rilles of cl a im precl usion that  \v il1 govern a j udgment .  A 
system thJ t m fonncd a p l aint i ff to look to s ta te law, unless s t a te law 
was h o s ti le  to o r  inconsis tem with fedcr;:d subs tantive interests ,  
1 54 Sel'. r .g. . B u rb \ .  L1ske: . ·l-t l t · . s .  ·4 '/ J .  "l 70-8U ( 1 9 7 9 ) .  
1 5 5 Jd. �tt -t 7 q  !Lh .  Con:jJ(Uf l :n 1 1 cd SL� t cs \ ' .  1-\. i rnhel i  Fooci s \  i n c . .  440 LY . S .  7 1 5 . 7204  
40 ( 1 979)  (re t-us ing [ r :  !�lshinn uni f.( l !'!H federal !�n\· ) ;.cith ()ccidc n t a i  Life Ins .  C:o .  \· . 
E E O C .  4 :3 �  t) . S .  :L S :J .  �) 66-/� ( l q 7 7 )  f rcf"u s i n g- to bnrr(_)1:: � t a i e  Ln\· ) .  
l 5G (.f ()ccider:tal  L1i"e 1 u  ..; ( : n .  \· . EE{)(� . -f J:? t_: . s .  :� :� :) ,  :� f )i ( i 9/ 7 )  ( s t. a U l H: ·� of 
l imi tJ t inns) . 
I 57 ' ' [" l ' lhc q :Jc-�: t � < > n  Gf the h1ndin?,· cf1(:·cl  u f  l h c  judg;n1cnt in  !he  ll rsl  c1c � i o n  is  ies ted 
only in t h e  l a t e r  a c t ic,n :-i . · ·  .S u Lc l i ffe S t u �·;_ tg-e t\: \\·;l rehc.l�L'\ !_;· C: o .  \ ' .  L: n i tcd S late� .  1 (:.2 F . � d  
849. 85�� ( l �; i  C i r .  � �-)--� ·; L Ste o!so Ph i l l i p:: Pctr(dCl nn C o . \' . Shu l l s .  ! 05 S .  C t .  :?965.  297� 
( 1 98 :) ) :  C .  v\' R ! C l !T . . 1 11/'1'1 n o t e  C) (i . s 7'2.  a r  ·l S �) � :-,t; ,).rP \\' i l snn , . _  CJ rn �th: 1  ! n (han · r r i b e ,  4 -� �  t: _ _  :..� _  () :1 �) . f ) 7-t ( 1 9 7 9 ; . 
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would immediately prompt the questions ,  w h a t  s tate a n d  what 
law ? 1 ">9 These quest ions are particularly poignant  where federal j u­
risdiction i s  exclusive . H>O The first ques tion may b e  difficult even 
\Vhen j urisdiction is  concurrent ,  because the cons train t s  on choice of 
law applicable to the exercise of diversity juri s dic t ion do not obtain 
outside of that context . 1 l; 1 Uncertainty might lead our hypothetical 
plaint iff to guess  wrong and thereby to lose rights under the sub­
s tantive law . Even if  the ans\ver to the choice of law quest ion were 
clear, 1 62 prediction would depend upon the further s teps of ascer­
taining s tate preclusion law 1 63 and testing it again s t  federal subs tan­
t ive interes t s .  U ncertainty would probably p ro m p t  a person in  this  
s i tuation to play i t  safe by satisfying the broadest  rule of claim pre­
clusion potentially applicable.  
Difficul ties of this order are not,  however, res tricted to preclu­
sion rules . In fi l l ing the in ters tices of federal s tatutes  with l imita­
tions periods , the Court has usually opted for s ta te  s tatutes ,  unless  
incons i s tent wi th federal substantive interes ts . 1 64 The problems of 
uncertainty in  these cases  are even more vexing .  M oreover, the po­
tential impact o f  uncertainty on rights asserted under the subs t.an-
1 "> �) T h e  dec is i on to borr01•: s t ;Hc l;,,,. ' ' r;:t ises two quest ions:  firs t .  to w h a t  State d o  we 
l o o k ,  a n d  secon d . gin·n a part icular S t:l l e .  "·hat  part of that  S ta te ' s law [ governs the 
matter j . "  De Svlva \ . B a l l e n t i n e ,  3 5 I  li .S 570. SK I ( 1 950)  
I t;o Apart from th e problem of ch01ce ol" ia,,., sa lll[m t e x t  accompanying n o t e  I G I ,  
exc1us i \T j u r i sd ic t ion z;:ses  present  a n  ;1clcl i t i o n a l  d i fficul t : :  n o  s tzt le e<1ses an n ou n ci n g a 
rule to deal  "·i t h  the precise problem of chu rn  p n:cl t r s ion before the federal court exis t .  
This d i Hicu l t v  i s  d 1 scussed i n deta i l .  "·i th rekrence t o  in i t ial a d j u d ica t ion i n  s t a t e  c o u rt ,  
tnjia text accompanving n o t es -i 2 K -fi 1 .  
u ;  1 See. e.g. , De S y h·a \ . . B a l l e n t i n e ,  :) 5 1  lJ . S .  5 70.  :)8 1 - 8 2  ( 1 95G) : 1 9  \\ .. F.. I G HT, \I ILLER 
& CooPER, sujim n o t e  ·s .  � -Ei 1 -t ,  a t � G-l -()5 ; M is h k i n .  supm n o t e  � 9 .  at  80ti-OS;  N0te . 
. -lppilmbl!itv rf Sto lt' Conjhct Ru!t.\ l ! 'hen Js., ucs of Sto/r Laze .-l risr 1 11 Fafnnl (2tlf.l !ion Cmr.r . ( iS 
H.\R\.  L. RE\ 1 2 1 :!  ( 1 95 5 ) .  But \l'f C ,\\\" , . . Hoosier Card inal  Corp . . 3 8 c� L_: .S (/)() ,  705 
n.8 ( 1 966) ( applicab i l i t ;  u f  l\. laxun Co . \ . Scent or Elcc .  \ l fg Co . . ;) 1 3  U . S .  487 ( l �H I ) . l o  
borrowed s ta te l i nntat ions  la1·; an open ques t i o n ) . 
l li� Th e  federal c n l t l " l S  could soh-e i l 1 c· p roh l cm of l a c k  o f' predictab i l i t Y  b1 adopting 
l"or al i cases the prcclw; i C i n  Ia" o i  the s t a t e  i n  \vhich the rcndet· ing federa l court s�1 t .  This 
11·as the regime sugge s t ed b \  C rescent C i t 1  Lin's tock C o .  1 · .  B\Hch ers· l_:nion Slaughter  
House Co.,  1 20 U . S .  I -t  I ( 1 ,'1:) 7 ).  So·  suj;ro text  ;<cromp;.ull i n g  no tes G6-(i 8 .  tvloreoYer.  
apph ing Klaxon Co. \· . S t e n to r  E k·c.  \ l f g. C o . ,  ') 1 3  L' . S .  -t 8 7  ( 1 94 1 )  . .  \H SI!j!l !l n o t e  f il l ,  
wouid usua!h lead l u  the same :"C:; u l t .  But  \l't' irfia text �1cco m p a n ving n ote :�2 7 .  The 
oniv s ta te i n teres t s  i m p l icated i n  t h i s  s i t ua t i on clerii'C from t h e  possible forecl o s u •-c of 
rights under s ta l e <; u b :; t:m t i\c l < t"· ·  Thus .  ei th er ap!J rO<IC:h ,, o u l d  r� n d e r  the protect ion 
or those i n r .ercsts \\·holh ron u i t o u s .  The r igh ts in  q u es t i o n  lll<l\' not  be proYid ccl 1)\' r il e  
sub·s r.ant i\'c  law ( ' r  t he .'l a t e  : n  ,,·h id1  the Ccdcral cuun s i t s .  
J <;>) s·cc _,upra n o t e  l bO .  
l (i.f Src. r.g . L.\W ., . H oosier Ca rdinal Corp . .  383 t: S ( )9() ! l % 6 )  
T o  belabor t h e  o \)l' : u t J s .  t h e  pruhlun u i  the  i i m i u t i o n s  p e r i o d  for a l"ccler:d cla i l !1 
i m p l i c a t e s  fcd cLi i  pruccd 1 1 rai as \\"C ! I  as federal s u bsunt i \ e i n t eres t s :  s ta t e  i n teres t s  �1 re 
either negl igible or n <. ;nex i s t en t . Therefore .  the problem prr \ \  1des a u s efu l  o a s i s  tor t c.-a ­
ing [ h e  anah· s i s  i n  t he t ex r .  <" " el l  ; 1 s .  one \\'Ol.ild t h i n k .  : 1  sober ing d o s e  o r  JT<1 l i t \  f(>r 
adnKatcs of a ll:cler;d c o m m o n  Ia\\· or procedt ll"C. 
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tive law 1s even more dramati c and those rights are unquestionably 
federal Y'" Here, the risk-averse plaintiff would comply-if he 
could-with the strictest limitation period potentially appli cable. 
In both the preclusion and limitations contexts, the lack of 
strong state i nterests and concerns about the admi nis trability of a 
svstem of borrowed state law s upport a uniform federal rule. 
Problems of administrabil ity may themselves lead to the loss of fed­
eral rights . In the case of the limitations period for a federal s tatute, 
the federal nature of the los s ,  should it occur, is certain. In the case 
of the rules of claim preclusion in an action assertin g  federal rights , 
the federal nature of the loss is contingent-as is the loss of rights 
under substantive state law. On the other hand, in the preclusion 
context federal courts are relatively less fettered by the conventions 
of common la'"' courts and their implications for the s eparation of 
powers . 1 Gli Thus , in most cases i nvolving the limitations period for a 
federal s cuute, the federal courts are faced with a choice between 
state law a nd the creation of federal law that is i nherently arbi­
trary. 1 li7 In contrast, federal courts have available to them a corpus 
of preclus ion law that w a s  fashioned by federal j udges. 1 08 And i n  
the area o f  preclusion as t o  federal question judgments , federal 
judges are les s  encumbered by precedent applying s ta te law, partic­
ularly p receden t under the Rules of Decis ion Act. 1 0�l The Supreme 
I li"> (/. Wibo; J  ' · Garcia.  1 05 S .  C t .  l 95 R .  1 9-!-i --! 7  &.: n . 3 -i  ( l 98 5 l  ( u n i form federal 
ch:JJ'J(l e r i z a lion Ol Ci\· j J  rights cL\ims for p u rposes of Slal f: J i m i t<J t i ons Jaw borrO\\'C'd 
u n der -1 2 L S . C. � i 9BS ( l 9H2 ) ) .  
I () (i Sn l.'.--\\\' ' . Hoo�ier Ca rcl i i l a ! Corp . . 383 t: . S  696 . 703 ( 1 066) ("dra:aic s u n  of 
jud ici ;t !  i c g:i s lat ion " ) :  :-.loYiccn!or L i d . ' .  Eastman Kodak Co . .  28K F.2d 80. 83-84 ( '! cl  C : i r. 
I 9G I ) :  Currie . su,ina n( ) le  l l  G. a t  6. H .  
I ( i 7  But sa. i'{i . D e l  C o s t el lo ,. _ I n t ernat ional  H h d .  o f  Tc::unsters. -I G 2  l.' . S .  1 5 1 .  ] I.)�) 
n.20 ( I () ;� �) ;· \ apph · i n g exi s t i n g Ldcral l i m i t a t ions  period) : Occiden tal Life I n s .  C () .  ,_ .  
EEOC . .t :. tz l . S .  3 5 0 .  3 1J 7  ( 1 9 7 7 )  ( :; �un c )  . . . E,-en so s imple a m ::\L I. tT  J S  plaung l i m l l�.n ion 
per iods on pri \ Jtc a c t i o n s  t-c q u i rc:s a ,:. ta t u t c :  n o  common la"· principle cxpbins "·h\ a 
C3use o r  act ion ,·;did ()!] ('l1e cLn· s h ould be h.trrcd the n e x t . "  Eps tei n .  Thl' Soc;o! ConsP­
(jllfll{fS of Conll!/!111 [_r:u• li ull'.i. ()!) H.-\ R ·, .  L R E \  l 7 I 7 .  ! 7 2 ! ( 1 98 2 ) .  
H i :->  _<.<'. ,. __ :' . Cmm ·.,Tl l  Y. C o u n t '  oi S� ;c .  ')4 U . S .  35 1 ( l 8 7 7 ) : supm text  accom;Jam i ng 
note I 4 7 .  F•>r the  rcleY;Jnce ol ' t l 1 e  e x i s tence of a body ol' ! J ,,· f� shionco b,· fedc1·al judgcs 
1 0  the l h G tcc . under tradi t i o n a l  ar�a h s i s .  between un i form fedcr<Jl rules and borrov;c-d 
s tate  la1,·, s e e . l ' .p: . .  C:a l i i i m1 i a  r>x u·l. S t a l e  Lan ds Comn1 n  ,_ .  t: n i teJ S t <J t e s ,  4 5 7  l' . S .  � 7 :) ,  
284 ( l �lW� l :  \lm i e:color Li d .  1 .  Eas t u t:m Kodak Cu . . 2 8 3  .F . 2 d  3 0 ,  8.,1-85 ( 2 d  C i r .  1 9l) i ) . 
The exis t <.>ncc of �� boc!\ u! 13"· Ll:;h ion(:'d h\ federal . J u d gc.s ,  al tho ugh not s pt:r i fica i l :. 
lllCnl ioned .  nu :- a i s o  h::tiT p L l n'd a v� rl l l l  C t S L' S  l i k e  C: lcarficld Trus t C u .  \ ' .  l ' nacd 
States .  :1 1 8  l' . S  . . :Hi '3 ( 1 9 -J :l l .  •:: ! t en· t h e  C : o u rl f( > tmd federa l  c o m m o n  la 11 ruks 1 1 1  the  
gcncr�d f(:clcral c o m m u n  �� � ·," Lt. '; h i o t tcd p r i o r  t o  bw Sef l lijHa note 1 Oc \  2 nd accompany-
For p u cposcs o r  t hi:' � tnal > s i s .  i t  i s  necc.--:�� try t o  ign( l lT decis ions th�l l h� i. \ 'C  a S �) ll l11ed 
its concl t t s i o >n b1· fonn�! ia t in�r u n i k> rn l  fcdcr�ll o rec l u s i u n : u i c s .  
! ( )�) sl'f 5/ij:iii . [ O: :  �\CC0!11F:�·, l 1\ ing l l O i l"\ 1 30- :) 1 .  ! n  D ... ICos t c i ! o  \' . !mern;l i i O t l�l! B h d .  
o f ' l 'ea!nstcrs . �!:):� l_ · . s .  ! :l l  ( l �)()�) } . t h c  ( � o u r i  n_·jcl t t_·d o rc\· iuus dcu:: ions t h�n h�1c! �� t ! ri h ­
u t ed 1 h e  �lppl i�·: t t t o n  I J J - '-l t ,U c  l i tn i t ;.u i o n s  ! a\•: to t ! l<:  Rul e:-: nf }),_.ci :� ; u n  :\.c! . Sn· ul. � l l  l � ·: ;  
n . l :) _ F o r  c: r - i t i c l ., in �. .. r 1 t s  n:��.� o n i n g .  s e c  .\' f tjnil t <:"� ' �l CC( J i l l p�tn >· i i l g i !O t c�; 1 1 0 8 .  : 1 !  :) - ? j .  
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Courl has recently come to  realize the costs o f  b orrowed s tate l imi ­
tations law. 1 70 There i s  n o  good reason to incur such cos ts i n  con­
nection with preclusion rules for the  federal ques t ion  j udgments of  
federal courts . 
Finally,  a regime of borrowed s tate preclus ion law i n  this con­
text might  skew l i t igants '  choices i n  the  in i t ia l  ac t ion i n  a manner  
contrary to federal procedural pol icy .  vVhatever the role  of such 
policy ,  or  the sources thereof that are cognizable ,  i n  the creation o r  
application of federal common law, 1 7 1 i t  i s  appropriate t o  consi d er 
potential procedural costs  in  determining whether federal preclu­
s ion law will  b e  uniform or episodic .  1 7'2 
In sum,  under tradi t ional  federal common law analys is ,  the  
rules of c la im preclusion governing a federal court  j ud gment adjudi ­
cating matters of federal l aw are  within federal competence. M ore­
over, the problems of adminis trabi l i ty ,  for courts and l i t igants ,  that  
would a ttend a regim e  of borrowed s tate law-problems that  in­
c lude the poss ible  loss  of federal subs tantive rights-support uni­
form federal rules .  The federal courts need not  wri te  on a c lean 
s la te .  Their rules ,  i f  known i n  advance, should p revent the inadver­
tent loss of any state substantive right s .  
Under a Rules o f  Decis ion Act  approach , difi1culry arises only i f  
the Act i s  in terpreted to  require tha t  the  precise content ,  rather than 
the creation,  of uniform federal common law ru les be " required " by 
the  Constitution or ac t s  of Congress .  Noth ing in  th e language of 
the A c t ,  however, compels that in terpretation ,  even ·,vhen s tate law,  
normally applicable, i s  d isplaced becaus e i t  i s  hosti le t o  o• incons i s­
tent with federal interes t s .  1 ; :-> When the appl ication of s tate law 
threa tens federal  substantive rights , the sources of lhose rights re­
q uire otherwise  than that state law aoplv . 1 7-' � j_ � ' 
Uniform federal preclusion rules mus t b e  cons i s tent with fed ­
eral s ubs tantive l a w ,  but  they ne1:-d n o t  he l imited t o  i t s  pro t ec tion . 
For tlv: res u l ts under the Rules of Decision .-\c t  1 1 1  i h ts  c o n t e x t .  · ;ce uifm t ex t  a cc·: ;mpanv­
ing n o tes l 73 - 7 4 .  
1 7 0 See. r.g . Wilson \'. Garcia.  l 0 ?'• S .  C t .  l 93i< { I  085!  \ u n i form k·dc:-al c l ;araclcriz�•-
t i o n  c>f civi l  righ t s  clai m:; Cor p u rpnscs of s l a t e  ! uni t ;! l ions law borro•.,cd under ·�? t) . S . C .  
s 1 9138 ( l 982i ) .  
! 7 i Ser i; fm tcx:. accompa nving n o t e s  1 S l -9 :i & ?9 1-30 1 .  
l 7 �: Federal procedurai pol icv 11 i th respecl  to the scope of '  the in i Lia! :J.ct ion i s .  in t h i :;  
a s pect ;  inder ern1in a t c .  Sri! FED.  R .  (� n· .  P .  l 8 ( a ) ;  n;j)·a n o t e  1 7 6 ;  t ex t  ::;ccuiT:panying :HJ t c  
1 97 .  but tt  i s  not  clear t h a t  rhc  unif'ormi t '  in(ju ir'. I !Ccci. o r  L h < P  i ;  s h o u l d .  be c;:1 h i r:ed b '  
c:.: : s t tng fcd eral lJ.\, .. .  �:f oreover, precl u s i o n  l ;r �\· �Jfl�:c t �  h t i g:u ion qr::neg:· and H L.!Y �1frect 
the 'Cope o f l i tigJ.cion i n  a rn;m n c r  comran· to « p o i i c• < • l  the rendering c o u n  ; i ;;; L >peaks 
u r1 iy  t o  t h e  I n i t ia l  act ion.  SeF infi·a notes l 9 S 8..: :!·! '2 :  Yl't _/u r//;t .. · · nJ/ tft i. t: X t  a rcni t1 p a n \· Ing 
! ��� -rhe R u l es (Jf f)c·cis ion .-\.c t  is  :-; c t.  fo rth :;,:j;ut n o t e  1 t"} .  
!. 7 - f  Sa De!Costcl l o  ,. _ I n t e rn ;n ional  E h d  n C  1 ·.·e� m s l t'!·o . -Jii'2 L S .  1 5 1 .  ! �>()  n l :\ 
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When required to displace s tate law,  federal j ud ges have the power 
to fashion a subs titute that is fully adequate in  l ight o f  a l l  of  the 
policies and interes ts that a common law court would consider in 
making law to govern the matter . 1 75 They need not  bl ind them­
selves to the procedural opportunities afforded by the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure nor to the capacity of  preclus ion doc trine to 
lessen the burdens of l it igation on courts and parties .  But ,  at the 
same time, they should not confuse s tated opportunities with s tated 
requirements nor in their quest  for j udicial  economy see i n  the Fed­
eral Rules of Civi l  Procedure support for preclusion rules that  i s  not  
there . 1 7(; 
c .  Claim Preclusion: Defenses and Cou nterclaims . C laim preclusion 
includes defenses to rights asserted under the substantive law.  1 7 7 
Where federal rights are asserted in federal court ,  the federa l  inter­
est in defining b oth those d efenses and the circumstances in which 
they are precluded is patent .  There is no  scope for variat ion if a 
federal judgment is regarded as a reposi tory of federal subs tantive 
rights . 1 78 In addition and for the same reason,  uniform fed eral la\v 
is  required for the definit ion of the circumstances in which a subse­
quent suit by the defendant in  a federal action adj udicating federal 
rights should be precluded because such suit ,  if success ful ,  would 
nullify the federal judgment o r  impair  rights establ i shed by it .  1 7() 
The tendency of modern law is to broaden the scope of re­
quired counter-demands .  ! ilo As a result ,  arguments for u niform fed ·· 
eral rules do not res t  comfortably on the need to protect  the 
substantive righ ts embodied in the federal judgmen t .  In this in­
s tance, a Federal Rule of Civil Procedur e  appears w speak directly 
·----------- ------ - -
1 75 " Federal common ! a 11· i m p l ements t h e  kder�d C o n :; t i t u r ion and l "cd eral S L\ l u t e > .  
a n d  i s  condi tioned b1 them. \Yi t h i n  t h e :; e  1 i mit5 ,  federal courts a r e  free t o  apply t l H .: 
tra d i tional  common-Lm· t ec h n iqu e or deci s i o n  and to dra11 upon a l l  the s o u rces of the 
common la11 . . ' "  IY Oench. Duhrnc & Co. v .  Federal Depo s i t  I n�, . Cc>�·p . .  3 l  :i U . S .  
4 4 7 ,  4 7 2  ( ! 942)  U acks o n .  J . .  c:oncuiTi n g- )  ( footnote  o m i t t e d ) .  Ser td. a t  -Hi�l- 7 0 ,  quoirrl 
supm note 1 1 2 : R e d i s h .  supm n o t e  l 7 .  a t  964 . 
1 7 (i Cj 01\'Cn E q u i p .  & Erection C o .  1 .  !\.roger.  4 3 7  tT .S  36.5.  3 7 0  ( l 97 R J  ( FED .  R .  
Crv.  1 ' .  l4(a )  permits claim b 1  plain t i ff a g·<t i ns t third-panv defendant  b u t  does n u t  pur­
port lO and could not determine quest ion of' subject mat ter jurisdict iun i .  
FED. R .  C11 · .  P .  l R . 'luot,•d injin n o t e  1 \) 7 .  could not pm,· i d c  a ,. �1 ! i d  rule o f prccl us i < , n .  
See !11) i a  text accomp�trl\lng n o r.es I R 1 -S G .  \ l o rcme r .  Car !':·om c:,prcs ;; ing a p n l i c: >  i n  
fi1 1·or of broad clatm preclus i o n .  t h e  R u l e  is  bY i t s  t erms indifrcrcn t .  I 1  me::; .  rh crcl()rt". 
pr01e a trap for the unw:\ry l i t i g·a n t .  �l l id  its p re cl u s ion i nq;l ica t ions  11· u u l d  doub t lcs c; 
have come as a surprise to t h e  Co ngrcS.'i that  al lo11Td i t  lo go i n to effe ct .  
! 7 7 
1 7 :-l 
1 7!) For t h e  trea t m ent or t h i s  pr( ) b l c m  in do:nC"S i ic !ail . . i t: <� Rr:sT.-\ lT. :,a : :'T ( S EC'Y< D )  
O F  juDC\lE:-.:Ts s 2 2 ( 2 ) ( b ) ( i ()8 2 ) :  ! 8 \\ I< i C I IT. \ l tLLEi\ &: CooPu<. su/m; n o t e  'J .  (: -l -! 1 -L 
1 8 0 Srt R. \ ! t t.L\ R ,  C t n t .  PRO C E D U R E  OF T i l E  TRL\ L  C :o t .RT r :-; H t sTo:n c; L  P;.:t,S PEC· 
T ! V E  ! 23-:!.:9 ( 1 9 :):2)  
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to the problem Y ' 1 B u t  Rule 1 3  (a)  raises more quest ions than i t  
answers . 
d .  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Federal Common Law . 
Those who drafted the original Federal Rules o f  Civi l  Procedure 
were not notably concerned about questions of power.  They shared 
no conception of the l imi tat ions imposed on their enterprise by the 
Rules Enabl ing Act.  In cases that they regarded as c lose ,  members 
of the Advisory Committee tended to rely on the Supreme Court to 
preserve them from error. 1 82 It i s  s triking, therefore , that the Com­
mittee rej ected as exceeding  i t s  authority the s trongly urged sugges­
tion that its class action rule should i nclude a provis ion as  to the 
preclusive effects of a judgment on  persons n o t  p ar ti es . 1 8'3 More­
over, a l though Rule 1 4  originally incl uded a provis i o n  on preclusive 
effects ,  the Committee deleted that provis ion in 1 94 6  as beyond the 
rulemaking p ower. 1 84 
O n  both  occasions ,  the Committee was correc t .  Read i n  the 
l ight  of i ts  his tory ,  the Enabl ing Act  does n o t  authorize Federal 
Rules that predi ctably and directly affect rights claimed under the 
substantive l aw. 1 85 Aside from the fac t  that i t  governs procedure i n  
the renderi n g  court,  which lacks the power final ly  to  determine the 
preclusive effects of i t s  judgment ,  Rule 1 3  (a)  does not  i n  so many 
words and could not  val idly provide a rule of preclus ion .  I ndeed,  
the apparent inflexib i l i ty of the Rule provides a case s tudy for differ-
1 8 1 
,-\ p l ead ing shal l  s tate as a counterclaim am claim which  a t  t h e  t ime 
o f  sen ing the p leading t h e  pleader has agains t  am o p p o s m g  party ,  i f  i t  
a rises o u t  of  t h e  transact ion or occurrence that  is  the s u b j ec t  mat ter  of  
Lhe opposing partY ' s  c la im and d oes 1 1 0 t  require for i t s  a dj ud i ca t ion the  
presence of t h ird part i e s  of ll' h o m  th e court  cannot  acqutre j uri sd ic t ion .  
But  t he pleader n e e d  not  s ta te  t h e c l a i m  i f  ( l )  at  t h e  t i m e  t h e  act ion \\·as 
c o mmenced t h e  cla i m  \\·as t h e  subj ec t  of another pending ac t ion .  or (� )  
t h e  opposing party brought su i t  upon h i s  c la im b y  a t tachment or  o ther 
process by which the court d id  not  �Kq uire j uri sdic t ion t o  render a p er­
sonal  j u d gm en t  on t ha t  c lai m .  and the pleader is not  s t a t i n g  anY coun ter­
c l a i m  under this  Rule 1 3 .  
F m .  R .  Cl\ . P .  l 3 ( a J .  
See Burbank. Rules Ennblwg . lrl. sujno n o t e  8 7 .  a t  l 1 3  l - en . 
s·w id . at l l (i4 n . 6 3 7 .  
1 8-+ A ! 94 6  amendment  to Rule  I -1 d e l eted t h e  fol l o 11 ing sentence :  "Th e third-pan y 
, j e fcndant  is bound b1 the a d j u d i c a t i o n  of t h e  th ird-part\ pla inufr s  l iab i l i tv  to the pla in­
t t f!'. as \\'e l l  a s  o f  his  m m  t o the p la m t ilT or to the  t hircl -panv p l a i n t iff. " 3 J. i'vl o O R E .  
\ l o O iu: ' s  Fi:. DER.\L PlnCTICE l l ..f  . 0  l l  I 1 .  a t  1 -1 - 7  ( :..' d eel I �)8-l ) .  Accord i n g  to  the Ac!vi­
'; o n  C o m m i t t ee.  the sentence 11·as " s tricken from Rule 1 -i ( a ) .  nut  to ch a ng':' the la11 . b u t  
because i h c  s c r l lcncc s t ates a rule of  substan t i \ e Lm· ,,·h tch is n o t  w i t h i n  t h e  scope of a 
procedural rule . I t  is no t  t he purpose of t h e r u l e:- to q a t c  the cllcct of a j u dgmen t . "  !d. 
;: l -J. .  0 I [  :l l .  at 1 ·� - I 1 . 
l c-\5 See Rurb;m k .  Ruin Fuoli!lng . l rl. l l ljnn note () / ,  at l l :! l -3 1 .  For  :1 remarkable rnis-
IT<tdi n g  of t h e  i m p l i c a t i o ns of tm v;ork 1 1 1  t h i s  co n t e x t .  sec '; o t c .  l !ljno note :..' �) .  at ] :', �() 
n . < J9 .  
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ences i n  s tandards of val idity o f  Federal Rules a n d  federal common 
lavv· in cases involving federal substantive rights . 1 8G 
Federal Rules of Civil  Procedure are not ,  however, i rrelevant .  
The Rules Enabling Act  authorizes the  Supreme Court to p romul­
crate " general "-that  is ,  uniform-Federal Rules of practice and 1:> 
procedure . Such Rules cannot by the exp ress  terms of the Act 
"abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive righ t . " 1 87 Valid Fed­
eral Rul es displace s tate law u nder the Rules of Decis ion Act not  
because they are "Acts of Congress" but  because they are p rovided 
for by an act of Congress and one ,  moreover, that was enacted after 
the Rules of Decision Act . 1 1-l8 In authorizing the Court to promul­
gate Federal Rules ,  Congress must  have contemplated that the fed­
eral courts would in terpret them, fil l  their inters tices ,  and ,  when 
necessary ,  ensure that their provis ions were not frus trated by o ther 
legal rul es . 1 HD That does not  mean that the fed eral courts  are free to 
create uniform federal decis ional  law or displace particular s tate law 
rules in  areas untouched by the Federal Rules . I \JO Nor does it  mean 
that the federal courts can create federal common law on the basis  
of pol ic ies not val idly the concern o f  Federal Rules .  1 � J  1 I t  does 
mean , however, that when the Supreme Court has exercis ed the 
power delegated by Congress to prescribe uniform Federal Rules ,  
we should regard those Rules , i f  val id ,  as if  they  were acts  o f  Con­
gress .  In  effect ,  they are ass imilated to the Enabl ing Act  for pur­
poses of the Rules of Decis ion Act .  Because Federal Rules cannot 
val idlv provide for the creation of federal common l;:nv-Rule 83 in  
I SG Ser Burb;\ I lk .  Rulr.1 Enabl111g .·/ct. supm n o t e  87 .  ;:ll 1 1 9:5: Bttrb;m k .  Sane/tons. suino 
note 8 7 .  at 1 00 7 - 1 0 : B u rba nk , Proposals /(} . l lllrnd Hule 68- Titlll' to . I L•r1 1 1 rlo11 S!t/j;. J l) l' . 
M I C H .  J. L  R E F .  4 2 5 .  -! 3 7  - 3 8  ( 1 986)  
1 87 28 L S . C.  § 2 0 7 2  ( 1 98 2 )  
1 88 Sec. I' ,g . . E h . supm note J 7 .  at 7 1  H & n . l 3-! . 
l 89 See Cooper \' .  Fed era l Reser\e Ba n k  of Richmond.  1 0-! S. C t .  � 7�>-! . �SO l -O:\ 
( 1 984) :  .:\lllerican Pipe & C o n s t r .  Co. \ .  L' t a h ,  4 1 -1 L' . S .  5:5 S .  5 5 1 .  5 1 :1 - :)-! , :) .'19 ( l (} /4 ) :  
Tullock \ .  \ l u h ;me.  1 8-t l · . s  -! 9 7 .  5 1 2 - 1 3  ( 1 90 � ) :  h:ro e t z  \ . . -\ FT- D;n ic !son C o , 1 0 � 
F . R . D .  9�H . 9 3 6  ( E . D . \i .Y.  J q8-! ) Cf. C h ;,rclon \ ' .  Fu m ero S u t o .  -Hi:? C . S .  li :) O .  l i S ! & 
n . 5  l ( l 98 c) )  ( i n  a c t i o n  gm ernecl IJI -!2 U . S .  C. § l 9SS ( J 9 8 :.? ) ,  d i s p b ccmct l l  uf s l <l t c  t o l l ­
i n g  ru i c  n o t  necess�tr\' t o  protect  federa l i n teres t expressed i n  F r n .  R .  C : t \· .  P .  � :) ) .  " B u t  
there i s  n o  rea son 1dw preempt i\'C l a w m a k i n g  could n o t  al>o b e  based o n  t h e  need t n  
pres erve o r  effe c t u a t e  p(J l ic ies  anicula t c d  b\· federa l  courts p u rs u a n t  t o  del egated lal,· ­
making. ' "  \ l crri l l .  i lljJJ :t n o t e �! :.? .  ; t t  58 n . 24 7: .\ 1/jJm note 1 20 .  
F o r  a \ · ic\1' o l'.·i mntmn PljJt a s  i mp l\' in g grea t er freedo m to fas h i on kder;l l  }a·,, t h< J i l  
that  suggested i n  t he text.  see Bou rne , supra note J 7. ;t t -!9 1 -� ) :.? .  Bu/ .lt'l' j ( l l t n son \" . R ;l i i ­
\Va\· Express .-'l.gen c1 . I n c  . . -1 2 1  L. S .  -! 54 .  -tGG-67 ( 1 9 7 5 )  (s uggesting t m p " rt <tncc o f  "relc-
\ an t  bo dv o f  f(:cl uai procedural  la\\ to gui d e .  . decis ion " ) .  
T h e  anah s i s  t il  t h e  t e x t  can h e  exten d ed t o  l o cal  ru le .> o t' court p r o n n d ga L::.:d p u r s u ­
ant  to 2 8  L . S . C. § :.? 0 7 1 ( i �182 ) . Str B urbank,  1 1 1/Hil n o t e  t ,  a t  G %  n . :)( ) :  1 1 1ji'o n o : c  � i'i :.? .  
I \JO For rej ec l l < J n  of unitorm i t \· as  an a rgu m e n t  for j ud g e - m a d e  federal  rult'S o f  p m ­
cecl u re .  gin:n the E n a b l i n g  .\u , see R ed is h & Phi l l i p s .  supm n o t e  1 7 . at  �)q() n . l X-L 
1 D 1 Sa utjm l <.::-: t accom p<m yi n g  n otes 1 94 - 9 5 .  
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that aspect is  invalid 1 D�-they are sources o f  p ower only i f, fairly 
read. they may be said to require i t .  
Federal Rules of C ivil  Procedure can thus serve as sources o f  
federal common law, no t  only by leaving inters tices t o  be fil led b u t  
also by expressing policies t h a t  are pertinent in  areas not  covered by 
the Rules .  Even when legal regulation in a certain area is forbidden 
to the Rules , the pol icies underlying valid Rules may help to shape 
val id federal common law. 1 9 '1 But ,  when a Rule speaks to ,  and only 
to ,  a matter with which i t  has no proper concern, i t  i s  a troublesome,  
if  not  a boots trap operat ion to invoke the Rule as legal jus tification 
for a federal common la\v rule tha t effects the same purpose .  Rule 
1 3  serves as an apt  example .  
Rule  1 3  was modelled after Rule  30 o f  the Supreme Court ' s  
Equity Rules o f  1 9 1 2 ,  which a lso contained a compulsory counter­
claim provis ion.  According to the Court in a case involving Rule 30,  
" [ t] hat which grows out of the subj ect-matter o f  the bi l l  must  b e  set  
up in the in teres t of an end of lit igation . "  1 94 Although the Advisory 
C ommittee refrained from s tating a rule of preclus ion in the text of 
Rule 1 3 (a) , i t  cited that opinion and o ther authori ty  for the conclu­
s ion that " [i ] f  the action proceeds to j udgment ·without the in terpo­
s i tion of a counterclaim as required by subdivis ion (a) of  this rule ,  
the counterclaim i s  barre d . "  1 0 :; 
I t  was natural for the Advisory Committee to preserve the 
mandatory language of the Equity Rule.  And,  part icularly a t  a t ime 
I �� � !he l a s t  sen te nce o f  fED. R .  Cl\· .  P .  8 3 ,  as amended m 1 98 5 .  pro v i d e s :  " I n  a l l  
c a s e s  not p ro l·iclcd Cor bv rul e ,  the district  j u d ges and magis trates may regu l a t e  t h e i r  
practice i n  ;:. n y  m a n n e r  n OI .  i n co n s i s t e n t  w i th these  rules or t h o s e  o f  the dis trict in which 
t hev ac t . "  For su gges t ion;; t h a t  t h e  Ruie  is  i n v a l i d .  s e e  B u rbank, Rules E11abling . l rl. supra 
n o t e  8 7 ,  ' ' t ! 1 �1 3  tl . i- tl ;  Bur b a n k ,  Sonrlio11s. mJHa note 87 ,  at 998 n . 2 .  For ful l  d iscussion 
or that  q ues t i on . including a n  <HJ ::!lvs is  o r  t h t' v iei'.'S and p u rp o s es or the o rigi nal  A. clvisorv 
Commiu ce, sec R11fl's Enabli11g . lei of 1 985: flem ing on H R  . .?633 a n d  3550 Brfor!' ihr Sub­
c o nt llz. o u  Courts. c;,,,) ribatirs and the :!dm in. ojjustiCf of the Howe Co111 111. ,,n t!tr.Judina ry. 99 t h 
Con g . ,  l st Sess .  2·1<� l ( 1 98:; )  ( l c t teJ- from S tephen B . B u rb a n k  to Co m m i t t e e on Rules 
of Pra c t ice a n d  Proce d u re (Feb.  '.!. 7 .  1 984 ) ) .  
I ' 1 :\ Ser cases ci t ecl supm note i 8 9 .  See also C. WRIGHT, supra n o t e  56.  § 7?. .  'H -! 8 3  ( t o  
p e rm i t  person o p t i n g  o u t  o f  c l a s s  certified under FED.  R .  C 1\·. P .  23 (b)  t o  r e l v  o n  
i·a 1 orablc .J U d gment for p r e c l u s i o n  p urposes . .  ,,, o u J d  make a m o c k e n  o f' t h e  ( b i ( 3 )  
t1nJ<:eclure ' ' ) . 
I ' l-1 A.merican \ ! i l i s  C o .  1· . American S u r.  C o . ,  '.!.GO U . S .  360, 36'1 ( l 92'.!.) . 
' �1 "' :3 . J .  M o o R :·: , supm n o t e  1 84 .  1i r : : Ul l [ 2 J ,  at 1 3 -8 .  St·e also Baker 1 .  G o l d  Seal Li-
quors . Inc  . .  -L\ 7  FS. -HI / .  4G9 n . ! ( 1 97-l ) :  S o u them Cons t r .  C o . , . .  Picka r d ,  37 1 l' . S .  5 7 .  
(j() ( l ()(i:2 )  (per curiam) 
A. n t l e  l ike i 'l (a)  migh t be a n i m a t e d  b1· procedura l  purposes ,,· j r.h in  the contcmpta·  
t ion o r  the Rule:; Enab l i n g  :\ct .  For i n s t �l l lCC,  o n e  might  concl u d e  that  the aclj u d i c1 l i l) ll 
n l clai t !"l:i ha•: >ng t h e  prescribed rela t ionship c o u l d  result in m u rc <\ ccur:: t c  L1n f i n d i n g  i n .  
::�n<i a m o r e  just  resolution of. the  i n i t i a l  act t o n .  Cf Brune! . .  · !  S!l!dr i n  r/11' . - lllomltOii '�! 
.'i'rnr,-rjurl!ciof J?,-_,o : u Ci's: ?J1e Fjfioewr of F!'dnai ln/tio.'t'l l ii0/1 Cn!rmt. l � C.'• . . L. R t:\· .  70 I .  7 1 ·1 
t i Sl 7� ) ( j o inder clcl' i ccs  . . ,houid pro\·idc the coun with more mi:-Jnnat iun a b o u t  c<ld: 
I ild lY idual  cl�� irn .  rc\·e:.� ahng s t rengths and '.•:caknesses ' ' ) .  
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when compulsory counter-demands were n o t  common, i t  was help­
ful for the Supreme Court to s ignal in  its Equity Rules an intent to 
depart from the norm . But none of this renders Rule 1 3 (a )  legal 
support for a federal common lav·i rule . 1 96 If that is to be done, i t  
must  be jus tified on the grounds that the Rule,  i tself  not  having the 
proscribed effect ,  is val id and that  Congress ,  alerted to the preclu­
sion implications of the Rule ,  nevertheless fai led to block it .  At least  
Rule 1 3 (a ) ,  unlike Rule 1 8 (a) , 1 �J 7 alerts l i tigants to the poss ibi l i ty of 
losing claims if they do not  assert them in the in i tia l  federal action. 
Unless Rule 1 3 (a) supports creation of a u niform federal com­
mon law rule of compulsory counterclaims in  federal actions adj u di­
cating federal subs tantive rights , the argument for such a rule mus t  
rest on the  difficulty in supervising a system of borrowed state law 
and the problems posed for l i tigants by such a system. If that argu­
ment prevai l s ,  the uniform rule may be fashioned with Rule l 3 (a) m 
mind .  In  either even t ,  any such rule should admit  of exceptions m 
addi tion to those required by the substantive law. 1 98 
1 96 On th<: probicm of i ncorpora t ing pre-exis t ing " federal  law" bevond the power o f  
the ruiema kers to bshion i n  th e first  ins tance i n  Federal Rules of  Ci\ i !  Procedure, s e c  
Burbank.  Rules Ennbling .·Jrt. s!ipm note 8 7 ,  a t  1 1 4 7 - 5 7 .  
1 9 7  "A partv a s s c nin g a claim to  relief a s  a n  onginal c l a i m .  counterc la im,  cross-
claim, or third-panY claim, mav join, either as indcpendem o r  a s  a l te rn a t e claims, as 
manv claims.  legal, equitable ,  or mar i t ime,  as h e  has agai nst  an oppos ing p a rt y . "  FED. R. 
Crv. P .  1 8 ( a ) .  See C ommercial Box & Lumb er Co. v.  U n i roy;1 l ,  I n c . ,  623 F.2d 3 7 1 .  3 7 4  
n . 2  (5th C: i r. 1 980) ; Degnan . wpm n o t e  3 .  a t  7 6 4 .  
1 98 In Cavanaugh \". Western M d .  R v . ,  729 F.2d 289 (4th  C i r . ) ,  m i. de11 1rd, 1 05 S .  C t .  
222 ( 1 984 ) ,  the court rej ected p la i mi lf railroad engineer's conte n t iou that  the Federal 
E mp l oyers '  Liabi l i t y .-\c t  does n o t  permit a defendant rai lroad to ass ert a counterclaim 
for p ro pertv da ma ge 1 1 1  t h e  ernpltwce"s action for persona l  i n j u ries under the ,-\ct .  The 
coun re-lied in part o n  the bet that .  i f  n o t  perm i t ted i n  the  em pl m ee ' s act ion,  the claim 
would be barred bv rea s o n  o f  Rule i 3 ( a ) .  Src ;d. a t  29 i .  Al th o ugh the court ad ver ted to 
possible consti tut io nal obJ e ct ions to s u ch a result ,  srr 1d.  n . 5 ,  it d id  no t comidcr the 
pos s i b i l i t v  that a fed eral  common law rnle o f  preclus ion,  wa i ,·er , o r  es toppe l would ac­
count for the inabi l i ty  o f  the rai l road , bv reason o f  the i n ter pret a t ion o f  the F E LA .  to 
assert i ts  cl a i m in the suit lJ\ t he emplovee. The court \ argu m e n t  was.  of  course,  3 
boo ts trap , b u t  i t  W3s a boots trap encouraged by the general pm·env of an alysis  of Rule 
1 3 (a) 
O n  the use of Rule 1 3 ( a ) t o  cTcdte a wan'tT or estoppel ,  sec ,  e.g. , Dindo , . .  'Wh i tney ,  
4 5 1  F . :2 d  1 ,  3 ( I  s t  C: ir. 1 9 7 1  i ;  \\"ngh t ,  Estoppel By Rule: The Compul\ol�l Citu! lorlaun [ 'udn 
Jforlnn Plmding, 38 M i i\�; L. Rc:\ · .  4 :! 3  ( 1 954 ) .  The au th o r of t h a t  ;::n i c l e  obs erve:; :  
Can a neater ex amp l e  b e  imag· ined of" t h e  impossibi l i t Y  o f  s e n s i b l e  dis t inc­
t ions be t wee n " subs tance"  a n d  " proced ure" ) C o m p u l s o r\ countercla im 
provisions ;1re e n a n e d  as a regulat ion of " p rocedure , "  and i n deed i f, a s  
in most  J U r i s d i c t i o n s ,  t h e '  h a v e  been mad e  by rules  of  c o u rt ,  they a r e  
\"a l i d  o n l v  as regula t ion  o f  "p1 ocedurc' "  \,·h ich m u s t  l e:ne n gh t s uf "sctb­
stancc" u n impa i r e d .  Yet  their efl'en:; are held t o  be exrra- tcrri tori:; l  on 
the expl ic i t  ground that  t hc�e effects arc · ·· subs tJnLi v c . "  
ld. at  --L) 6 .  \Vi t h  t hese \· i e w :� ,  ccl lnparc,  in addi t ion Lo the  ar:a ly.s i s  1 n  the  t e� t :  
In rccognlznt g  t h ('  J n t crdcpcndcnce of procedure and s td) s � zn-; cc . . i t  i s  
n o t  n e c c :s s a r:-· .  a l though i t  mav b e  com-en i e n t ,  to rej ect t h e  u t i l i t v  o f  a m  
at tempt  t u  dc\clnp ru les  u r  s tandards of c l a > s i iicat ion for c o u rt ru lemak-
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e .  Issue Preclusio n .  Against this background,  we need n o t  pause 
long over the la'v governing the issues precluded by  a federal court 
judgment adjudicating matters of federal substantive bw.  To the 
extent that  redeterminat ion o f  i ssues  adjudicated in the federal ac­
t ion migh t  al ter the substantive rights embodied in  the judgment , 
there i s  a federal in terest i n  furnishing the rules . 1 �J9 I n  addi t ion,  the 
rights that  a l i t igant may lose through adj udicat ion in the federal 
action include fed eral rights not asserted in the o ri ginal action .  
There i s  a federal in teres t in  ensuring that the rules employed are 
sensit ive w considerations that  might make tha t  loss  unj us t . :::oo The 
difficu lt ies o f  supervis ing a sys tem o f  borrowed s ta te lavv and the 
potential costs of such a sys tem are comparable to those discussed 
in connection with c la im p reclus ion . :::0 1  Moreover, the existence of 
val id uniform federal rules  o f  claim preclus ion furnishes an addi­
t ional argument for the same regime as to i s sue preclusion . To the 
extent p ossible ,  l i tigants and the courts should not  have to conform 
their l i tigation conduct  or their decisions to two separate bodies o f  
preclus ion law . ::: o::: 
One aspect of i ssue p reclusion, however, d eserves  closer scru­
t iny .  After a federal court a dj udicates matters of federal law,  the 
ques t ion may arise whether s trangers to tha t act ion can use Endings 
in i t ,  defensively or o ffensively ,  in subsequent l i t igation agams t  one 
i n g  p u rposes .  I t  1 s  nc c essarv t o  a ccep t t h a t. a l l • J Gi t i n n  rules .  l ike o t h e r  
legal  rules.  w i l l  not appropriatelv adj u s t  t h e  compe t i ng yol ici�s a n d  i n t er­
ests  in all of the cases to wh ich ther arc applied.  \\'c s h o u l d .  of co u rse , be 
alen to t h e  dangers of labe l s .  \'\'e sh ou l d ques t i o n  "·h c thcr form;1 l i s m  
exac t s  t o o  heavv a p ri ce w h e n  the ques tion i s  �Vho s h ould dec i de . B t t l  \\'L' 
should not  conti n ue to h ide behind the dangers "·h ! ! e  pre t e n d i n g io per­
fo rm a task mandated b y  Congres s .  
Burbank,  Nulcs Fnabl/ng . Jrt. supra n o t e 8 7 .  a t 1 1 8 8  ( footno i c  orn i u cd ) .  
1 � � q  (.[. 1\.essler v .  Eldred . 206 U.S. 285 ( 1 90 7 )  (patent  i n fr ingemen t -;ui t  aga i n s i  cus­
tomer o f  1· ictorious defend a n t  i n  pn:vious s uch s u i t viobtcs ri gh t  establ ished b;·  judg­
I ll C tl i  i n  L:n r u ) :  .wpm t e x t  accompanving no te 7 8 .  ' ' Fi n a l i t Y .  repose a n d  rel iance arc 
often cent ered on a col loquial  sense of the ' ri gh t s ' establ ished h v  a j u d gmcnt  t l lJl  c a n  he 
ex pressed onlv t h rou gh binding d e t e r m i n a t i o n  o f' issues t h<l l c a n n o t  be recxammed 
mcre lv  beca u s e  a ne\\' claim . can he i d e n t i f ied . "  IH W !" C: i iT . .  \ l i LLER & CooPE R ,  
.>11/}1(< n o t e  5 ,  § 4 4 6 7 .  at  6 3 2 - 3 3 .  
F o r  a rcccnL case m w h i c h  the S upreme C o u rt appears to h<J •;e proceeded on t h e  
\· i e1,· t h a t  ! 'ederal prcdw:ion law governs t he i s s u e  prec l u s i H·  cfl'ects o i  o n e  of i t s  O l\ 1 1  
deci s i o n s .  rendered in a case o r i ginat ing i n  a s t a te c o u n . :i c c  Limbach 1· .  Hom"C!l & 
A.l l i > r m  Cu . . 466 L' . S .  3 5 3 ,  3 6 1 - 6 2  ( 1 984 ) .  
:.!OO For t h e  trcatn1ent o f  s u c h  n1 a t ters i n  a donH:.' S L i c  c o n t e x t ,  s e e  R LST .. \TE:'.I E�T ( S Ec-
o;-.;o) O F  jL'UGMEYrs § 28 ( l 9H 2 ) ;  !S \VRIC! !T. \I I I . I .ER & CooPER . .  wpm n o i e  :�> . �§ 4 1 2 2 -
� G  
� O l Sl't S i i/Jm t e x t  accompanving n o t e s  l 5 4 - i 2  . .  -\s ' u ggc-; ! i \c of '  t h e  r i -; k  to l i t igan t s  
fro:n gue s s i n g  ''Tong.  consider poss ible  vari a t i o n s  i n  s t a l.c b1·; on t h e  q u e s t i o n  ,,· h c th t: r  
actual l i t i ga t ion is  � i  requ irement of i s su e precl us ion.  Cot!iixn-r \'cs t a l .  'f'hl' Rntrt!r·iill'llf 1 S,., ­
ond I of.fi/((fi"il'lil.': . I .\ forirs t Dis.ltnl .  Gl1 CoR:\ ELL L .  l� E' . -Hi-1 ( l 0R I )  , , . J :r l-b z:-t rd . .  l ! ljlm 
n o te t\ 0 .  a\  :=, i -+ - S G  . 
. 'if'l' .iilj>m n o t e  60.  
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of the parties . J urisdictions differ o n  this  quest ion,  tradit ionally 
treated under th e rubric o f  mutualitv of estoppel . e!03 Following a 
vigorous and highly successful attack on mutuality ,  there n o w  seems 
to be doubt  about  the wis d o m  o f  the revoluti o n . e!o-t F o r  our p u r­
poses , the ques tion is not  the wisdom o f  this or that  rul e ,  b u t  
whether federal o r  s tate l a w  governs t h e  matter where a federal 
court d e termined issues of federal la\, . .  
O n  this quest ion,  recent S up reme Court authority sugge s ts , i f  i t  
does n o t  compel ,  the answn that un iform fed eral l avv· govern s .  The 
first case in this recent seri e s .  Blonder- Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. Cn l­
·oenlty of Illinois Foundation, e!W• demons trated that the choice b e tween 
mutuality or nonmutuality as  to fed eral issues a dj u dicated i n  a fed ­
eral action m a y  implicate s u b s tantive fed eral policie s .  I n  a pp roving 
defensive nonmu tual i ssue p reclusion in patent l i ti gat ion,  t h e  C ourt 
relied in p art on those p o licies and in p art o n  considerations o f  effi­
ciency a s  regards parties and j ud icial a dminis trati o n . C!Ot> But  the 
Court h a d  already concluded that federal la\V govern e d ,  n o t  relying 
on the fac t  that in both actions involved in Blonder- Tongue t h e  fe d eral 
courts h a d  exclus ive j urisdict ion or o therwis e  j u s tifying uniform fed ­
eral law (as  opposed t o  fed er;:d - laiY-in-res erve) . In a foo t n o t e ,  t h e  
Court laconically obs erved t h a t  " [i ] n  fed eral-quest ion c a s e s ,  the l avv 
applied i s  federal law , " e!OI a n d  cited in support an equally laconic 
remark in one of its  own decisi o n s .  a la\v review art ic le  a n d  cases 
cited therein . 2°K There the matter has res ted . In the i n terim the 
C ourt has d ecided , as  a matter o f  uniform federal law,  that  offensive 
nonmutual issue preclusion i s  available in a federal action a gai n s t  a 
companv that had l o s t  an act ion brought in federal  court  by the 
S E C'20q and that n onm utual o ffensive issue p reclusion d o es n o t  ap­
ply agai n s t  the United States . :.> l l l 
'20 �\ Ser grneml!r R r-: sT.\TDIE .:\T ( S r:c :o :--m )  OF j t  LJC \I E:\TS � 29 ( 1 92 2 ) :  1 2  \ \.RICl !T. 
:\1 Iu.ER & CoOPER, sujim n o t e  .'i . � �  .f- H i:3- l i :) .  
'20-t See. e.g. . Gree n .  The fnohllliY of Ofjrll , l i 'f' C:of!otrml Lstnpprl In Fu/ji/1 1 ls hmn l ' r ·  . l n 
E\onu twlt/ 1!1 of 1:·_, /ojJjJe! 1 1 1  . J. ,!J,._, /os l.t ltga/ lo ! l .  7 0  ! 011 . \  L. Rn· .  I -l l  ( l C)l',.f ) .  
:.> o s  - f O �  l' . S .  ') 1 3  ( ! �1 7 1 )  
:.> o t ;  Sa 1d. �H cl 28-50 .  
'2 0 7 !d. : t t  3 2-t n . l 2 .  
:!OK This Court h a s  n o t e d .  " " I t  kt.s been h e l d  in 1 1 0 1 1 -d iH-rs i t \  cas e s .  s i n c e  Ltii' 
!d. 
. that  t h e  fecler�d courts 11 i l l  a p p h  t h e i r  o '''�' rule of 1es ; ud1co!rl . . .  
Jlnm 1 .  J l 'oodmjf. :l'-.!.7 l" S .  7 2 6 .  7 �\ 'l ( 1 C)cJ (i ) .  Sec a l s o  \ 'cs t a l .  R c; Judi ­
c a c a/ Prcc l u s i o n  lw Judgme n t .  ! 'he Lt11· A.p p l tcc!  i n  Federal C o u rt s .  ( i {) 
\ l i c h .  L Re\.  1 7 2 :1 .  l 7 c'.ll . l 7 ·FJ ! J < l ()i"\ ) :  tri . .  cases ci ted at J nD- 1 7 10 .  
n n . b2-(i-t 
'2 0 ' 1  Set Parkl�me H o s i cn C o .  1 .  S h u re .  i :l�J L· . s .  3�:2 ( i <1 79 ) .  
'.! I 0 Sre l" I1 1 t c d  S u tcs \ .  \ l c n cloz� t .  -i C-l t . S .  1 3-i ( l DR.f ) . B1 1 1  .Ill' 11i. a t  l li �  ( \w l d i n g  
l im i ted  to " rc l i t tg·a r i o n  of i ' ' ues q t c h  <l S t h o s e  ! 1 1 \ 0 l H·d in  t h i s  c:; s c " " ) .  For o t h er rcLt t ccl 
S u p reme Court c1 s c s .  sec C e nT .  Suj;!"lll<' Court Dw l ll ilf  111 !lit Trmrht.'. Tilt Co.11' of Collrt itm! 
E., toj;J!d '27 \\· , � .  & \ L \ R Y  L .  Rn . cl :i .  cl / - :-10 ( l CJR:J )  
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I n  l ight  o f  t h e  federal i n tere s t  i n  these circum s tances� 1 1 and the 
problems of adminis trabi l i ty that would a t tend a s y s tem o f  bor­
rowed s ta te law , even i n  cases  of concurrent jurisdict ion,  i t  i s  d iffi­
cult to fau l t  the conclusion that uniform federal law govern s ,  
a l th ough i t  is  easy to fau l t  t h e  lack of analys is  o f  that ques t i on . 
Moreover, here,  as i n  o ther aspects o f  the p recl u s i o n  law govern i n g  
federal question j udgmen t s ,  we need n o t  consider whether an as­
s erted federal i n terest  in final i ty ,  judicial econonw o r  the rep o s e  of 
the parties ( o ther than an i n terest  in protect ing adjudica ted subs tan­
tive rights)  would have j u s tified the wholesale displacement o f  s tate  
law. 2 1 2  Once t h e  Court found displacement necessa ry· for o ther rea­
s o n s ,  it properly cons i dered those i nteres ts  in fas hioning uniform 
federal rules . ·whether the C ourt was wise  i n  appeari n g  t o  embrace 
the revolut ion without regard to the requ i rements  o f  substan tive 
law ,2 1 :1 and whether " u n i form" rules  as fra u g h t  \Vi th qual i ficati o n s  
a n d  excep t ions as  those t h e  Court adop ted a r c  i n  fact  e ffi c ie n t , 2 1 4  
are inquiries beyond the scope o f  this Art ic le .  
3.  Cases in ·wh ich State Low Furn ishes the  R u les of Decision 
a .  The Sta te of the Law . In proposing a general rule that federal 
preclusion law governs the scope and effect of federal j u d gm e n t s ,  
Profe s s or Degnan w a s  p rimarily concerned w i t h  divers i ty j u d g­
ments . n" The b l e s s i n g  o f  the S u p reme C o u rt , however laco n i c ,  
s eemed to render t h e  analysis o f  federal q u e s t i o n  j u d gm en t s ,  a t  
least  those within exclusive j ur isdict ion,  unnecess arv. I n  any event ,  
the result as to federal quest ion j udgm ents followed a j(ntlori i f  the  
dav could b e  won on d iversi tv  j· udgmen ts . I I '-../ 
Professor  D e gnan did not  rely solely  o n  abstract  <n-g u m e n t s  a n d  
t h e  Federal R u l e s  o f  Civi l  Procedure. He had avai lable  a srnatteri n §  
o f  deci s ions  t h a t  a p p l i ed uniforrn federal l a w  t o  go vern t h e  p reclu · 
� l l " ' [ T ] h c  �lbanclonmcnr of m u t ual i tY causes a > l �ll i s l i c a i h  CtTta in  decrease in tht 
recovery of a pan1· fac i n g  m u l t i p l e  opponents  o n  re l a t ed c i :.u n 1 .' · · i\ o t e  . . 1 Probrtlillis!i, 
.·J nalvsis of thr Docl n tlf of .\ lutualily of Col/a!em! L., iojJJ!d 7(i \ f r c r 1  L. R �-: 1 · .  !) i �. G 7 9  ( 1 9 7 8 )  
� I �  These m a t ters are considered wji o text  < lccolil j) d l l l  1 m . ;  nolc :; :Z < l ] <Hl l .  
� l 'l C:runpme P :n k l an e Hosi er: C o .  1 .  S h o r e .  4 3 9  t •  . S .  :1:.! :! .  ;l :Z�l - 3 3  ( 1 �) 79\ u•/11 
B l o n d e'r · T o n g-ue Lab o ra wries  Y .  L: n i 1 er.-; 1 t Y  or I l l .  F o u n d  . .  40� L ' . S .  ') J :L :UO-SO ( 1 � )7 1 )  
See C:orr,  supm note 2 1 0, a t. 39--W, ()/ .  
� l -t s('( Green . supm note :!04;  Levin 8.: Leeson.  IS.I /11' Prrri/1.\ 1/)// . l,�.:rli/1\! /h, •  ( .!1 / l!'d Sio/r 
Goi 'l'!l/ !!11'1//. 10 [ OI\·.·1 L. REI·. I \  :l . 1 'H - :5 :) ( !  �)1:q ) .  In r�: iecung t h e  :.tp p l icu i o n  or n o n  
m u t u a i  off(:ns i ,·c i s s u e  prec l u s i o n  again�t  lhe L' n i Lcd Sutcs .  t h e  C( l l lri  ckt;·annizcd " ' L l > •  
standard a n n o u n ced lw t h e  Court of .-\ ppl':ds Cor c!ctcTm l l l i n g  ,.,·hc:1 relit  ig�t t i u n  o r  :1  k·g;; 
i ssue 1s to be permi t t e d "  as - ' so ,,· h o l h  s u h j ec l r \ c r kl l  i L  :dforcb 1 1 0 gu:chncc l o  t h •  
cour t s or to the C menun c n t . "  Un i t e d S t :t t e s  , . .  \kndoz: ! .  -l i i.f  c· . '-i .  1 0- L  I !i2 ( l 'l84 ) .  : 
s imi lar  concern 1s r:Jised by t h e  · ' s unciard" set  ! ()nh in Pari:io!ll' Umirrr. -};)9 :.. · . s .  ;l ! :\3 1  
a n d  in R EST\TE :' .I E �·:T (SEC:O�l l )  O F  .J L'DC� IP\T� � 2q ( l : J >):! ) .  Srr' ! !t(i·a text  acnnnp:1 m i n ;  
n o t e  3�lc\ .  
5're lJegnctn ,  supro n o i.c 3 ,  a t  7 5 5 - / 3 .  
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sive effects o f  federal d i vers i ty judgments m varymg circum­
s tances . :! Hi By th e t ime h e  publ ished his  article i n  1 9 7 6 ,  the Fifth 
Circuit  was clearly moving t oward the rule he espou s e d . ? 1 7  
Since 1 9 7 6 ,  a t  least  tvvo o ther c ircui t s  have adopted Profe s s o r  
Degnan ' s  general r u l e  for d iv ersity j ud grnents . T h e  resu l t  i n  o n e  
cir;u i t ,  however, may b e  a t t ri b u t able  to f il i a l  p ietv _ :! t K  Th e result  i n  
the other i s  supp orted bv s u ch tenu o u s  aut hority and a n a lys i s  t ha t i t  
is ripe for reconsiderat ion.?  I n Th e  courts  in t h ree c ircui ts  apply fed­
eral law t o  govern the preclus ive effects uf a federal judgment as to  
matters addressed i n  R ule 4 1  ( b ) ,  b u t  they h a ·.-e nCJ t 0 thr.:'nvise taken 
a clear pos i tion _??o  I n  one circui t the posi t ion i s  c lear that  the gov­
ernin g preclus ion law depends upon the precise legal ques t i o n , ?:! 1 
---- - ------------
:! I Ii Srr. t.g .  Kern \ .  Heninger.  :303 F . :! ci :l :J 3 i :2 d  C i r.  J llt i':? : :  C l ick \ .  Bz:l !cn t ine Pro­
duce. Inc . .  397 F . 2 d  590 (8th C i r .  1 96 8 ) :  Dcgn;m.  suf'!il r lO i (' :1 . aL  -;-()  l - i)3 . .  \s t o  Click. 
see ufm noLe 2 2 0 .  
? 1 7  SeP .--\erojet-Ceneral Corp. \ . .-\skC11 . :) ] ]  F .':!d 7 ! 0  C '> t h  C : i r. ) . iljljim/ r/i.' ''ussal and 
ml denird sub now !\leLropol i tan 0;\cic Cnu iH 1· \ .  _\,-r: j ;: t -Cencr ;d Cor -p . . -!?3  U n n cd 
SLaLes 908 ( 1 9 7 5 ) :  Degnan.  -�·upra noLc �-� - :l l / ()().()� .  h1r  , ,_ , bsc( J i ! C' r J !  Fi ft h  C i rc u i t  cases .  
:;ee. e.g . .  H enderson Y .  United S tates Fidel  i t \· & Cu;u C o  . .  li(F1 !: _ :z c l  I ()()  (:lth C i r.  J 983 ) :  
Harch ,. _ . Johns-�l a m i l l e S a l es Curp . ,  ti l)  1 F . :Z d  :nl ( ;) t ! J  C: i r.  l % ':! '  
:! l s Sre Pre c i s i on A i r  Parts ,  I n c. \ · .  :\Yeo C o rp . 7 :l t i  F 2d 1 -l � i\) . l S CU ( I i t  h Cir. I �18-l ) 
( c i t ing onh d e c i s ions of r r s  p :H cn t .  the Fift h  Cn-cu 1 l ) .  r•'l ' r!n;inl. 1 ! ! :i () C t .  :HiG ( 1 98 :) ) .  
:! I D Srr' S i lcox ,. _ T_: n i r cd Trucki n g  S e n  . . I n c . .  (18 7  F . '.! d  :--; \ .:-' r ( i t h  C: i ;· . l 'JW:? l .  Th e court 
in Silcox purported to folio\\' Ccmer \' . \brathon Oil  Co . . �' ·''; '� F . :Z ci  ,;:;)() ( l i th Cir. l 9 7 tl )  
( p er  curi :1 m ) .  Sr,- _'·ji/cu.\. G 8 7  F . 2 d  a t  8 :) '.!  B u l  (',-i!ln ! I l l  , ., j ,_ . .__. r :  : 1  i'c-clc-r : d '- !ucq iun _j udg­
ment:  moreon·r. t he n JU n  i n  t h ;; t  case rel ied o n  Fru. R ( : ,,_  P -i ! ( h :• : t -;  � o  the cllc-ct Dl a 
d ism issai  and did not cJearl\- d i> L ingt t i >h  L h c  C JL!t'Si run o!'  t h e  l; ; i•. go >. c' i' i l l l 1); : h e  scope pf 
the ci <t i m  p:-ecluded.  Sl'!' Cnnn. 583 F . 2 d  at i n :.> .  
:!?O Smn:d Ciu 1ul .  Coillj){l !'i' PRC Harri s .  I n c . \ .  B o c ; n g  C < >  . .  ! l l t >  l- . 2 d  �9-+ . 0915-9 7 ( :.? rl  
C ir.)  ( f'ec lcr:d b\'.- g(jverns cf-lcCL o f  d i s m i s sa l u !  d i ·.- c : '. i l '>  ' t ct i c : ;  undcT F E ! l .  R .  C l \· .  P .  
-� ! ( b ) ) .  m'l. dnl li'd. - H)-! U . S .  � l 3 G  ( 1 9.'\ 3 )  ;c/1/; \·\-cs ton h ll r d i 1 ; g  C : l i p.  ' . .  Ldd\Titc To\\·c:-s. 
Inc . .  SSO F . 2 d  7 1 0. 7 1 3  r L 3  ( :Z d  C i r .  1 9 / i' )  ( u nncf\''"" ' ' ' ' '  "(kci d c- '' h e- t h e !' i t :J t e  ur 
federal Lr\1 . i f Ll1c\· \ITIT in conil i c t .  11·ou ld cuni rnl t lH: rL·S _J ' r <. ! I <. d l <: d k :. l  o! a d is rn iss :l l  h :  
a federal c:ourr. i n  a divcrs i tv  act i o n \\hC'n t h e  d r s mi s s �d L' ln_, ,-d I l d t  . , ; ;  : r  iL·cic-ral n d c . 
buL on a sLate cloor-clo:: i n g  s ta l u Lc" ) .  J'lw d Cu : iu!. C .> n tlp:> "' : J i L· Des Baux i te,.: De 
Gumee \ .  L ' U rnon _-\ t l a mique S . .-\ . D' . -\ s s u ;·zmces . 7 '! 3  F.�d ' i :) I . �) ()() L'd Cir .  I L J0 3 )  ( kd ­
eral l a\1· govern.-> eHccr of dismi s_-;;tl o!' d i \ e:s l l \  :tn ion u n d e r  h·: t > .  R .  C . i \ · .  ! ' .  --l l  ( b ) )  ;uth l!i. 
at 3G I n . l (unncccss<trl to decide \\ h e t i t cr  st;; i c  o r  i'cc!c:·; t !  !:;,, , ,f i s s �tC p r<·c:lus ion ap­
plies ) .  Stc aisu H u n t \ .  Libert\ Lobb\,  f n L  . .  701 F . :2 d  l -lT� .  ! -E: ;· ! !  ,-, : D . C. Cir .  i 0� ti ) 
(cnl l ec t i n g rhird C i rc u i t  cases ) .  l :' iglt th Cinll l i :  Coi'I!H:.'·· G i ; d,; \ .  lsa l l c ! i t i n c· P:·n d r t C C .  1nc . .  
:i 9 7  F . :Z d  \ �10. :i9:2- � l3  ( 8 t h  Cir. 1 9liS l ( fcdcr;d b" �:'!' c· : n s r:iL; < " ( d i ., nms:d of ci r Ycrs i t Y  
action under h: u .  R .  Cll · .  P . -! I ( b ) )  a n d  Dcgn<� n .  l ' lj.'lrl n o t e �' - : 1 1  7 li:2-C--! ( (;!,,k r m p l r c:i r h· 
app l ies fed eral Lm of claim p rec l u s i o n )  U ' l ih C a t Z L' I !lC\  l.T ' .  \ · , ; g e l . :�; p,q F . '.! d  360 . 3()'.! 
(8 Lh  Cir .  i 978 )  ( apply ing s ta t e  IZJ "· o f  c la im prccl u-; i o n i and L n·:: r  F k c .  I . r gh t  & Pm, er 
C o . \· . \lobi lL· .-\cri�d ro\'�·crs ,  Inc . . 7 � :_)1 F . � d  50. 0 �  u�. t h  ( : 1 r .  l � -li(�) .·; ( <! p p l �·: i n g  :� Ll! c L-t\\. o f' 
c la im a n d  issue prccl r  1 s ion ) .  
For L h e  tex t o f  R u l e --! l ( b ) .  s e e  iuji a i i ') l C  :2 :H . 
:!� I So· .-\n s 11en ng Sen· . .  I n c. '- .  Eg:m . 7 :2 8  F . � ci l :iOll .  I :">O!d ii )  • D . < . . \ : i r .  \ �)8--! l The 
coun in Egan quali fied broad la nguage i n  H u n t \ .  Libc!-i \ Lo :: h ,- . i nc . ,  1()7 F.:? d  l -EJ3  
m . c .  C i r. 1 98 3 ) .  ��-hich held L h a ;  fcder;ll l<!\1 gm c-;·;;<; t h e  f i n :d i !\ o !  ' I  d i '> <.T> i l \  _ jUd b!ll(;!l [ 
For a s t udent conlnH.: n l  on /fun/ .  sec  >·: o t c .  F!'rf,.';f;/ Cnu_�I,·- TI;t /�r�l·· o/ fltf' E l " ie  nnd Full 
Faith and C:rrdit Dortruu-.\ in 1111' Choler 13r!;o'•'ll Sin!!' ru11i Fr·dn11 i  Rc .' _ i : ! d ic!U !.1 1 : : ·  1 ' 1 C,·; ; :sr·r u-
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and in another ,  s tate lavv seems s ti l l  to be  the rule ,  a l though ,  again ,  
the courts ' reasoning leaves much to be  desired .��� In the  remain­
ing five circui ts , the matter i s  up for grabs . :..> :..>:l 
Professor Degnan 's  arguments h ave also influenced commenta­
tors and law reformers, a l though not usually to the extent of ful l  
embrace. The two m o s t  prominent works on t h e  subj ec t  in  t h e  in­
tervening years , the Restatemen t ( Second) of judgm en ts and the  treatise 
of Professors vVright ,  Mi l ler and Cooper, take the pos i t ion that fed­
eral lavv governs but tha t ,  as to certain quest ions of preclusion impl i ­
cat ing state subs tant ive pol icies , s tate law should be  borrowed as 
federal law . :..>:>-1 The Restatemen t ' s  qualification is ,  however, expressed 
in  the comment to  b lack le t ter that  s tates :  Federal law detennlnes the 
effects u nder the rules of res judica ta of a judgm en t  of a federal cou rt . � :> :>  
Moreover, nei ther work takes ful l  account of the  implicat ions of 
post-Erie Supreme Court decis ions on the re lat ions h ip  between fed­
eral and s ta te  l a w  in  divers i tv cases . 
b . Sources of Federal Competence . If  i t  is correct th<tt t he basic ob­
l igat ion to respect federal jud gments requires ru les  d efin ing a 
' 'j udgment" to which that obl igation a t taches ,  b ind ing in federal 
and s tate court s ,  that  conclusion is  as appl icable to j udgments  on 
s tate law questions as it is to federal quest ion j ud gm en ts . I\loreover, 
in this context as vve l l ,  the federal in teres t in uniform federal rules 
appears to be suffic ient ly s trong to rule out reso rt to state L::tw . :>:> t i  
!�< ··· Ot; ·;Tstlr . Jc!wn.i-H u n t  , . _ Liberty Lobb,· .  I n c  . .  707 F . '�d 1 -l�U ( I! .C C : i r .  1 1 )S3 ) .  5 7  
TD! l'Li L Q, 1 :19 ( I �H)-i ) 
l l • ) ' )  �)·n, (;asharr:.l \ ' .  Park-C) h i o  Indus . .  I nc. . G�J 5  F . :! d  ! l � )  ( 7 t h  Ctr .  1 �10 1 ) : � l o q1, ; 1 n  \ · .  
l n ter- C o n t i n cn la l  Tra d mg Corp . ;1GO F . :2 cl 8:)3 ( 7 t h CiL l �)()li ) :  Lin ck!\ ' ·  C: u t t lT Labo­
ra tories .  I n c. . :) �)() F . Supp. 799 ( \\' D .  Wi�.  1 98 :! )  ( q u e s t i o n i n g  .\ irn:!J,ru; but [. , j j"" i n g  i t ) .  
For crl l i c i s m  o r  Gos/)(111(/ ,  see N o t e .  Rrs judir alfl I l l  the Frdnoi Cow ls. Fl'dl'uil ()}  S/!1 /i' f.mi ' >, 
1 7  h o .  L R t \ . 5 :2 3 .  :) �1-i-35 ( 1 98-i)  
:..> :.! :\ Fin! Cu ntil: Sfl' Skrzat 1 · .  Ford \loLOr  Co . .  :38 9  F. S u p p .  7 .'> :3 ( D . R . I .  1 �1 7 :) ) (s t : t le 
\a l\' :1p p l iecl t o  perm i t  ollens ii"C n o n m u t u a l  use o r  federal  d i i"Cr S i t \  j u d g m en t ) .  Fo lll/h 
Cim u t :  .'ir'e .-\elk in:; 1· . .  \!!state I l l S . C o  . . 7�9 F . � d  D7-l Hth Cir. I <)8 -i- )  ( c h i m  prccl u s i \T 
effco o f' fecler:d cl i 1crs i t ;  j u dgmen t determined ,,· i t h o u l  reference 10 s late  l a l,· ) . .\'u t l lt 
C'irout : Set' Performance Plus Fund.  Ltd . ,._ Winfield & Co . . -i -1- 3  F .  S u p p .  1 1 88 ( \: D .  C a l .  
1 9 7 7 )  ( a pph in g  fed eral I a\\ o n  fi na i i t l or f'cderal di\ ersl t \  j udgme n t  b u t  S l J t c  I a \\· O i l  
n o n m u t ua!  i s s u e  precl u s io n ) . Ten th Circ11it : Sl'l' \!cC:rrt1 1 .  Firs t o f  Georgi: �  I m .  Co . 7 1  '\ 
F . 2 d  GOG ( I  Ot h Cir .  I 0 8 3 )  (apph· ing s tate c l :um precl m i o n  la11  to federal  diHT,; i l '  . Judg­
ment.  1,·i r h o u t  t'': p ! a n<J t i o n ) .  But Sr'l' Fr:de1· ' . .  -\merican C1 a n :1m icl Cu . .  Y /0 F .  Supp.  -1 � )7 
(D.  Co l o . I �i8 c) )  (expl i c: i t l v  n .:J CCt ing u s e  of s ta t e  Ln,· t o  d e t erm i n e  a1  ad�r h i l i t 1  d o i k ns i l · 
n o nmutual  i s :;ue preclus io n ) .  
I ha1 e n o t  f()lmcl a n v  per t i n en t Gts c s  i n  t h e  Federal C i rc u i t .  
:> :..>-1 SPe R r sr.\TD I F.�T ( S r c o � n )  oF . lu)(; _\I E'>Ts � 8 7  co1nmcnt  b .  ar C.\ 1 6- l �� ( l ' )8 � ) :  1 8  
\\' R r C t iT .  \ l i ! .u:R & CooPER .  s upm n o t e  5 ,  � -i-1 7 2 .  <t r 7 :\ � --! 0 .  S e c .  to t h e  s :l ! l l l' c f l'ect . C 
\ \. R ! C i iT .  supm n o l e SC.  � 1 00.4. .  a t li� I:J-9() .  
For rccc:H s tudent  11·nrk bucking this trend and re;JCh i i i g  res u l ts m ore in  l i n e  11· i lh  
those suggested h er e ,  ,; e e  'iotc .  s •tj!I'II I IOte  2�) :  :\o te.  su;1m nnte  :2 :2 � .  
:.: :.: ;, R F.ST.·\Tf.\l f.:.iT ( S EC O:\ D) OF J t :DG�!E"TS s 8 7  ( 1 C JS:2 ) .  
:..> :.! l i  Srt S l ijim t ex t  a c c o m p a n n n g  not e .s l -i0--f 3 .  This t c n t ;; t i H· co: t c l u s i o n  should  be 
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\"''hen a federal court judgment involves only s tate subs tantive 
law, federal competence to prescribe o ther rules of preclus ion rests  
primarily ,  a l though perhaps not  exclusively,  on  article I I I  of the 
Consti tution and the necessary and p roper clause of  art icle I ,  sec­
tion 8.  Current concept ions of  Congress ' s  powers under e�rt i c le  I I I  
and the necessary a n d  proper clause suggest  that Congres s  could ,  i f  
i t  chose ,  enact a complete code of preclusion rules  t o  govern s tate  
law act ions  brought in  federal courr . :> :> l  Some of the pol icies that  
may be considered in fashioning preclus ion rules  concern the effec­
tive and expedit ious adminis trat ion of the business  of  the courts .  
Thus ,  the rules would be " ra tionally capable  of  c lass ificat ion":.>:>/"\ a s  
procedural . 
The analysis proceeds smoothly so long as both act ions , that  
potentially preclus ive and that to which the precl usive effects  may be 
attached, arc brought in federal court .  The analys is  insp ires less  
confidence wi th  respect to a federal-s tate configurat ion . In  that  con­
text ,  apparentlv .  the necessary and proper clause must do  double 
dutv ,:.>:.> � 1  or  Congres s ' s  power to protect federal substantive interests  
must be added to  the const i tu tional sca l e s . :> : ; , >  
Congress has  not  enacted a code of p reclus ion rules , and I have 
argued that  t he Cons t i tut ion cannot plausibly be interpreted to give 
that power, as  against  a contrary congress ional  directive,  to the fed­
eral cour ts .  I have also argued that ,  i n  considering the relat ionship 
between federal a n d  s tate law o n  matters of preclus ion,  the R u l e s  of 
rested ,,· i r h i n  t h e �m�d l t t cd fr�lm c,,· , ) rk sC I  f< ) t · th  ; ufm t e s: r  Zt <Tomp�tm i n g  n N c s  :!( i:J - :)Ofl .  
I n  th �t l  rcg;J rci . i ;  i s  n N  ck:Jr rh < t t  1hc  fed er a l  p o l i n  < tga i n s ;  d i l crcn r  n u t co t n cs on the 
basi� of c i t izen s h i p  1·:ou l d  he ,· i o i a t ed 11\· di fferent rules on t h e  m<:lltTs in qucst i t l l l .  .1iN' 
HunL  1· . Libcm l .ohl l \ . l i l c  . . 707 F . � d  1 -! < U .  l -1 �)()  (D.C. C i r.  i <J::l:\J t fi n zd i t l· ) : srP fll'" '\ o t c .  
supra n o t e  '.2 '.2 1 .  a t  I li'.2 - l) �\ .  
2 � 7  Sn: I L1 ! �nd , - _  P l u n1er. 380 l . S .  "+ GO.  -1 7 1 - 7-! ( 1 �H)5 ) :  I S  \\' R I G H T. \ J u .r . r.:R & 
CooPER.  siip;o ! W l c  .'> . � -! -!lib. at 11� l ( ' " \\. i th in  the l i m i t :; i m po:;�:d lF the case or con t ro ­
vcrS\· requin·n1cn t s  . , [ . \ n ick I l l .  C:on :..;-r-c>;s probahh· has pmq:r t o  c ! l a c t  a cndc: of res 
j u cl ic<� t:J principles  ior icder�d j ;H igmenl:i a s  pan u f  i r s  control  e>1cr 1 h e  crc;aion .  juri .sdic­
tion. and procedure , ., r  kclcr�d couri s . · · ) .  
��H /-!anna , �BO L: . s .  , ; t  -l / <.2 .  
:.':''> The anah· s 1 .s a s s u n H: :s I h e  b;t s iC icdcr,d o b l i g�; t i o n  of respect  :1s 11 c l l  �1:; �� l t t1 l i : cd 
number uf fecl< · ,·<tl p recl usion rule .'< e s s e n t i a l  to i m p l u n c n l  r hz1 t o b h gd c io n .  Src suput l ex !  
accompan;·in g- l l < > l.c  '! �:n .  i ;  �dso ; I :, o u rncs ! h a l  t hc.;e m�i ! tc· r:; o: h<\U s t  z;m· d iscrete federal  
in terest in E n a l l t \ · .  Srr 1 nj: ·!! tcxl  i.1 C C t .J i l lp�tl l y i n g  note:-:  '2 �)-1 - �H) .  l"hc rcn1 a i n t n g fcd<:L.t l 
· · p roceduu l · ·  in i crc:, t s  scn cd h1 precl us ion  b"· :u-c t l l l J.l ! tGi t c d  onh i f  :,u h s <.'qucn :  i i t i l(:t­
I ion is  broug h t  i n  fcd e r< d  co u ri .  Str i llj! rl text : t \compal l l ! ll i', n o t e ,;  '!K7 & :}.qg_qq.  hm!­
ing s upport [ ( _ >r Ccd cral p rc�. i u s i o n  1�111 i n  :1r l l c k  I l l  :tnd t he n cccs S<tr., � tnd p roper cbusc 
therefore requi re.' o p t i n g  l ·n r  < �  p roccci u r�d cLt s s d t c a t i n n  : rs  to <l m :l l l tT · · fa l l i n g  \1 i dn n  t he 
u n cert a i n arct i)l· t ·st-ct l s u b s i :tncc ;u : c! proccdurl- . · ·  !Iouuu .  ' lSO L· . s .  at -1 7 '2. .  and pos i t i n g  
federal po;, cr t o  pn : i cc l  coi i i i ngcnt kdcra!  i n l crcs : :; .  
C''W Srr .wpro r c :d : ;ccorn p; : ! l i i n g·  n o t e  l :-1 1:> . .  -\ p p l t cl l i o n  ( ) [ . p rcc i l l ' d < l l l  b 1' t n  :J d j u d i ct­
L ions < li  s t :1 t c  Ltl \  c i .t t m s  I J 1  lcdn<li  co1 1r 1 s t i l � l\  k11 c t h l· dkct  o f  J.' : c c l u d i l l �  l(:clf :Lt !  
c la i 111s o r  i s :; 1 1 c s .  
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Decis i o n  Act cann o t  b e  ign ored . "3 1 That p o s i tion i s  s tronges t i n  di­
versity cases . The Act appears to have been i n fluen tial i n  shaping 
pre-Erie l<nv t h a t  the p reclus ive effects of federal al ienage and diver­
s i ty j udgments are governed by s tate law . 2 'l c> M oreover,  n o t  even the 
Supreme Coun i n  i ts  most  despera te momen t s  has  su gges ted that 
the Act i s  inaoolicable in divers i tv cas e s . 2 :u 1 1 / 
The task of j us t i f\· i n g  uniform federal rules across the whole 
spec trum of preclusion law would appear easy if the Federal Rules 
o f  Civil  Proced ure embo died s uch a code .  In t h a t  event,  on any in­
terpretation of the Rules o f  Deci s i on Act that reflected m odern de­
velopments , the Act would b e  " inapplicable by i t s  own term s .  " c> :l l 
B u t  the Rules Enabling Act does n o t. authorize Federal Rules o f  pre­
c lus ion,  and the ru lcm<1kers . with few· excep ti o n s , have not sought to 
s tate thern . � v. The nde b earing most  c losely on claim p recl u s ion 
su gges t s  a n y thing but foreclosure of asserti o n s  of legal righ t s .  In 
that res pect Rule l 8 (a) may h e  thought to convey a promise to be 
broken . " %  The ru le o n  compuls ory coun terclai m s ,  Rule 1 3 (a) , i s  a 
p roduct of his  ton• and , :'lt m o s L ,  a veh ic le  of l egal support  for federal 
common law . '" :n 
Finally ,  properly v i e\\'CCL Rule 4 1  (bf:l:-1 merely states  what  o the:· 
s o u rces of fcder;:,_j l<J.'S. u f  a n alional lv binding character,  have the 
power to deten n i ne;  i t  thus prGvic!es fai r  n o tice to l i tiga n t s . "Y1 Fed-
'} :� :2 SN· Si l/nu !H l l C  { �5  :Jnd � t C C O i n p �t n\· l n g  t t.�X l . 
� :) :-; .\r·r ::u;,ru t ex t  � iCCn1 n p:1 n y t n g  l 1 !. J ! c>: i l -l - 1 6. 
'.' :;.; l >c !C, ; '; I c ! l n  , .. h w·nn l ion�: !  B h d .  of T<:�I l n s t crs .  -Hi'! U . S .  I :) I ,  1 5() n . ! 3  t i <J:-1:) )  
St( .1 11/JI'U t cx l  � iClO!ii jU ii '.' ' li.'J.  l ' < J [ (' :i  1 1  ( )  K: l I c\ - �! ! .  h i ! '  t h e  rdationship bc t\\'CCil t h c  R u le:; 
u f  1Jcc is i () } j  _-\ct  (UHJ t h e  R : d .�-�� r n�; b i i n g· :\c t .  s e e  : llJjJl"fi tcxl  dCCOnlpanying n o tes 1 8 7 - S S .  
:� :-) !, S!'P .•:upra l C '-: t ; tcc { ) rn ; > �U ! >· i n g  n n t c .�: I �� l - K6 .  
:.?. : H �  .\'u· .\ l ij.JI"(! n o t e  1 7 � .i : lnrl : ;rcorn p:nn· i n .�� t ex t .  (( . .ldiS \\"(·ri n g  S er\ . ,  I n c . \ " _  Eg�ul , 7 � R  
F. � d  l :)Otl .  i !'lO:\ ( D . C  c·. J ; ·  J < )S-l l ( iros ,-cL! !m u n d e r  F E u .  R .  C I Y .  J ' .  1 3 ( g ) )  
�::> 7 StP supra ! ex !. ; t c ( nn�p�n ��-· i n g· n o t e� U� l - � b ,  1 9:)-�JS .  
For L1 i l u n.· ; 1f i_ h c  pLl ! n L i ti" l o  p rosecu t e  or t o  cotnply \\· i th  these rull'.':'i o r  
;J n y  nrder u i "  (.'< H . ! � · t , � !  dct �_- l !d:n l l  J n ; t \. I llo\ ·e !� Jr dis :n i.ssa l  o f  ; n 1  action o r  of' 
: 1ny c! a i t n  ag._nn:·q h i 1 n  l ' p k·s:-;  : he court. i n  i t s  o r d e r  fo r  dis rniss;,:d  
o t hCT\\·i::Z' _�;pcct f i c �. <  ;-J di .'.; i n t :<"-al  l t iH icr  t h i s  s u bcl i\ · 1sion and a nv disrn i�sa l  
not  pro\ i dcfi fin· i n  dns ; :de .  other 1 han � �  dismiss:1l lor lack �f juri>dic­
I i G n .  t·•. l r  i m p n •pcr · .  c ' : ' t w .  ' ' �' i 'u r  l ;ul urc In j < l i n  �1 panv u n der Rule 1 �l . 
opcLH ::.�s  : �:-;  J l "l ;; tC� J �id : ( :a t i on  upon the  t n c r i t s .  
F E u .  P. .  ( : n · .  P.  t l { b ) . 
�! : ) � J  I 'h i :' rnay bt :  YiC\\ cd ' ' ·" � t l 1  i l 1 \ l : t i 1 C1_' of t h e  phcnon1Crt0! l  f Cal i  i ncorpoLt t i O l 1  . . \'ri' 
.�o u;n-o n o u.:- i 9 t) .  In t h�� � n .. · �-; J I·cL � !-. ,__· l � � t ) :·;� ::J i'ih.:.' J H.l nH· n t �  t o  t h e  R u l e  res ponded 1 n  part  t o  
<kci :; i cm:d l :r.·: . Sn· ;) ; . \ ioo:; l . • i!Jmi l l id C  ! .S -J. ,  lf ·-l l . O l l l :l j . a1 -l. l - lO ( l �J();\ :t <.h iv;n 
COl : lnl l t � t:C n �"d. C l .  
I ' h !..· pr::J\" J S i (, : !  1 n  �< ; : i :_ '  ! ! ( � i } (  l J t h �: t · · : : n u ucc o!"  cl i s tn ls sa l  npcr�l l cs a s  a n  � :d_ j ud : c��­
t iun u p ,·>n d�c- i"! i l'rl t "·. -._,·hr:· l :  h i �.:d ! : \- a p ! �! i n t ilT \\·hn h a s  o n c e  d i s 1n i s sed in �t n\· courl of r hc 
L: n i t r::-d .:�:t .. u c .s ( ) \ "  o t  J n \· _..; f_ �: i c  ;_t n  ;_; c t i C l n  h�L-.;cc\ on or i n c l u d i n g  t.hc san1c c l ain1 . "  �..:-F u .  R 
c: n· . P . . J 1 ( :1 ) (  1 ) .  hJ .'-i i; :cr_· : l  dc.·:c n hcd � ! --� · · u n i q t l (' (l t t h e  L i rn:: i t  \\'(lS fi rs ! adopt ed . "  q ( � .  
\\.-R [ C tr�· S..: .-\ . .\ l i : . : . !·_ ; �- - 1. - r - :n:-� !< . \L  1-'i<. . ..  J :T ! C E  . \ �' D  J-'goct-:ut :RE � :236f t  a 1  ! H 7 ( l.q 7 1  ) . I f  s : > ,  
t h e  n l( :. ::; L  Lh� t t  c ;;� n  h;_· -<! i d  f "t ) ; · ! 1 i. �� t h ::u i 1  � u g·gc \ t :� �1 r u l e  th �H c o u l d  ,·a l i d h· be f { > n n l t Lu r_·d 
I 
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eral s tandards are necessary to  determine when a federal judgment 
can preclude subsequent l i tigation,  whatever law governs the 
preclusive effects of that judgment .:.>40 In the case of so-cal led pen­
�l ty dismissals  under Rule 4 1  (b) ,:!4 1 that interes t  i s  buoyed by the 
additional cons ideration  that uncertainty as to the binding nature of 
federal judicial  action might lead to disregard of perfectly valid Fed­
eral Rules and orders and that the costs  o f  such disregard \vould fal l  
o n  the federal court s . :.>-t :.> Thus , the decis ion i n  a case u p o n  which 
Professor Degnan rel ied ,  Kern v. Hettinger, 243 was correct ,  and the 
courts that have subsequen tly reached s imi lar decisions were cor­
rect .:.> -t-t We m;ty forgive reliance on Rule 4 1  (b) as a direct source of 
legal power in Kern and e lsewhere ,:.>-ls but  we should be ,,·ary of at­
tempts to extrapolate from the decisions a more general rule re­
garding t h e  relat ions hip between federal and s tate preclus ion 
]a \Y . :.>-u; 
c. Frdeml Common Lacu: General Considerations . If federal law i s  
t o  govern al l  matters of  the scope and effect of federal d iversi ty 
judgrncn r s .  that  lav.· must  be federal common law. I t  is poss ib le to 
maintain that the Rules of Decision Act 's  force is exhaus ted once 
there i s  a finding of federal lawmaking competence, :.>-t / and that the 
federal interest in the nature of a "judgment" entit led to respect,  if 
a� :1 m a t l v !· c•! i c<kr;d C < l l l 1 11 l011 �;t ,,. ; 1s  ;; corolbn· t o  the basic federal [a,, obl ig:l i !On to 
!CS[JL"Cf i !:dcr;: ! i u dgnil"l l l \ . liu! so-. '' .!.: . Engdku ch ' . Bell & H o w e l l  Co . .  �\)9 F . :! d  -t80 ,  
485 (8 th  C i r .  ! �lii� ) ( u p h o l d i n g  ' 'd i d i t \  d Rule)  
1ng· t c� t .  
�--I I .)t1f', t. _!!-- . •  \."oC! �H- i P J l  de Etnp iCi. l dos dc i  i n s t i lll l o  de ( �ul tura Pucn_ o rr iquena ,. _ 
Rodn glicl.-\ioralcs.  ,) �);-) F . � d  � i ! .) ( 1 s t  c : i r.  i 97l) ) :  t S  V\' iU (;i iT. �� I l l . ! .G R  S.: c:oo PER , 5 ll,iJJ"(l 
n o t e  ') .  � -H t ) / .  ; 1 1  ( ) -i :\ . - 1 -t .  
� --1 �� · rl t � i t  t :-; .  t h ere i S  d l�_·d cri.d I n t cn.: � t  t ·c l a t 1 n g  \ O l <'h· to Lhc i n i r ia l l i t1 gi.t t i c n  t h �t t j u o;.; r i -
hc.� �1 Ccc.i �� ! "�tl ndc . .  \n' Sl ljJU! J i o t c  1 q :) .  
:!-l �l :l ! d  F . :2 d  :l 'U ( :2 cl C i r .  l �){i:.! l Sa lk;�n�m. s1:jm1 .: n l c  :.l . ;, 1 7 G l - ( i3 
'! ---1 -i- .. \'t�� c.ht:." c i ted sujn·a l 1 « ) t(' �! � 0 .  
'! - h  SN' ,\·nu. :IO:l t' . S .  ;l t �\-H l :  ( : o 1 1 1 p a g n i c  Des B<l u x i t c:; De Cui n e e  \ · .  L"Lninn :\tbn­
t iquc S . .  -\ . l"J " .-\ s ;; u ranccs.  7 :2 :\ F . :.! d  :\::i 7 .  j (i () ( :.ld Cir.  1 98 :-l ) :  Degn�m. sujim nncc '\ .  ;1 1 7()(). 
{)�5 : �<o te  . .l' ii/;i'rt note �� ) .  ;:,t . l :·) l � J .  (f- C:erncr ,. \ l ar�Hhon ()i !  (�o . ,  S.S3 F . :2d 8 3 0 ,  �):r.� ( f>th 
Cir. l 0 7S)  :_pe r  curiam i I R u k  4 l i i J )  cl i s m i ." : d  i n  kdcr�d an icm asc: c n i n g  l "eder2l s u b s u n ­
( ive :·tg·h l :� ) :  sufnil n o i t.� � !  l q .  
Th;: u i s  uor l o  "ay th ;.H .. �uch i ·c l ia ncc � �  \\' i lhout  cos t s .  i n  pan i cular ! he Joss o f  Hcxihi l ­
i ty th ;H chZlLtn eriz ;..· �  C ( : � � l l i l ( 1 1 l  I J \\. �H.�j i. l d i Cl l J u n .  (/ :·;!ipra t:.::·xt  acC( > tnp::1n:' i n g  1 8 6 :  infi·o 
tex 1  ::I C C < J illpany i i i >�.· n u r e  �) 1 0  ( Ru l L' l :)J ( c.t ) ) .  In t l :c  C: I S C c ; f  Rule -! l ( b ) .  C<.H1tparCJ, b ! (: H c x i b i l ­
t ty  has  been ;I (h 1 �__, \· ,_:·d b y gcnc.T t ; l l:-i t n tcrprc t �t t i o n  n! ' t he l (l n guagT · · h1ck ofjunsd�c r i on . "  
5:,, C n s t c 1 1c  1 .  t "n i t c d  S r a ; u _  :Hi:  .. ) L S .  :.! G :'> .  :2 8 1 )  t l U! i l )  
FED.  R .  c: n· . P .  ·� l {h)  d u e s ! } ( ) \  prcd c t tTI 1 1 inc ! h e  !�1\\ go\'Crn i n g  t h e  cl �U l11S o:r i �; �-\ U (�s that  
nla\· h e  precl u d ed h··, - l lH: . J u d g rn c n l  ( l i' t he p : t rt tc :-; 1.\·i 1 o  tn :n· hcneht  fro rn or  arc bound b: 
the J l !JgnlC l l ! .  ! 'here.  the c o u n �hSUnH.:d t h : l l  s t a t e  Lth' \\'Otdd gn, ·crn the Cl \'J. i l abi l i t y  o r  
n o n n1 :.t t l 1 J i  i s �uc p rf:·•: l u .-; i n n  h u t  f o u n d  i t  u n n ccc\\.'< try  t o  c hoose bct\\-·een :"� e·.\· Y c·rk �1 n d  
Cl l i h :-n i : l  !_a ·,, . .  )r·,• ,\, (; u .  � :. ( ;J  F . : \ !  ; n  :l-10-..J ! .  
�-+ "'; ,)'rt· supru [CXL  :ICCUi l l p; in:\·i n g  Tl ( ) { CS i 09 &_: ! ! J - J � . 
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n o t  Congress ' s  power under article I I I  to enact a complete code of  
preclusion rules,  sat isfies the  competence requirement .  But  that  ar­
gument does not dispense with the need to j u s ti fy a complete body 
o f  j udge-made federal preclus ion rules ,  rather than s tate l a1v bor­
rowed as federal law. Rather,  i t  remits the search for s tandards gov­
erning the creati o n  of  federal common law t o  sources exclusive of 
the Rules of Decis ion Act .  
In  l igh t  of  a demonstrable federal in teres t in some matters of 
preclus ion,  and assuming that uniform federal law governs those 
matters , we should consider the poss ib i l i ty that  a complete body o f  
uniform federal rules i s  necessary a s  to diversi ty j udgments for the 
adminis trabi l i ty o f  the system of  preclusion rules .  To the extent 
poss ible ,  l i tigants and courts should not  be required to  pick and 
choose among preclus ion rules .:2�s l\!loreover, in  this  context too,  
the use of  s tate preclus ion law could skew l i ti gants '  b ehavior i n  a 
manner contrary to federal procedural pol icy . 2-� ' '  
According to the analysis to this po1nt ,  the m atters governed by· 
federal preclusion la\v a l l  have to do with precondit ions to recogni­
tion or,  in  the case of  the "on the meri t s"  exception to claim preclu­
s ion ,  something thar i s  functionally identica l .  They are a discrete 
gro up,  clearlv recognizable a s  such by courts and l i tigan ts .  The un­
certaintv that might confront  a l i tigan t  in a. federal question case as  
L O  the s tate law to be borrowcd:.! >o i s  reduced , i f  not eliminated .  i n  
the  diversi tv  con text bv the exist ence of a cl earlv stated choice of law ' ; I 
rule for the federal courts . 2 '1 1 Further, whereas in federa l q u est ion 
cases s tate substantive i n tere s l s  are us uallv cont ingent ,  in divers i ty  
cases ,  assuming the act ion involves t h e  adj udication o f  rights under 
s tate substant ive law , s ta te  in teres ts are di rect ly  a. n d  inescapablv i m ­
p licated . :.!'�  The exis tence of uniform fed eral  preclus i,on rules . de­
veloped for fed eral ques tion judgments ,  is  relevant .  B u t  tho s r.:  rules 
Sri' supm n o t e  b O ;  t ex i  accomp�l l t \ i n g  n o t e  � 0 � .  
:2 -t � l  Sef' S it/NI! text  acco1npan>· in g notes 1 7  i - 7 � .  
:.! c•O Sfl' .111pm text accfJmpam i n g· n <  > l c� 1 (j l - ti2 . 
:.! :>  i Sf•' hlax o n Co. \' . S t.cnwr E l c c .  \ l l g .  C o . ,  :1 I C) l' . S .  -1 8 7  ( 1 94 1  ) : Dai· & i: i m m n­
man n .  I n c .  Y. Chal loncr.  4 � :l li . S .  :l \ l �) / :i )  ( per curi a m ) .  \!o rcon:t. i n  an �t<.t ion 
grow1clcd s o l eh· o n  s t::�tc  s u b s t a n t in' i a 11 . l i t ig a n t s  need be ks:>  co n c e rned th<H . i n ;; s u b ­
sequen t a n i o n .  s t ate preclu s i < > n  b"· "· i ! J  b e  d i s p L:ccd hec:w sc hos t i l e  i o  ' n  i n con s l :c. t •. ' l l l  
1' i th federal substan t in: i n ter cc;t s . .  --\ :' to t h e  p u s s i b i l i t 1  n f  d i s p b c c; n e n t  i t t  :.� i d  nf fcd< ·r.J !  
p rllccdural t n le res t s .  see lnjm t e x t  clCCompcml i l t g  iH > I z:s :! 'i' i:: - :-1 :> & :.! \l l -30 1 .  
� ::-- �  Cf� \larn��;e \· . .-\ tncrican .-\c : tdcn1:; ( J r  ( ) n hopacd!c S u rgeo n s .  I 05 S .  ( � l . i �)�·? 'i .  
1 3 ')7 n .4 ( I  :J8 "1 )  ( H urgcr. C : .J .  c o n c u r r i n g )  ( " lh Co!H ra,; t .  1d : c·n J feeler;; ! c o u rt  c o n :·. t < :. < c s  
s u h s t a n l i l'(; r i g h ts e1 nd ohl iga t i n n s  u n d n  s ta l e  l a 1,· i n  t he c o l l l L' X l  Df a d inT'> i l \  ;,c l i • ; l l ,  t l t c 
fed e r a l  I n terest  1.� i n s igni i lcant  and t h e  sL t tc · �  i n t erest  L"' n n i c h  n 1 o 1·c cl Jr:_·u. : h � tn i ;  is i n  
t h e  present s i tu ;-.rion .  c1-cn if  t h e  lTicl·a n t  s t cl l c  Ln,· !:.;  ;t J n b i guuus . " l .  
F o r  a case su ggcs r. i n g  1 hat  federal  1 s s u c  prcrlus i o n  LJ \'; ;2;o\ ·erns i i 1c  ju c !gnH· n t  ; ·d · �l 
!"cdera l  d i i ' C rs i t y C O U rt  ad j t t d i cl l in g l t l d l t l' IS  t d l"cdcral s c t b ' i : ! ! l i i i L' Ltl\' , S L'l'  P�\ l t ll �dl c. ,rp.  
1· . l'a c;t m o u n t  l' ic 1  urcs l hc;H rcs C : o rp . . '\-+ 7 \. ' . S .  ;-:rJ .  < ) �' ( i l F>-f ) .  
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are tran s - substan tive a n d  hence p o orly suited t o  p ro tect s u b s tantive 
righ t s .  part icularly those conferred by another l egal system. � c,:l Fi­
na l l v , an independent federal po l icy affects the circum s tances i n  
"·hi�h uniform federal l aw can be appl ied i n  diversity  cases .  The 
eflec t of that p ol i cy in  o ther con texts has b een to submerge the costs 
to the federal courts and l i tigants of a m ixed sys tem of federal and 
state la w .  
The Supreme Court ' s  decis ions i n  Hanna u .  Plumer '2''"" a n d  
r ra!kn ;' . �-1 1 171CO Steel Co. '2 :1S  sugge s t  that  vvh e n  the only p utatively p er­
tinent federal lavv is  federal  com m o n  law , the quest ion whether a 
common law rule applies i n  diversity cases depends upon two in­
quiries . First ,  on e  asks  whether the application of a fed eral rule,  
rather than Lhe rule that would b e  applied by the courts o f  the s tate 
in  which the  fed eral court s i ts ,  w o u l d  materi a l ly affect the character 
or result  of th e l i tigati on-whether,  i n  m o re famil iar  terms,  the rule 
in quest ion i s  o u tcom e determinative.  Second, if  the answer to that  
ques t ion is  affirmative,  one asks the further questi o ns whether the 
difference b etween the p u tative fed eral rul e  and the s tate rule would 
lead a l i l. i ga n r  to choose a foru m for that reason or vvh ether appl ica­
tion of a \ a r i a n  t federal ru le would lead to inequitab l e  adminis tra­
tion of the la '>':s . :.::> ti I t  a l s o  app ears that ,  if the rule in question is  
outcome dctcrmin ati, ·e,  i t  d oes n o t  matter whether,  o n  the fans of 
the c a s e ,  i t  prom p t e d  choice of forum, so l o n g  as applying a variant 
federal  c o rn m. o n  law rule w o u l d  res ult  i n  inequi tab le adminis tra tion 
of the Ln\· s .  :e ,-, � 
Al l o f  L h i s  i s ,  of cours e ,  well  knmvn to first  year la'v s t u d en t s .  
W h a t  i s  surp r i s i n g  i s  r h a t  those w h o  d o  n o t  a ccept Professor 
Deg-n:.m ' s  compl e t e  d i �;patch o f  the Rules  o f  Decis ion Act and who 
have espoused a modified vers ion o f  his general rule for d i vers i ty  
j udgment�; p roceed a s  i f  these GISt-S did n o l  cxis t Y'k 
One pr1 s s ibk expl a n a t i o n  for the failure t o  gra p p l e  \vith the Erie 
l ine o f" ctscs is a concl usion that  those cases are irrelc\ a n t  to q ues­
tions concerning the p rcclu" ion law that governs che effects of a fed ­
eral di '·.·er:, i ty  judgment. B u t  the  conclus ion i s  insupport ab l e .  I t  i s  
�:"1:} Fz.li· the iT_i �·\·J n c c  of c-xis t i : �g· f(:dc'r<l.l ruics.  sec· supra nnfc ! 68. For purpose� of'  
thi :; an;l l \ � i s .  t l l L' yzt f i ,h\ nt "  f (:Jcr:Jl pr(· ;: l l ! s w n  rules  fo r fedcr�1 l  q uL·q ion j ud gme n t s  i;;  
<lssumed.  On t i t •.· prolJ l l' l l l  of t r: t l l'-' u b , t �l i l ! i '  c ru le ., a p p l i e d  t rans-sy> remic3 i h , C<}n< p:lrc 
.l'llf_no t e :-.:l acc1nnpan\· i n r2; i HJ l c :-; l :-) G - :1K { ...: i 1 n i l a l  concc�rn �� :-; t o  ust' of state p reclus ion l � t '-'" 
Cc ;r fcctcr�t ! q u c 5\t. : o n  j U (·l �{ nH' n L s )  
� '·1 �-::: ( l  l s --! (�() ( l  �J(i .1 ) 
:z _s 7  i ! 'o //,· ,T. --i � t )  l · . s .  ; : l  / :) �) .  For �\ _..; ug· _gc 'i uon  t h :t t  i n q u i ry u H o  1 hc fac t s  u i  1 h c c;:1 :� <.: 
C n1  t h ,'-· ; ...:. -� ·t : e  oi· l 'oru t ; 1  � l l c .,p p i n g  !S in� lppro p n ; d c .  >ct..· B u rb� 1nk .  l?tu'tl'- i:'nabhn,r,· . ·lr/. "� l i/J ·)·n 
l 1 C l i. L' g :.- .  �H l J f :--=; 
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true that preclusion rul e s  are n o t  made by,  an d  do n o t  ha.ve their  
ult imate bite i n ,  the ren d erin g  court .  B u l in fashi on in g  preclu s i o n  
rules  for federal j ud gmen t s , fed e r a l  c o urts a r e  b o u n d  b y  fed e ral 
s ta tu les , includ i n g the R u l e s  o f  Decis i o n A.ct and fed eral j uris d ic-· 
t iona] statu tes . The p u rp o s e  of t h e  e n terp ris e is p re c is ely  w d e ter­
mine the law that vvill  attend a fed eral divers i ty j u d gment and that 
will bind all court s ,  fed eral  o r  s tate ,  in \vhich the j u d gment i s  s u b s e­
q uen tly raised . Once that law is as certained , i t  wi l l  n o t  only furnish 
the rules prescri b i n g  the ulti m a t e  b i te, bu t i t  may a l s o  a ffect  the con­
duct  of l i t igation i n  the renderi n g  c ou rt .  As Profe s s o r  D egnan rec­
o gnized , albeit  i n  a d i fferent contex t ,  " [i]f ' ou r come determi n a rive' 
is  the relevant tes t . . .  h a rdly any th in g is  m o re disposit ive than the 
doctrine o f  res judicata . "259 
Another possible rea s o n  for i gn o rin g Erie ' s  pro geny i s  disagree­
men t w·i th the app roach taken in those cases . This apparemly 
p l ayed a part i n  the Restatemen t ' s  trea tmen t. The cornrnent to s ection 
87 follmvs Profe s s o r  Degn a n ' s  reas o n i n g, including his his torical ac­
count,  a long way dcnvn the path,  but draws back <t t t he point of 
banishing s r;:: te law entirely .  The co m m en t  mentions Erif' ;m d the 
Rules of Decis ion A c l ,  and it s u g-o-0 e s ts that federal  l a 'N  should adopt  (...1 '-.  .. 
s cate preclusion law ·,vhen the pwposes of the l a t t e r  can be ch aracter-
ized a s  subs tantive.  The analvsis  whol ly· neglects  the Supreme 
Court's  deci s i ons that characterize rules as  subs tan tive ;o,ccording to 
their effects  o n  divers i t y  cas e ·; . 2 (;o 
\Ve can disagree w i t h  the message in !-Ja n na ' s  d i c: u m ,  v;h i c h  ar­
guab ly became a command in !Talker, b u t  \V C should  n o t  i gnore i t . :?h l 
Indeed,  s i nce Dec:m Elv  helDed to cl arifv m a t t ers bv o oin tinc: o u t  that  , r-� , , t u 
o n e  problem i s  really three,::.:• ;::.: s cholars h�1ve dis p t: ted \vb ether the 
d d emma iden tified i n  Hanna ' s  d ic tum i s  th e dilem ma t h a t  should 
(Oncern federal co u ns s i t tin g i n  divers i ty w achn i r : i � Lcr s u Le L,\. 
\vhere there is  no pert i nent  c o r J S li tu ticmal o r  s t a t u t o ry p rovis ion or 
Federal Rule . ::.:1; �1 \Vithout rep eating this  dcbate ,  it may be us�C.:ful to 
�: ���) Degnan.  supra n o t e  3 . .:lt 7:}--l { f (; o t n o tc orn ;. l t cd ) .  l) i ! ! 'crcnccs i 1 �  \ o i n t· :: : .-.: p (_' c l s of '  
prcc lus icn law.  h o\\'C\ 'CT.  n1 �1y n ed_ affect  ch() Ice  n f  forurn . .  )'t: ·  } l u n t  \ ' .  Libci·� y Loh b v .  
I n c  . .  707 F . :>d J-1.93,  ! 4CJ1i ( D . C.  CiL i 1H 3 l :  .\ lf/N! n o t e  :?2\ i .  
:.! {}() See RE::JTATE�vi i·)'( 'f (SECO�< !) )  OF .J t ' DG).li< �..: r.:..; § s -�� C 0 1'1 1 ll "l l' ! 1 t  b ( ! �- / .) :2 ) .  Fot• the text  
n f"  -� S7,  .-:. e c  supul r.ex1 acc � )nlp�1nyn ltJ,- n o t e  2 �2 :, .  Sti' o!so (: .  '\\- H ! ( : i tT, .·. uru.' n o t e  :-)G.  
-:� ! 00_\, � t  695-DG.  
:2 f) l Professor  I--Iazard. repo rter o f  f i l e  l-?r:· iflt'(li!t:.'! t Stt"o;td _; :}(jli:(.�J,ltn l.�. hf.t.". n ...· !_ ;_' n t J , -
c:�.prt.·�:�ed his  d i �"\agrccrncnl �.,· i t h  r.hc po:� t -F�" It c :1 s c �  i li t h i ." c u rn t · x f .  Se1) t-Lt !. � l rci . _, uprn 
n o t e  9 2 .  For Ili)· r<:_'sp� } n :  .. : c .  s e c  Bu rb�tnk  . .  l'!i/J.'·o n o t e  q :.:: _ Fo: ·  L·�: ri icr. �� C IH:r:. t i . (· x p rcs .' l n n �  
c f  disagreenH�nt.  s e e  R cd1sh 8� P h i l l i p s .  supra n o l c  ! 7 : Rc-d i :d : .  ;·njJUl t i ( ; f �_· 1 7 . B n u :· 1 �c.  
sut,;a n o t �  1 7 . 
Sr'e Eh , ' "Jni: n o t e  1 7 . 
See s o urces ,.i � <:d l l ljJm n u t c  1 7 . 
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res tate t h e  implications of mv analysis for some of the maj or points 
in dispute b efore moving to the  p roblem a t  hand .  
d . The R u les oif Declslon A ct .  Whatever i t s  role i n  orescribimr the ' u 
relat ionship benveen federal and s tate law in other contexts ,  the 
Rules of  Decis ion Act unques tionably plays a role in diYersi t y  cas e s . 
Moreover, the  Act cannot  fairly b e  read t o  ex emp t feci eral common 
lavv from i ts requiremen ts .  Nor i s  the  Act exhausted when there i s  
federal lawmaking compe1.:ence.  Final ly ,  the las t r c s o n ,  selectively 
reading the Act s o  that the  reader d etermines  " the  cases vvhere ! the 
laws of the several s tates ]  apply, " turns the  C ourt ' s  rn i s t ake in Klaxon 
Co. v. Sten tor Electric ,\1a n ufacturing Co. :!G-+ into a cop-ouc 2 ; -, 
The Act does no t  prohibi t federal common l a w ,  howe ver. The 
creation o f  fed eral common lav,' mus t be j us t i fied b v  ref�::rence to 
provis ions  (or the s truc ture) of the Cons t i tu tion ,  federal s ta t ute � .  or 
Federal Rules that. fairly read ,  so provide or so req u i re . 2hli In some 
cases , the in terp retat ion of  those s ou rce5 wil i  y ield the conclusion 
that a uniform fed eral rule govern s .  In o ther cas e '; ,  s tzt te l: nv ap­
plies ,  unless hos ti le  to or incons i s tent  with federal i n t erc<; t s ,  ;md it  
does so not because the federal cou.ns ha'v"e borrowr:' d n b u t  b e cause 
Congress has borrowed i t .  
Under this  view, fed eral courts are not  J.utuma ticallv remi t ted 
to s ta te  law b v  the Rules of Decision A.ct  whene\ ei c; m <: t t cr has es­
caped specifi c treatment in the Cons ti tutio n ,  an ;; C' of Cong-re s s ,  or 
F ' l R-, 1 ·  ' • . d · l t c , th • '  ' I t ' '} ' e aera • u , e s . ! t  J S  ouo t Ul ,  on c 0 c 1 1 e r  nan o ,  \\ • 1 c t ncr Lley nave 
the freedom sugges ted bv the Court in Ho ww .
·
'' h i  1!' an eth s i s  con­
fines the federal "procedural " policies that federal c: :o \ i rt s  c1 1 1  c o n ­
s i der in crea tmg federal c o m m o n  l <nv iO tho·; e  h n d  c:zpn�5 S ion 
:! t i < cl l :' L . S .  - ! 8 7  ( i �H l l .  
� { ) :-) Ste supra tc:--:t : tccorup� tn\  1 n g  n o t e  1 � ,:) ;  note 1 :.?  j . .--\ l t hnu!J)l  � P n c:-; h�n· :.__· c h ; : n :�·c d ,  
an d \\' i t h  t h en\  1 1 o t io n s  �d) t Jt l 1  Ln,· . L :1 n guJg-c 1 n  t h e  R u l e:\ of l )cci :..; : c ! i  \ c t  i h,_n r T i l c c t c d  < Jn 
u ndcrs t dn d i n g· of the po\\'CT of fed eral  coun� t c  c h ( i o s c  Lhc ] y._,; ( c \·cn i i  
destgncd t o  t: n s u re � l  cho ice o i "  :.;; t a t e  l<n\· �\s to " l oc�d · · q t t t:: > a i o n :� )  . .\f"t· F l t· tcher. S ! t/) i"r! n u t c  
1 1 6 .  need n o t  be dcpr i \-cd o f  al l  ·1 i gn i fJ cancc,  le t  a l o n e  usc·d i n  t h e  _ \ c �  of "  �dl  
s i gni f icance .  L' ndcr t h ts \· ic\,- , the .-\ct  cnq.Jo\,·cr�; a h: rJer;_d C < J U rt  t � J  ch ! :� ; � :� c  \ d J Ji. l t  -�. L�n c ' ." 
l J.\\ to app l Y ,  t''- ·en in a di\-tT.\ ! \ Y  C�t "l C  . . \'f'f' ja� · - .l.it/Ft"rl lU i l C  i 0 �� .  ;;: I  J c� \ )q  
:.2 tlt) \e�� sujnn :_ext acrorn p�i n \· i n g  n o t es 1 0�_L:2 q ,  i 7 3 - 7 () ;!..:. 1 H 7 -- � :l �  .-\ \.; t r J  ! � Jed '..' u u ri. 
rul e s ,  s e e  Sl ij)i"tJ n o t e  l b�.l :  n o t e  � S � .  Sre o!.1o sujnrt n o l c  l �U ( fc d c r: t l  c u rn rn �· l n  Lt\'." (\'-\ 
s o urce oi' p o l i c'; lor l (:dn�d c " : n m o n  b 1-. l .  
� ( ) 7  
i t  clear t h a t  i n - h a n d  s c-r\· i c c  i s  n o t  t'cqui rcd i n  d iYers i t �. ·  ;_t C t l O l L,; _ _ the  
obligated t h e  D i :..; !r ic t  C ( ) u rt  lo t "u l l o>.,- t h e  �. LJ.. \ :-\ �tch � t s c ! t:..: � }g{) L _ .t) � t t  
4 6 G  ( d i c u nn ) .  -rhe ( � o u rt  chc l ! � o i  niakc c ic�lr \d1c t h c:- i t  ,, -�L.; a -., _., \_ : t t ; : n  n •  : \  ( : � J ! \ · : ·; 1 )  pcr : 1 -
C�o . .  l OL F . R . I) .  q3-L � f � ) t )<) 7  ( L . lJ . � - Y .  l �Lq -+ )  ( cX L'; U:ncc \ > i  n_· l c\ - �l n i  F ;  - -L .. Ld F. 1 J ic'-�  re­
qu ires ch:-\·c lop !nc ;; r  oi ' fcd c·Ld c�t."C' Ln\· ) � ! 1 ! 1 /i lfi. �1 1 q ;r 7  ( C\' (.' 11 d t · cd cr:_ t l  E : d ·'--' <  .-:. d ct "z �  c n t t r !_ 
need n u t  �lpply  S L ;l l c  Ll\\- tf t u  d o '\ ( )  . .  \\·nulcl I J ( ) t  di�cu \ t r�J g v  i -: ; 1 · : : L 1 - ·..; = � ! '  ; J \ ·o ; d  t l H '  
lfH: q u i tah lc  adnnni �d r�u i o 1 1  o i  ! l : c  Ln\ s ' ' )  F tl r  o t h e r  e n  t ie l .'-; lit ( � ! / /tu t l! /: \ c i i ,  ; ·: � nL >; cc B u r-
bank . Rult.�" . i f "! . .. ujiUi p o r e  h i .  : H  l i 7 -I - i' :�) 8:. :1.hh� 
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i n  o r  are fairly inferable fro m  the C onsti tutio n ,  ans o f  C o n gress  and ' G 
valid Federal Rules . 
Federal la1v may give confl icting s i gnal s .  The d e b a te about  the 
\\· i sdom o f  the course taken i n  diversity cases after Erie has inc luded 
the quest ion whether,  i n  effecting a pol icy a gains t  d ifferent o u t­
comes o n  the b a s i s  o f  c i tizenship,  the C ourt was interpret ing the 
Rules o f  D ecis ion Act o r  s o m ething else. � (;,, The d ic h o t o m y  is  fal s e .  
T h e  policy agains t different o utcomes o n  t h e  b a s i s  o f  ci t izenship i s  a 
' " p o licy of federal j uri sdict ion" ; :> l> ' l  i t  evidently d erives fro m  the act  
o f  C o n gress conferri n g  d ivers ity j uris diction o n  the fed eral 
court s . :> 7 0  I n  considering w he ther the Const i tut ion o r  acts of C on ­
gress  ( i n cluding t h e  Rules Enabling Act) require the appl icat ion of 
federal l a w ,  the federal court s m u s t  consider both p o l icies gro unded 
in those s ources point ing towards a federal rule a n d  p olicies  p oi n t­
i n g  t o  the application o f  state lavv . The Supreme Court's  deci s i o n  in 
Byrd u. Blue R idge Rum! Electric Cooperatiue, '-' 7 1  the b e s t  refu ge for 
t h o s e  who ass ert broad power in the federal court s  t o  apply a fed eral 
c o m mon Lm of p rocedure ,  is not incon s i s t e n t  w i th this  analys i s .  O f  
course the c a s e  w a s  e a s y  if the seventh amendment required s u b m i s ­
s ion o f  t h e  i s s u e  t o  t h e  jury . :> 7 :> I f  t h e  Coun bel ieved tha t ,  i ts  a p ­
p roach is perhaps be s t explained as a res p o n s e  to fears for t h e  
i n tegri tv of the Federal R u l e s  because of i ts  o w n  confused o p i n i o n s  
in earl i e r  cas es ; �27 :1 pain ting ,,· i th a broad b ru s h  i�  not  unknown in 
this  corner o f  t h e  law.  But ,  if r h e  Court beli eved that ,  the � u gges­
t i o n  thar  i t  might have reached a d ifferent !"esul t  if a " s trong p o s s i ­
b i i i t \  . , h a d  existed t h a t  t h e  difference between t h e  federal and s tJ. te 
rules  'XJ S  ou tcome d e t ennina t i ve , :> 7-<  a n  aspect  o f  the opinion to o  
e�t:'iil v i gnored,  is  i n expli cabi e . '-' 7 -, O n e  need n o t  e s p o us e  a t heorv of 
�t i t·; Cr�t!ijJ(trt-:o \\ · c . ...;t cn & Lc h t n a n ,  SU/Jl'o n o t <: 1 7 . at 3G.� - -i" 7  \ c o in tnon i �n\· pol ic\· J r.t "ilh 
R e d i s h .  > �tjnn nolc 1 7 . : l l  < ) ( ):2-ti :i
. 
9tiS- b�l & n . liO ( R ules o C Duiston .-"\ct ) .  So· u!sn \\. cs r cn . 
\ U/Jr:'t n o : c  l / . �H �-�8� -��:1 . 
:c • ;� ;  Cu:\ranl\  Tru s t  C ' J .  \ . York.  :\ � t i  l...· . s .  �)�). l 0 1  ( l  �l-LS ; .  St•r Burbank .  sujmt n o t e  ' l � .  
: t i  f ) i) l .  Cf. \\'ai kcr \ .  :\nnco S t eel  C o rp . .  -l -1-t.i l. · . s .  7 -10 .  7 :<5  ( l () H O }  ( . .  T h e  p t d i cics  t t n ­
du-h i : lg d i \ crSi l \  jur i sd ict ion do I I (J l  support .' uch a d i s t inct ion  . :.n 1 c.i Fur :,ncJ It \ 
: n· : ' / C' I 1 '- du n o t  penni l  i t. . ' ' ) .  
� 7 °  il tht�  I S  · · Jngh fic t i o n  . . . \loi i : tgh ; m .  F /;t' SuJilnlli' C:our/. 1 ') /-1 ! 1-rii;-F, ) } t'< • ' '''d: (o! l ­
• i ' i ' lunuol  ( .o l!lilil)/ ! l.r�ec. 8�)  1-l.\R\ · .  L RH· .  I .  1 7  ( l ' J 7 :i } .  quoil'd r u  i\ .cs t c n  & LE.·hm:m.  • ujnrt 
n < • i e  1 7 . <ll 3 7 :) t t . ! � l (i .  s o  be i t .  H u l l h e  C :o u n  i ndulges t h i :; hui o n .  :1m.i it t h c t efi nT 
s l H ; ; t l cl not he ignored.  C\·cn 11·hct 1  inc< > n n·nicnl  t.n one · s dwon u! t h t: rcl a t i o t l s h i p  hc­
i h L"<" ! I  t h e  R u l e s  or lkCJs ion .\C! : tnd federal  U l l l 1 l 1 1 0 l 1  bh.  
! 1 .  1 �Hi .  
T' J i j  l S  :'/2 5  ( ! � l :) S )  
.\n•. r· . .  � .  Fric t :dh· . wjmt t W i c  10� . : 1 1  -HU n . �l:") :  !-: ! "' · · l itjn l  ' ' ' J l <. · ! 7 .  :1 1 7( )q _  i ! "/ 
Sr'1'. I' g .  L h . SltjH• t n o t e  1 7 . : 1 t  7 0 1 ) .  
s,·r !hu!. :3 .1 1 )  L· . s  . •  t t  :) C') � l  
'..!. / . ..,, P n "' Ccs s o r  Bourne s n g-�·cs t s  d L l l  l h i s  a s pect o f "  t hl' ( J p i 1 1 i o n .  ra her t h (u! i l l � \ '  n:L t : -
I n g  to th t' :-\C\T l l l h  :n ! l L'! H l t n e n t . rc\ ·c:d:' t h e  C o u rt ' :..; d c :-; i n_· [ 1 ;.  · · :� ho r j c up l ·, J l t h  l i 1  Ccd c Lt 
."i t ;.t l U L t_'s � tnd rul{'s  . . . H ( ) u rnc . .  ' !ifni! n o t e  ! 7 . �1 t -� { ) ( )  n . \ 7 -: . .  \,.,, irl .  : t t  h-i ! l . i t l 7 .  
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co n s t i t u ti onal common law�'( ;  to accept t h e  n o t i o n  t h a t ,  \Vh e n  con­
s ti tu t i o nal pol ic ies  are i m p l i cated a n d  the federal rule appl icable in 
federal quest ion cases i s  clear , � 7 7  the s o l em n  business  of co n s ti tu ­
t i o n a l  decis i o n  m a y  b e  defe rred u n ti l  the a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  federa l  o r  
s tate law would m ake a d i fference and the fed eral p olicy agai n s t  d i f­
ferent outcomes o n  t h e  b a s i s  o f  c i t izenship \vould t h u s  b e  
implicated.  
I f  one regards Byrd a s  a u t h o ri tv  i n  d iversity cases for the consid­
erat ion o f  federal p o lic ies  other than those involving the j ud ge-j ur v  
rela t i o n s h ip , � 7 s  a n d  i f  one reads Hanna  a n d  i l "al/w as c o n t i n u i n g  
that au thority even i n  c a s e s  i m p l i c a t i n g  the federal p o l i n  a gai n s t  
different  o u tcomes o n  t h e  b a s i s  o f  c i t izen s h i p , � 7'1 t h e  mz� or o b s tacle 
to the deve lopment o f  p ri n cipled guides to deci s i o n  is the art icula­
tion o f  proces s e s  by \Vhich the competing pol ic ies  are iden tified and 
decis i o nal w e i g h t  a ttached to them . Even those who rej ect t h e  s i g­
nificance o f  t h e  pol icy  i d e n t i fi ed by the Court in i t s  p o s t-Erie cases 
recognize that ,  unless t h o s e  proces s e s  arc discipl ined,  federal courts 
are essent ia l lv  free o f  c o n s traints . �so 
The approach advocated h ere regards the Rules o f  Decis ion Act 
as s peaki n g  directlv to Lhe c ircums tances i n  I\ hich i t  is penni s s ib l e  to 
fashion or applv federal common law.  It  bas 1.he obvious  e ffect of 
i m p o s i n g  disc ipl ine o n  t h e  Erst  o f  those proces s es . Fed eral c o u rt s  
are n o t  fr e e  t o  c m�jure u p  " i n tere s t s " ;  rJ ther,  t h eY must  t i e  t h e m  to 
� �� >  s,.,,, '. Jon;1gh<l l J .  slljJm n o i c ::.> 7 n .  For " cri 1 iqul· , , r  i 'rot\.·";or \ J ona gh<ln·s  i l le• > n· , _, r  
con s l. i l u l ional com m o n  b11 . s e c  \ !crr i l l .  supm I H > I C  q ::_> _  a 1  :-J..J -:,q.  
'.!. 7 7  .)·u� /)yu/. :L ) f )  l· .s .  a t  :1�$ 7 .  
� I S  SPr"1 Rcr l i .-;;h & P h t l l i p s .  sujJrtl l 1 1 ! t c  1 / . �l t '3 7 1 .  
� �� �  Crnnjmu· Eh· ,  wjmi nolc 1 7 . < I I  7 1 7 n . l : lO C l l l h cr e  i s  ' ' ' '  pLi < ' l' i n  ! h e < l l l < lh  s J..; t < H. 
L h e  son ot h;d:m c i n g  o f  fcdn;d :md s t a l e  i n L cr c S i s  cnn t c m p i :t l e<.l l ) \  t he ijy,,; o p i ll l n n  · · 1  
<l 'ilh R ed i :; J J 8..: Ph i l l i p > .  sufnll n o l c  1 7 . el l :1 \ !7  - 7 '2 .  :lS-i ( ba la nc i n g  pcr> l s l cd : l i t e r  f!o ! ! I JII :l i HI 
is neccs s;ln in l i ght of c o s L s  to f"ccl er:d :; n l ern cxaci ed !)I 1 /a u nll ) .  
Both o f  t h e s e  J ruc les \\TIT 1\Ti t r en bdorc t h e  J l .o /l:n cl cc i s i r m .  \ 1 1' R c r ! i s ! ! .  ' ii/JI(I n • > l c  
1 7 . a l  q;;r_l n . ':! .  On o n e  ,·in .. . br'C: lUSe J J "aiker ap p l i ed lial l l ! fl · ., d ic t u m .  i n l CJl" \ l  h : d : l l l C l ll g  
hy L h e  i ( J I':cr fedcr:1l court s i s  cl i f l i c u l i  t o  j u s t i f,· u n L i l  t h e  cou!· l · · rcc,·a l u;i l e [ s  I t h e  .s u 1 1 ·  
dards s e t  o u t  i n  !-IO!illa . "  lri. I l  is  possible.  ho\IT\"LT. Lo  I"C<Jd t h e  C o t i ri \  opini <., , ., 1 n  
l l "olkn : t s  i c<ll i ng  the  door ope n .  The C o u n  roncluck cl :  · · Thc: -c i s  s n n p h  " "  re�h ( > : l  
11" 1 1 1· ,  in  Lhc  : tbsc:lLl' of a C<l l t t m l l i n g  federal  rule.  : 1 1 1  < t c t i o n  b: 1 scd o n  S l « l c  l <l \ 1  h h 1ch 
conceded!:, W• • tdd  be b:1 1-rcd i n  th e s ta t e  C l l l ! rl s  !}\ t h e -; i :l l l' .s t : t l l l t c  o !  l i m i Lt l H > I l '  s l H i l d d  
proceed . . 1 1 1  kdcral c o u rt  s o l e l Y  because o! 1 he ! on u ! l l  : l u t t here i s  r l n n > i l l  o f  c i l i ·  
zcnsh ip  h c l �<cen t h e  l i t i g<nl l s . · · l ! "o /l:n. -1-i(i L S .  : t t  7 :) ') .  T h e  nq.�:1 1 : , c p it :g n: l l l l  1 n :n he· 
Lha r ,  dt lc :! s l  i n  cases 11·hcrc forull l  ;; h o p p i n g  1s n o t  :1 concern.  i1 1 1 1 ,,.,. "tfnr; I H • l c  '.:. :-l 7 .  :t 
cons id cr:t t i < J i l  ( ) f  k d c r. d  p u l ic ics m : n  f l t rn is i i  :1 " rc<tson ��-h � · ·  :mcl j t LS i l i \  a ' " ' H l > h ; , , n 
i ll < l t  a d i !kt-encc in o u l co 1 n c  d o e •' n o t  con s t i t ute " i n c q u i t : th lc  : � rl 1 n m i :d r:t l 1 u n  of t h e  
� �H )  Srr. r.g . . R c d i �d 1  8.: Ph i l l i p  . .; . supra n o t e  l 7 . �ll �) 80 .  F!ut oun,Jntrt B P U !T i c .  "'/il"ri n o i c  
i 7 .  : 1 1  -Hi9 - 7  i ( " i nflur:nce h u 1  ! l i ; l  L h c  comm:;nd of kd n:d posi 1 i 1 c i ; 1 h  · · ) ,, • r lh ;r/. : l l  - �  7 :-; 
( " " a  S l !"O!l g fcclcr;l \  pol i n . <I C O l l C T L' l C  i"cderaJ pCCUll i :Jn· i ll l CI"CS l .  a . J l l ' l i f i : : ! J !c .S C P ." ·  o i  t i l l: 
need o! " u n i l ur m  Ccc! e ral  s \ a n d a rck or :1 s e n s e  t h;H t h c  prohkm i m pl ic;, ; n  n o  \ Ll l c  m l cr ­
c s r s " ) .  Str' o!so ui. : l l -\ 0 ::!-Cl-! . 
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policies already art i culated i n ,  or a t  least  a rt iculable fro m ,  val i d  legal  
prescrip tio n s . :.> ·'-' 1  The natural tendency of i n s ti tu ti o n s  to seize the 
moment to expand their p o we r i s  thus bounded by a requirement of 
resort for authority  to pol icy choices made o n  o ther occas i o n s  
through differen t ,  m ore democrat ic ,  process e s . :.>82 
The ap proach aiso has the  less  obvious effe c t  of d i sc ipl ining the 
process bv \ \  hich fed era l p o l i cies finding expres s ion in the perm i s s i ­
b l e  legal sources are c o ns i d ered, a s  again s t  c o m p e t i n g  policie s ,  i n  
determin i n g  whether federal c o m m o n  l avv applies If the P�ules of 
Decis ion Ace i s  taken s er ious ly ,  i t  should not  b e  i n t e rpre ted ' ' in  a 
crabbed or wooden fas h i o n .  " :! <·n S tatu torv i n t erpretation and fed ­
eral c o m m o n  lawmaki ng a r e  variat ions o n  a c o m m o n  theme . 2 8·1 The 
s tronger the pull of a policY underlying the C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  an act o f  
Congres s .  or  a Fed eral R u i e  tmvard implem entat ion through fed eral 
decisional 1 a '.\" , the eJ. s i er it i s  to conclude that  the s ource " requires" 
otherwi se than that  s t a t e  ] ;:nv applv .:.>K:. Wh ere t h e  pull  is  weaker but  
s tili fai rl y  discernib l e ,  and no confl ic t ing federal  pol ic ies  p o i n t  t o ­
i,�ard t h e  applicat ion o i· s L1 t e  law.  any l i n gui s ti c  s train i n volved i n  a 
:2 S l (j .·\ n • > '' ' m i t h \ .  l. � ; l ' I Cd Prc.,s  I n t ' l .  :1::?0 F . � d  � 1 �1 .  '2 '}. 7  ( '!. d  CiL J CJ G:� )  (en b;m c )  
(rc fu:< i J 'g  i ! l  c! J il"rs i ;  1 ; : u  i < ) :1 • "  : ipph !edcr;d s u ndarcl o f  pcr�onal j urisd i ct i o n  " " i n  t h e  
�t h s c n c c  • > ! : 1 ; 1  l l l't •ni d i n ).l: f'r:der;d : nt crc s t  m t i m�ttcd h1 C:on g-rcs .s or i t s  dclcg:l tc " " ) ;  \\";t i ko 
C :crp . \ .  B t t r;_:;· :· C : h <: i  S , q ctm. I n c . . :) :'!-+ F . �d 1 l b5 .  1 1 7 '2 ( D . C. C i r .  l � J 7 7 )  (i{ ulcs of" 
l)cchion .-\ ( - { · · :2.- ; \ ' -..::' i c d t:Ld < ·uu r t :� n u  l i ( 't·nsc  t o  s!L1pc t h e  p o h c\· Cor d i •: t:rs i t y  
! i l ig�t t io n " }  
:2 � '2  \ L : h i- d n .  Ld_-\ 1 i l .ouls. suj)ro n o l c  1 0:2 .  � H  l ()H7 ( " ! \ \. \ here the  l i rn i t .� �t iT bt' ing 
l lll ] ! i l S ·_·d < > : 1  ; he < • > U ri '< t h c t n s c hTs . . the  j u d i c i a l  con., t ra i n t s  t < l  act i n  accortb ncc 1\ i t h  kgis L; ; n d ··. ; : ' ' ! " ' "�·d l i t l ! i t ..; ., l w u l d  he CITP s t ronger in ordu·  l O  coumcr t h e  i t l hcren t 
t c n d e n c \· • d  ; t n :: n � ·� i t ! u i l i n1 t o  c x t t:nd i t �  c,\',Tl n::�l ch  and po \\·cr . ' ' ) .  
R l·cc· n i  �- ; , ; H i .� \.. � .• , , 1 1  t i le proc�.:�s b y  \\·h ich  l oc�d di :-; t r ic l  courl  rul e.� d r c: p ro n n d �:;H cd 
n t c. l �_. din1 i i l ! �; h  �: o ! -� . .  _-(' 1 : �  � l i H J L J t  d H J 5 L' rules b e i n g cons idered \- �die! s o u rces uf pni icy  fo r 
[(dcr�d cu n n n l ; n  Ll\\  ;nakn1g· . .  \t'r Fr:v .  R .  Cn·. P. sg (tt::: a nH:·ndcd .-\ug .  l ,  l �)k:J ) .  St·t ah·{i 
H . R  . ."1 .1 :1 0 .  �l l i t h  C o n g  . .  l s t S cs s .  � ·H :t )  ( El " :i )  (requir ing n o t i c e  a n d  comnwnt  in l o c a l  
c o u r t  n d c n ; ;• k i n g l .  I h e  l ·lou.•;e •�Jf Rcpt"Csctl i. �! t i n::s passed H . R . 3 550 on Dec. <l .  1 qs :; .  
I 'l l  C o :. .J . . RH . .  H l i , ci \)\)  ', cb i l '  eel . Ike. � � - j < ) t) :i ) .  l· rom t h i s  pcrs p c c t i1c .  ho\,"Ci er. r c·  
s o rt t ( i  \-� d i d  t (:d(:r:d l. On! i n o n  l d \\. a:---. a s o urce of po; ic\· fo r  : tddi t io n a l  c o n 1 n 1 o n  L .n\ - r u l e s .  
St'�' _, 1 1/JUI n o t e s l � 0  l�.: l �� ) .  i .s  t ro u b l c s o rnc .  
. •·upru 
� K---i 
Rohc: l s u n  '-· . \ l "cgm:n : n .  -J 'Hi L' S .  58-L 5�J8 ( l \1 7 :-:l )  ( B l�' c k m u n  . .  J . . d is :< u t t i n f.i )  . .  '"irr 
l :  ..·��l � iC I_. : ) J l1 j ) � l ! l � 'U lg � � O l L'  J :29 . 
Sn-· \\ ' i,· .<; t { � � ; 0< Lch! n : n L  .i t tj/U.' n o t e· 1 7 . at :>:S � - 3 t) .  
'..! .:-\:� Pro\· i s ions  u r  the· ·,u \ I C i t l l"C' or !_ h e  c:ons t l l l l U O n  o r  acts  of' (-�o n gTe�;s rna\· a lso be 
dccmccl ' 1. \ " " p r l l l  rd •,.· . . uthn .,,- i :<c  th : tn  t hat  > l < t tc  l a 11· apph . n o t  b c ral, ; sc < l  fcd.cr:ll rule 
�done \\· i i i  :.;c �  \ C t h t: pt !t·pn.·;•�· h u t  hcC:! � i SC· t ht' fr�t l ! llTS O r  C:Ot""!grcss COn t!._' 111pl :t t cd } nl ple ­
J11C n t ;_u i n n  t h  _ _ j u (.lg·(·-nLtdc- l 'c c i c t . . (d  Ll\, . . ,\'tt sujJrtt ; c ;..;,t accon1p�1 n y i n g  n o t e  l t..; � 
( l<.u!c�·. 1-: n�: h l i H .� ..- .-\ c t ) :  \ ic- rr1 J L  sufin: 1l O i l'  9 � .  <H -1-0--l t >  ( ' ' l)el c.G!_·a t c d  La\\"Dl �l k i n g· · · .) Sn• olsr. 
I -f i l L  -' i f/; , ·(; � ; c; \ C  1 0 .--l ( d i � � · ;. : :� s t n g  co:l s l ! l u t i u n a l  �1 n d  s t at u t o ry p rccn1 p t i n ! l ) :  \ I o n� t.gh �u l  
.\ 't/P-rt n o t 1. · '2 7 � :: .  ;_i l  i -� 1:_ · · r�·(kT;.·d cornrnon L :n\· gieancd b y  nnp i ! c�t t ion Crorn t h e  feck.-r�l 
:-: t n.: c ! t: t"C o f "  I_ ! v· l " n ; l cd S t�l tc _-.; " ) :  . l .ex�-�s l n d u � .  \ · .  R:s d c l dl '  \ L1 t c -r i a l s .  1rH . .  - L )  l L · . s .  G:)O 
-���L�!; :lt��� : 'l' (;;·,�· �·;11�:·' ;�:(;,_' ;.:�� n::::,�,··, ;l::;,, a�lc�' 'el!��;il;·o�,':-.:11��! i Il !����� i ': �l \�;::·�:� c( ;�),':,�.,\� i'n';''· �� �l�: l �: 
L) �� - ") .-\ ·..; i. u F F ! l .  P. . ( � i '. '  P .  ;:-:; �� .  h n\\'C \"Cl' . s e-c : litjno n o t e  1 9� .  
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o·enerous reading of the  \vords of  the Rules of Decis ion Act  con-o c 
fro n ts the rea l i ty of a documented federal in terest in  the applicat ion 
of federal law and no recognized policy favoring s ta te lavv .  When,  
however, a pert inen t federal pol icy favors the applicat ion of s tate 
law ,  the s train reaches the breaking point .  
e .  .ipphing Federal Common Law . i nalysis and a Rules ofDecision Act 
-t1'J!Jroach . S o  long as uniform federal la i"' governs onlv the definition � f L ,� , 
of a "judgment "  enti t led to respect ,  pro b lems of adminis tering a 
svstern of borrowed s tate law do n o t  j us tifv,  either under tradit ional 
f�d.eral common law analvsis o r  under a Rules of Decision Act ap­
proach , uniform federal rules  for al l  preclus ion quest ions ari s ing 
from federal divers itv judgments . '-'"'; Moreover, to t h e  extent as ­
pects of the preclusion law app l ica ble to federal divers ity j udgmen ts 
implicate federal pol ic ies cognizab l e under tradi t ional analysi s  or a 
Rules of Decision Act approach , the relative homogeneity of preclu­
s ion la\v through o u t  the country cautions agains t  a ca tegorical a pri­
on determination that  the  threa t to federal in terests requires 
uniform federal rul e s .  In diversitv cases federal subs tantive inter­
e s t s  are usual ly contingent .  I f  federal procedura l  interests exis t  that  
may b e  cons idered ,  t h c v  are not  onlv con tingent ,  but  in terms of  any 
concern about federal court suoervis ion ,  thev are nonexi s tent .'-'�7 l ' 
Final lv .  d i s tinguished author i t y ,  umvi l l ing to follow the Supreme 
Cour t ' s  p o s t -L'rle decis ions as L1r as  Hanna a n d  Wollwr may require,  
acknowledges tbar s tate pre c lt! s i on law s houid apply to pro tect s tate 
subst<m tive polic ies .  and that complete un i fo rrn i ty i s  therefore 
impo::: s ib le . '-'C:K 
Tho s e  who would applv  federai p reclusion rules except when 
confronted b v  discrete state rules tha t are deem ed " subs tant ive" 
seemin gly have i t  backwards . '-' c:< J  In the absence of a documented 
S"P supro t t·x t  �tcco n l p a n y i n g· n n t e s  �r� 7  - 5 �� 
,\"re sujno n u i_: .:' '1 '2 �} �tnc\ accutnpt tn\ · ing l c x t :  u;j�·o t c:� t accon1 p::1 nying n c t e  � 9 8 .  
� K S  ,)r·e suprn ! ext �lCC(JtHp�tn y i n g  nolc � 2-L 
:!WJ Pro lcssor \\'nght m ake> ;m a t tempt t o  rccor: c i ! c  the reg i m e  h e  ach octlcs \l· i th  t h e  
SuprcnH:- C o u rt · ..., fed e-ral C ( l r11!1 1 0 !1 l et\,. c a s e s :  
ro :-; ( iy  [ r h ;J !  federal  L� l\\" ��-o\·crn:-. t h e  prccl tb i\T c. f fccl  or a fed eral j u d g­
rncn l !  Is J h ) :_ to :.; u ggc:�t that  federal c o t : n �  �i re tn i gnore 1n1portant  s ta t e 
i n tc; -c s t s  ur t h J t  t h <: p rcclusi\c dfcn of kdcr.1 l j udgmen t s  1s monol i t hic 
I t  has bccorn e  YcrY corn rnon 1 n  other a rea�; t t.J  hold t h a t  a p a rt ic ·ular sub­
J L'C t  in :_1 t t ;_' r ls  gn'-Trncd h y  f(�d E'ra l i::t \\· , bur  t h a r  J u n i fo r r n  : 1 �u i unai  ru le  i s  
: 1 u t  n(�ccs:-::ar\· and :-; t �t t c  Ln\· 1 s  to be lonkcd tr J  .'. ! ) long 3 S  i l  i :-· n r_:� t (!iscr i rn i ­
n a h � c.- ur i n  cnn H i c t  ,,: i c h  federal  S Ll t LH C .\ .  S o nlt.' a s p c c l s  :. J f' prech1s lon 
rcHcct p i' 1 I l iJri ly  p n )cf..:_'dural  p o i i c i c:-i and � - , )  i (.1 the  t':):-; c n c c  o f  the j udic ia l  
f\_t n c l i �,:-1 . · rhcsc :JspccLs  o l  p t·cc l u s i c n  � h o u l d  h e  go\·t-rned by a s i ngle 
un1Corn1 fcdcr�tl rule.  () thcr a s p e c t s  of F>!'l_· c l u s i o :;.  rcf l c;__·t pnl icics t ha t  
s c c·n1 rn o r c  d i :; t i nct iYe ly  :; ubsta n t i v e .  
C .  \\.!1. : ( ; \ l L ' "/JI<: n o t e  ::it i .  � i OU.\ .  a t  (/J t j  ( l o o t ; w t c  u m i t t cd ) .  F u r  cri u c i s ll l  o f  : h i :; !< Jr-
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case for uniform federal rules ,  state law applies unless  i t  i s  hos ti le to 
or inconsis tent with federal in teres t s .  Perhaps ,  however,  I have not 
fully grasped that case .  The fact that the system of p reclus ion rules 
will inevitably be  mixed does not  mean that \Ve should  abandon the 
goal of  predictability or  the federal in terest in aclminis trabil i ty .  If in 
s ignificant aspects of  preclusion la\v ( in addition Lo the defini tion of 
a "j udgment")  federai interests require the displa cement of state 
law,  predict<1bi l i ty as to the governing preclus ion law counsel s ,  and 
the relative homogeneity of  preclusion law support s ,  depart ures 
from a federal norm. 
As to claim preclus ion ,  Rule l 8 (a) certa inly provides procedural 
opportunities that federal courts may consider in fas hioning com­
mon law rules that are otherwis e  jus t ified.  'Nhether the rule ex­
presses a policy that calls for federal claim preclusion rules is  
another question , one that i s  difficult to ansvver affirma tively. C er­
tainly i t  is diH1cult to answer in the wav in which those  favoring par­
ticular federal preclus ion rules would answer i t .  · ' l'vlav" as used in 
Rule 1 8 (a) does not  mean " shall . "  " S hall" in this  context is  bevond 
the competence of the Federal Rules , and " may·"  j uxtaposed with 
" shall , "  even if  unauthorized , i s  a parti cularly feckless vehicle of 
policy. �'H) 
Many would not accept the notion that the federal "proce­
dural " pol icies jus tifying federal common lawmaking are cord1 ned to 
those expressed in  the Consti tu t ion,  federal s ta tu te s ,  o r valid Fed­
eral Rules ."9 1 In the context of  preclusion, i f  one put s  rhetoric  con ­
cerning j udicial power in  i ts  proper place." ' 1:..> the arguments reduce 
to a federal in teres t in final i ty or in eH1cient j ud i cial adminis tration .  
Preclusion law is als o typically concerned wi th  l i t igants , :..>• J:\ but the  
concern is a function of  ( 1 ) the in terest  in final i ty ,  ( 2 )  the protect ion 
of substantive rights ,  which s tate lav.· defines in this contex t ,  or (3 )  
repose s impliciter, as  to which i t  is  d ifficult  to jus tify a federal p o l i c y  
independent of that  furnished bv the svstem that  governs primary 
act:vny. 
Sfi' .wpm n o t e s  1 7 2 & l 7 G and accompJm ing :ext  
:! !l l sl'f. (',g . .  Bourne, Slljim note 1 7 , ::It 4 7 2 - 9 2 :  Rcdi'h & Ph d l i f.J S .  ' 11/Jif/ n o t e  1 7 . a t  
:i84-94 . 
� �v2 SPe _, upra tex t  accon1panying no 1e:;; S 1 -9 2 .  
:\.ppl icat ion o r  both [ c la in l  c.n d  issue preclusion ] I S  CCt l t ral ! O  t h e  p u rp< > SL'  
ro r ·,·;h idJ Ci\ i l  C O U r t S  h J \IC: bce:1  eS tJb\ i ohcd.  : h e  CCJnc l u -;i \·C  r<..'SOi l l t J 0 ! 1  < .> 1  
d i s p u t e s  ,,· i rh in the ir  jurisc! ic t iuns . To p!-cc l u d e  p a rt i e s  from c o n ­
test ing mat ters tha t  theY haYe k:cl a fu l l  and f: , ir  o p p o rt u n i t \  t o  ! i t igJ t c  
pl-o l ects  t he i r  ;:vJYersarics from 1 h e  e:.;pense and \Txa t ion �it i.t: n cL n g  nnd t i ­
p l c  laii' S l l i t s .  c n n .-; enTs judic ia l  resources .  and fo s t e rs rel i a n c e  C>l! _ i u d i c i : d  
act ion b\ ·  m i n i m i z i n g  the possibi l i t \  of inconsi s ten t deci s ions .  
\lonuna ,. _ C n i tcd S t::ttcs .  · t 4 0  L. S .  1 4 7 .  l :J 3 - :_",..j ( ! 9 7 D l  ( Cootnote ! J ! ll i t < cd ) .  
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I t  i s  n o t  c lear whv the federa l  in tere s t  in final i ty-th e  i n terest  
that both the federal system and l i ti gants i n  federal court have i n  the 
s tability o f  j u d gments-should extend ,  as a justification for uniform 
federal rules , b eyond the basic  o b l i gation of respect  for fed eral 
judgments  and the fevv m at ters o f  preclusion law (for exa m p l e ,  va­
lidity and finality)  e s s en tial  for i ts  protection."'l 1 It  i s  difficu lt t o  d i s ­
cern final i ty a s  an animating concern o f  discrete preclusion r u l e s ,  as  
opposed to a concern basic  to the preclusion law o f  all A merican 
legal system s . "'F' Final i t y  i n  this c o n t ext  is  a mask for j udicial  
power. c> %  
Let u s  turn to ef-Ficient j u dic ia l  administration . A s s u m i n g  a fed ­
eral interest  i n  reflecting t h e  procedural opportunit ies afforded b y  
the Federal Rules i n  fed eral rules o f  claim precl u s i o n ,"'l7 i t  bears 
repeating that the i n tere s t  i s  contingent or,  put another way, d efea­
sible.  Thu s ,  the costs  o f  l i ti gat ion fo reclosed by a p utative federal 
rule of clai m  p recl u s i o n ,  but not  by state law, will b e  i ncurred b y  the 
federal sys tem only i f  s u b s equen t l i ti gation is  b rought o r  removed to 
federal court . " ' )" If federal-s tate relations were ordered i d en tically 
to state-s tate relatio n s ,  that would b e  sufftcient. "'l'l But they have 
not b een s o  ordered i n  other contexts involving the exercis e  o f  di­
versity j u risdicti o n ,  and i t  i s  a d i s s e rvice t o  legal thought t o  pretend 
See sujHa te�; t  <Jccomp�tm i n g  n o t e � :? l i .  
The cen t ra l p r o b l e m  i n  f i n a l i t \  o f j uclgm e n ts t s  ho 11· far t h e  p r i n c i p l e  
o f' fin a l i t \· i s  to be qu a l ified . T h e  Ll\1 of res  J Ud ict t �l gra p p l e s  11· i t h  t h i s  
cen t ra l  problem . I t s  s p e c i ficat i o n s  cncl c �n ur t o  s t a t e  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  u nder 
11·h ich  the  p o s s i bi l i t 1  , . f  ! ;nl urc ( ) r  CI\ i i .J w; t ice ts .s o s ! lbs ta n t ia l as to _ j u s t i f\· 
remedial �tc t ion  in the form of rel i t iga t ion .  [ .\ [  pol iC\· of reas o n a b l e  
fin a l i t \  requires ru les  : ha t  t ;t k e  i n t \ l  a c c o u n t  the complex s u b s t a n t i \ e  a n d  
p rocedura l  c o n sic!cr�t t i o n s  g o i n g  i n to a et 1 i l judgmen t .  
REST.-\TB! F :\T ( SEC:O:\D )  o F j t DC\!Ei\TS c h .  I ,  l n t ro d t t c t i o n .  at  l :? - 1 3  ( 1 9 8 :? ) .  
�D() 
·rhc principle  of l in a l i t \· is �u1 cs:; e n t i �l i clcrncnr uf a c o u n " s  au thor i tY .  
T h e  m l e s  of  ITS j ud i ca t <J express the q u a l i t 1  o f  a court 's  a u t h o r i t Y .  n o t  
onh i n  gcn er�tl doct r ine hut  i n  the  techn ica l  part icular:; o f  t h e  r u l e s .  Th e 
sou t ce of t h e  fed eral  courts "  �!u t h o n l \  1s i n  A,rt ic lcs  I and I I I  of the Con­
s t i t u t i On .  I t  i s  t herefore �t p p ropria te t o  h o l d  that ,  a t  least  i n  t he  absence 
o f  s o m e  other pn>, is lon b\ ·  C o n gres s .  t h e  e f fec ts  o f  a feder�1 l  _j u d g m e n t  
arc a legal  i m p l i ca t io n of those pro1· ! s i o ns . 
R r:sT.\TD! E :\T (SEC:o:s;n)  or j L"DC;\ !E :\TS � 8 7  comment  a ( 1 982 ) .  Ser td. comment  b 
( ' " [T jhe  ba s ic rul e s  o f  claim �m e! i ssue p r e c l u s i 01 : in effc- c·t define fin al i t 1  a n d  h e n c e  go t o  
t h e  essence of t h e  j u d i c i a l  fun c t i o n . " ) :  H �t zarcl . \ Ujn o n o te C J2 .  a t  G - H .  (i4 7 :  sn also B u r­
b�mk,  supm n o t e  9 � .  �l l 6(i0- f'i2 (cr i t ic i z ing- Haz�1rd i .  
�' l 7 Sec Degnan.  s t c,!n , t  n o t e  cl , a t  / (i-t . 
��)H S'et sujJUl n o t e 2 2 9 :  t e x t  �l ccon1pdl l ) " l ! 1g- no te  '2 8 7 .  
29�) Professor l)egnan grasped rhe d iHl c u ! t \ · i n  connec t ion \\· i th  p en den t but  Ll ll ZI S ­
s e n e d  s t a te Lm· c : ia i m s ,  not ing tha t  a ppl ica t ion of a federal r u l e  o f  b a r  " ca n no t b e  j m t i ­
fi e cl  iw com e n l l o n a l  mYocH i o n s  o f  ecorwr m , dlic ien c 1 · . and exped i e n C \  . · ·  Degn a n .  
supm note  '5 .  a t  7 7 2. .  R :lt hcr,  he zt s s e rt ecl . " [ i [ t h a s  t o  be t h e  pr inc iple  of  fu l l  Ll i th a n d  
credi t  11·hich is a t  s t ak e . [ .--\ fccl er<1 l  ru l c ] 11 i l l  ha1c to  b e  placed fort hri g h t l Y  o n  the  
ground t ha t  t h e  i n t egr i r :· o f  t h e  Ccdcr;d . J ucl ic i :d J10\1Cl i s  a t  s take . . "  lri. 'll 7 7 � - 7 3 .  
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that  the;' have.  Indeed,  to t h e  extent that s tate preclusion l a w  is not  
sensitive to the " s ubs tantive" p olicies o f  other s ta t e s ,  the i n termedi­
ate p o s i tion taken by the Restatemen t (Secon d) of .Judgments and 
others300 i s  revealed not as a concession to p o s t-Erie cases,  but  part 
of the attack on those cases,  and in p articular on Klaxon. :lO J 
Differences b e tween p utative federal and s ta t e  rules of claim 
preclusion present a " s trong possibi l i ty ' "10� that b o th the character 
and resu l t  of li t igation •vi l l  differ depending on the forum .  Those 
differences will  l ikelv affect choice o f  fo rum . :�n:; vVh e ther,  in addi-
, 
t ion,  such d ifferences can be characterized as " inequitable adminis­
trat ion of the laws , "  i f  the words mean any t h i n g , :w.t may depend 
u p o n  whether fed e ral i n teres ts may b e  cons idered,  w h ether the con­
tingent federal i nteres t in efficien t j u di cial  a d m i n istrat ion i s  cogniza­
ble,  a n d  whether by some process that i ntere s t  outweighs the 
declared federal p o l i cy again s t  different outcomes on the basis of 
c i tizen s h i p .  Byrd, the best  hope for in terest b a l a ncers who do not  
seek to remove the baby fro m  the bath vva ter, :HJ'> p rovides p recious 
l i t tle s upport  fo r the conclusion that federal la\Y govern s .  Unless  
one can dispense with the C o u rt ' s  entire p o s t-Erie j urisprudence,  
both tradit ional  federal common law analysis  and a Rules o f  Deci­
s ion A c t  approach point towards the application o f  s ta t e  law rules o f  
c l a i m  preclusion t o  diversity j u d gments ,  because t h e y  must  t a k e  a c ­
count  of t h e  federal  pol io a gainst  d i fferent o u tc o m e s  o n  the b a s i s  o f  
citi zenship , and b ecaus e a n y  federal interest  i s  con tingen t .  U nex­
pressed disagreement w i th that j w-i s p rudence will n o t  d o _ :HH>  
I f  claim preclusion does not yield an analvsis supp o rti n g  the ap-
'\ 0 0  Sri' s upra t e x t  ;H:companying- ! lU l l'  :! :!-! . 
:\O l cl Ll t..: . s .  4 8 7  ( 1 94 1 ) . Sa supro t e x t  accornpamin g n o t e s  :2 :'> 1  Y..: :!( i -! - () .5 .  
:\ 0 2  lhrc! \ . B l u e  R i dge R u ral  Eke. Coop . . c) .5(i LS. 5:25.  5 3 �) ( l (1 5 (") ) .  Sl'e S lijJ!{I text  
acco m p a n )  m g  n o t es '2 7 1 - 7 7 .  
'\03 31'1' \\"al ker v . .  -\ rmcu S teel  C o rp . ,  4 4 6  L . S .  7-1 0 .  7-H -4 7 .  7 0 :2 - :) 3  ( 1 980 ) :  H a n n a ' ·  
Plumer. 380 U . S .  4 6 0 .  4 GG - G�l ( l 'l6:1 )  ( d i n u t n ) :  _, upro t c:•: t ;�cco mpatn ing n o t e s  '254- 5 7 .  
:HH .'il'r sujHrt n o t e  � 7 9 .  
:HJ"> For a t tempts to clean u p .  rai her t ha n  mere! :-· d ra i n .  Brrr!"s  d i n 1· h"<H cr.  sec Redish 
& P h i l l i p s .  suj1ra n o t e  1 7 . at  :$62 -6(; :  Bourne . .  l :tpm note  1 7 . ; H  ..J. G:--1 - 7 1 .  S,•r fllso .1 /l,f;m t e x t  
accon1pai 1 y i n g  no tes :! 7 -t - 7 � .  
\h edi wrs suggest  t h a t  I haH' n o  h o p e  of m ,· re;tder< f( , r g i ,en c s s  fen t h i s  i m age. 
But B urbank is  not brought to book 
For one i m pcrf"cct ca h x :  
So 11·e 're p repared 1 0  U\crlook 
O n e  m c : ;1 p h o r  1 njrln . 
F ic id .  Fmn/;fintu . .f. . C:onol lll i l.�. 7 !  H. '.R\ · .  l . .  R£\ · .  7 7 .  � 1 ( !  �15 7 )  ( fl lU ilHJ l l" o m i l t c d ) . 
:\< ) ! ;  See supm text ; :ccomp,m , i n g  note �G l . . -\ppbuding Profe s s o r  !- Ltc�u d · , accep t -
ance of mY i l l\ · i rat ion l O  h e  expl ic i t  in h i s  d is;�grccmelll H i t h  the po�t -Ln,- c a ;; c s .  Sl'i' Haz­
ard . sujHa i lOlC' 9 � .  l obscrn:d: ' "Of c o u r s e .  n o11· that J l l  the GJrcb �liT o n  t h e  t �1 b i c .  lm,-c:­
fcdcr;JI courts m;:n· fee! rt"i u C L l n l  to apph· u n i form feckrai preclus ion r u l e s  in t h i s  con­
tex t .  The\· !ack t i l e  fi-ced o m  o f  la11 p ro fessors to m crru !e  the C o u rt . . .  H u r h <mk . mjnn 
note 0 ? .  at 6GO. 
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plication of  uniform federal rules ,  there i s  no longer anv need to 
consider ferlcral la>v as the norm . There rna; be  a cognizable fed­
eral interest in protecting federal fac tfinding and ,  as to such matters , 
the federal pol icy against  differences i n  outcome on the bas i s  of cit i ­
zenship i s  less  clearly implicated. But  i t  i s  also sufficiently d i fficult  to 
predict  as an a priori matter that s tate i ssue preclusion lav,· presents  a 
threat to the federal interest tha t ,  even if  i t  i s  cognizable ,  uniform 
federal law does not seem jus tified under ei ther traditional common 
law analysis or a Rules of Decision Act approach. In  that aspect  of 
issue preclus ion law where consequenti al  variation is most l ikely­
the persons who may benefit from findings (herein again of mutual­
i ty)-any federal interes t favoring uniform federal rules i s  at tenu­
ated , 307 and the federal po licy against  differences in outcome o n  th e 
basis of cit izensh ip i s  l ikely to be  impl icated in  full force . :HJK 
It remains to consider compulsory counterclaims .  Ru le  l 3 (a) is 
valid because it does not  p urport to s ta te  a rule of preclus ion .  
Moreover, even though i t  i s  animated by policies tha t are n o t  prop­
erly the concern of Federal Rules , the Rule ' s  implications for preclu­
s ion law are patent ,  and i t  was not blocked by Congress . :) ( ) ' )  Th u s ,  as 
long as a putat ive federal common law rule of preclus ion ,  waiver, or 
estoppel did not mimic the seeminglv infl.exibie command of the 
Rule, thereby accomplishing indirectly what could not be accom­
plished d irectly and robbing the federal common law process  of that 
which tradi tionally has dis t inguished i t  from court rul emakin g and 
which may jus t i fy difi'(�rent s tandards of v a l i d i t y , ' 1 0  the Rule could 
serve as a source of Icy. The problem, again, i s  the federal policy 
agains t differences in ou tcome on the bas is  of ci t izens h i p ,  there be­
ing no doubt in this context that the pol i cy is implicated . Gi ven the 
clear express ion of policy in  Rule 1 3 (a) , and the concern for obedi­
ence to o ther less problematic Federal Rules that  might be aroused 
through the fai lure to enforce the p o licv ,  unif(Jrm b u t  H exible fed­
eral common law may be  required .  
This analysis undoubtedly suggests another reas o n  t o  reco n ­
s ider Erie ' s  progeny . '' 1 1 I t s  burden has b e e n  t h a l  t h o s e  cas  e .'S shoul d  
not b e  ignored . The greater need,  however ,  i s  to i n tegra t e  the 
307 :V!oremcr, because o f  the poten tial  eftec t  oi' t he dw!l c· l H_" t >� ccn m u t u : d i_ t l  :: nd 
nonmutuai i t 1· o n  l i ab i l i t v  . .  I PI "  wpm n o t e � ] ! .  the  i n tere s t .' o f  t h e  o; t ;H c:< .  ,,·hrch f u rn i : d : rhc 
rules gmc rn i n g  l r : r b i l i t  1 in this  c o n t e x t ,  are m t c n s c .  
'IOK Tha t i s .  t h e  d i lrerencc hcl\1·een a s t :; tt- rule  reqll ! r i n g  m ut tnl i t v  �, ;Hl ; :  kdn;d rule 
n o t  so rcq w r i n g  . .  \I'P s upm text accompan yi n g  n o tes :zo:) - l -l .  II <J u i d  m d t c r i ; d h  ; , fi cct t h e  
chara c t er ;;tnd tc:) u 1 t  o f  t h e  i n i t ial  l i t i g�t l i o n  i n  a prcchct � J.hlc  ( ·Lhs c�C c �L S t"' s .  �1n d  i L  \\.O l l ld 
s i m i la r! \  ;dfen ci .utcc < >f  fon : m .  
309 
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Sn· supm text accom panving n o t e> l 8 ! -8(i .  l �JC)-�)8 
S'ee 5 U/Jf'O text acco1npa nying n o t e  1 86 .  
h h : t s  ;d rcach h ;;d that  effect.  SeP H;vard.  siljJI ' '  t i o t c  • J '.:' .  
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Court 's  approach t o  problems i n  the relationship b e tween federal 
and s tate law in diversity cases with i ts  a pproach t o  t h o s e  problems 
in o ther contexts . :\ I :.?  The Rules of Decis ion Act  is  t h e  c o m m o n  vehi­
c le ,  and i t  is  time to take the s tatute s eriously .  
The interest  o f  the fed eral j u diciary in efficie n cy i s  unquestiona­
ble,  and unquestionably p o werfu l .  Particularly when s tate  substan­
tive rights are involve d ,  however,  i t  is  importan t that  fed eral j u d ges 
not  have free rein to define and pursue that interes t . :1 u  Preclusion 
rules may implicate subs tantive policies ; they have dramatic effects 
on substantive rights . W hen state subs tantive rights have b een in 
question,  fro m  the p erspective of purposes o r  e ffects , fed eral j u d ge s  
have not  in t h e  p a s t  been p ermitted t o  a c t  with the autonomy o f  
state j u d ges . Rather, they have been required to d o  w ha t j ud ges o f  a 
p articular s tate would d o . :l t t The ques tion is whether,  i n  fashioning 
preclusion rules for diversity j u d gments ,  federal j ud ge s  should h av e  
greater freedom t o  act  as  if  t h e  fed eral c o u r t s  w er e  a d o m estic  
system . � 1 "'  
I t  would b e  analytically tidier if there could b e  o n e  s e t  o f  preclu­
sion rules applied to successive actions in fed eral court and another 
in the federal (diversi ty)-s tate configuratio n .  T h e  ful l  faith and 
credit principle ,  applicable to fed eral j udgme n t s  t hrough sources 
other than the full  fai th and credit  clause,  requires only a very l i m ­
i t e d  set  of uniform federal rules . T h e  ful l  faith a n d  credit  s tatute ,  
fairly read,  does not  a p p ly to federal j ud gm e n t s .  In any even t ,  i t  
d o e s  not  designate t h e  s ource o f  t h e  la'v that governs t h e  p reclusive 
e ffects of the j udicial  p roceedings i t  covers , al though i t  unques tiona-
: l  1 :.? The at tempt  made b1· ProCessor \\" r ight  t o  t-c-ronci lc t h e  p recl us ion regime h e  
bnJrs, �V h i c h  is  reflected i n  t h e  Rrstatnnl'll l  ( s·nond ;  a( judglllfllls. 1 1  i t  h t h e  C o u rt · s  federal  
common l a11· cases , srr supra not e 289 .  Ct i l s  o n  t11·o counts .  First .  i t  s u b s t i tu tes ztn amor­
phous procedure/substance d i c ho tom y  a n d  rhetoric about t h e  ' j u d i c i a l  f im c t i o n "  ior  
the d iscrimi nat ing a nah·s i s  t h a t  has  recenth· ch<t r;tc terized t h e  C o u rt ' s  response to c<tl ls  
Co r unifornt federal l a 11· . Srr. e .g . .  U n i t ed S t a t e s  1· . Kimbel l  Foods .  Inc . .  -�-! () l ; . S _  7 1 5  
( I  �179 ) .  St'l' also supra text  <tccom panving note  I 0 8 .  Seco n d ,  t h e  procedure/substance 
d i ch o tO lll l' sugges ted i gn ores " t h e pol iC\' or federal ju risdict ion" t h a t h<ts led t h e  Court 
to al loca te  feder<tl and s t a te Ja1 ,· m a k i n g  au thori tl· in di1·ers i tv  cases .  S1'P supm t ex t accom­
panving no tes 269-70.  E1 ·en i f  t h e  C o u rt d L Cep t ed the l a t t e r  refo rm u l at i ( J l l ,  i t  i s  u n c l ea r  
11· h e t her i t  11·ould accep t t h e  former.  
'1 1 :� Usual lv .  the i 'ecleral court s ha1e been p ro1· ided jurisd ict i o n  !'o r  ;t purp o s e .  
a n d  am reduction i n  e i t h e r  t heir j uri sdi ct ion or i n  l i t i g a n t  access t o  t h e  
courts wi l l t L se lf  impose a cos t .  � l o reonT. i f  on e m 1·opicalh· focuses u p o n  
t he admin i s t ra t i 1 e  da ngers caused h1· d o c k e t  s i z e .  one i s  l i keh t o  a ccepi 
most  j udicial  a t tempts to curb those dockets.  fo r the ven rea s o n  that dtel 
ha1 e that  effec t . 
Redish . Book R n ie11· . 80 CoLl' � l .  L REI · .  1 3 7 8 .  ! 3 8 6  ( I  98.5 ) .  Sec B urbank.  supm n o t e  
1 86 .  a t  -1 3 6 - 3 7 .  
: l  1-1 See. r.g. . \\'alkcr 1 . . 'umco Steel  Corp . . 44\)  L . S .  7 -10 ( 1 9 8 0 ) :  K l axon Co. 1 .  S t e n t o r  
E l e c .  \lfg .  Co . . :1 1 3  U . S .  4 8 7  ( 1 94 1 ) .  
Sre supm n o t e  299 a n d  acco mpan1 ing t e x t .  
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bly contemplates a domest ic  model or  referent . :l t (> From the per­
spective of l i t igants ,  however, a sys tem of preclus ion rules  for 
divers ity j udgments keyed to the locus of  s ubsequent l i t igation 
would be hopeless ,  ei ther because it wou ld  be unpredictable or be­
cause i t  \Vould be ,  functional ly ,  a sham . �  1 7  The choice, then,  i s  be­
tween imperfect solut ions .  Unt i l  such t ime as federal pol icy relevant 
to preclus ion law i s  more c learly art icu lated ,  through processes pro­
viding safeguards agains t  j udicial  parochia l i sm, s tate la\v should 
provide the norm on most  questions .  
I I I  
T H E  PRECLUSIVE EFFECTS O F  STATE jUDGMENTS 
A .  The Fu l l  Faith and  Credit S ta tute 
Professor Degnan evidently be l ieves that  the ful l  fai th  and 
credi t s tatute directs courts in interj ur i sd ic tional  cases to apply the 
preclusion law of the state whose j u d gment  i s  claimed to have 
preclus ive effect . :l t K  Certainly,  he favors that regime as  a normative 
proposi tion . :\ 1 ' '  In any event ,  a l though Professor Degnan devoted 
l i t tle attention to state j udgments outs ide the divers i tv context, the 
Supreme Court has recently paid them great a ttention and blessed 
Professor Degnan ' s  general rul e  in the s ta te-federal configurat ion.  
The resu l t  of the Cour t ' s  efforts has b een that ,  in order to avoid the 
application of  s tate preclus ion law, a fed eral court must find a viola­
t ion of the due process clause or c lear ev idence of an in ten t by Con­
gress  express ly  or impliedlv to repe a l  the ful l  fai th  and credit 
:� I i i St''' s11jno n o t e  GO:  sn· a/.,o 1 11(m L C :\ l  JCCOn lpa n ;· i n g  I W t c s  :1 1 8-5� .  
: I  1 7 Such a , ,· s t e m  m i g h t  c; Jusc l i t i gan ts to guess ,,· h c t h cr kJI-csceablc s u i J s ,:qucJH l i t i -
ga t ion c o u l d  or "·ou l d l w  brou g h t  i n .  o r  rcmon·d t o .  fed era l c o u n  an d t o  c o n d u c t  t h e  
i n i t ia l  l i t i ga t i o n  accord i J J gh .  \ l o re l ikeh·. beca u s e  o f  t h e  po tem i a l conseq u en ces o f  er­
ror .  such a s Y s t e m  would c1usc them to conf'orm thei r c o n d t tc t i n  t h e  i n i t ia l  l i t i ga t i o n  to 
t h e  most  b roadh prec! u s i 1c rules p o 1 e n t ia l h · a p p l i c a b l e .  
O n e  m igh t seck s up po rt for s u c h �� s\· s t e m  i n  t h e  r u l e  t h a t  a dismissa l  o n  s t �l l L : L c  nf 
l imitat ions grou n ds lw t h e  cou r t s o f  o n e  sL! lc  i s  i n dl'e c t iYc <IS a bar i n  ;m o t h er s ta t e .  S1·P 
R FSLITDtr-: :--.:T ( S u:o:\D)  OF Co:; F J . J CT OF L1 1-. .\ § 1 I 0 cornl llent b ( 1 9 7  J )  . . l .ha t ru le .  ht '"· ­
C\Tr.  rep res en ts h u t  a rdlc:-; of t h e  tradi t i o na l .  m o n o l i t h i c a p p roach t o  'l :l l l t t cs o f  ! i nJ i ta­
t ions for cho 1cc o f  !:1 1,· p u rposes and is harclh good :Ju r lvni t \· .  \ l o rcoq_·r. t l  d o c '> not 
s u bjen l i t igants t o  the d i l e m m a  t h�u t h e suggested p reclus i o n  reg i m e  \\'Otdd i n 1 p os c .  
Final l Y ,  a proponent  o r �� S \' :i t Cil l  kncd t o  t h e  l o c u s  o f  s u b s eq u e n t  l i t i g·a t i on m u s t  be 
,,· i l l in g t o  w l crat c .  or b e  p rep ar ed t o  c l i m i n J t c o p p o rt u n i t ies  fnr. foru m - shoppi n g  a:; 
bct�,·een s l a t e  a n d  feder a l  court i n  order t o  ga i n  the b c n cii t  or a LtYora h!c n i l e  u f b "· t h<l l 
the C o u rt  h a s  t h u s  Lu· been u n ;,· i l l i n g  t o  a s s i m i l <u e  t o  i n ters ta t e  CC> nt n l - s l l ( ) p p i n g  Co r t h e  
same purpu.sc .  B l i !  .\!'1' i 8 \\' i< l C I IT .  \ ! I LLER & C o u p u: .  supm n o t e  'i .  � ··l·t 7 :2 .  <J l 7 :l8  
C ' [ T j h ere m;l\ be set t i n g s i n  11· h i ch p reclusion n d cs <Ire so close!:· t i e d  t o  procccl u r<d 
i n te:-cc> t s <)[ t he second t'm l t !ll t ha t  federal  n i l es :1 n:  <l ppropri :1! c  i n  a !L·der: t !  n w n �md 
s t a te ru l es 111 a -'l a t e  cot t r t . " ) .  
:I 1 0  StP lkg·n�l l l  . .illj;II! J H l t c  :1 . a t  7 :10- :) :� .  /lui .it't' irf .  at 7 Y.) l J . (iO .  :l l ' l  Si'F td.  a t  t :n ( q u o t ed ' ufmt text acc< • m p a n \· i n g  n o t e  1 :2 ) .  
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statute . :':..'0 I believe that the Court ' s  approach is  d emons trably 
wrong and that, in this confi guration as wel l ,  one must  consider the 
role of federal common lav,r .  
Consider first the  lan guage of the  ful l  fai th  and credit  statute as 
enacted by Congress in  1 7 90:  
[The dulv authent ica ted] record s and j udicial  proceedings of the 
courts of  am s t a te . . . shall  ha, ·e such fai t h  and credi t  given to 
them in e v en court "·i thin the United S tates,  as  they have by law 
o r  u s age in the courts of the s tates from whence the s a i d  records 
are o r  shall be t aken . :\:..' ! 
As a l i n guis t ic  mat ter, it is difficult to read the s tatute as choosing 
the rendering state ' s  domestic preclusion law rather than the law 
that the c o urts  of the rendering s tate v\'Ould apply .  The task i s  no 
easier t o d zn  . :-��� 
Apart from the language of the statute,  and in the absence of  
pertinem legi slatiw materials to a id  in in terpretation,3:!1 attention 
should be paid to  the const i tutional basis  of the s tatute and Con­
gress ' s  p mp o s e  i n  enacting i t .  Article I V ,  section 1 o f  the Const i tu ­
tion gives Congress the power to  prescribe federal preclusion rules 
governing the ef-Fects o f  s tate j udgments  in other j urisd ict ions . I t  
does n o t  give Con gress t h e  power t o  prescribe such rules with re­
spect t o  the e ffect s of s tate judgments domestical ly,  that is, in the  
.s ta t e s  v. h erc t h e v  arc rendered . :l:!..J Congress has  n o t  p rescribed fed­
eral prec lus ion ru les  for s l<:� te  judgments in the large . :; :! ,'> But \Ve are 
asked t o  hclicve th;:n i t  has chos en domestic state p reclusion law to 
:�:.!O Sr=r· 1\� ! -S tJ.tlS S : cc ! .  l 1 1 c .  , . _ F i rs t  . \l a . Bank.  l OG S .  C:L 768 ( I 98G) : �-l a rresc Y . . �\nH:ri-
can .-\ ca d c r m  : .> !  O n il' )P� lui i c  S u q  .. ( COl l S .  I 0 5  S .  C t.  l 3 2 7  ( 1 985 ) ;  :V!igra , . .  'Xarren Cit �· 
Sc!wol D i ; '  H d .  , J ! E r iuc  . . - H i :·; L" S .  7 0  ( 1 ()!:\-f ) ;  I-!aring ' . Prosise,  46:! U . S .  306 ( 1 98 3 ) :  
h.remn ' . C : huil lcl l  C"nqr. Curp . . · i 5 6  l ' .S .  -Hi i ( l 9S :! ) ;  ,-\ l ien v .  \IcC urn· . .f4D t ' . S .  �)() 
( i m<.O) ;  111jrn t n: t  accom p<l!l' i 1 : g  n o t e  3 3 6: note 3cHl. 
:; :! I .\c \  o t· \ .i :: \  :.!\ i .  i 7�l0.  c h .  I I ,  1 S u t . l ? :? .  
S: , :.! 8 \.. .  '-. ( :  � i 7 3 S  ( !  � JH:! J .  r;uotrd ( ti(Jia n o t e  G .  
The h e > !  , ; c c u : n t t :> u ! t h c  a n t ecedent;; ;md h i s t o r\ of art ic le  I V  o f  t h e  C c n s t i t u tion 
and the c;1 rh ! m pi c , : :cn t i n g  � ;ns arc .'\adc l m a n n .  Full Faith anrl Credit to}lldglllt'!lts: . ·/ His­
tonml··. 1 Hrrpp • o i.·.ol. :'ii i  \ l i C H .  ! . . Rn·.  :) ') ( I  <)5 7 )  �llld vVh i t t e n ,  Thf Consllliitionol  
Lun ito t tot;_, on  5: ro t•·.J.". ,wf . j lft ,flil ilfil-ln !nj!rr/atli 'e Rre.\WI/ 1 1/C/tion of thr Full Fru th 
ond Cu·r!ii tflui Ui't J>i ,-,•u''' Uou.1n t !'tn t Onn I -� C I<r: IC:flTO:\ L REY. 499 ( I  98 l ) .  For other  
acco u m s .  sec' . !' . � . .  .-\ b c i .  . · ! ,h•mli.lf .>Ii!i; ·r· /);·fnii! I IWIIoll.< aJIIi Full Faith rll!d C:redit. :2 2  ! 01.,·.\ L. 
Rr:\· . -! fi l . .f !l :l · i" �  ( i � l : l 7 ) ;  Chikk F!ill Fo ;th and Cmiti: The Lrm'yc.t <,· Chn,t. 36 KY. L. R n . 
3 0 .  :\0-'iO '. l �)-� 7 ) .  ( :u :� t i .t, : l l ! .  · ttf'iii : l" lc  -+ 7 .  <ll -1 70-76 :  Rad i n ,  The . 1 uthnli lrotrd F:ill Faith 
and Cri'd;f t)'t ii.:r·: fr,- l fi.� .'ol: . .  .-. �) � i  l Li . .  L .  R E \' 1 ( i �)-i-4 ) :  Reese 8..: J ohnson. supro no l e  :2 ? .  t � t  
1 5 �) - ,:} ::, :  1L,-�:-; ;: . . . Full Ftd/l! tn: d  Cu·rli: · · nt o FPdt'rrli 5\slrm. �0 !\ I I i': N .  L. Rr\· .  l -10 .  1 40--t H 
i_ l S)�{?J )  . . \'rt' .--d .. ;u l h_'g- l 1 �l l l  . . ·' ''fl f"(i n o t :�' >� . a L  .. ,�-t � -�l-L 
.\1--. · U \\·n H:�_: czt : ·cl1 h ,�:-;  ! H l (  U l H  .. : a rt h cd a n y  · · p c n i n e n r  !cgi s i a ti, ·e rnatcri;ds t o  ( t id  I n  
\t·r· ··U/•! ",'i t :�-- :�: t �-! C I , \ ln1 ) J � l i l \· i : l g· l l l, ) L C .\ � i -:?:? &: i �)-l . 
C " t " 2 ; ·ns i , : L' l ! O\'. l" \ cr. p :·l > \ l cL�d s pecific  i n terstate c n Corccmcnt rule ·; fo r c h d d  
-
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govern m interjurisdictional cases . �-�� (; 
There may be cases in  which the courts of the renderin g  s tate 
would choose to apply the preclusion lavv of another s tate,  as  where 
the la tter 's  law furnished the rules of substantive law in the init ial  
act ion and the ques tion i s  vv·ho is bound by the judgment i n  that 
action . :'� :z 7  Let us assume that there rnav also be cases whollv domes-• I 
tic to the courts of a s tate in  \vhich federal preclusion law is  appl ica-
ble.3�� Are vve to imagine that ,  notwithstanding the law applied 
domestically in s uch cases , Congress intended a different law to ap­
ply in  cases identical  to them in  al l  respects s ave that they are in­
terj urisdictionJl?  T o  what end ? Such a regime would not  s erve the 
purposes of the ful l  fai th and credit c lause of the Const i tution .  O n  
the contrary, i t  w ould be fun damentally at odds with t h e  goal of pro­
viding " the benefits of a unified nat ion . " :1�9 
Admittedly , Congress probably did not cons ider the role of 
either another s ta te ' s  preclusion law or of federal preclusion law 
when it pas sed the fu ll faith and credit statute . '1'w But in  a changed 
legal climate, that i s  hardlv a good reason to prefer a reading of  a 
:) 2 (� •· It is  no\\ . .s e t tled L h a t  �1 federal cnurt rnust give to a s t a t e-court j ud gn1en t Lhe 
same prcclusl\ t' dl"cc t  as 11·ou i d  be given t h:n judgment under  the law of the S t :J t c  in 
\\·hich t h e  JUdgmen t 1'. <1 :, ;-cnr!erl' d . "  .\l i gra \ .  WcllTCll C i t y School  Dis t .  B d .  or Educ. . . 1-f)S 
LI S .  7 5 .  K l ( J < l8-! ) .  Sn· ir!. ;u iEi-0 7 ( d i scuss ing Ohio p rccl L:sion hw) ; Parsons S teel.  I nc . 
., .. First A.b. Bank. lOG S .  C t .  7 \iS . 7 7 '2.  ( 1 986)  ( " O n c e  t he s ta te  court  h a s  fin a l l v  rejected a 
cla i m of t·cs jtH� ict t fi .  t h·n t l 1 c  Fuli  F2i t h  ; ,nd Creel it .-\.ct  becomes applicable and fed era l 
courts t ll �! s l  turn to s t ;l t e  b 11· t o  d e t e r m i n e  t h e  prec l u s i 1·c  dfeu of the sta t e  coun ' s  deci­
s io n . " ) :  \ Ia n ese , . . . -\ mcrican .-\ca d e m 1  o f  Orthopaedic S urgeo n s .  1 05 S .  C t .  1: )'2. 7 .  i 33� 
( 1 98 5 )  ( ' 'Tins s t.< l tu le d i rec t .' a !edt-r<d court  l < l  refer to the prcciusiol l  la\•; o f  t h e  S i al<� in 
"·hich j t 1dgmcnt '-I'< !S  rcn dcr·cd . .  J .  s,.,. nlso tnji a tc:-.:t accomp:uFing note el Y) . 
:> � 7  T'his  l s  n o t. J.n a � s c ri FHl ! h :n ;n1y s l�l l c  c n u n  has ��o acted,  b u t  r;J t her t h a t  l h t  
cho i ce o f '  anot her s t a t e ' s  p rcdu s i t > n  h "  '' n u l d  I ll somi..· cases be ra t i o n a l a n d  cons t i ll . t ­
tional--all  that i s  n t.·u·s .-;;tn· fo r t h e  purposes o f  th is  discmsion.  The example: i s  s u g­
gested iw RFSl.,\TE\! F.:<T !. S u:o:.; p)  OF  jn)C\!F:NT:i � 8 7  COll\ illt' Il t  b ( 1 98:2 ) .  
I pursue t h 1 �  � � s u rn p t i o n  n1/ro t c x r  ;J ccorn parl \· : n g  notes 3 78--1 2 7 .  
:) �q Ser _r,ufJro t �-·xt �h,_.c (nnpanying n o t e � :..? ; C:he�nh�1n1 , I?es _fuditala ruz d  the Full Fuith ond 
Credit C/au.�e.· .1/r:gnn/w Fl'/. > ( 1/nw; DJ .  < ' . ffu u/ .  · +4 C o Lt ' '>! . l . .  REI· . 330, 3 cl 7 --1 1 ( 1 0-! -t ) .  B!il  
Jl'f Duuon. C/;umclrn:ollon. fir.c )!idi(a/a and ill!' l.a:C\ !'15 . Clausr. 2'2 J;.;n.  L.J .  2 0 1 .  '2.07·· 1 :!  
( 1 94 7 )  ( s t <J t llle requ ire.' rei'crl'ncc: LO domc-< ! J C  Lw: ) :  1[. REsTxrr:�-1!::;-:T (SEco:-�n)  O F  Co:-�­
FLIC:T O F  Lw:s §§  94- � J/  ( I  D 7 l )  :, req u i r i n g  �'p p l i c a t i o n  of " lo c a l l ;m· " of rendering -;t a t e ) . 
For t h o s e  d r iv e n  to i l l l C i  prcl t he ft i l l  L1 i t h  a n d  cre d i t  s t atute as choosing domes t i c  
:s tate preclusion la\\ I.>U l  of k<il and lo;J. thing o r  t h e  problem o f  rem ui . .\i'f Dutton.  SlljFII. 
note Lhat fcdctai  c o 1n i n o n  la\,. 1 :--; cirn n c s t i c  i ;n.,· l o r  these p u rposes.  Srt utj)-r; n o t <: 3 3 2 .  St<<� 
also R ESTXJDIE>:T ( S u:cJ :-.: l i )  O F  Co:-.:F I . lCT :' OF L-1 1.\ � 5 c u m m e n t  h ( l �ri I )  ( " ' l ocal b ·,,·' ( l f  
a � t a l e . . inc l udes  s u d t  ; · � t k s  uf f'eckr;tl Lt ,,. '' ' <Irl' bind i n �  •. lj)Oli i t " ) .  
:l:30 C)'. Smith .  Fuf! F. ui!J ii!lr! Crl'!!lt !!iid S,•ci iun I �!.' U:  . I  HcajJJnaisa!. ()3 :< . C. L.  I!.E'. ' .  ;) l J . 8� ( 1 9FH) { ' ' [ I j 1 :  the c;u l l  n : n c Lccn r h  ccntun t here 1\<IS no s e n s e  ! !ut  the commcn-l : l l,. 
preclusion doctri:1c .' m i g h t  cL .. >c lop i nckpen c! e n t h· m S i <H C  a n d  feder:.d rottn ;; . " ) .  
Professor  \\' h i u c n  htts ! ! ! � ldc �u1 i rncrcs t i n g· �Irgu tne n l .  b;_tsc-d on ::;. re\· i c\•: o f  t h e  h i s ·  
tory, t hai  n(·i l fH.' r a n i ch.· ! \ ' .  � l .  n o r  i h c  i 7�H) in1 p i e1nen L ing :.; ! � lu t e ,  req u i re�;; r. h c t t  
prc c l u s i\'l' ;c-f!'cct  he <.!, i\ C ! l  i o  :. : :J l C j u d g·n: •.: n r s  . .\1'1' \\' h t t ll.: n .  wpm n o t e  3 :? :\ .  at  :)-1 '2. - 7 \i  . . ·\s 
to the b t t cr. ho-.•:(.'\ "C:· . � tncl in l i g·l \ !  n i '  t h e  S u p n.' l l lC  c: ourl ' s  C()i l S i s l.cnt  ,_-nn t rdry i n tcrprc·  
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statute that can l ea d  t o  results inconsis tent with i ts p u r p o s e  when a 
reading that is more plausible l inguist ically e n tails  n o  such resu l t s .  
Under t h e  latter i nterpretati o n , C on gress h a s  t ied the m easure o f  
the cons t i tu tional ( interj urisdict io nal)  obl igat ion o f  r e s p e c t  t o  the 
measure of respect  required by law (or usage)  in  the courts  o f  the 
rendering s tate . C on trary t o  conventio nal form u l a ti o n s , 33 1  the ful l  
fai th a n d  credit  s tatute d o es n o t  require applicatio n  o f  t h e  d o m es ti c  
preclusion law o f  the rendering s tate .  Rather,  i t  requires appl icatio n  
o f  the preclusion law that  the courts o f  the ren d erin g  state  w o u l d  
apply. That d o m e s t i c  state l a w  usually w i l l  furn i s h  t h e  r u l e s  a p p l i e d  
domes tically s h o u l d  n o t  b l i n d  us to the p o s s ib i l i ty t h a t ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  
principles governi n g  the relationship b etween fed eral a n d  state  la\v 
that have their source elsewhere, fed eral law rnay s u perven e .  Any 
such supervening fed eral law wil l ,  by reason o f  the full  fai t h  a n d  
credit statute,  b e  b i n d i n g  throughout  the l a n d  b ec a u s e ,  b y  r e a s o n  o f  
the supremacy clau s e ,  i t  i s  b i n d i n g  i n  s u b s equent proceedings i n  t h e  
courts of t h e  s a m e  s tate ,  a configuration u n t o u c h e d  b y  a rt ic le  I V ,  
section l of t h e  C on s t i tut ion and b v  the full fai th  a n d  cre d i t  s t a t u t e .  
I refer agai n ,  of c o u r s e ,  t o  federal common law _ :u:.? 
Given an interpretation that seems obviouslv correct ,  l i n guis t i­
Gllly and i n  l ight of const i tutional and s tatutory p u rp o s e ,  the temp-
t �H i o n  s i n ce !\! i l ls  Y .  Dunce. l l  L . S .  ( 7  Cran ch ) -W I ( l i-\ 1 3 ; .  h e  s c: n s t b h  argm·s agam s t  a 
return to t h e original  unders ta n d i n g .  So· \\' h t l l e n  . .  wpm n o t e  :l 2 3 .  a t  569 n . 30-L 
En·n assummg· Pro fes sor \Y h i u e n  1s corre c t .  h i s  con c lus i on s do n o t  a l t er t h e  anah·­
sis. For, as 1v i l i  b e  demonstrated.  th e C ourt has onh· rcc en rh· adopted ;he v·ie11 rhat the 
fui l  fai t h  and credn s t a t u t e  chooses d u m o t i c  s Lt t e  preclusion Ia\\· .  Si'r 1 11)111 text a c c o m ­
p a n v i n g- notes 333 - 5 2 . c\ncl tlut i n terpre tat ion i s lc :;s  p la us ib l e .  b o th l i n gu i s t i u l l v  <i l lci i n  
l i gh t  of const i tut ional  and s u t u t o n  purpo,es .  t h a n  t h e  i n t npre t a t ion :Hh an c c d  h ere. 
:>:l l See. r.g . R EST.-\TDIE:\T ( SEC:o:-.:n )  oF Jn)(; � I E \TS � S (j cnmmem c ( J 08:!. ) :  .-\l\, uod.  
Stolt Court judgmmls 1 1 1  Fnfemi Litlgo lwll:  .\ fojJJJ/il,!!. the C:oi i !O! I I .\ of  Full Fr uth o n d  ('red! !. 5 8  
hD.  LJ 59 . 68 ( l 9S 2 ) :  Currie .  RPs jwlu olo: Tl1e Yrgln terl --± �> l' . C m .  I . .  Rt:\ . 3 1 7 . 
325-26 ( 1 97 8 ) :  Degna n ,  sujm; n ot e  cl , <:t 7 :1 2 - 'J cl :  S m u h .  \ lijml n o t e  3 3 0 ,  a t  ()().() 1 .  
:l :> :.? ,-l,,s to t h e  \1·ords " Lt\,. or usage" i n  t h e  p h r;;s c  " L.t11 < J J "  usage i n  l h e  court s  
. fro m  11·h ich t heY a r c  t ake n " :  .-\ s a p p l 1 c d  t o  q ;u c- j u d g m e n t s  a n d  d e ­
crees , t he " Ln,· o r  u s a g e · ·  m c a r H  i .' rhc  L11\· n : - u :;; :gc ( I f' the s t a t e  ,,·here i n  
t h e  j t tclgmen t o r  decree i n  q u c s t i o r; \l et S rend ered . The " la11 or rh · 
age" o f  a :; t a t e  means ( J )  t h e  loca l  Lm 01 t i s  age pecul i a r  t o  t h a t s t a t e .  and 
(2 )  the n a t i o n a l  l a1•; o r  usage.  c o m m u n  t o  a l l  t h e  :; U t e:; ,  m a d e  up o f  t h e  
c o n s l i l u t i o n  o f  l h c  t: n i tcd S ta t e s . a c t s  o f  ( : n n grcs�: �{ n d  tre.a l ies ,  c\S ex­
pounded ll\· t h e  Supreme C o u rt o l  the- t· n i t c d  States .  con s t i t u ti n g· " a  
commo n  la\1· . res t i n g  o n  n a t i o n �d a n t h o ri t \·"-th( '  par;, m o u n t  lav1· o r  u s ­
a ge i n  C\'cry s t a t e .  an y loc�1i i £ t 1.\. or l ! S � tgc pccul l�:r L n  Li n ': s ta t �� : o  t h e  con­
t ran n o t\l· i t h 5 t a n d i n g .  
C a :- c  Comm e n t ,  sujna n o t e --± �) . a t  :) l b . 
Since t h e  publ ica t i o n  ot " nl\  t c n l a t i l c co n c l u s i o J i S  . d > l > l l l  t h e  Ct dl  [ a i t i l  :u Hl credi t  ·'' i < t i ·  
u t e .  SPI' Burbank.  sujmt n o t e  ·r : B u r b <t n k .  ; upm n o t e  'Y.? .  P n > f c isor  Lu n e b l!rg has  i n d e p e n ­
den t l v  reach e d  the sam e b a s i c  pos i t i o n . St•t l .unebt u·g.  !!tr Ojiji() / / 1 / l l l l \' t o  ih' Hmul o n rl thr 
Dru l/"1111'.\ of Pretlli.i/:))1." Frdeml r/ 111 1 1 \  Oil .\!niP l.ri <l, :� l \ i l l  . .  I . . R n· .  S l  ( l (l::Hi)  ( i 't ; i t hcon ; ­
ing) . Ser' rdso Thl' Sujm'l/11' Cnu l. I 1 '81! 1 1'1!11 . � ) :) li. \ R \  L R F\ . C' b ( l .  C' ���) ( l \ i �� ] :  ( s u g g c,; t i n g  
t h a t  domes t i c  l i t t g:l l i o n  m:n icad t o  fec! c r;J I chL'IL 0 1 1  s ld t t· l :m 1 
• 
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ration i s  to proceed immediately to the more in terest ing and 
challenging business of  working out  i ts  implications . But there is  
precedent to contend with .  
For those ei ther emboldened or disheartened by the S upreme 
Court ' s  recent series of decis ions concerning the ful l  fai th  and cred i t  
s ta tute, :l :l :l i t  i s  \Vo rthwhi le  t o  recal l  that ,  as late as 1 979 ,  the C ou rt 
decided two cases involving problems of  s tate-federal i nterj uris dic­
t ional preclus ion without reference to the s tatute .  In  both cases the 
Court applied federal preclus ion law. 334 A cynic might speculate 
about the reasons for the Court ' s  rediscovery of  the ful l  fai th and 
credit s tatute and of  the rol e  of  state preclus ion law when federal 
substantive rights are at  i s sue .  Such a person should b e  aware, how­
ever, that this phenomenon is  not  unique to the present Court .  
Over t ime, the Court 's  invocat ion of  the ful l  faith and credit  
statu te has been sporad ic ,  as if  the s tatute were periodical ly  lo s t­
whether in the fog fol lowing Swift or in that  fol lowing Ene . '135 :t\'Iore­
over, the opinio ns that have invoked the statute are of l i t t le  help on 
the question of interpretat ion that concerns us .  Consider the fo l­
lowing from the C ourt's 1 98 2  decis ion in Kremer v. Chemical Construc­
tion Crnp . :  
Our previo u s  d e c i s i o n s  h av e  n o t  s p ecified the s ource or defined 
the content o f  t h e  req u i rement that  the first  adjudicat ion o ff':' r  a 
ful l  and fa i r  opport u n i t v  to l i t i ga t e .  B u t  for present p u rposes , 
where ,,·e are hound b v  t h e  s t a tu t ory direct ive of § 1 7 38 ,  s ta t e  
proceedings need clo no m o r e  than sat isfy the minimum proce­
d ura l require m e n t s  oC the Fourteen th Amen dmen t ' s  Due Pro ces s 
Clause i n  order LO q ua l ifv for t h e  ful l  fai t h  and credit guaranteed 
----- ------
: 1 ' 1 3 Sn· i upro n o l c  :) '_? \ )  a n d  c1 s c s  ciLed L herein :  St'l' also McDonald ,. _ C i t \ o f  1.\ 'es l  
Branc h .  -l (j(i l' S .  '.! S {  ( i � lS·+ l  ( lu l l  b i t h  a n d  cre d i t  '.latute do cs n o t  apph t o  arbi Lra r io n  
a1,·arcl ) . 
Srr H rm,·n ' .  Fci�cn . 1 -� :!  l ' . S .  1 '27 ( i 9 /9j : \fontana \' .  l' ni rcd S La L es . -+·HJ l ' . S .  
1 4 7  ( 1 U79 ) :  S n> : ; h .  ' iifii • i  n o l c  3 3 0 .  a t  (i-l . l t  ma1· b e  m ore preci s e  to sa\· L h a t  i n  ne i ther  
c a s e  d i d  the Coun refer  l. t \  s u r e  p r e c l u s i o n  la1, . 
:l:l''> For p rt.: -f-"'nr ct s c s  d e c i d i n g  s t �l t c - kderai  cases ,,· i t h o u t  rel Y i n g  on the s ta t u t e .  -' <"'-' · 
r.g. . Gru b b ' .  P u b l i c  L' r i l i l lcs  C n n nn · n .  '2H  1 C.S.  - 470 ( 1 93 0 ) :  B echer ,. _ C :o n to urc LJ b D r< l ­
tories,  I n c.  n9 l ' . S .  c\ 88 ( 1 9 '2 'l ) :  F i d cl i t \  :\<t L . l Bank & Trust C o .  Y .  S" ope.  '2 7-i l' . S .  1 2 :) 
( 1 927 ) :  \fars h a i :  1 . H o l : n c :; .  i -1 1 l' . .S .  5o0 ( 1 89 1 ) . For posL-f:"rie cases of l he same su·i pc.  
i n  add i L ion t o  .\!on !!i l !a  : tnd 8mu ' l t .  :; cc.  r'.g . .  :\ ngel  \' . B u l l i n g l o n ,  330 L! . S .  1 8 3 ( 1 9· \ 7 ) :  
Kalb -. . Feuns t u n  . . ':\00 l . . S .  -\:H ( l 9-Hl ) .  Su· if,Piii'l n!lr At1,· o o d .  supm n o t e  3 3  i .  a t  7 1 - 7 '1 : 
De:•riojJIW'II I.' i l i  iltt in: · ·-.\t't '!irilt / (!83  l i l l t l  h•r/rm!ill/1, 90 l-IAR\· .  L R E\· .  1 1 :) 3 ,  1 3 34 1 1 9 7 7 ) .  
,-'\.s suggc s l eci i n  t h :.: t ex l . ! <1 m l l lC l i ! l Cd l O  bci ine t l 1 <l l  th e Ll le of � 1 7 :) S a t  t h e  h a n cb 
of the Supreme C o u rt  !n:;  been ducnmnccl 1 1 1  pa;-r 1)\ L h e  pl-e,·a i l i n g  j uris pruc! c J J C C  oi 
fccle;·a i i s m .  '' i d 1  m �H :hTrt c n c"c a n d  confu s i o n  a l s o  pla1 · ing a role.  Th al rel1iz: i n s  t rue to­
cia, · .  I n  lochn · ,  _ i u r i s p : u d c J l C L' o f  federa l i s m .  h m,·c\Tr. and nm,· that Lhc C : o lil t · ,  �l l t <:n­
t i o n  is  i innh· foc u s ed m 1  � i i :l .S .  I U J l l l O l  hcl icn: that  i l  ,,· i l l  deem cas e:; dcndcd \\ t t h o t : i  
reference l u  Lhc  s t . t ! u t c  as l n 1  t : : g  c q u ;t l  cLu m t o  cl l lc n t ion ,,- i l h  t h o s e  i n  · . ., I nch t h e  s u p ­
p o s e d  in: p h �· � ! l l '. ; n s  : ; ( ! I I L· .·� Lt l u t c  i l �n-c bc· c n  worked ou t .  8u l  sn·. f')!, · · Str! i t h .  _, ujn n ! i n t c  
3 30. a t  d-l-�:i .  ') ( ) .  i 0 i .  
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by federal l a w .  I t  has l o n g  been establ i shed t h a t  Sect ion 1 7 3 8  
does n o t  a llow federal courts to employ their o w n  rules o f  res 
j udicata in  determining the effect of s t.a te  j udgme n t s . R a th er i t  
g·oes beyond the common l a w  and commands a federal court t o  
accept the rules chosen b y  t h e  s t3te fro m  which the j udgment i s  
t aken . ,\lcE!moyll' v .  Cohen, 1 3  Pet. 3 1 2 , 3 2 6  ( 1 8 ;) 9 ) ; Jfl!!s v. Dzny:e, 
7 Cran c h .  4 8 1 ,  4 8 5  ( 1 8 1 3) . :.% 
Even this in terpretat ion of  the full fai th and credit  s tatute can be  
read as consis tent  wi th  what ,  I have argued,  is  the  correct interpreta­
t ion of that s tatute.  Thus ,  if the Court ' s  not ion of a s ta te ' s  choice 
includes a " choice" of federal common law required by the 
supremacy clause,  there i s  no problem.  But the C ourt ' s  d iscuss ion 
of New York law suggests no such role for federal  lavv· i n  a domes tic 
context . :l '> 7  · Mm-eover, could any court agreeing with the interpreta­
tion of the ful l  fai th and credi t  s tatute ad\'anced here at  the same 
time embrace the repeal analysis that has  dominated the Court 's  re­
cent opini ons , including that in l{remertUH 'We can safely assume 
that the Court  mean t what i t  subsequentlv stated,  namely that the 
s tatute " directs a federal court to refer to the p reclus ion hnv o f  the 
S tate  in  which the j udgment was rendered . · • :l :l 'l  
Vvhatever the Court intended t o  say in Kremer. the cases it c i ted 
do no l.  s upport r.he in terpret a t ion of t h e  statute i t  has now clearly 
embraced as against  the in terpretat ion  urged here . On the  contrary, 
in both ,\fills v. Dwyee :>-w and . \I(E/mov!r < '. Cohen :;-! 1 lhe Coun \.va s ,  in 
:I % '1 5 6  lJ . S .  4 G ! .  4 8 1 -8 2  ( l D� 2 )  
--- ·--- -
:l :l 7 SPf id. at 4!1G-G 7 .  :'\ o r e .  on the other l :a l l d ,  th<;t t h e  C o u n ' s  ban i,;hmcnt  of t l 1 e  
federal court s '  · · 01-. 11 rules c,f res j udicl l �l l l l  determ i n i ng t h e  dfu t r >f .-; t ;l l c _J ud gmen t s . "  
id. J t  48 1 -8 2 ,  i s  n o t  d i spos i t i n:· o f  t h e  q u e s t i o n  because t h e  Cuun prohabh v;; : :; n:krri n g· 
to ;·o ut ine applica t i o n  of a c:o m p rch c n s i n· hc•dl of federal precl us i o n  Ln·.' . ,,·h c t h c r  prc-
1 938 :; cncral fcdcrai common L1'' •: > I  pos t - 1 93 8  fcder<II co m m o n  l ;\1\' . .  'irr· irl. ; l l  -1 82  
( q u o ti '-1[; .-\!ten v .  McCmn . 449 {.' . .S 90.  :H1 ( I  9 80 ) ) :  iNjia t e x t  accompamin� n o l c  :1:)0 .  
:> :H\ ".·1 /irn 1 ·  . .  \ frl.u iT\' . 1� 1 J d c  dc: :r  tk1 1  a n  c;.;ccpti r m  t o  ·� l 7 c3 S  11· i l l  n o t  he recog-
nized unless a later st<Jtutc cont;.t i n s  an ex p re�;; o r  nnpiied p a rt i a l  repeal .  . .  4'",()  l_: . s .  at 
·! ti e .  · ' Congress must ' c lcari1 m a n i Ce � t ·  1 1 :; i n t cn !  to cleFt rl fro m  § 1 7 3 8 .  !d. � t l  
't 7 7 .  
TtL s o urce o f  t h e  Court ' s  repc:l  ;1 11<J h s ; s  a p pears 1 0  ha1c b e e n  Currie.  ·, u;mt note 
:13 i .  z:t 3'26-33.  Sri' :\l ien 1 .  \!cC u rn , -l-J.9 L ' .S .  90.  9.'\ n . l i ( l 9 R0)  ( ci • i ! l g  Curr ie .  sttjmt 
note :3 3 1 .  a t  3 2 t; ) . Prolc:;sor Currie 's  a rt iC ic es pouses t l : c  co niCiHi o n a l  but  errot1 c o u s  
vie1' of the ful l  faith a n d  credit  s t a t u t e .  Sn· it(. ;u '\ � G  ( " ! S ect i o n  1 7 :-l S J  d o c s  rcc.;u i rc th;ll  a 
clai n·1 or i ssue he precluded in Cr�·dcral  c o u rt  i f  t h e  res jud icata L .l\\. u C  t h e  �· il�Hc in \\·h ich  
the· j udgn1C'nt \\·as rendered :.; o  i n d i c�·t t t·�; . " ) .  
Th ere m a 1  s tili  b e  r n o m  ( ( , r  I C'iK\d anah \is  u nder  t h e rc i n : crprctcu Cu i !  b i d t  J n d  
crc..:.·dit  s t a t u te ,  b u t  t h a r.  analys t :� d i frcr:-: h·o n 1  t h e  (: ourt · .s .  Ser Ui/ iD t c :� l dccotn p�u-.: > · i n g­
n o t cs -HJ0-09.  
'I :> : >  \ l arrc'c 1 . .  \m crican .-\ c : dcnl\ o f O rr lwpa•_·dic Sm;,;c<J t l s .  1 00 S .  C ! . i 3 � 7 . i :U :2 ( l �)g5 ! .  Set' P:�rsons S teel . I nc. 1· . hrsl :\ l a .  l):u d-: . :)·+ L · . S . l . . \\ ' .  -l i -1 - l.  -i l ·l ' )  ( l'. S .  Jm 2 S .  
1 98\) ) :  �-, ! i gra v .  \\';nTcn C i L' Schoo!  D i ., t .  B d .  o [  Ecl u c ,  -! ! ) :')  L . S .  7 :) .  S i .  � :J -S(i ( l ( )S -t ) 
:>.;o l i L' . S .  (7 C r;\nch) -t.'l l ( 1 8 1  :3 ;  
: >1  i 3S l: . s .  ( l :l Pet ) J i 2  ( l S :l ' l )  
• 
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this  aspect ,  fai thful  to the s ta tu tory language . ���:! In  .HILls, the  Court 
held that the ful l  fai th and credit statute bound federal court s  and 
rej ected an at tempt to  l imi t  i t s  reach to the admiss ion of j udgments 
as evidence.  As to the lat ter aspect ,  the Court could " perceive no 
rational interpretat ion of the act of  congress ,  unless  i t  declares a 
judgment conclusive when a Court of  the particular s tate where i t  i s  
rendered vvould pronounce the  sarne decision . " :; � :; In J fcE!moyle, 
the Court observed that  the judgments  of  state courts ' ' are concl u  .. 
sive upon the defendant in  every s tate ,  except  for such causes  as  
would be sufficient  to  se t  as ide the  judgment in the Courts  of  the 
s tate in  which i t  was rendered . " :l-1< 
Apart from .Hills and i\1cElmoyle, a group of cases that might be 
thought to shed l igh t ,  but  in  fac t  casts shadows , has involved the 
issue of greater preclusive effect .  In  a 1 903 decis ion the Court he ld  
that a federal court could no t  preclude l i t igat ion wi th  respect  to  
s tate taxes on the bas i s  of  a j udgment that \VOuld no t  be p reclusive 
in the rendering s ta te ' s  court s .3-15 Subsequent decis ions reaffirmed 
the general principle ,  albeit occasional ly in language difficult to  de­
cipher . :Ht; The main problem wi th these cases ,  or at lease  with one 
of them , is  tha t  the a t tempt  to get  behind the language w i l l  not be 
made .  In Oldahoma Packlne,· Co. u .  Oklaho m a  Gas & E!ectnc Co. ,  J-17  the 
u 
Court applied the general principle and held that an Oklahoma s ta te 
court j udgmen t  \Vi thout preclusive effect in Okb.homa courts could 
not be preclusive in federal court . The Court  concluded:  · 'Hence, 
the piea of res judicata in  this case must fa i ! ,  for o n  tha t issue s late law 
is determinative here . ' ' :Hs 
Language l ike this ca.n take on a l ife o f  i t s  o w n ,  and tk: Cour t ' s 
recent decisions suggest  that i t  has done s o .  vV c need n o t  pause 
over the q uest ion whether the full fai th and credit  s ta t u t e  should  be 
read to forbid greater preclusive effect  m in te1j urisd icr ional 
3-1� For a departure from the l i tnal bng u�tge or rhc  S l �l i l l lt: in . \ /1!1 \ .  ' t : C  1 1/j!IO n o te -n .  
3 -1 3  .\ /dis. l l  C . S . ( 7  Cra n ch ) � , [  -t�:) ;  scr· olso 1(1. a :  -� M··I .  FDr ; 1 c!d i t i(lnai  d i s cuss i.c>n u i  
.\fi[/s. see Smith,  supm note 3:50. :1 1 :3 � -t:::) ;  \\ 'hi t i en . l lt,!n o  !: l llc 3 2 :1 .  ol [ :"li) ·i - ( i!' .  344 .\ frFhtoy/,•. 3 8  LS. ( I �) Pet . \  a t  :)�( i .  
lin i o n  & PLmtcrs'  B �m l;  \ .  \ J e m p l m .  1 � 9 \ · . s .  7 l ,  7 5  ( ! C)U :\ l .  
Sec Oklaho m a  l'a c k i n �  C o .  \ .  O k l a h o m a  Ca.' &: rice .  C o  . . :l(i9 l.' . ::, .  -i .  i-: ;  ( ! 9- Hl )  
(opinion on rehearing): \ \ .  ngh t \ .  Cco1·g i a  R .  R .  g: B:mkl l lg Co . .  :2 l !) t ·  . S .  -I :?0 .  -t :?:J 
( 1 9 1 0 ) ;  Covin g ton \ .  Firs t  '\a i · l  B:mk d C01 m g t o n .  1 98 l. ' . S .  l C:U .  ] ()c) l l � l () :) )  
I n  Cot. i iJl[!:fO i l ,  d : c  c : o u rt .'-: a i d  l h a t thc  h o l d i n [!· i n  [ 'n t u J! d Plo u/r'i".\' . Bon!.· \\' d S  t h�u " t h e  
Federal cou1� t s  ,,·ere n u t  rer;ufr,�d t o  �;i \T t o  i s  ra t� l J U d �· n l cn t s  d ! l \ ' e-r c a t c r  i'nrcc o:· cifect 
than 11·a� a1,·ardcd to t h e m  !w l l : c- co; 1rt s  " ! the S t :.l i c  1,··h uT ! h e·'-· ��- c�;T ITn(krc:cl . "  C:o; ' / 1 1 " ­
ton. ! 98 L; . s .  � � �  ! O�l ( e l l l ph ;t''l ' .t ddcd ) .  Th i s  fo n n u l a t J l l l l  �� ppc; ; !·s ! · •  l 1 : : \ <_· b e e n  t : Jk�-� � 
from Deposit  Bank \ .  Fran l;t( • n .  1 9 1 l' . S .  -\ �) � ) .  ) l 7 ( ] DO:\ ) Sn· Co1 , ; J g t m> . 1 98 L· . s .  :n 
l oo \ . . . () I I ' , . I . . - I . ' . . ' . . v . •  - separate upnuon 1:1 . ...... onomtt J-'fl(r; l i l! .!.-. t � S l iCCI :� c i o rc 1 liC up1n 1on on rt_· l !C� l n n t;· . 1 :.; 
l? the sa�c effect : Sn· Ol:!uhotno P11rking. 3fE} L . . S :. < <  I i .  
c 
34 7 3 0 9  L' . S .  -I ( 1 9-t O )  ( i l p i n i o ! 1  un rL·he:t r in g ) .  
� -I H  !d. a t  t\ .  
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cases . :; ' '' Assuming that i t  should ,  Oklahoma Packing a n d  i t s  forbears 
s ta.nd only for the proposit ion that federal courts cannot ignore the 
sta tute ,  routinely applying " federal" preclusion law, whether o f  pre­
or post- 1 938  vintage . 3 ''0 These cases do not speak to the quest ion 
hhether,  in subsequent l i t igation domest ic to the court s  o f  the ren­
cicr ing state, federal preclus ion la>v responsive to a particular 
scheme of  federal subs tantive rights  displaces state preclusion law 
<md hence does so interj udisdict ional ly by reason of the ful l  fai th 
and credit statute.  
Al l  of  this i s  not  to say, of  course, that s tate law is  an inappro­
priate place to begin analys i s .  Indeed, in two cases decided in the 
period between Swift and Erie, when the Court was emerging fro m  
one s e t  of  analytical shackles and before i t  succumbed to another,  i t  
s uggested that approach . I n  the firs t ,  the Court o bserved ,  without 
reference to the ful l  faith and credit  s tatute :  
B u t  i f  the de termi n a t i o n  o f  the s ta t e  c o u rt w a s  res adjudicata 
accord i n g  to i t s  l a\vs a n d  procedure,  n o  reas o n  i s  s u gg e s t e d ,  n o r  
arc we able to perceive a n v ,  w lw i t  is  n o t  to b e  deemed res adjudl­
min h ere, i f  the proceed i n g  in the s tate  court was a " case" o r  
" comrovcrsv" w i t h i n  t h e  appellate j uris d i c t i o n  o f  t h i s  C o u rt . . .  
s o  that  cons t i tu t ional  r ights  asserted,  o r  \\·h ich m i gh t  h a v e  been 
ass erted in t h a t  proce e d i n g ,  could evemual l v  have been reviewed 
here . :\ :> !  
� n  the second,  the Court ,  relying o n  the ful l  fai th  and credit s ta lUte ,  
:, i ated : 
Th u s ,  a decis ion i n  a proce edi n g  begun r)\ m o ti o n  lO s e t  as ide a 
j udgment  for w a n t  o f  j u r i s d i ct i o n  i s ,  u n d e r  Idaho law,  rcs ; udlru ta. 
zmd precludes a suit to e n j o i n  e n fo rcem ent o f  the j u d gmen t .  
Since the decis ion \\·oulcl formalh· c o n s t i tute IPS j l l dlra to i n  the 
courts o f  t h e  s tate;  s i nce i t  i n  fac t  sat isfies  the requirements  o f  
prior a d j u dicati o n ;  a n d  s i n c e  t h e  c o n s t i t u tional i s s u e  as t.o j urisdic­
t i o n  m i g h t  have been presen ted to the S tate Supreme Court and 
reYiewed h ere, the d e c i s i o n  i s  a bar to the pres e n t  sui t  ins ofar as i t  
:� • � '  ·rhe (:oun appears l o  read t h e  .s ta t u tc:_· 1 1 1  t h i  ..;; ,,·a� · - Srt> :\!a rrcse ,. _ .-\rnerican .-\cad­
'- " ' \ o l· ()nhopacdic S u rgc o 1 1 s .  1 0 5 S. C t . l Y. ! 7 .  i :l :l-i 1 1 9ti S ) :  :\ l i gra 1· . \\'a rrc 1 1  C i t 1· 
:-; ,_ h ool  Dis l. Bel . . -165 L. S .  7 5 .  :-\� i l q� -1 ) ( \\'h i t e .  J .  conLUITi ng) . CoiiiJ'rl l l' H a ri ng '. . 
. · : o:mc: . -16:2 L . S .  3 0 6 .  el l cl n . 6  ( 1 1 li) :) J u : / t /; u!. �\l ') l 7 - 1 < J .  ! 'h e  prc'.· i o u s  cases bear i n g  o n  
._ , � i s  q ue s t i o n  a r e  l l o l  ,,· i t h o u t ;nn b i gui t i c s  Srr ' llfn a note  �l-Hj . 
s,,,, sujnrl n o t e  :l :l 7 a n d  acc o r n p a l l \ i n g  r. c :-; l .  
Ficleli t1· 1-\a t ' i  lbnk & Trust  C o .  1 .  Sv. opc.  :2 7-1 L S .  1 :2 3 .  1 3 0 <1 1 I 1 9 2 7 )  The ·_ - > l ! i"l  d e t e r m i n e d  that the s t ;t tc  proceed i n g  <·b i r n u l  r o  h a 1 c prccl u s i l c d!Cct · · -,,-;ls _ j ucl i ­
·� ; ;d r: 1 t hc r  than lcgislat i 1c o r  ; 1 d m i n i -"l u t i n· in ch; ,ra c t c r . "  1d .  ; t t  1 :l O ,  therefore s;1 t is l\ i n g  
'. h e  e< tSC n r  cont rmcrsy req t r l tT!ll cn l .  .\rr /d. ; I [  l �l l - 3-1 . \ l o rcm <T. as t o  t h e  s t ;Hc  p t·cci l ! ­
' ! ' "1 '""·· t h e  C o u rt deemed i t s e l f' h o u n d  i l l  ;1 -'l ; t t c c o u rt rl cci ' H > n  i n t c q!l"C l i n g  t h e  s 1 �1 t c  
· ; ;i l. \ l l c- J m o h·ccl . So' id. ;: t l �1-! - 3 ."J .  Bur t h e Coun ;d s o  re l ied " "  c; tscs appl l i 1 1 �; ;: fnkr;d 
'. ' ;· �;c1 1 cr;d f'ccl e ral  c o m m o n  l ;l l\. o l  prcc l u s l n l l .  Sn· 1 r l .  
.. 
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s e eks to enj o i n  the enforcement of the j udgment for w a n t  of 
j ur iscl i c ti on.  :l'> :.!  
805 
The tl rst c a s e  l eaves open the p o s s i b i li ty t h a t  there a r e  "reasons " 
why d o m e s tic state p reclusion la\v should n o t  apply .  B o th require 
additi onal inqui ry before applying state la\v . I t  i s  t ime to address 
the appropriate scope of that inquiry.  
B .  Federal C o m m on Law i n  S tate C ases 
1 .  Obstacles to Clea r T "lslon 
In choosing an in terp retation o f  the ful l  fai th and credit  s tatute ,  
i t  should suffice t o  consider that  ( 1 )  a s tate court could rationally 
and cons titutionally d etermine the p reclusive effects of i t s  j u d g­
ments according to the law o f  another s tate and (2 )  reading the stat­
ute to require a different result  in interjurisdictional cases would 
stand i t  on i ts headY''' That has n o t  been , h owever, what al l  the 
tlghting has been about.  Rather,  atten tion has fo cused o n  the role of 
federal law in the s tate-federal contlguratio n .  The C ourt  has held 
that domes tic s tate  l aw governs the interj urisclictional effects o f  a 
s tate court judgment ,  subj ect  only to the requirements o f  the due 
process c lause and to a tlnding,  on clear e\'idence,  that C on gres�' 
intended in a subsequent s tatute expressly o r  impliedly to repeal the 
ful l  fai th and credi t  s tatute . Y'-1 I n  so h olding,  the C ourt has fai led tu 
cons ider t h e  role o f  federal law in domestic  s ta t e  cas es , the model  o r  
referent used lw the ful l  fai th  and credit  s ta t u t e .  
The C ourt ' s  failure i s  p uzzl ing in l ight  o f  i ts  recognit ion t ha t  the 
due process cons traints on the interj urisdict ional  applicat ion c C  
state preclusion iaw are identical t o  the cons traints applicable clo­
mesti cal l y . :F, c, S uch recognit ion should have prompted the q u e s t i o n  
whether o ther v a l i d  and pertinent fed eral la\v con trol s in t h e  d o m e.' ­
tic context and hence,  by opera tion of the s tatute,  in i n teij ur i s d i c­
tional con texts . There were,  I think,  three o b s tacles  to clear vis i c J\ 
First .  the Court ' s  erroneous in terpretation o f  the fi.. t ll  fai th 
credit  s t atute foreclosed an i nquiry into the relations hip b e tv, ': ': J'  
.-\mcriGm Surct  v C o .  \ .  B�dd11 1 1 1 .  2 S 7  LS. 1 :) ( ) . l ( i (i -(i/ ( i 93 2 ) .  'l :"'d See sujnu t ex t  :lccompan\l ng  notes �l 2 1 -2 9 .  
3 ·""�  Sri' c1 •;es  cited supm note 320 an d  : tculmpa m i n g  t ex t .  3 "' '  .-\ S ta te  ma; not grant preclus i 1c c fil-ct i n  i t s  o11·n co t <rls  to a cons t t tu t ion ­
c d h  m firm J Udgmen t .  and other  s t a te  and federal court .s arc  no t  requ i red 
to  accord fu l l  fa i t h  and credi t  to  such a j uc!grnen t .  Sect ton J 73S do cs not 
suggest  ot l tc-r11 i se :  other  s t a te and federal  c o u rt s  11·mdcl ;a i l l  b e  pr01 t d i n g  
a s t a te  court j t tdgrncnt II" ! Lh the "same " '  prcc!u s i �t· cflcct a s  t h e  c o u r t s  o l  
t h e  S ta t e  from wh tch the judgment emerged .  [ n  s u c h  c l  case. t here c o t1 ! d  
be no cons t i t u t i ona l !�· recog· n i z a b k  nreclus ton a t  a l l .  
Kremer \ .  Chcmtca l  C u n s t r .  c:orp . .. � S (i L. S  · - Hi ! .  � 8 2 -S :l ( l 1 J S 2 )  ( l oo t ll ( J [ (' '< f ' l' l ! ! k· 1 ) .  , )  i '  
Lunebmg . . \lljim note  :l :l 2 .  at -. 
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state and federal law in the domestic context .  I f  the s tatute repre­
sents a choice bv Congress of domestic sta te preclusion law, the 
choice can be defea ted only if  i t  \WLdd lead to a deprivation of con­
st i tutional rights or  if  Congress subsequently made another choice .  
Second, the Court has approached the relationship of federal 
and s tate preclusion law without close a t tention to the meaning o f  
" federal la1v . "  I t  i s  no s urprise t h a t ,  having failed t o  analyze what i t  
means ro say that federal preclusion law governs the effects of fed­
eral judgmen t s , :F• (i members of  the C ourt , when freed of the sup­
posed mandate of  the full fai th and credit statute,  take a 
disembodied federal rule approach to s tate j udgments . "" '  What i s  
'\ 50 Sri' supm text accompan,·i n g  n o t es 1 32 &: 205- 1 ·± .  
:\ 5 7  See \l igr.l 1 .  Warren C i t Y  School  D i s l .  B d .  of Educ. .  -H:J 5  L' .S .  7 5 .  8 8  (\V h i t e , J. ,  
concurring) ( " I f  t h e  kcl nal cuurt s h ;J I't' dcYcloped ru les o f  res j ud i ca t a  a n d  col l ateral 
es t oppel t h a t  prcH:nt  rcl i t 1gauon in circums tances th a t 11·mdd not he prcc l u s i Y c i n  s t a t e  
c o u rt s .  t h e  federal c n u n s  s h o u l d  be Cree t o  applv th em . t h e  part ies t h e n  b e i n g  free t o  
rcl i t i ga t c  i n  t h e  s ta t e  c G U J ' l S  . . .  ) . . Jw, , icc \\'h i t c c o n c l udecl th:Jt t h i s  ,· ic11· . which h e  Lworcd, 
was fo rec l osed b 1· the " l o n g  s t a n d i n g · ·  "co n t rarY co n s t ruc t ien of § l 7 3S . "  !d. But see 
.lilf'm no t es 34Ci & ;q�) . Fnr o t ! 1c r  c ri t ic i s m  o!'. Jus t ice \\' h i r e ' s  o p i n i o n .  sec S m i t h . sujJm 
n o te 3 3 0 . at I I :? n . 300.  
I t  is unclc1r 11 hct h e r  t h ::: ! ll r putat ion of a disembodied federa l ru l e  a p p roach appl ies 
1 1  i th equal  force r "  C h i d._j u q : c e  Burger's  c o n currence i n  .\lon i'Si' . Srr \ l arresc 1 . .-\rneri­
cm ,-\ ca d Cilll  ut' On h o p a c d i c  'imgeo n s ,  1 05 S Ct.  1 3 2 7 .  1 cl 3 5 - 3 7  ( 1 9g 5 ) . Th;H d e p e n d .-; 
on the ex ten t  to I, ! J i cl J  t h e  r nq u i n w h ether "a s t a t e s t :! t u t c  i s  i den t ica l in a l l  ma Lcrial  
respec t s  11· i t l !  �� kdcr;d s : :t t t t t c  ,,· i r h m  exclus iH: J Urisdic t ion . . . id. a t  1 3 3 7 . cont e m p l a t e s  
;! nah sts o l  !cckr:.li :iLt ! u t o n  p u l i c ic:c  . .  in c l ud i n g i n  part icu l <tr  t h e  reas ons ! i > r  t h e  g r a m  of 
cxcl u o.; I \T j u ri sc F •: t t o n .  : n t cl oi '  t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  of t hose pol icies ! o r  prec l u s i o n  rules .  
L n fort u n :J t ch . t h e· a t t <':' l n p t  w m i t i ga t e  t h e  damage cau sed b 1· t he Court 's  i n tcrp re t a ­
! ion of § 1 7 :\S 1 1 1 1  ohcd :t  rcph· in kind- u n reasoned qual ificat io n  of s ta t e  p recl u s i on l a 11· 
'" i t h rra n s -s u b s t ;m t nT fcdcr;1l n r l es t h a t  h;IIT t h e i r  origin i n  c�1ses clecidcd l l 1  d i s regard o f  
t h e  full  b i t h  and cred i t  s u t u t e .  So·. ! '  . . !', ,  ]-b ri n g -_ .  Prosise.  4 ii� l.' . S .  ;)() () , � 1 3 - l ·+ &: n . 7 ,  
') I �  ( I  D S ;l )  ! d i e !  u m ) .  l n foo t n o t e  7 . . ) 1 r > t  i c c  \Llrshal l .  IITll i n g  fur a u na n i m o us C o u rt ,  
rel i ed on i1 l o n t a n <t ' · l 1 I> i ted S t a t e s .  -4 -4 0  L . S .  1 4 7  ( 1 9 /C) ) ,  for t h e  pro p o s i t ion t h �t l  . .  ,·ari­
ous o ther cond i t i o n s . . m u s t  also be s;u i sficcl before gi ,· i n g  p rcclus il c dl'ect 1o  ; ;  s t a tc­
ClJui ·t j u cigmcn t . '  [ n  tlnt 1,·;11·. Jus t i ce :\ Ltrshal l  (ldw also IITO tc ; he Co urt ' s o p i n i o n  in 
.\ fon louo)  s o u fiht  to ;11 u i d  t ! t c  re" l r ict i l't· g l o s s  t h a t  had been p l aced o n  " Cu l l  and fai!­
opport t m i tl tc l i t i ,;;l l L· . . in Krcn1cr· 1· . C :hemicd Co.-: s t r .  Corp . . -!:Jfi L. S .  4() 1 ( 1 CJS� ) .  Sre 
sujJm text  ;Hcomp<m ' i l t g  rw l c  :U G . . -\ 1·o i cl :mcc 11 as a l ogical impos s i b i l i t Y  . .  \ lon /rnlrl d i d  
n o t  refer t o  t h e  h d !  Lu t h  ;nH! cred i t  s u t u t c .  Ser sujJm text accomparw i n g  n o t e  �. :H . The 
c o n d i t i o n s  :HJd qt t : t l t l i czl i i o J i s  : l t c  Co urt  : tnnouncecl m connection 11 i t h Lhc a p p l i c a t i o n  of 
prec l u s 1 o n  under l'uic;-;1l la 11· Gll1 l 1 o t  s urY I Y e c r .n cler the C o u n · :, current < tpprrnch t u  s t a r e  
j u dgmen t. :; J l n k s s  t he' a rc t cq wred h i '  t h e  ch 1c process clause or u n l c s , .  i n  a part i c u l a r  
ca s c.  the Co\ ln ducrn ,u les t h a t  : 1  s u bscqucn t h  enacled s ta tu t e  represen t s  : t n  express  o t­
i m p licd p; tn i ;t l  rcpc,!i u l' � ! 7:>8 . . 'il'l' suj;m n ote :� 3 8 .  or course ,  u n d e r  t h e  rei n t erpreted 
fu l l  b i th and crL·d i t  s l �; tu t c .  uniform l(:dcr;t l  preclus ion rules m a 1  go1 c rn  i n  : 1  c;: o; c  l 1 kc 
. \ fo n i u .; lo ,  b:_' '�·au sc .':' u c h  ru le,·, ·\,· o u ld gn,·e: ·n \•:hen the second a c r. i o n  \\ ·as brought  i n  s t a t e  
c o u rt .  B u t . i f  tint 11crc r ru c .  i t  11· n t d d pro b a b l Y  res u l t  from t h e pecul iar s t :J t us or t h e  
L ' r: i t cd S t;HC.'-' 'IS < i  l ! t ig :n t t .  ( /  l- n i tcd S t: 1 t c s  " ·  \ kndoza. -tG-l C . S .  ! 5-t l. l �lH�l )  ( o flem i 1 c  
n o n tn u t � ! �d : :.; �; u c  prec l u � i o n  do�·s n o t  ;_}pply  � !ga i n s t  t h e  L 'n i lcd .S L a t e :·: ) .  
Just ice \, L� r-:Ldl  ; ; J :;u ; 1 r. tcrn pt c d  i n  flrni!l!', t o  prcst.:r-ce p o s s i b le " zu:i d i t i o n a l  cx ccp­
tiuns to colLr r cr; r !  C:i i <Jppci . . .  f!onug. -Hi::! l' . S .  ;l l :l l 3 . from t h e  p o l ic ies  u nd nh i n g 
§ i �)W) . E u :  . \ i ! cn \ .  \. I c C u rr; . .  4-J.Sl l._· S .  llO .  1 0  I ( 1 9 8 0 ) .  !ro m  ,,· h ich t h o s•,· p o , s i h i c  cx­
ccpt lm1:i ,, ,_Tr:· dcri 1cc i .  kld ;l :; :; : n n Lttcd them tn " ;1 fu l l  ;md L! i r  o p p o n u n i t l  to i i t i g;1 t c . "  
' 
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surpris ing,  and equally untenable,  is  the  Court ' s  sugges tion  that 
federal common lavv· rules of preclus ion ,  o therwise applicable ,  are 
insulated from congressional  will to the same extent as the ful l  fai th 
and credi t  s tatute-to be displaced onlv upon demonstrat ion of  a n  
express or imp lied repeal . :I :; K  
Third,  cases emanating from state courts were the least  l ikely 
candidates for the development of a general approach to the rela­
tionship bet ·ween federal and s tate preclusion law.  For, pass ing the 
failure to develop such an approach in the context of federal judg­
ments ,  bo th the Court and comment a tors have tended general ly  to 
treat federal law i n  s ta te courts , a t  least i f  the issue can b e  l abeled 
procedural ,  a s  a discrete problem presenting unique considerations , 
if not  requiring i ts own doctrinal apparatus . :ls �J I refer to cases in  
id . . a n d  f..:mnrr t h en s h u t  that door.  B111 src S m i t h .  511/JIO n o te 3 3 0 .  a t  7 3 -7 6 .  7 8 - 7 9 ,  1 08-
1 0 . Taken toge t h e r ,  .-II! en and I\rc111tr p rnen ted the C o u rt in J/rmng from realizin g  th e 
ful l  potential  of c.1ses s uch as Board of R egents \·. Toma n i o .  4-!6 L . S .  -!78 ( 1 980) (cited 
in  f-lm·ing. -!62 U . S .  at 3 1 cl .  fo r prc>po s i t ion t h a t "-!2 L' . S . C .  § 1 988 a u t h ori zes federal 
court s , in act i on u nder § 1 98 ;\ .  to d i s regard othen1 1 s e  a pp l ica b l e s t a t e  ru l t> of law i f t h e  
s tate b 11· i s  inconsis tent  11 i th  t h <:'  federal pul icv u n d crh i n g 1 98 3 . " )  . . 'ia tnjia t e x t  accom­
panying notes -1 1 4- 2 7 .  
:l5R  Srt .-\ ! len v . .\icC u rn . -14 0  L. S .  0 0 ,  9fi .  9 7 - 9 8 ,  9�) ( 1 9R 0 )  " S ince repea l s b v  impl i ­
ca t ion arc disLJvorcd, R.od:rutO<I 'i'l ; • .  Toutltc Ross 0 Co . . 426 l; . s .  l · + S .  ! 54 ,  much clearer 
suppon t ha n  t h i '  \\ O u l d be required to hold t h a t  � 1 7 :\ 8  r11 : ri !Itt /rruli!tnllltf m!es of prn!u­
sion are nor applica ble to \i 1 98 3  s u i t s . · ·  !d. at 99 ( c m p h <r s i s  < I d d ed ) .  lt is  p o s s i b l e  that  
the Court imcndcd onh r o  si gml i r s  assum p t i o n  tha t § 1 7 ?. 8  i ts e l f' makes a p p l icable 
" t radit ional  rules o f  p recl usion . · ·  Sf'l' 1(/. < t t  95 n . 7 ;  Krclller -. · .  Chemical Con s tr . Corp . . 
456 U . S .  -!G 1 .  4 8 5  ( 1 98 2 ) .  B u t  the C o u rt had ea rl ier establ is hed a d i chotoll iy between 
the freedom of the fedcr<.t! courts lO " l ook to the curn m o n  i a1-.· or to t h e  po l i c i es support­
ing res j u dicata  and c o l l ateral  e s t oppel  i n  a s s e s s i n g  the p rcc l u s i\T efT en of decis ions  of 
other federal cou n s  .
. . . -1 /lm. 449 l' . S .  a r  ()()_ a n d  their o b l i g:r t ion u nder � 1 7 38 " t o  g i Y<:: 
precl u s ive dk cr to sta te-e<JUrl _j u clgl l l c n t s  1-. h e n e\cr t h e  courts  of t h e  S t <lle from \,· h ich 
th e judg·ments emerged ,,·oldd clu s o . "  I d. \ l o rcm n. t h e Court had a l readY s t a t ed the 
conc lu s i cm tkrl " no t h i n g  in t h e  l a n guage of � 1 983 t-e m o l eh· expresses am co n gres­
s i onal i n t e n t  to c o n t ra1 c n e  the cumrnon -b\,. ru les  o f  prec l u s i o n  o r  lO repeal t h e express 
s tatu tory requirements of [ §  1 7 3 8 ] . "  !d. a t  9 7 -�1 8 .  
T h e  ca s e  cited b'  the Co u n .  Raclzanrmer \ .  To uch e R o s s  & Co . .  -± 2 6  C . S .  1 4 8 
( 1 9 76) . deals  only  ·s i ch repc<ris n! '  s ta tutes .  The doc t ri ne s u ggested as t o  common l ;m· i s .  
for 1 h e  kclerai courts . a ba t t l e lost  l o n g  a go SrP. r.g. . Ja' , supm n o t e  l 0 2 ;  sr'l' af.w Cit: o f  
!Vl i h,·aukce \ .  I l i inois .  -!5 1 L . S .  3 0 2 .  :-) Hi- i 7 & n .�l ( 1 98 1 )  ( d i s t i n g u i s h ing s ta n d a rd s for 
finding p reemption of S LH e  L\11 fro : ll t h o :;e go·;c:rmng disp lacement  of kclcra l common 
la,,· ) .  
For ;:; c a s e  i n  ,, hich t h e  C o u n  p a i d  a u en t i o n  1 0  t h e  impl ica t i o n s  of t h e  s u b s tant i \·e 
law scheme where � 1 7 38 \\·as f(l und not lo ap p l Y . se<..' \!cDonald 1· . C i t Y  o f  \\' e s t  B r<.:n ch . 
-!66 U . S .  2 8-l r l 98-± )  Scr n/1o S m i t h .  1 1 1/11 !1 n o t e  '\ 3 0 .  a t  7 l) n . l 0 3 .  1 1 7 n . 3 1 G  ( di s c u s s i n g  
.\fcDona!d) . 
:-l C> D  C:on!jHo·;•. e g  . . lli C. \ \ · i� r c ; ! !T . .  -\ . .\ i i LI . U� .  E .  C o o PER & L C R Ess: "Al\ .  F E DEl<.\L 
PRACTI C E  2...: PR0C E D L R E  § §  -!0 1 9 - 2 7  ( l �.l i / i  !r<c\· i c'-. of s t a le cou n s )  ,, , ///; ! D \Y RI CHT. 
\ I J ' .LER  & CooPF.!C s 11jJm no:c 5 .  �� -! S l -! - 1 5  ( teckr<. d  common l <.n,·) . 
The Court ha:; tnade progn::;:; in col la p s i n g  anal:'l ical b<ItTins b\· c i t i n g  a case dis­
placing > ta te  la1,· in :; t alc c o u rt  J S  :;u f l i c ien t h  an a l ogou s to lend support to a di�c� 1ss ion 
of the bornwing d s t a t e  b,,. i n  feel era !  court.  Burk:; \' . Lasker. -l-1 J L.S.  -! 7 1 .  -} '/�1 ( i �) 7� ) ) 
(c i ti n g  Brohn \ . \\'(· :; tern K\ . . 3 :l tl L . S .  2 �1- L 298 ( l �)-[9 ) ) . .\loreo1 cr,  s o m e  c o m m c n t a -
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which s tate "procedural" l a w  h a s  been "preempted" because i t  was 
inconsistent with a federal substantive obj ective.  The best known 
cases arose under the Federal Employers ' Liabil i ty Act ,:wu and some 
would treat the phenomenon as essentially confined to l i ti gat ion in­
volving that  statute . 'Hi 1 
2 .  The Releuance of Federal Common Law .-f.nalysis a n d  the Rules of 
Decision Act 
I hope that I have removed the first of the three obs tacles .  I t  
remains t o  confro11t the other tvv o .  The problem of federal la\v i n  
s tate courts ,  even i f  that  law i s  dubbed " procedura l "  for some pur­
poses ,  i s  neither discrete nor aberrational .  The probl em i s  one of 
federal common law-nothing more, nothing les s-;md we should 
seek to  determine the circumstances appropriate for the develop­
ment  or application o f  federal common law in the  context of state 
court proceedings . I f, as is the case,  a general approach is  accepted 
when the quest ion is  whether substan tive federal common law gov­
erns in s tate cases ,%2 no a priori reason exis ts  why the same ap­
proach i s  inappropriate for matters less confidently characterized .  
Indeed , looking at  the  problem th i s  way highlights deficiencies in 
traditional federal common law analysis ,  even with respect to the 
problems for which that analysis was s pecifical ly  adopted .  
There is  a federal interest in ensuring that legal  rules used in 
the process b y  which rights under federal substantive law are recog­
nized and enforced are not inimical to a part icular  scheme of federal 
substantive rights .  This interest exists whether federal or state law 
provides the process and however the rules are characterized .  In 
t he case of l i t igation in the federal court s ,  the exi s tence of the int er-
tors ha\ e gone further. Th u s .  i n  Norfo l k  & \\·. R 1 . \ .  Liepe l t .  ·{-i-t L S .  � �10 ( 1 980) . th e  
Court held that  a s t a te court erred 111 refu s i n g  <1 req u e s t e d  J Lin i n s t ruct JO! l  as t o  t h e  
nontaxa b i l i t ;· of a n  FEL.-\ a\\·Jrd.  !d. a t  -+CJ 8 .  Professor Clermont  correct h· d e s cribed t h i s  
a s  a h o l d i n g  t h a t  t h e  m a t t e r  \\·as " governed b \ ·  . u ni form fcc!era!  c o m m o n  LJ,, . · ·  R .  
FJ ELD, B .  KAPL\,'-; &: K .  CLERMO:--IT,  M.-\lTRL\LS FOR ,\ B.-\ S I C  C<K R S F. 1 :-.:  C: l\ ' 1 1 .  l'ROC:EDL "RE 
2 5 1 (5th ed.  1 98 -t ) .  
'l i iO  Srr. r.g . . D i ce \· . .  -\kron, Canton &: Y o u n gs to 11 n R.R . .  � \-+ :2  1..: . s .  :l 5�l ( 1 9 5 2 ) :  Bru11 J l  
\ ' . \\' estern R \  . . :138 u . S .  29-t ( 1 949) . Sci' P,P//fl(/1/y H i l L  Su/J.I /( /) /(1' (1 1 / (/ Piucl'(/1/ i (' I I !  Stoll' 
FFL-1 .-l ctlons-The Co11vnsr of the f:'nr Prublrm 1. l 7 Omo Sr. L J .  3 g-+ ( l �)56 ) .  
:'viv q uarrel i s  n o t ,  o f  course,  11· i t h  the c h o i ce o f  the " p ree m p t i o n "  la bel  i n s tc�1d o f  
" federal common la1,· . "  I t  i s  rather \\· i t h the fa i l ure to s e e  the p rob l ems ,,·hol e .  Prccm p­
t i n:: b11·making is  a subset  o f  federal common l a11· . Set \ [ c r ri l l .  supra n n 1 c  �l :Z .  :.1 1  :l 2 - Cl9 :  
/11}1rl n o t e  3 6 7 .  
:-J G I Profe s s o r  \\"r ight  obs en-cs t h a t  " e\·en i f  the FEL-\ case ., are u m q u c .  t h c 1  > r a n d  
!'or t h e  p ropo s i t i o n  t h a t  C o ngress has c o n s t i w t i o n a l  p o w e r  to cont rol  t h e  i nc i d e n t s o f '  a 
s w tc tr ia l  of a federal c la i m . "  C .  \VR I G I IT, suj;m note 5() . § -Li . a t  2 7 'l. -7 �i .  Si't olso J 
F R I E DENTl L\L ,  \'1 . KI�E &: .A. \ [ I LLER.  CIVIL PRO C F. IW R E § - L R .  �\ l 2 3't ( 1 98 5 ) . 
:Hi2 Sre. e.g . .  Local 1 74 .  Teams ters v. Lucas Flour C o . ,  :) li'l L . S .  'J::'' ( l �l C'l. J :  H i n d cr-
l i der 1 .  La Pl <tta River &: C h erry C reek D i t ch Co . .  30-t L. S .  �l 'l. .  1 1 0 ( l <J :l S l  
• 
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ests suffices , under tradit ional  federal common law analysis ,  to trig­
crer the conclus ion that fed eral law govern s .  According to  the t> 
dominant (but not  invariant)  approach taken by the Supreme Court ,  
a federal court in such circumstances may choose between a un iform 
federal rule and state law borrowed as federal la\v . 3<'3 To the extent 
that the Rules of Decision Act i s  deemed relevant ,  the percept ion of 
a federal interest in the firs t step analysis i s  thought to dispense \Vi th 
the Act ' s  direction to apply s tate law . �Hi-1 
Why hasn ' t  the same approach been taken in cases l i t igated in 
state court s ?  Surely we must  admit  the power of the Supreme Court 
to displace s tate law employed by s tate courts  i n  the adj udicat ion of 
federal rights when the Court  finds s tate law hosti le to or inconsis ­
tent >vi th those ri ghts .  Could i t  be that  those who treat the problem 
discretely%" do so because  the notion that " federal law govern s "  
the incidents of s tate l i t igation involving federal subs tantive rights 
seems too broad, nay uncons t i tutiona l ?  
When federal courts adjudicate federal substantive rights ,  there 
is unquestioned federal power to make al l  of  the legal rules , includ­
ing rules of procedure. The only question i s  \vhether the federal 
courts can exercise that power. Congress has no power to make 
rules of procedure for s tate courts except as they are necessary and 
proper to implement federal substantive la \\· , and nothing in art ic le 
III  confers greater power on the federal courts . In these circum­
stances ,  the exis tence of an inchoate federal in terest hardl y  seems 
sufficient  to vvarrant speaking of state law functioning as fed eral law. 
And in this context ,  i t  would seem, the Rules of  Decision Act func­
tions solelv as a restatement of const i tu tional requirernents . :Hiti 
3G3 SPP sujJm t ext  accompanYing n o t e s  I 05-08 .  
3 (i-l S1'f sujHrl text accompam·ing n o t e s l OD - :!  I .  
3G5 Sef. r g  . .  :;o u rcc:s  ci ted sujJla no t es 3 SD-GO. 
:lGb The S upreme C o u rt . ·,,·h i c h  fo rmu lates  Ccder�l l c o m m o n  Lt\,. lo r cases in s ta t e  
courts ,  i s  hound b\ t h e  R u l es o f  Decis ion . .\ct .  
En:n before the demise of t h e  tenth a me nd m en t a s  an mclepenckn t check o n  kd­
eral la\,·making . .  w Carcia  \ . San A n t o n i o  !\ l e t .  Transi t  .-\ u t h  . . 1 0 5 S.  Ct.  1 005 I J qt:\ 5 ) .  
precl u s i o n  Ia\, . . hecausc of ns subst<m t i \·e  i m p ac t .  \,·as a n  un l i ke l Y candid a t e  !'or sol ic i tude 
under that  rubric .  Cj. Federal  E n crg\ Regulaton C o m m ' n -_ .  :Vl i s s i s s i p p i .  -L'>G l; . s  7 -t :!  
( 1 982)  ( p r0\ 1�' 1011>  of P u b l i c  l; t i l i t i c s  R egula t on Po l ic i es ,,\ c t  of' 1 9 78 req u i r i n g  s t a t es t o  
consider s tandards a n d  t o  fo! io1,· certain procedures i n  d o i n g  s o  a r e  n o t. unco n > t i t u t io n<ll 
i 111'a s i o ns of s t;:ll e soYcrcign t ; ) .  Rut r/ ul. at 7 7 1 - 7 '5  ( Po\,·cl l . .J . .  concurring a n d  d i s s e n t ­
ing) ( p r o cedural pro1 i s i o n s  o f  .�.ct  \ i o l a t c  t e n t h  amendm e n t ) .  
The tendencY o l' cornmenl<Hors t o  speak t h e  lan guage o f  preem p t i o n  rat h e r  t h a n  
federal c o m m o n  Ia"· m the contex t of s t a t e  c o u r t  l i t i g a t i o n  i s  s u ggest iH' of t h e  larger 
issue,  put \ \T i l  b \  Professor  � ! o n a g h a n :  
The c lose rda t i rm s h i p  b e t w e e n  p reempt ion p r i n c i p l e s  a n d  kcl cral  
c o m m o n  la1,. . . has n o t  been adequa teh d i s c u s s e d  b ;  t h e  C o u rt . Ar­
gua b h . a m b i g u o u s  fed era l s t a tutes sh o u l d  ha\'e a d i s p l a c i n g  i m p ;:1ct  onh 
\,·hen state Ll\1· i s  seen t o  be i n  111atniai confl ict  "· i t h  t h e  p o l i c ies  of f'cdcra l  
l a w .  This 1\'0Uicl c:; ta b l i s h  s t a t e  l a w  a s  a n u n n  opcra t i \T u n t i l  c lcarh· 1 !1 -
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This analysis  should cause u s  t o  question whether,  even i n  cases 
ini t ial ly brough t  in fed eral court,  traditional two - s t e p  fed eral com­
mon law analysis  is  u sefu l .  The mere exi s tence o f  fed eral power 
does not j u s ti fy federal  common law . % 7  \1\fhen a fed eral  court con­
cludes that a u niform fed eral rule is not necessary t o  protect federal 
in teres t s ,  what does it m ean to say that s tate law o perates as  federal 
law? O n e  step wil l  d o  nicel y in both con tex t s ,  and the Rules of Deci­
sion Act provides the common vehicle .  
I t  i s  n o t  necessary ,  h owever, to accept m y  view o f  the role of the 
Rules o f  D ecision Act in conn ection with state  court l i tigation any 
more than i t  is necessary to accept it in connect ion with fed eral 
court l i ti ga ti o n .  The key is  to recognize that,  w h e n  fed eral preclu­
sion law applies  to either fed eral or s tate j ud g m e n ts , it  will  almos t 
always b e  federal common law,  and that the same p rinciples  o r  s tan­
dards determine the p ertinence and validity of fed eral  common law 
in both contexts . 
3 .  Appl_ving the General Approach 
We are l eft with t h e  quest ion when federal c o m m o n  lavv validly  
appl ies  to d etermine the preclusive effects o f  s t a te j u d gments in state 
court .  Wh a tever the role of federal "proce d ural " p o l icies in the d e­
velopmen t o r  application of federal preclusion law for federal j u d g­
ments .  they can have n o  role in this context .  B u t ,  because my 
analysis of the law governi n g  the federal quest ion j u d gments o f  fed ­
eral courts considered only the requirements of fed eral subs tantive 
law,:HiC' that mode of analysis  is equally relevant h e r e .  
Under traditional fede ral common lavv· analysi s ,  preclusion rules 
are " [l ] egal rules which impact  sig·nif1can tlv upon the effectuation of 
fed eral righ ts . " 3G9 The exis tence of that p o ten tial  for impact in s tate  
l i t i gation involving federal subs tantive rights s u p p o rt s  fed eral law­
making competence j us t  as it  does in federal l i t igat ion.  In the case 
compat ible  with the polic ies  o f  recleral la w . While this  a p proach 5eems 
verv much in keeping ,,· i th  the ph i losoph1 o l  ihc R u les o f  Deci s i o n  :\ct  
. i t  finds  onlv  occas ional  s upp o rt i n  the  case law. Federal  couns 
have developed fed eral common !all" o n  a basis  which t o  mv m i n d  would 
not have been j u s tified under �� s trict  preemption anal1s is  . 
M onaghan, sujHa note 270,  at 1 2 - 1 3  n . fi9 .  St!' ([/so 1 11[m text accom panving note 3 7 6 .  For 
the sugges t i o n  that Professor :\ l o n a ghan p�t i cl i n s u Hic!ent  a t t em i o n t o  his 0\1"11 1· i e"· o f  
the Rule� of Decision A c t  i n  d i scuss i n g  const i tu t ional  c o m m o n  la 1,· . s e e  \Jerr i ! ! ,  supm 
n o t e  92,  at 55 n . 2 3 6 .  
3b7 See, e.g . . Texas I n du s . ,  I n c .  , . .  Racl cl i (f  :-.. Ll t eri ;d s .  I n c.. -1 5 1  l: . s .  630 , fi-t ! ( 1 98 I ) :  
.w olsn W a l l i s  1 .  Pan . -\merican Petroleum Corp . ,  38-i L S .  ti3 .  (i8 . 7 1  ( 1 96G ) :  \-! i rec ,. _ 
DcKal b C o u n t v ,  4 3 3  U . S .  2 5 .  3 l -3 :3 ( 1 9 7i) 
Ser sujJm text ;;cco mpanving n o tes i 30-2 I 4 .  
Burks v .  Lasker, 44 1 U . S .  47 1 ,  4 7 7  ( 1 0 7 9 ) . Sec supra t e x t  accom pul\· i n g  notes  
1 50-5 1 .  
-
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o f  s tate l i t igation,  however, the case for uniform federal rules is far 
weaker. The same h o l d s  true u nder a Rules of Decision Act 
approach . 
T o  b e  s ure, the application of trans-substantive state p reclu s i o n  
l a w  to s tate j ud gments a dj udicating fed eral rights370 p resents a 
problem of administrab i l i ty for the fed eral courts . The p o ssibi li ty o f  
S upreme C ourt review m a y  n o t  adequately safeguard fed eral sub­
s tan tive l aw agains t  s tate preclusion rules that are host i le  t o  o r  in­
consistent with i ts  requirements . :n i  S tate courts  d o  n o t  ahvays 
determine the domestic  s o l u t i o n ,  h owever . :l 7 C! Given the rela tive h o ­
m o geneity o f  American preclusion law,  diss onance is  d i ffi c u l t  to pre­
dict a priori . Further,  a body of federal preclusion law formulated 
for similar cases by federal j ud ges , who are l ikely to b e  m ore s ensi­
t ive to diss onance, provides a c onvenien t initial check for s tate 
j u d ges who share the obligation t o  honor the requirements of fed ­
eral s u b s tantive l a w . �>73 
I n  contra s t  with the u s e  o f  s tate l avv to determine the p reclu s ive 
effects of the federal question j ud gments o f  federal co urts , the use 
o f  s tate preclusion law for domest ic  s tate court j u d gments  presents 
n o  serious problems of adminis trabil i ty for l i t i gan ts .  I n  planning l i t­
igation s trategy, they can b e  confident that ,  in most  cases , they need 
only  consult  the domes tic precl usion la1v of the s L J t e  where the ini­
tial  act ion has been commenced . :1 7 4 
Indeed,  in the context o f  state court j u d gments , i t  is the u s e  of 
uniform federal p redu:; i on law that  would create aclminis trabi ! i ty  
p roblem s .  Local l i ti g mts would be required to know, a n d  court s  to 
apply,  two entire bodies o f  p reclusion l a\N , perhaps i n  the same 
cas e _ :n:, i-\ l though alike i n  m o s t  respects ,  those bodies of l a w  would 
37 0 T h e  ,,·ord " a dj u d ic a t i n g" in t h i s  co!l lext mcludcs t he precl u s io n  of federal cLurns 
and i s s u es not raised as s uch in t h e  i n i t ia l  Jct ion.  
; ;  7 I Cf suJna text accom panying note ! 58 ( federal judgm e n t ) . 
:1 7 :! ,\Jam· Glscs in w h ich a s t a t e  j udgment is cbimed to ha\'c prcd u s i \·e elfect \Vi i i  b e  
b rought i n  federal c o u r t s .  Al thou gh 1he r e i n terpreted fu l l  fai t h  and cr e d n  statute re­
qUires such courts t o  use the domest ic  s o l u t i o n  of the rendering s l a t e .  t h ey arc free.  i n  
t h e  absence of a n  a u thori tat ive  ru l i ng b ;  t h e  S u p reme Court . to d e 1 erm i n c  t he e x t e n t  t o  
"·hi c h  federa l  J a ,,. controls  that  solu t i o n .  
:> 7 1  This s;.�fcguard sh<;u ld b e  d i ; t i n g u i � hc d  from t h ;:! t  d i scusse d .\!ljna n o t e  :\ 7 � .  
a l t hough federal j u d ges requ ired to a p p l v < t  dom es t i c s t a t e  solut ion u n d er t h e  rein ter­
p reted ful l  faith :md cred i t  s ta t u t e  would surch a cln:rt to the federal  preciu:; ion rule  
applicable t o  a com parable  fecler::d j u d gmcn t .  rhe disc l lSs ion a s s u m es r.o n c u rr c n t j u ri s ­
d i C l i o n .  and t h e  p o m t  made req u i res a n  i n i t i a i  <l cU u d i c a t i o n  of t·edcral  r igh 1 s .  CcllljHnP 
suprrz n o te 3 70 and accompanvin g t ex t .  For an ;ma h sis o f p rcc! u s i o 1 '  ;1 s t o  ; n a i l ers \,·i t h i n  
exclus i\T federal  j u r i s d i c t i o n .  s e c  inji-a t e x t  accomp�ln'· i n g  n o te-s 4 '? 0 - ti  l .  
:\ 7-: Cf , , ,pm text accompanying n o t es l �>9- 6c� ( feder;d j t � C igm c n t ) .  
:;-; c, I a m  a s s u m i n g  that , "·hen federal  ;nH.l s t :l t e  c b i rns JIT l i t i gar_cd i n  S t :l l l'  court . � In 
argument h r  u n iform federal ru l es o f  }Jrec i u s i u n  ci S to the  for!l l cr cou l d  no1 p l a u s i b h  he 
extended t o  the  l a t t er .  ColitjJrllt .111jno note  I ;) 3 ( federal  j u dgment  adjudiC! t i ng !Ccl c ra l  
: l ! !d s u t c  q u est ions ) .  
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not  b e  alike i n  a l l .  Further,  advertence t o  fed eral preclusion law 
could skew l i ti gants ' choice s  in the init ial  s tate court  act ion i n  a man­
ner contrary to that state ' s  pro cedural pol icy . :m> 
There i s ,  then, n o  strong argument for applying u n i fo r m  fed ­
eral preclusion rules to s t a t e  j u d gments adj udicat ing fed eral  ri ghts ,  
particularly when , d ep arting the normative rea l m ,  one c o n s i d ers the 
paradox that a regime o f  " borrowe d "  s tate law,  d i s pl aced whenever 
host i le  t o  o r  inco n s i s tent with fed e ral substantive p ol ici e s ,  may 
prove more protective o f  t h o s e  p o licies than a regime o f  uniform 
fed eral rules . :" ' '  I n  any event ,  o n e  need not  ei ther e m b race a label  
o r  invoke the rhetoric  o f  fed eral ism t o  rebel  a t  the routine appl ica­
t ion of fed eral preclusion law to s tate court j u d gments  in s u b s e­
quent s tate proceedings .  
H aving determined that uniform federal  preclusion law i s  not  
required , under tradit ional  fed eral common l aw analys is  a court  
must  st i l l  b e  alert  to the p os s i b i l i ty that appl icat ion o f  state  law , bor­
rowed as federal law,  wil l  tlnvart the purposes o f, o r  o therwis e  i n t er­
fere with, fed eral subs tantive l a w .  In that event ,  the o ffe n d i n g  s tate  
lavv rule  i s  displaced ,  because federal s ources require o therwis e  than 
that i t  apply .  The same resu l t  o b tains in connect ion with l i t i ga t i o n  
in s tate courts , but  there has been a failure to see the problems 
whole .  
I n  s o rne ca ses ,  pol ic ies  animati n g  federal subs tan tive l a w  may 
require a rule more p reclusive than that  provi d e d  by domestic  s tate  
la\v .  Perceptive commentators  have suggested as a n  exa m p l e  suc­
cessive s tate contrac t act ions  o n  patent  l icense a greemen t s  wherein 
the valid i tv of the patent  i s  in i s s u e ,  drawing an analogy to " p reemp­
t i o n "  cases . :1 7s  If, in the first  act ion,  the s tate court finds the patent  
invali d ,  the quest ion may thereafter aris e  vvbether o n e  not a party to 
t hat action may u s e  the fin d i n g  to p reclude the patentee i n  s tate 
c o u rt .  The Court ' s  d e c i s i o n  in Blonder- Tongue Labom!ories, !n c. u. Cni­
versity of Jllnwis Fou n dation '1 7�) vvas based in part on the conclusion 
:l / ( i  q: supm text  accomp am·i n g  n o t e s  1 7 1 - 72 (use o f  borr< J\\"Cd s tate  p recl u s i o n  la1,. 
nuy s ke1,. fed eral l i t i ga n t · s  choices in i n i t i;d act ion in manner c o n t r;1 n to federa l  proe<:: ­
c lural  polin) . 
:) 7 7  Sef' uifro text  � lccctnpanying n o t es -!50-S l .  
:1 / S  Srr ! t)  \\"R rc r-rr . \l n.LER 8.: C o o P E R .  supm n o te 5 .  § -! ·Hi 7 .  a l  ()� 5  ( " " p r i n c i p l es a k i n  
w federal preemption ma\  occas ional!\· req u i !T s ta t e  co u rt s  to Co ! l o 11 Cederal  r u l e s  of 
preclus i on ' " ) : see a lso supm text  accomp a m i n g  n o tes 359-G ! .  For ihe propriel\  of s l ate  
co u rt s determining " 'q�tes / 10 1/S ;:;ris ing u n d er the p a i c n t l ;n,·.s . " '  :; e c: Pra t t \ Paris  C;ts Light  
& Coke C o  . . 1 68 L . S .  2 5 5 .  2 5 9  ( 1 8 9 7 )  
T h e  problem discussed i n  the 1 ex t ,  i n H>h i n g  su cces s i \T s ta t e  co•. t rt act ion: ; .  should 
he dist ingu i s h ed from the s i tuat ion i n  ,,·h ich t h e s ubsequent  a c t i o n  is  h ro t tght i n  federal  
court . 51'1' I S  \\' H. I G I IT. '\ l i LLER & CooPER . .  wpm n o t e  5 .  § ·H 7 0 .  Zl l  GR-! - 8 .'> :  1 1 1jir1 note -H)  1 
and accompam i n g  tex t .  
: \7 � )  402 c: . s .  3 1 3  ( 1 �) 7 ! )  
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that  the federal rule of  mutuality of estoppel was inconsistent with 
policies animating federal patent law . :>�o Presumably a s tate mutual­
i ty rule is  equally incons i s ten t .  In such a case, it must yield to fed­
eral common law . :oH l 
In o ther cases , policies animating federal subs tantive law may 
require a rule less preclusive than that provided by domestic s tate 
law. If, for example,  we assume that s tate courts have concurrent 
jurisdiction of tit le VIP8� act ions , the ques tion may arise whether in 
such an action brought in  s tate court ,  that court can apply domest ic  
law according preclusive effect to the adjudicatory proceedings of  a 
s tate adminis trative agency that is a deferral agency under t i t le 
VII . :>s:> A s trong argument can be made that application of  the s tate 
rule would be inconsis tent with pol icies animating tit le VII . Because 
the EEOC is  required to give only "substantial weight" to admini s ­
trative findings of  deferral agencies , :;s� and assuming Congress d id  
not intend in that regard to dist inguish between invest igative and 
adjudicatory adminis trative action, it makes no sense to permit a 
court, federal or s tate ,  to give those findings preclusive effect .  Doing 
so would seriously undermine the federal adminis trative proces s . 385 
Thus far, \Ye have considered cases in which s tate preclusion 
lavv yields to federal common law in domestic l i ti gat ion because a 
380 See 11/_ at ;) :! 8 - .) 0 ;  .IN olso supro text  accomp:umng n o t e  �06.  
') 8 1  I\ ote that . under t h e  rei n terpreted Cu l l  fai t h  and credi t  s ta t u t e ,  such a case does 
n o t  pres e n t  a problem of greater p reclust\T e f l t·ll. Crnnjxne supro text  accompa m i n g  
notes 3-lG-:"JO .  T h e  purpose of t h e  i n q u i n  t s  t o  de term i n e  w h a t  t h e  domest ic  s o l ut ion 
would be,  recogn i z i n g  t h a t  domes t i c  sta t e  prcclmton la11· wi l l  u s u a l l y  b u t  n o t  ah,·a\ s fur­
nish thai  s o l u t i o n .  The s ta t u t e  makes the domestic  \O lut ion thus d i scon-red the n a t i o n a l  
s o l u t i o n .  
3H� -1 2  u . S . C .  §§ 2 0 0 0 e  t o  �OOOc- 1 7  ( J (}8� l .  ! he S u p r e m e  C o u r t  has n o t  rcs ol l'ccl 
th is  ques t i o n . Ste i\!arrcse 1 . . J, mcrican .-'\cadcm1 nf Onhopacdic  Surge o n s ,  I 05 S .  C t .  
1 3 2 7 .  1 3 3 2  ( 1 98 5 ) ;  Krmzn . -L"ili C . S .  a t  -! 7 CJ n � O .  For cr i t ic ism o f  t h e  Court 's  b i lure t o  
resoh e t h e  quest ion i n  kll'/11 1'1', sec 1 1 1)ir1 note -1 5]  : l llcl accompanying t e x t .  
383 On the a s s u m p t i o n  o f  concurrent  junsd iwon. the in-p o th e t ical c a s e  i n  the t ex t  
might  ar ise  i n  I\e11 Ymk.  Cj. Krnnn. 4 5 1i l.' . S .  at 4llVl-l & n . 9  ( B lackm u n ,  J . ,  cb s e n t i ng )  
( sugges t i n g  t hat Courl 11·as gra n t i n g  preclus t\'l' d!en to s t :t t e agencv 's  d e c i s i o n ,  a s  r e ­
qui red b : .  s t a t e  law) . I t  11·oulc! b e  the dome' i i L  analog o f  i n tetj u ri s d i c t i o n a l  cases 
b rough t m fcderai  court . Sre. e g  . .  Buckhal ter 1 .  l'tpst-Cob Gen. B o t t lers ,  I n c . ,  7 6 8  F . '.! d  
8 4 2  ( 7 t h  C i r .  1 98 5 ) :  "J u t e ,  Res fzuilt(l /o Efjecl.l oj S!nii i.�FJIC\ Dcci.I IOI/S 111 Tz tll' I'l l  , l ciirnn. 7 0  
COR:-.i ELL L .  RE\ . G 9 5  ( 1 98 5 ) .  l n  E l l i o t t  1 .  l'nt iCr\ i t l  o f  Tenn . ,  7 6 6  F . 2 d  9 8 �  ( 6 t h Ci r. ) .  
mt. gmn!cd. 5 -t U . S . L.\\' .  3 3 G i'l  ( l' . S .  Dec.  'l . I C)(\ ) ) .  the  court  held  t h a t  a n  u n rcl i cll-cd 
state a d m m i s t ra t il-e proc e e d i n g  11·as n u t  c n t i i led tu prcclu: ; t \C effe c t  in a fed e ra l  a c t i o n  
under t i tl e  \ ' I I  and t h e  ci1 i i  r igh t s  a ct s .  B u t  t h e  �lcl tn i n i s t ra t i iT p roceed i n g  d i d  n o t  a r i s e  
11·i th in the t i t l e  \ ' I I  e n forcement scheme and t lws cltcl not  i !1Yohc a s tate  deferra! agc n n . 
'\ H I  -! 2  L S. C.  § 2000e- 5 ( b )  ( I % :! )  
See kn·1nn. -l .ici L. S .  � t t  -! 7 0  n . 7  ( " S i n cL· t t  t .s , c t t l ccl t h a t  c! c c i s t o ns lw t h e  EEOC cl r '  
not  preclude a t ri a l  r/:> 1/IJi 'i! i n  fed eral C < l l l rl . i t  1 s  cl c:r r t h a t  ur1 !'L'Y ie11·cd acl m i n i \ i r a t i H· 
determiil:l l !ons 11\ s u t c  agenc i c '  a l s o  s ho u l d  l l ( J t  preclude such i'C\·ic11· •.'\'C l i  i f  .s ut h �� 
decis ion liTre to be a fl()nJcd I:J rec i u s i 1 c  ci1cct 1 1 1 ] S t :n c ' s  0 11 1 1  court s . " ) .  ClLmcl ln ' . 
Roudebush . 4 2 5  L ' . S .  8-!0,  S-l-l --15  ( J l) 7 (i )  ( t t t lc  \ I I C ( ) n fcrs r ight  t o  t n a l  clc n mo ) .  
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particular s tate rule i s  found hos ti le  t o  or  inconsistent  with a partic­
ular federal subs tantive policy.  The question remains whether there 
are occasions when s tate law is at  odds ,  not  with specifically identifi­
able federal substantive policies , b u t  with the sum of such p olicies , 
that i s ,  a scheme of federal subs tantive rights as a whole .  This prob­
lem , I believe , concerned Justice M arshall in Haring v. Prosise, :?sG and 
some of the peculiari t ies in his opinion for the Courrc's7 may be at­
tributable to an auempt to address it . Ul timately, the effort to pre­
serve the federal checks that such an analysis affords fel l  before the 
logic of the basic interpretive posi t ion into which the C ourt 
backed. 3c;s Once one recogmzes that the Court 's i nterpretation of 
386 - Hi�  U . S .  306 ( 1 \J i\ 3  l 
38 7 See sujJm n o te 3 5 7 .  
388 Ste ul.  The al i -or-no t h i n g  p o s ture of the fi rst  case i n  t he recent series,  Al len v .  
McCurry , 449 U.S .  90 ( 1 980) . misdi rected a H en t ion from the rela t i onsh ip between fed ­
eral a n d  sta i e  Ia,,· to the  quest ion of preclusion o r  n o  preclusion. T h e  Court purported 
to decide onh that  c[ :? li . S . C. * 1 98 3  did not p revent the appl icat ion of the "conven­
t ion:�!  doctrine o f  co! I ;Heral estoppel , "  1d
. 
a t  95 n . 7 ,  in a case where federal habeas 
corpus was un:w;;i! a b l e .  l nnedibh . t h e  Court an nounced i ts repea l a nalysi s ,  see td. a t  98-
99, witho u t .  or s o  I t  sa i d . fi rst ha1 i n g  d etermined what the ful l  fai th and cre d i t  s t a t u t e  
requ i res .  See id .  < t t  �iel n . :? ,  9 5  n . 7 .  1 05 n . 2 5 ;  S m i t h ,  supra note 3 cl0 ,  at 6 8 .  The Court 's  
repea l anah s i s  c a n  b ': made to appear sensible i f § i 7 3 8  embodies a choice of domestic  
s tate preclusion ],!\, . .  I t  cannot be made even to appear sensible i f, as I m a i n tai n .  t h e  fu l l  
fa i th  a n d  credit  :' L i l. l i t e  chooses n o t  t h e  precl usion l a w  of the ren deri n g  s t a te.  b u t  t h e  
preclusion Ia"· thcll t h e  cou rts  di '  t h e  ren deri n g S l a t e  wou l d applv.  I n  bet .  t h e Court ' s  
repea l <� na i l  s is  nt<1kcs n o  sense on i t s o\\·n terms. a n d  a repeal an ah·s i s based o n  a correct 
i n terpretat!nn uf � 1 7 :\S m i ght i n  �ome cases ,-i c ld the concl u s i o n  that -� 1 7 3R docs not 
applv .  Set u!fi<t te;,:t :·Iccorn pam i n g  n o tes -W0-09. Perhaps reco gn i t io n o f  t h e  first propo­
sition contributed < o  t ht· C o u n · s  subsequent  erroneous i m er p ret a t i on o f  the fu l !  fa ith 
and credit  s ta t u t e .  So·  1\ronn. 4 3 !) L . S .  a :  4 8 1 -8 :!  (quoted supra text accompanving note 
�.\3 ()) . .  \ t  l e a s t  Pn, f t: s s o r  c: urr ic .  t h e  prob ab l e source of the Court ' s  repeal  analysis .  rea­
soned from erTo ncoits  p rem i s e  to cno ncous conciusion and not v ice-versa.  St'l' .wpm 
no t e 3 3 1' .  
I n  this  l i gh t .  H!n i11g n l �I ,. represent  a n  a t t en 1 p t  hv m emb ers o f  t h e  Court w h o  h a d  
los !  the nnjnr b�1 1 t lc to !·cg:n n s o m e  gro u n d  i n a skirm i s h  tha t .  beca u s e  cvcry0ne « greed 
Oil the 1\' l l 1 11 CT ,  might i i n cl ! h e  Other gcn er�J i s  s leepi ng , �lt icast at  the end oC the C<l lll ­
p:t ign.  Sn· 1 8  \\' R I G HT. \ i i LI Y R  & C:ooPE�. supm note 5. 1 98 5  Pocket P<J rt .  at l f-) 1 .  Th u s .  
c1-en aher i t  ,,·as clear that f 'cdcr:d courts could no longer rout inelv  a p p l v  u n i form fed ­
eral precl u s i o n  ru!cs •. o .'i t : l t e  judgmen t s .  cmd when it  should h a v e  been cle: tr,  g iven 
1\rfll!n. t h a t  the Coun ' s  rcpe; t i  :ma h s i s  erected h i e;h barriers to the l l S l' or {/ !/ _\'  fedc rcd 
prec!us :o t <  LJ ,, . f-{rm ng u b s c n  <:s t h: l i  s t a t e p r e c l u s i o n  rules may be d i s placed bv p<1 rt i cu ­
lar ru les  cli·a\': ! l  i ro m  tr:t t : s - s u b s t a n tiH· fcder:1 l preclusion law.  SPP !!anng. 462 U . S .  a t  
3 1  :l - 1 4  n . 7 ;  \Pi' also Sll/m! l l o t (' :'. :) 7 . .-\ Ct c r  \ l igra \' . \\'a rrcn C i t Y  S choo l D i s t .  BeL or E d u c  . .  
-1 65 C . S .  7 :1 ( l �l S·i ) .  t h i s i n s t :nKc o f  t h e  losers p u ll i n g  < J n e  O\Cr o n  i h e  \\· m n er' m u s t  be  
regarded , ts a s p o rt .  But  ·'''I' S m i l l L  wpm note cl 'W . .f!rusim . B u t  i t  d o c s  suggcSI. a d d i t ion<l l  
scope Co r federal p rechis i <Jn ] av; ·.d1Cll the r u l e ;; or h<l l l k  h;Ive changed.  
I n  t l i t s  s c· n r:s , , i · c:J s c s .  : ! H:  Co: I rt  h ; 1 s .  Lur l cn t a hh , confirmed J u s t i c e  J ackson · s  \· ic 1,. 
t h a t  " the ! i:dera l i s ! n  of i l w  b i t h  ;t: <d  ucd i t  c lause depc: lcls gcner·al iY  on p ri 1 2 t c  adYo­
cac: . .  n o r  �_ d \,-�1�-s s u pport ed b �- 1. hc best n.·se�irch and u ndersta n d i n g .  and oft en f-:nds t h e 
pcrceptiu;; of '  t h l'  _ f tb i iCCS l ! i i :; }urpcn::d a nd their pcrspect i1·e u n i n fonl ! Cd l11 ;1 l i \  l' X l C l l ­
;; i;c l:x pn;cnce o r  l l i \T:' t ig �t t i <: I< u !  t h i s  s ub j ect  . . .  . J ackson ,  F1t!l f-'11 1 /h  rnlfl Crl'dli- "i'll" l.it < � '­
Y!'! ·s Chw.•i' of tiu· (,, n., i i iu lwu .  -! 5 C t l t .l' \ t .  L R n·.  ! .  ;} :l - ;\4 ( 1 �J.t :) ) .  
1 
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the full  fai th and credit s tatute i s  wrong, i t  i s  appropriate to address 
the quest ion anevv .  
M odern domest ic preclusion law tends t o  b e  n o t  only trans-sub­
s tantive but also aggressive in i t s  pursuit  of the goals of finality and 
economy.  Major changes in preclus ion doctrine have occurred in  a 
relatively short t ime, and the pace of change wil l  continue with the 
recent publica tion of the Restatemen t ( Second) ofjudgments . 389 I t  seems 
unlikely that  legislatures often think about preclusion law when they 
are enacting schemes of substantive rights .  But  they do legis late 
agains t  a background of judge-made preclusion law. 390 It  seems 
equally unlikely that j ud ges often think about particular schemes of 
substantive rights when they formulate preclus ion law. But the to­
tal ity of such s chemes condit ions their work. I t  i s  probable that 
neither qualificat ion obtains in  an in te1j ur i sd ict ional sett ing. That 
is ,  the federal legislative background  probably does not include 
s tate preclus ion law, and s tate judges probably do  not think about 
federal subs tantive law when they formulate s tate preclus ion rules . 
Reminders of  their duty may suffice to make j udges , bo th fed­
eral and s tate,  alert to the possibil i ty that  a particular trans-subs tan­
tive pre clu s i on rule i s  inconsistent with particular substantive 
Policies .  Unfortunatelv , there i s  another Droblem . Preclus ion rules  ' J 
not only arc animated by and i nteract 'With legal pol ic ies :  they have 
legal effects . The effect of modern preclusion rules is  to cut off 
some subs tJntive rights in circums tances t ha t , had they been think­
ing of preclusion law, the legis lators who created those righ t s ,  could 
not poss ib ly have imagined . 1 ' '  1 Preclusion rules may, in o ther 
·words ,  be inco n s i s tent  v.·i th  t he s u m  o f  pol icies that inform a scheme 
of subs tant ive rights . 
From th is  perspecti ve .  broadly pn:c ius ive trans-subs tantive 
rules are tolerab l e  only to the exten t  rhar  they are sufficiently 
nonformal ,  o r  contain sufficient qual i ficat ions or exceptions ,  t o  p er­
mit the avoidance of preclusion in circums tances where i t  would be 
unjus t . 3' 1 :z But the charac teri s tics that l l l a y  make modern preclusion 
3R'l Stt . 1 //n;, -lA D l. S .  at < i-f-9:) & l L b :  I ii  i\ R lCHT, \l i LLER & CooPER,  sujHo note 5 .  
§ 440C.l . at � i -� :2 .  
:'190 Srr 1 8  WRiGIIT,  ,\ l r LLFP /1.:: CooPER,  s11jJm n c t c  S ,  � 4-Hl 3 .  aL  i 0 ,  Cf Cal i fano v .  
Yamaski ,  .q 2 l_' S {)8 2 .  b9S - 7 0 l ! l �l 7 9 l  ( Federal R u l e:; of C i v i l  Procedure ) ,  
'>9 1 Sfe .-1/!rn. -1:-ll/ l. ,S ;J! �1 7 :  ;r/. : 1 1  l i 4 - l :i (Bbckmun.  J .  d is senting ) _  Th is 1' n o t  1 o 
suggest th(1t  �.s e s h ot.dd .,_ a r �· p rcclu:� ion r u l e �. i 1 :  ;:! ccorcLn:cc \\· i th t h e  prec t u :s 1on I a \">' pre­
vailing a r. the t U1 i C'  o f  a s t a t u t e · .-.; cn:lc t r n c r n . R�tthcr .  (n1 z:. n a l y s i s  of the fl t bct\\·ecn ptH�l­
t ively  appl i cable prec l u s i o n  ru le:,  ;mel a p a n i c u b r  ;;che:nc of :, u b s t zm t i \ c  r ights  sh o u l d 
include a\1':1H' lkSS  of tl w;  u o t c n t i:d d i scon l l l 1U i ll ' ,  
':i\)C? Sfr R ESL\TI·:,t ! : :-> 1' ( SFt:O'>D.I ur J t 'DC�lE':Ts ch. l : I n t roduct J u n l .  at  I ] , 1 3  ( 1 9!-\ '2 ) :  
5eP also Bo gard 1 ,  Cook.  :)8() F , :? d  ;) : J l J .  -±0 7-00 ( :) t h C: i r.  l �) 78 ) ,  uri dnurd. ,[-f-l C . S  �8:1 
( 1 979) (rcfu s m p  t o  prL·d t�dc i n ch ;rhn! cl a s s  meni fJ cr · -:  cl:1 i rn for damCJ g cs \\here n o t ice 
t o  class mcmb;;,, did n o t  :d e n  them t lu t  the'  c o u l d  .' cck damJges in �lass :1 n i o n ) ,  Bo-
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law tolerable i n  the admini s tration of substantive l a w  are the very 
characteristics that bedevil  l i t igants , who desire c lear and certain 
rules in planning l i ti gat ion s trategy . 393 
These considerat ions s uggest  that  a court adminis tering a mod­
ern domestic body of preclus ion  law must  be alert to the loss of 
substantive rights caused b y  the fai lure of that  body of law to pro­
vide fair notice of i ts implicat ions for a particular context or by the 
fai lure of the jurisdict ion's  law as a whole to afford a fair opportu­
ni ty to pursue claims of subs tantive righ t .  Moreover,  b o th concerns 
are more pressing when the preclusion law is n o t  only trans-sub­
stantive, but  trans-sys temic .  
The perception of such problems may or may not  have 
prompted the Court to suggest  federal checks agains t  s tate  preclu­
sion law addi tional to the d u e  process clause and express or implied 
repeal of the ful l  fai th and credit  s tatute . :1'H In any event ,  the pro­
tection of federal substantive rights against  "springes" :1 'F' set  by the 
s tates is a duty long acknowledged by the Suprerne C o urt .  
The principle i s  general a n d  neces sary. . . I f  t h e  C o n s ti tu ti o n  
and laws of t h e  U n i t e d  S t at e s  a r e  to b e  e n forced,  this  C o u rt can ­
n o t  accept as fi nal  t h e  decis ion of the s tate tribunal as to what  are 
the facts a l l eged to give rise t o  the righ t o r  to bar the a s s ertion of 
i t  even on l ocal grounds . . . .  This i s  fam i l iar as  to the s u b s tan­
tive law and for the s ame reasons i t  is  neccs sarv lO see that l o cal 
practice shal l  n o t  b e  allowed to put unreasonable o b s tacles  in the 
wav. :1Db 
When the Court determines that s tate law,  in a d omest ic  case,  
puts "unreasonable obstacles in  the way" of a federal scheme of  
substantive rights , i t  applies federal com.mon lavv. and i t  can  do so in  
accordance with the  requireme ms of the Rules of Dec i s ion  Act .  In  
the case of preclus ion ,  the domest ic  so lut ion therebv determined is  • I 
applicable inte1j urisdict iona l ly  by reason of the ful l  fai th and credit 
gard i s  also Jn exa m p l e  o r  the inf luence o f  procc d t t r:-t l pol in reflected i n  a FedtTJ! R u le  
o f  Civi l Procedure on fcclcT�l l c o m m o n  b\,-. Sn· 1rf .  at  108:  S l lJHn t e x t  <Kcompam in g !l O l c  
1 89 .  
' ' One impl icat ion of ki OIIN i s  tkll prec l u s i o n  m '111  i n t LTs v s t e m  c o n t ext.  •.•. here t h e  
ful l  f a i t h  and cred i t  sta t u t e  a p p l i es .  i s  a l cs,; fk:-.:iblc doctr ine than precl us ion i n  an i n ­
tras;· s t em c o n t ex 1 . "  At\,· o o d .  sujmt n o t e  3 cl l .  a t  t-lfi-87  J L ! :\ ( i .  
:; D 'I See s11pra n o t e  :Z 1 -!  �t n d  acco 1 n p a 1 1 1' ing text :  l S  \f R I C: ! IT ,  \l i LL Y <{ & CooPt:!{.  Sliintt 
n o t e  5 ,  § -JA O / .  a t  -!9 :  :-- !ancsc \· . .  -\m cr ican .-\C\ Llc lll\ o f  O t  thup:t c d i c  Surgc o m .  1 ( ):J  S .  
C t .  1 �� :! 7 .  1 3 3 7  ( 1 985)  (Burg-cr. C.J . C <mcurr! ng ) .  
: I ' J - I  Sre supm t ::xt  accompam i n g  notes 3 :'\ li - H :-i .  
:I < J ,; Da\ i s  ,._ Wech s l er.  :! G el L S .  � � - �-1 ( 1 9:! 3 )  . .\•·�' !.(mtml/r H i l l .  1 11/>m n o t e  cHi O :  
\: euborne ,  Tu<l'ord Pmu'dllml  Poniy  i 1 1  C:o nsti l l l l !nutd L/iit:oi l i>; l . '..' � \<· :.1 .  /1..: \1.\�y L REI . 7 '..' :-'J 
( 1 98 1 ) . 
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s tatute . ·� � )' 
C .  Special  Problems Under the Reinterpreted Full Faith and 
Credi t S tatute 
1 .  . i ctlons Under -12 U. S. C. section 1 983 
I t  i s  a p i ty that the occasion for the Coui't ' s  recent rediscovery 
of the ful l  faith and credit s tatute was a case involvin g  4 2  U . S . C .  
sect ion 1 983 . 3')8 For, even i f  the Court had considered the interpre­
tive approach advanced here, the choice of interpretive approaches 
might not have appeared to make a difference. 
Sect ion 1 98 3  actions present an anomaly. The anomaly resu l ts 
from the existence of a p lausible argument that the s tatute i s  
animated by a pol icy in  favor of a federal forum on the one h an d ,  
a n d  concurrent j urisdiction in s tate courts o n  the other. 3�9 \Vhen a 
federal action involving section 1 98 3  fol lows state proceedings 
claimed to have preclusive effect ,  the rein terpreted ful l  fai th and 
credi t  s tatute requires a federal court to look to the law that the state 
court s  would applv in  a sect ion 1 98 3  action. And in such a state 
court action.  a putative pol icy favoring a federal forum would not be 
pertinen t .  
O n e  anS\\'er t o  this l ine o f  reasoning i s  that the anomaly i s  ap­
parent ra ther  than real .  Once one adopts the correct interpretation 
of the ful l  fa i t h  and credi t  s tatute,  even a repeal analysis sugges ts the 
conclus i o n  that  federal preclusion law governs in a subseq u ent  sec­
t ion l 983 action brought  i n  federal court . 
Reca l l  that  the Coun's  repeal analysis initially focused on the 
quest ion o f  preclusion as  against  n o  preclusion. 1 0 0 Even though re­
peal analvs is  may u l t imately have influenced the Court 's  in terpreta­
tion of Lhc full E1i th and credi t  s tatu te, w 1 the fact that the Court 
regards  the repeal question as relevant only if domestic s tate law 
wo uld preclude�0� i s  a s ignal that it continues to focus on results  to 
the exclusion of the source of law that should determine them.  
t:nder d1e Court's  in terpretation of the ru!l faith and credit  s tat­
ute, repeal au ?.. ivs i :; •;hould focus on the ques t ion whether a subse-
:l�l 7 Fo r  a n  appi ica r w n  o l t h i s  �1r:;t lys is .  s e e  injia text <�ccompam i n g- n o t e s  4 l 0 - � 7 .  
:> � J 1'>  :\l i en '- .  \ ! cC:mn . -t-l�J LS.  l ) ( )  ( 1 9 1\0 ) .  F u r  other regrettable aspects o C  t he c;1 s c .  
s e c  .'11/HO n o t e  :.l i'l <� .  
:i:J';  Fo:· rep rest· n t a l!'. ·c ;·Irg; u n e n t s  concerning t h e  pol ic1 m L11·or of a federal Cor u m .  
s e r.· . l f/1'11. ·H 9  l· . s .  <J l  I ! () ! B b ckrn; :n  . .J . .  d issen t i n g ) .  F o r  t h e  concurrent  J U ri sd ic t ion o f  
the '; l a t e  co u rt :; .  :; ('c \Ltn i n ('f  1 .  C ; d i l ( ll-:1 i< J .  -t -l ·± L S .  '2 7 7 .  283  n . 'i'  ( ! 98 0 ) . 
-lOo See . i !it 1 1 .  -1 -El l · . s .  di � )8-CJ < ) :  supm notes cl :S tl & :188 .  In th is  the C o u rt f o i l uhcci 
Prokssnr Currie .  Sn· Cmric .  ' 11/'1!1 l i ( ) t c  3 3 ! . ;u �1 28-:!9 :  supm notes : n s  & 3 8 ::1 .  
-! O  i Str suj;l(i ! ! O I L' 3 � H .  
-> 0 '2  Sti' \ Li !TC:<c 1 .  :" l l i cTic < In  .-\e<Ic!cnl\ , ; [ ' Onhopaecl i c  Surgeo n s ,  1 0:1 S .  C t .  l :l :l i' .  
i 3�\S ( l �) <-\ :1 ) :  u ,ji .'1 r e x \  < ICC<,mp�"r i n g  note -t : \G .  
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quently enacted s tatute or i ts  legislative his tory p rovides " clear and 
manifest" evidence-to:> o f  Congress ' s  intent that prec lus ion quest ions 
in l i ti gation arising thereunder be determined by (uniform) federal 
rather than s tate law . After all ,  s tate law may not preclude .  Thu s ,  
the question the Court should a s k  in a case like A llen v .  AfcCun�v --to-1 is  
whether the language and legislative his tory of the 1 8 7 1  act  c learly 
vvarrant the conclusion that Congress intended prec lusion questions 
aris ing in l i t igation under that statute to  be determined by (uniform) 
federal rather than state la\v .  
O f  course,  that too would be the wrong question ,  because Con­
gress  did not  choose state preclus ion law in 1 790 ,  and there was no 
reason for Congress to bel ieve that i t  had in 1 8 7 1 ,  when the prede­
cessor  of section 1 98 3  was enacted .40" As to the choice Congress 
did make in 1 790,  reexamination of the 1 87 1  legi slat ion and its  h is ­
tory may yield a different answer to the question o f  i mplied repeal .  
The so l icitude of the 1 87 1  Congress for the avai l abil i ty of a fed­
eral forum has led to holdings that  section 1 98 3  expressly autho­
rizes an inj u nction within the meaning of the Anti-Inj unction Act406 
and that the normal rule regarding exhaustion of adminis trative 
remedies does not apply i n  sect ion 1 98 3  actions Y17 In l ight of that 
solici tude,  when a plain tiff has exercised a preference for a federal 
forum to pursue a claim under section 1 98 3 ,  i s  t here not something 
odd in pretending that he did not exercise that preference ? Yet that 
i s  exact ly what the reinterpreted full  fai th and credit  statute re­
quires . From this perspective-vvhen the right question is asked­
the two statu tes reasonably may be deemed " i n  irreconcilable 
confl ict .  "40t-l 
To find that sect ion 1 983 partially repeals the full faith and 
credit  statute should not lead auwmaticailv to the conc i u s ion that ; 
uniform federal la>v governs ,  let a lone tha t fed eral sect ion 1 98 3  ac­
t ion� are immune to p reclus ion .  But  the reasons fr.)r finding a repeal 
s trongly suggest tha t  uniform federal law gove rn s .  In an y event ,  
when freed o f  the supposed man date of the Cull fa ith and credit  s tat-
- -- --------
-1 O:l Pr;sadas v .  :-.J a t i u n a l  C i t  1 B a n k .  2 �)(j l' . S .  -l 9 7 .  :)03 ( l  \J:Hi ; .  qur > lr•d ; u  R,J dz;l llOI\·er 1 .  
Touche Ross & Co . .  4 2 () l. '  . S .  l -I e) .  l :"i -1 ( 1 9 "/()) . SeP also ,r,·IFIIII'i. -� 5 fi \..' .S a t  -l b 8  ( q uut ing 
from Rari:n IIOil'er) . 
· Hl4 -l49 U . S .  90 ( l 9BO) 
w :, See sujJm text acrompJ n l i n g  n o i c s  3 �\3--1 4 .  Tlw text ;! s s u n J c s  ; h ; r t  t h e  l K 7 1  Cnn-
grcs:; '.·, as  a ware CJ C � 1 7 3 K .  But vr· n o t e  ·l l l . 
-t OG See iVl i tchum , .. Fos t e r .  -H) 7 L' . S .  22 .� .  2-1 2- 1 :\ ( 1 (1 7 2 ) .  il;e .1, nt . i - In junct i c.n .\c t  i s  
codd�cd a t  2 8  l_I. S . C .  s 2 2 8 '\ ( I  ( )K'! ) .  
-! 0 7  See Patsy \' .  Bo �n-d of  Rege n t s .  ·Li 7  L' . S .  · l0(i.  :J0�? - 0 7  ( l � l ,'l 2 l :  S m i t h ,  .wjn a n o t e  
;)::\0,  a i  l 0-t.  
--I OH Posadas \' . Nat ional  C _� i L ,. HJ n k .  :2 0 () L .S . ..t 9 7 .  _;)():) ( 1 q ;) () ) . n; R�-tCL'. : tnO\,·c r  Y .  
Touc!> ,� Ross &: C c  . . -1 2 (1 L .S .  l -t S .  l S·.J I 1 9 7() )  Si't' of.,o A."ir"'�'� -Fl (i l. · . s .  a r  -1 \i\"l f q u o t i : 1 g  
fron1 Rad:anott'tr) . 
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ute ,  the Court has demonstrated i ts vvi l l ingness and abi l i ty to  apply 
federal preclusion law that Js sensi t ive to the peculiar subs tantive 
context of  sect ion 1 983 .409 
There are other routes to the conclusion that, even in sect ion 
1 983 actions ,  a court 's  interpretive approach to the ful l  fai th and 
credit  s tatute may make a difference .  The S upreme Court ' s  repeal 
analysis  requires clear evi dence of  congressional  intent on a specific 
is sue that Congress  rarely addresses . -1 1 0 Apart from the fact that the 
basic premise of the Court 's  repeal analysis i s  w-rong, the analysis 
imposes entirely too much on unsuspecting C ongresses ,  that i s ,  o n  
all Congresses legislating before 1 980 .4 1 1 This i s  hardly the heyday 
of federal common law, even in i ts  tradi tional manifes tat ions .4 1 2 
But ,  on the assumption that the reinterpreted ful l  faith and credit 
statute applies , federal common law analys i s ,  whether of  the tradi­
tional type or under the Rules of  Decision Act ,  holds greater p o ten­
tial  to protect federal substantive rights than does the Court's repeal 
analys i s . -1 1 �·1 
409 See McDonald v .  Citv of v,:est Branch . 466 U . S .  284 ( 1 98-l ) : supra note  3 5 8 .  The 
Court did n o t consider t h e  pos s ib i l i t v  that stare p reclusion l cm n11 g h t  app1v  excep t when 
hos t i le to o r  i nconsi s t e n t  with fed eral i n teres t s .  
I f  t h i s  an alvs i s were accep ted , i t  m i g h t  l ead w d ifferen t precl u :; ion rules b e i n g  ap­
pl ied i n  s ! 9W)  act ions brought i n  federal ;md state cour t s .  For. t h e  preclusion !a,,· ap­
p l ied in !'cdcral act ions II'Ou ld be unifonnh fed e ra l ]a ,,._ \1·h i lc  that  appl ied in state 
act ions 11·ou l d be s t a t e  b11· .  except as d i s p l a c e d  b 1  fcdet·al law in respons e t o  the req u i re­
ments of � 1 98 3 .  Ste 111Fr1 text <Jccompanving n o t es 4 1 0- 2 7 .  Suc h a resul t .  l,·hateH:r 
" embarrassmen t s "  it m i gh t  enta i l .  .If/' 1 8 v\' R I G H T .  '\ [ I LLER .".-: CooPER . . 1 11/J I'(/ I I O !.e  0. 1 91:-i:i 
Pocket Pan. :l l l G3 .  "·ou l cl be a fu n ct ion of t he b;1 s i c  emban ;lssrnerH o f  :1  s t a t u t e  
an ima ted lw a s t rong preCcrencc fo r a f'cd nal forum b u t  o n e  n o t  s o  s t rong ; o s  t o  haH· 
prompted a gr:J iH of exclus i \ e  f'cclcral _ jurisdict i o n .  
Ano t h e r  possibl e  ;ms"·er t o  t h e  a n o m :1h· p o s l l ec! i n  th..: t e x c  but  o n e  t h a t  I do n o t  
pursue.  i s  t h a t  t h e  source o f  the precl us ion rules go , ern in g i n  a n  :1c t i o n  u n der � I �18 3  i s  
directed b 1  4 :!  (.i . S  C � l qs.s ( 1 98 2 ) .  On � 1 98 -S .  s e e  general!  1 Kreimer. Th,, Sowr1' of 
Laz<' 1 11 Ci;ti/ R1ghls . lrilons · . rioml' Old L1ght 011 S{'(tfOIJ 1 988. 1 '3 3 L. P.\.  L. R H .  fiO l ( 1 98 5 ) . 
See supra note 3 5 7 :  lnjia n o t e  4 2 7 .  
4 1 0  Sa .lllen. 449 L: . S .  at  %- 1 05 :  A:rnnn . 4 5 G  U . S .  a t  4 6 8 - 7 8 .  
"1 1 1  SP<' 1 8  W R t G I !T. \ [ I LLER & CooPER,  SlljJm n o t e  5 .  1 985 Pocket Part.  a t  I tA .  I t  has 
already been obs erved that  the C o ngress that passed the predecessor or s 1 98 3  ��·ol.dcl 
have found rad i c a l h  d i ffcre rn prcc l us 1o n ru les .  had  it Zlcldressed the I s sue ,  t h<J n arc ap­
pl ied todaY. Sri' .<upra text  accompam ing note 3D 1 .  I n  a d d i t i o n .  a cenain r ro n v  res u l ts 1 1 1  
holding any Con gress to a n  all'a reness of t he fu l l  bith and cred i t  s tatute .  SN' :\ th·uod . 
supra no te  c\3 1 .  at 83 n . l l 9 . But srt Cunic. s: LjJI!I n o t e  3 �\ l .  at :l 2 �l . .-\t \ a rious t i mes in i t s  
h i s torv. t h e  Court ,,·oulcl i t s e l f  h a\T fiunkcd L lut r es t .  Srr sujm! t ext  accornpan, i n g  n o t e;.; 
:13 3-35 . 
4 1 '2 See supm text  accom p:m ; i n g  n o t e  1 O S .  
4 1 :1 The clirfereilce can be .s een as bet iH ..'en " n o rm a l  p r i n c r p ! cs o f  s ! :J < u tor\ i n te rp re-
tat ion· ·  a n d  " t h e  nwlT d i ffi cu l t t e � a  of d e mo n s t r:t t i n g  an i m p ! iccl  ! ·cpe;; l . "  f."rrmn. -! :)() 
U . S .  a t  -!7 I n . S .  Perh;q)s more t l s cfu!h· .  it <:<I l l  be s e e n  �1:.; the cl i ffncnce b c t \1·ce n  "askin g 
lvhat colla teral or suhsidiarv rules [of  precl u s i u n j :m·_· i l c c e s s �l i  . . , to c rkn u;\l. c or to a\·oicl 
frus trat ing the  spcci !] c· m t c n t i o n s  of [C� o ng n:s .s J . " \inri i l .  S!I/HO n o t e  9:.! . �l l :J C .  and re­
quiring ey;cJencc of speci l ic  i n t en t  as to precl u s i o n  m a t t er s .  
For anOLhcr cx;:unplc of '  t h e  d i fference t h ;r t federa l  c o m m o n  i;t·,·; �l t � < :h· s i s  G!ll m a k e .  
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I n  s ect ion 1 983  actions fil e d  i n  state court s ,  the S up reme C ourt 
has the p ower and duty to ens ure that the appl icat ion o f  d o m est ic  
s ta[e law does not  nul l ify federal subs tantive righ t s .  The d o m e s tic  
:wlution thereby determined i s  b inding interj urisdict i onall y .  The 
c:oncern , agai n ,  i s  to p revent the loss  of federal rights through appli­
cat ion of state preclu s i o n  law that does n o t  give fai r  n o t i c e  of i ts  
implications for the p articular context or throu gh a p plicat ion o f  
state l a w  t h a t ,  viewed as  a w h o l e ,  fai l s  to afford a fair  o p p o rtunity to 
pursue federal subs tantive c la ims.  For these purp o s e s ,  the n o ti o n  o f  
fairness should n o t  be confined to " the l e a s t  p o s s i b l e  g o o d "  one c a n  
s a y  a b o u t  s tate law.4 1 ·1 T h e  d u e  process clause i s  n o t  the only p erti­
nent rep ository of fed e ral ri ghts . -1 1 5  And just as fed eral  p recl u s i o n  
l a w  c a n  serve as  an init ial  check for s tate j u d ges alert to t h e i r  d u ty to 
safeguard particular federal substantive policies, s o  may i t  s erve as  a 
reference when the concern i s  the effect o f  s tate law,  inclu d i n g  s ta t e  
preclusion l a w ,  on federal subs tantive righ ts . A l t h o u gh typically 
trans-subs tantive,4 I t; federal preclusion law i s  a t  leas t fashioned by 
j ud ges a gai n s t  the b ackgrou n d  of the substantive law w i th which it 
interac ts . When the appl icat ion of s tate law, which i s  not so fash­
i oned,  would preclu d e  fed eral subs tantive righ t s  n o t  precl uded 
under federal law, further i nquiry is  warranted . 
In a case l ike .-l llen v . .\IcCurn, ·1 1 7 i t  i s  not  e n o u gh that the pro­
· ·eec.\ i n g  claimed to have preclus ive effect met the requirements o f  
due proce s s .  O n e  s h o u l d  also ask whether, i f  s t a t e  l aw w o u l d  accord 
the  proceeding precl u sive effect ,  [hat result would b e  consis tent 
; c ;: Llliml  1 .  L n i 1 cr s i t 1  o f  Tenn . . 766 F . :? cl 982.  �lf\9-9-1 (6th C i r . ) ,  m i. Y, lllll icd. :'J -i 
l.. S . L. \\· . c\ 368 ( L S .  Dec. 3 .  ! 98 5 )  . . -\ ! t ho ugh E//io/1 is an i n t ctj u ri s d i c t i o n a l  case . t h e  
.' < > t trt h e l d  t h e  h i l l  fai t h  and ncdit  s t a l l l t e  i n a p iJ l i ca b l e  beca u s e.:· t h e  c a s e  i n, ·oll' \:cl t h e  
: t n rn i e\\ cd IJro ccccl ings o f  a s l :l l c  a cl m i n i s t ra t i i'C bod\' .  Sre /(/. a t  �)90 .  T h e  c o u n  t h ere­
l(>n· !'e l l  free lO fas h ict�  f'cdera l  COll l 111011 la11· and did S O  under the i n f l uen ce o f  t l ! c  p o l i ­
:: in fo u nd t o  i n form � 1 98 3 .  Compare S lljHa text  accomiJ�tm· i n g  n o t e  -I O�l . 
Fnr o t h e r  c r i t i c i s m  of the Court ' s  repeal a n a l y s t s ,  recogn i z i n g  the correct i n terpt·cta ­
i ! Un o i' t h e  ful l  fai t h  and cred i t s t a t u t e .  see Luneb u rg , .\1/jJm n o t e  3 3 :! .  ::n - .  
-1 I ·-+ . . fo S<J\' that  < I  b11· docs I I O l  1·io l a te the due process cla use, i s  l O  S < i \  l h e  least  
J >u s s : b l e  guocl a b o u t  i t . "  C he a t h a m .  Conjlicl of l.O<l'S ' Sollie DrTrlojJIIIfl!ls and Snll/1' QIII'S/ 1 1! 11.1 . 
' : :'i . \ i< t; .  L. R E\·. 9 .  25 ( l 9 7 1 ) . Stl' B u rb a n k .  Sonrllolls. supm n o t e  8 7 ,  a l  l O lO .  
-i 1 '  E1- c n  ,,·hen t h e  i n q u i n· i s  p u rely  c n n s t i tut ion a l .  Professor L u n eburg m <tkes  a pcr-
' U :1S I I  c argument t h a t  the adcquac1· o l t h e  IJroced u res aff(>rdecl i n  the Erst  proceedin g 
·: .i w u l d  be a s s e s s e d  ll'i t h  reference t o  ,,· h a t  i s  at s t ake in t h e  s u b s e q u e n t  procee d i n gs ( i n  
., h i c l t  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  p re c l u s i o n  : t r i s e s )  . . \re Ltmeb urg.  supm n o t e  3 �l 2 .  a t -. H e ���,;,_, 
<ccr:gntzes �1 roic l'o r  fec!er�d common Ia ,,· checks on s t a l e  prec l u s i o n  i a 11· in d t > i l l cs i H  
.; t : t tc  l i t iE; a t i o n .  Sr•P ;r/. a l  - .  
·! I < ;  81 ! /  _,rr. !'. ,<;. . .  \ l cDonaid 1 .  C : i t 1  o f \\'e .s t  B ra n c h . --Hi6 l ' . S .  :!84 ( 1 98-l ) :  .' l lfml n o t e  
. i :) K .  Sre o i.1 o D e a n  \\' i t t e r  Remol d s .  I n c .  ., . lhr d .  1 0 :) S .  C t .  1 :! ;) 8 .  1 2-1 -1 ( l l)8 :i i  1 " 1 1 \ n  
< ra n ! l i l g pr�cl u s t • m  ru l es i n  t h i s  cunte:-: t .  r :ouns s h a l l t :tkc 1 1 1 t o  accouni  t h e  fcdcral  i n icr­
· ;; t -;  1-, a rr�m t i n g  protcc l i ( Jn . " ) .  
· f 1 7  -t-El l : . s  ()() ( 1 �)�0) . . -\ga i n .  t he a n a l 1 s i s  �1 S S t i mcs d 1 a t  i k'  fu l l  Lt 1 1 h  ;md n c· d t t  
:-. u l  u t e  a p p l i e s  l <i i t d  t l u t  l l  i .s b e i n g  c o rrect  ! I  i n J e rp r e t c d )  
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wi t h  the scheme o f  substantive rig·hts establ ished by sect ion 1 98 3 .  
More specifically,  under the reinterpreted ful l  fai t h  and credit  s ta t ­
ute , i t  i s  n o t  enough t o  conclude that a state court ' s  pro ceed i n g  o n  a 
m o tion t o  s uppress evidence met constitut ional  minima given vvh a t  
w a s  i nvolved i n  t h a t  proceeding. 1 1 c> Rather,  w h e n  s ta t e  law would 
require p reclusion i n  a subsequent sect ion 1 983 action i n  s ta te 
court ,  o n e  should determine whether, viewed as a whole,  s ta t e  l a w  i s  
adequate t o  t h e  recogni t ion and enforcement o f  t h e  s u b s tant ive 
rig h t s  conferred by the federal s tatute . 1 1 � 1 
Under federal preclus ion la\1·, " [r]edetermination o f  i s sues i s  
warranted i f  there i s  reason to doub t the qual itv ,  extensivene s s ,  o r  
fai rn e s s  o f  procedu res fol lovved in prior l i tigation . "-120 In determin­
i n g  the preclusive effect o f  findings made a fter a p retria l  s u p p res­
s ion hearing in s ta te  court ,  the use of this  rule s hould p r o m p t a 
n u m b er o f  inquiries : to what  extent is discov ery available to the de­
fen cl an t ? ; -t :Z I t o  what  extent do the rules of evidence appl v ? ; + :z :z who 
has  the b urden of persuasion and what is t h e  s tandard ? ;-1 2 '1 and who 
presides a t  the p ro ceeding,  and if that pers on is  not  a j udge,  what  is  
the n a ture of review by a j udicial officer ? t :z -t 
Can i t  be t h a t  such inquiries are irrelev<m t  in s tate  court l i ti ga ­
t ion concerning federal subs tantive rights ,  and hence ( if  t h e  ful l  
fai th a n d  credi t s t a t u t e  app l ies )  in fed eral l i ti ga ti o n ? G r a n t e d  L h <t t  
the C o n gress t h a t  p a s s e d  the  predecessor o f  s e c t i o n  1 983  c o u l d  n o t  
have con templated the p ro cedural opportuni t ies ;:n-ail::1 ble tocl<r. i n  
-I I ·'-' Pro fes sor ! .u ncburg \\·uu l d ha 1c t h e  co m t i t u t i o n a l i n q t t l l\ c o n s i d e r  t h e  s t ; t kc-s i n  
t h e  s ub .s c q ucn t p roceed i n g .  See supm n o t e � l :i .  
. . 
-1 1 ' 1 Sn . l l!tu. -t-El L . S .  �H l l :l - ] ( j  : Blackrntm . J .  cl i sscn t r ng)  
.\:i an o th er c:-;a m p l c ,  comider \lcDnnald 1 .  C : i t l  of \\ "est  B ra n c h .  -t liti l · . s .  '.!S �  
I !  �Jt)-1 1 .  The C :u u rt ' s  rctso ns {or  r d u s i n g  prccl u:; l ll' e frect  to a n  u n d p p e< t l cci arhi t L t t i o r l  
J l-. a r<i  i n a federal � l 9in :v t i o i l  Me c q u;t l h  �tp pl irablc i n  a s ta te � l < J .'-U  : t ct i < l n .  Sn· ul. � � �  
'2 8 8-9 :2 . .  \ccord i n gh . a St �l l t' r u l e  gi l n g  prcci l l S I I C c{ J cct to such � ll1  ;n,·�Hd .s h o u l d  nc!d 
t o  fedcLtl common l a 1'-· i n  s t a t e  c • J u rt . 
-! :ZO \ l o n t �llLl 1 .  L'm t ccl S Ll l c s .  -t -t ( !  LS l -l 7 ,  ]() .} n . l l  t l �1 7 D i  . .\1'1 R t· s :  \ l " l- '1 ! :\ !  
( S u: o ?\ D )  o F ] L ' DGI, IE:\TS � '20 ( �\ )  ( l 9 W: ' ) .  I n  a case l i k c . i //m. 1-. h rch ap pct r,; t u  l ! l l o h c 
J l o n m u tu<t l i s s u e  p recl u s i o n .  •rr -t i < )  l ' . S .  at 1 1 -t II\Ll c k m u n  . . J . ,  d i s s en t m g ! .  < > i h cr cvc p ­
t i o n s  i n  federal  pre c l u s ion la11· a r c  reJc,·an l .  l'a rk la n c I l osien C o .  1 .  S h ore . -± :) < )  L· . s .  
:1 '2 '2 .  :l 3 l  ( i � ) 7 9 )  lojjmw•p n t l l l l l! l l t l l :t l  es t o ppe l n u l  h e  u d :-� i r  11· h er c  second �l c t i o l l  �dlonb 
" " procedural  op port un i t i es u n �t \ �J i la b l c  ! l 1  the  first  actiun t h a t  co u ld rc1 d i h  < <l l ts c  :1 c l i f ic r ­
e n t  n·s u l t " " ) .  T h e  C o u rt i n  l'rnNru;,• C i n h r� icccl thc Rn!alnntnr ! Sl'!mul ; ofjudi!_ lllfl l /. 1 .  • er 1(/ 
:u :lcl0 - 3 1 & n .  ! (j _  11· h i c h  prundcs a n  cxct·puon : o  i ssue prcclmion i n sub;;cq u e n t  i ! l i g a ­
t r o n  11 i t h  u t h er s  •sh e n  " " l t ! he  fu1·u m i n  t h e  St' co n d  : 1ct i u n  atlords t h e  p�trl l aga i n s t \• h r • : t t  
p rcc l n s i o n  1 s  : � �; -, ._-rtccl proced u ra l  u p J l ' > r t u n i t l e s  I l l  t h e  p rese n t a t i o n  �mel d c tcrrn i n �l l i n n  " l  
t. h e  i s s u e  t. ha t  11·cr-c not a 1  a ibblc 1 1 1  c h c  fi r<t �l ct 1 o n  a n d  co u l d l ikeh·  res u l t  1 11 the � ' ' ·'·'· C 
be ing di lfcrcn t h  dr:t t:mJ i n c d . "  lh sT.\TDi r \T I S fCCl\D) OF j l"IJC\IF.:\TS § '2 � 1 ( 2 \  1 I � l ;', :: ) 
L ? l Stl' '2 \\' . L1 F.\IT /(.: J I s R \ E L .  C R I \I I \ \ 1 .  PROC:ED uu: � 1 9 . 3  ( 1 1 ) :'1 -t )  [ h erc ; J , ;d ; ,_. ,  
c i t e d  a s  L1F.1 \ F & h K \E I . ] :  I 1 d .  0 l 0 . :1 ( c )  
-! C! C! Set I 11/. § 1 0  5 1 d ) .  L n i t e d  S tates  1 \ b t lock . l l 5  L S .  l (i-t ( 1 9 7-1 ) 
·< 2 :\ See 1 \\ .  L\l-'_\\E & J  I s R.\EL 1'1/Jm nut c -1'2 ! .  � ! IJ . cl .  
l :! -t  s·!'l, t d .  � ! O . G: L n r lcc l  S t z; t cs \ . Raddatz .  � -ti l" S .  ( i ( i/ i i < J i'\0 ) .  
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civil actions i n  federal or  state court ,  i t  also did n o t  contemplate 
modern preclusion law.c}:.>s  Assuming answers to some o f  the inquir­
ies suggested above, what sort of a federal substantive right is  it that 
can be lost  as a result o f  a state court proceeding in which ( 1 )  the 
person subsequently claiming the right is  an unwil l ing p articipant ,  
( 2 )  discovery i s  not available t o  that person , ( 3 )  the rules o f  evidence 
do not  apply,  and (4) someone who i s  not  a judge, and p erhaps n o t  
even a lawyer, hears t h e  test imony?c}:.> li I t  may b e  t h a t  when the 
ques tion i s  the admissibi l i ty of evidence in a s tate criminal tria l ,  such 
a regime passes constitutional muster .  But  there is  no  reason to ac­
cept that  regime, implemented by s tate preclusion law,  as providing 
the final domestic word on substantive rights conferred by  a federal 
s tatute . 4:.>7  The full  fai th and credit s tatute does not speak to the 
problem. If i t  applies , it merely makes the domest ic  so lution the 
national solut ion.  
2.  Claims l!'ithin £."\elusive Federal Jurisdiction 
Those who hoped that claims within exclusive federal j urisdic­
tion would be insulated from the rediscovered full fai th and credit 
s tatute received a dire warning in Kremer v. Chemical Construction 
C01p. -1:zs In  that case ,  the Court found that t i t le VII  does not  ex-
Set 1 11j1 1 11 text  accompanving n o t es cl 9 1  & -! I I . 
See Parkh n e  H o s ierv C o .  v. S hore.  -!39 U . S .  �l :2 :2 .  :l 3 l  &: n . l S  ( 1 97 �)) ; .i !!m, H9 
LS. a t  l i S (R l ack m un . J. . d i s s e n t i n g) . Cf S ta nde f er \· . L'n i ted S ta tes .  447 U.S.  l 0 .  2 1 -2 5  
( 1 980)  ( ;w n n iu tu a l I ssue p reclus ion does n o t  ap p l v a ga i n s t gov e r n m e n t  i n  cr iminal  
case) . 
-1 :.>7 S'ee Luneburg. supm n o t e  3 3 2 ,  a t  -. Cf. \!cDonald \ .  C i t \  of W e s t  Branch.  466 
u.S .  :2 8 4 .  292 n . ! :.? ( ! 984)  (accord i n g  precl u s l \ e effect t o  �l rb i tra ti on zm·ard w o u l d  
" gravel\ undenm n e  t h e  effectiveness o f � 1 �)83 " ) ;  \l crr i l l .  1 11jJm n o t e  9 2 ,  a t  5 3  ( " Bv i g­
nori n g t h e  pos s i b i l i t v  of p ree m p t iYe l awmak i n g  a l t oge ther i n  the s ra tu t O I \. a rea. the 
Co urt  has o n:rlooked t h e  fac t  that  relega t i n g  a pla int irl to ex i s t in g s t a t e  a n d  federa l 
remedies could in some cases render federal  r ights  a · m er e  form oh,·ords .  · " ) . Co mpare 
the C o u rt ' s  anah s i s .  under -±2 C. S . C. § 1 98 8  ( 1 9 82 ) , m rej �·ct i n g  a shon s ta t u t e  o fl i m i t �l­
t iO!l .'> for : I  cl�um brought u n d er 4 2  U.S .C .  � 1 98 1 :  
S i m tlarh , the state p e t i t i o ners arg u e  that  t h e  s hort l i m i t a t i on s  period 
. should be a p p l ied here becaus e i t  a ffo rds public  o l Ecers "some rea­
s o n a b l e  pru tect ion fro m  the s eern i n gl v  endle:;s s t re<tm of u n fo u n d e d .  a n d 
oft en s ta l e ,  Lm·sui ts  brought  aga i n s t  them . " . The s t a t e m e n t  s u gges t :; 
that the l eg i s la t ive choice o f  a iTStrict ive s ix-ll1 0 l l l h  l imita t i o n s  period re­
flects i n  pa n a j udgm en t t h a t  fa c t ors such J s  m i ni m i z m g the el i\ ers ion of 
s t a te o fficial s '  �l t t c n t i o n  fl·om t h e ir d u t ies  o u l \,·eigh the in t eres t in p roYid­
ing emp lo\ees rea<h a c c e s s  t o  a forum t o  resoh·c \ �d id c l a i m s .  That  poi­
in I S  man i f es t !\  i n c o n s i s t e n t  \,· i t h  the cen tr<Il obj ec t i Ye o f  the 
Recons truct ion -era ci\ i l  r igh t :s  s t a t u t e s .  ,,·h i ch i s  to C i b u r c  that i n d i vi d u als  
w h ose !Cderai C o n s t l l u t i o n a l  o r  s t a tu to rY r ights  <HT abri dged ma\· renwer 
cLH1l<iges  o r  s ecure i n j uncti\e rel ief. 
B ur n C' L l  \ .  Gr<l l t an .  l Oci :� . C: t .  2 9 2 4 , 2 9 3 2  ( 1 9 8 4 )  ( q u o t i n g  p e t i t i o n e r ' s  bncf) . 
For t he p o s s i b i l ! i \  t h a t  � J l)H8  is more t h <m analogica l !\  pert i n en t in t h i s  c o n t ex t .  
:' C C  ' ufml note ..f O D .  
- I:.>H 4 5 ii L. S .  -l li l ( l 9W 2 ) .  Str 1 8  \\'F. I CHT. l\l ! ! .LE l< & C o o n: F. ,  .1 11/JIIi n o t e  :'> .  l <) H S  
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press ly o r  i m p l iedly  repeal  t h e  ful l  faith a n d  credit s ta t u t e  without  
determining whether t i t le  VII  confers exclusive j urisdict ion on the 
federal courts . ·1:2'l Moreover,  the Court h e l d  that antecedent New 
York p roceedings p recluded M r .  Krem e r ' s  t i t le  VII action without 
determining whether the preclusion was o f  a claim or a n  i s s u e .-uo  
The o ther shoe dropped las t term i n  ;\1anese v. American Academy 
of Orthopaedic Swgeons .. 1:-.' At issue was the freedom of plaint iffs i n  
fed eral court to l i ti gate fed eral antitrus t  claims w h e n  those same l i t i ­
gants had been unsuccessful  i n  s tate c o u r t  l i ti gat ion,  involving s tate  
law claims , agains t  the same defendants . In ivfarrese, there was n o  
question as to t h e  exclusivity o f  federal  j urisdiction o v e r  t h e  claims 
sought  to be raised in federal court :L1� Nor was there any q u e s tion 
that , i f  p reclusion appl ied,  i t  would b e  c la im preclu s i o n . 4 3 3  
I f  the ful l  fai t h  and credit statute requires a fed eral  court to a p ­
ply  the law of the rendering s tate in d etermining the p r e c l u s i v e  ef­
fect  of a s tate court j ud gment on a claim within exclusive fed eral  
j urisdictio n ,  that  court confronts a conundru m :  where wil l  i t  find 
s tate law ? Percep tion o f  this difficu l ty l e d  J ud ge Posner,  s peakin g 
for a p l ural i ty o f  the court of appeals in A/muse, to concl u d e  that  the 
ful l  faith and credit  statute did not applv .4'H I n  his  opinion concu r­
ring in reversal ,  the Chief Justice reco gnized the problem,  b u t  he 
dispensed wi th the s tatute only after satis fy ing himself  that  s tate law 
was indetermina t e . 4 %  
T h e  C o ur t ,  however, ;vas undeterre d .  Never mind that  there 
cou l d  be no s tate l aw on the preci se quest ion.  That p o s s i b i l i ty h a d  
not given the c o u r t  pause i n  Kremer. On remand,  the fed eral court 
could p robably figure out what Il l inois law wouid b e  on the q u es tion 
bv looking a t  cases  resolving analogous p ro bl ems . Only if the l mver 
court det ermined that the la·.v thus d i scovered -vvould preclude the 
federal antitrust claim \vo ul cl i t  n eed to inquire whether the fed eral 
statute contains an express or i mplied p a rtial  repeal o f  the ful l  faith 
Pocket  Far t .  at  1 5 1 -52 .  I t  i s  important to note again that the  analvsis  in the text  c o n ­
c e rn s  the source of p rr:-clu s i o n  law, fede;·::�J or s ta t e .  a n d  not the  content  o f  the iaw th:H 
may be appl ic :1blc .  The dis t inct ion i s often O\·erlooked . Rut .ser. r.g . .  :\ t h o o d .  sujJm n o t e  
3 3 1 ,  at I 04-0G;  NillC, Tht C!oi!ll htclusn·e Lf!nt of State Court jw/gJIII'! I ts 0 1 1  Frdnai . i ulltmst 
Clai111.> i\brrese \ . .-\meri cm Acadcmv of Onhop<!edic Surgeons, 7 1  JO\L\ L. R E\ . iiO�l. 
6 1 5  ( 1 986) . 
4�D 4 5 6  U . S .  at 479 n . 20 :  sri' also injio note 4 5 5 .  
-no Ser -+56 U . S .  a t  ·!8 i n . 2 '2 .  
4 3 1 1 05 S. Ct . 1 32 7  ( 1 9Rb ) .  
-+3 :2  S a  :r!. a t  1 3 3 1 .  
4 �\ �l Sre 1d. �1l I :3 3 3 .  
4 :\-l \ l<lrrcsc 1 . . -\meri C:.!ll Acadcn11 of O rt hopaedic S urgcum. 7 2 fi F . 2 d  I I :'JO.  l i ;)-\ 
( 7 th C i r .  i 9Sc} )  (en bane) . rtl ' d.  ! 0:1 S .  C t .  1 3 2 7  ( 1 985) . For t h e  Court 's  mtsrcpre;cnta­
t i o n  o f .J u d gc Posner" s opin i o n .  sec Burbank .  Sl l/!1 11 n o r e  9 2 ,  a t  f)l) ;) n . 3-t .  
4 :-'> "> See .\ frmrse. l O S S .  C t .  at l 3 3 :J - 3 7  ( B urger, C J .  c o ncuning) . 
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and credit s tatute.·UG 
In  circumstances l ike those presented in  Jfarrese, call ing the 
rules discovered " law, " let  alone " s tate law ,"  i s  n o thing more than a 
play on words . I n  this  aspect ,  the Court was m o s t  o bl iging in  dem­
onstrating the folly of the course o n  which i t  embarked. For ,  re­
sponding to the Chiefjustice's  conclusion that I l l inois  lavv was l ikely 
to b e  indeterminate on the ques t ion of claim preclus ion ,  the Court 
relied on provis ions of the Restatement ( Second) of Judgmen ts s tat ing or  
contemplating an interjurisdictional s olution that  i s  no t ,  and is  n o t  
based on ,  the law of a n y  s tate .n7 T h e  Court a l s o  s tated that ,  having 
discovered the most c losely  analogous s tate law rules , a federal 
court should consider "whether application of the s tate rules would 
bar the particular federal claim. " -l 'l S  The la tter p assage evokes 
memories of federal common law and also,  perhaps ,  of the Rules of 
Decision Act .  There are critical differences,  h owever.  Federal com­
mon law, even ·when incorporating s tate law rules .  is  avowedly fed­
eral law.-139 Further, not  even a s trict reading of the Rules  of 
Decision Act  sugges ts that s tate  laws " apply" in  s i tuations where i t  is  
imposs ible for them to do s o .-l- lO I n  a case l ike .\Iarrese, state law is  
-!3G See td .  at 1 33 2 - 3 5 .  Kremer a s i d e ,  the  Court ' s  o n h  s u p p o rt f o r  i t s  conclusion that 
§ l 738 appl ies in th i s  contex t  was Becher \ .  Con toure Laboratories .  I n c. , :2 7 ()  l' . S .  �-l 8 8  
( 1 929 )  . .  \ Ianese. l 05 S .  C t .  a t  1 3 3 2 .  Bechn prm icles n o  s uch s u p p o n  . .-\.-; noted in  .\frn­
re,t. ' ' [  ,,· ] i thout  discuss ing § 1 7 3 8 ,  th i s  Court . . held [ in Bl'rhr; I t h �i t  the  i ssue p rcc lu ­
s in· effect of a s ta te  court j udgment barred a s u bsequent p a t e n t  '; u i t  tha t  could n o r  ha\ 'e 
been b rough t in  s ta te  court ." !d. To be sure. Bechn doc s " n tchc.tt. c  th < t t  a state c o u rt 
J U d gment  mav in some circumstances ha\-e precl usin: effe c t  i n  ��  subsequent  ac t i o n 
11· i t h i n  the  exclusive j u ri sd ict ion of the  federal court s , "  11! . .  h u r  tt t el l o;  us noth ing ;\bout  
what  Ll\\ determines such preclusive dfcct ,  except as the  L:. i l urc t o  d i scuss  � l 7 :l x s u g­
ges ts a federal source. Srr s11jira note 4 2 8 .  
F o r  problems \\' i th  t h e  Court 's  repeal anah·s i s .  s e e  .wpm t ex t <tccomp;m\ · ing n o t es 
+00-09.  
-� :� 7 St't . \larresf:'. 1 05 S .  Ct.  al  1 3 3 3  n .3 ( discuss ing REsT.-\TE\t E�T ( S E C O :\ D }  o F  Jl ·nc-
\tENTS § 24 comment g. § 26 comment  c ( l ) .  i l lus tration 2 ( 1 98 2 ) ) .  ! 'he �tss u m p t i o n  of  
<Ill avaibble court in the same system, made in  the  former. is  a r d l c:; o f  the  i n t erj ur isdic­
t i c 1 n al  rule stated in the la t ter .  Sre n!so R r: sT,\TEM ENT ( S r: c o x D )  O F  . J t ·nc\tExTs � 2 () com­
ment c ( ! )  report er' s note.  The reporter s ta t e s :  
\\'hen t h e  plain t i ff. after  h a v i n g  los t  a s tate  act ion,  s e e k s  rel tef \ \ · i th IT­
speer to the same transact ion un der a federal s ta tu te  enfo rce�1ble onh in 
fed e t a l  court. i t  may b e  argued that h e  should be h e l d  h<l iTcd cspcc ia lh i f  
he could have ins t i tu ted h i s  original s u i t  in federal cour t . i t  a p p ears 
sounder,  however, not to preclude the federal act ion b; the do ctrine of  
bar. but ra ther  to al lo\\· a carn -o 1·er d e c i d ed issue from t h e  qate  to  r h c  
federal action b:- \l'a\ o f  i s s u e  preclusion . 
< :; s  .1 /rm-esr, 1 05 S .  C t .  a t  1 3 3 3  ( foomotc omi t ted ) .  
-l '> � l  Srt supm text accompam ing notes l 05-08 S:: 1 5 1 .  
- ! J O  But srr. r g .  Campbel l  Y .  Ha\erh i l l ,  1 5 5 U . S .  G I O  ( 1 8�l :i )  ( s t :Hc s r.a t u t �· ,, f l i nn t a -
t ; u n :; appl ied under Rules of Decis ion  .-'\cr in  fcdcral patent  ac t io n ) .  The C o u r r · s  deci ­
s ion in Co111pbr!! \l·as clril'en bv i t s  concern that ,  i f ;, state s t a t u t e  d i d  not  "applv  . . . t l t c tc 
"·ou l d  be no l imitat ion:; period.  Srr id. at () 1 3 - 1 4 . \l oreo\' er ,  the Co urt suggested th< u  
the l a n g uage in quest ion might  confer ' ' a  cert a i n  di screti o n  "·i t i t  res pec t  t o  t h e  e n force­
ment o f  s t a t e  statu tes . "  !d. at  () 1 5 . Sre jiu thn \l erri l l ,  1 11jm1 note CJ '2 .  <It 3-\ n . i -} l ) _  
J 
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always indeterminate. 
The basic problem with ;\larrese, however, is  the Court ' s  adher­
ence to i ts  erroneous interpretation  of  the full  faith and credit s tat­
ute .  One might have hoped that the influences prompting the Court 
to insinuate federal law into its discussion of  " s tate law" would lead 
i t  to reconsider.+-! I Moreover, Judge Posner's  opinion,  even though 
accepting the Court 's  basic premis e  about  the statute,  o ffered food 
for thought .  I n  any  event ,  under the  reinterpreted full faith and 
credit  s tatute ,  his conclusion vvas correct :  the s tatute " cannot  be 
used to decide" a case like Jlarrese . ..J -! '2 The reason ,  however, is  not 
that there can be no s tate law on the question .  It  i s ,  rather, that as  a 
resul t  of  the exclusive j urisdiction of  the federal courts , the same 
problem of preclusion cannot ar ise " in  the courts" of  the state 
whose courts rendered the j udgment ,  with the result  that there can 
be no " law or  usage ,"  whether state or  federal . Some may rej ect 
this interpretation of section 1 73 8  in  cases of  exclusive j u risdict ion 
as too l i teral . ..J..J:-; Accepting my basic in terpretive posi t ion,  h owever, 
they must admit that if the reinterpreted full faith and credi t s tatute 
imports a principle of  functional equivalence ,  the mediation of  s tate 
law through that  principle must include consideration of  federal 
policies and interests .  In o ther words,  whether or not  the full  faith 
and credi t  statute plays a role ,  there is  a role for federal common 
law. 
Under tradi tional federal common law analys i s ,  the argument 
for uniform federal preclusion rules ,  rather than s tate law b orrowed 
as federal law except ·where i t  is hosti le  to  or  inconsistent with fed­
eral interests ,  is  l ikely to be s trongest in exclusive j urisdiction cases .  
Although a regime of borrowed " s tate law" would not  present  the 
federal courts vv ith problems of adminis trability as serious as  those 
attending preclus ion of federal claims in cases within the concurrent 
jurisdiction of the s tate courts ,-1 -l..J  finding s ta te " law" would impose 
- H I See .1upm text Jccompan: · ing n o t es 4 3 7 - 3 8 .  
· H 2  1\larrese ,. _ .-\meri can .-\eadem,· of Onhopaed ic  Surgeons ,  7'.2() F .2d 1 1 50 .  i 1 54 
( i th C i r. 1 984) (en b;mc) . re;'d. ; 05 S .  C t .  1 3 '.2 7  ( 1 98 .7 ) . 
Tak i ng this  \ ie" , I need not  reach the q ues t ion of repeal .  a l t h o ugh t h e  analvs is  of  
§ 1 983 suggests  tha t  J find ing  of a n  impl ied repeal is l ikeh, at  l eas t  i f  the  full  L1 i t h  �mci 
credi t  s tatute  is o ther"·ise in t erpreted correct ly .  See supra text Jccompanying n o t es 400-
09.  
·!4 3  F o r  t h e  i m p o rt a nce' o f � principle of funct iona l  equiYalence to  t h e  role of fu l l  
fai th a n d  cred i t  a s  a nat ional lY un if:·mg force. sec .-\ . \ "o:-.: :\ I E H RE:\1 & D .  TR.-\L.Ti\1. \ :-o: . THE 
L-\\1' OF i\h. iLTJST-\TE PROflLDIS l 4 GO-G3 ( 1 965) . See also Harper, The Suprnne Court ond thr 
Conjhct of Lows. 4 7  C o LL'\1 . L .  RF:\ ' .  883 . 884-90 ( 1 94 7 ) ;  Summers, Full Faith o 11 1l Cr1'1btjo1  
judina! Proceeding:�. 2 L . C . L..-\. L R E \ . 'H l ,  446-5 1 ( 1 95 5 ) .  
·H-I I n  a case l i ke .\ Ianese. the p reclusion quest ion w i l l  arise onh in a federa l proceed ­
ing .  Compare supm t e x t  accompam ing notes 1 5 7-58 ( fed eral ques t i o n j u d g m cill  of  fed­
eral court ) .  3 7 ! - 7 '.2  ( fed era l quest ion J Udgment  of s t<I lC court ) .  
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its own costs .  Moreover, the adminis trab il itv problems for l i tigants  
would be extreme. At  least in cases of  concurrent j urisdict ion,  i t  i s  
poss ible that ,  assuming the choice of la>v problems can be reso lved 
with confldence ,-l·E' courts of the relevant s ta te will have s elected or 
fashioned the rule of preclusion applicable to the federal clai m .  
\IVhere t h e  federal courts have exclusive j urisdic t ion,  how·ever, there 
is  no poss ibil i ty of finding a solution in s tate j urisprudence.  Specu­
lation about " s tate lav"·" mediated through a principle of funct ional  
equivalence may be great mental  exerc ise for the S upreme Court .  I t  
i s  not ,  hovvever, a task t o  impose o n  l i t igants ,  for whom the s takes 
include the loss of federal substantive rights . 
M ore fundamentally, a congressional grant of  exclusive  j u ri s ­
diction typically bespeaks concern for the elaborat ion of a scheme of  
substantive rights by federal j udges .  t - Hi Even if the adminis trabi l i ty 
of a sys tem of  borrowed state law vvere the only relevant cons idera­
tion ,  one might well conclude that federal j udges should not  be dis­
tracted by the j udicial equivalent of a wi ld goose  chase .  Just  as 
Congress usually has better things ro worn· abou t  than the arcana of 
preclusion law, federal j udges have better things to \vorry about  
than what a s tate court 1vould think about  a problem i t  has never 
considered and never \Vi l l .  In both cas e s ,  one of those bet ter things 
is paying attention to federal subs tantive ri ghts . -1 -1 7  
I f  o n e  believes ,  a s  I do ,  that the Rules of Decis ion Act speaks 
directly lO the creation or applical ion of federal comrnon law,  the 
resul t  is no differen t .  Indeed, in exclusive j ur i sd ic t ion cases one can 
say,  without l inguis t ic  s train or a cademic s le ight  of hand, l - lK that  
s tate laws do not  " apply" \vithin the meaning of the A c t . 1 J ; J  I t  mat­
ters not ,  however, because ,  for the reas o n s  given above,  uniform 
federal preclusion law is l i kely to be deemed ' ' req u ired ' '  by the s tat­
ute conferring exclusive jurisd iction on the federal c o u rt s .  
To say that uniform federal preclus ion law governs i n  exclusive 
j urisdiction cases is not to sav that  trans -subs rant ive federal preclu­
sion law govern� in such cases o r  that federal law should n o t  p re ­
clude .  In connection wi th cases o f  concur rent j u ri sdic t ion under the 
----- -------
-I -I !'• Collljl<ll'l' Sll/Jm tex t � tccomp�� n :  ing n o t e s  I ;-J t ) .()� ( federal  q u c s r i o n j u dgment o f'  fed-
eral  coun) <l'i!h SlljJIII text  acco mpanving n <J l c  :1 7-! ( i'cderai rptcs ! ion juc!gmen! of s t a t e  
court) . 
-! - H i .� i'l'. f g .  H n w n  \' .  Fclscn.  -l {�  l_· . s .  1 '2" 1 .  i �)-.1 t l f1 J �)i : \ .S  '.\' R J C : l i T  . .  'd t l . I . E R & 
CO<JPI:R.  \ 1 /jJra n o t e  5. � -!-! 7 0 ;  _.l, t l':oo d .  wjn o n o t e  3 :\ l .  ; ; t  l () 1 - 0 8 .  
-� -1 7 (f_ \ \' i ! S \ ) ( 1  \". c.;arcl a ,  1 0 :) S .  c:t.  i �·!:) � .  l D-! 7  ( l � ·:s:1 )  ( ' " .\ { r lrCO\"(T ,  t h e  1cgi s ! a t i \"C 
purp(hC to cre; t e  a n  dl'cctin' rcmuh for t he c n f'm ccmcnl  ol· f'cdc;;d u\·il n!. i h t s  i :;  ob­
structed bY unccnai n t \· in  Lhc appl ic1bk > t a t u t c  o f l i m i t lt t ion:; .  f(lr -''Gtrt l' rc.-; o u ,·cc; m u s t  
be d i s s ipated l w  useless l i t igat ion o n  col l �i l crJl  m�H t ers.  " ) ( foo t r l o t c o m i t t e d ) .  
-4-l H Sn' suj,rri n o t e  l 2 1 : st'P olso t e x t  accunl pa nyl n g  l l P t C  :! 6 �  ( nl J n i p u Lu i o n  o f  1 a n gu�1gc 
" i n  the case,; 1·:hcrc t he\ app l :· "  t o  aYoicl rcquircm <· r t !  to a p p i ,· S l :l t c  l :l\\ s ) .  
·+-t � l  B ut .\.('!' suput n o t e  -1-1 0 .  
I 
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reinterpreted full faith and credi t  s tatute,  I have noted the paradox 
that a regim e of borrowed state preclusion lavv may prove more pro­
tective of federal substantive policies than federal preclusion law if  
state and federal judges take their policing function seriously .4 :;0 
The paradox results from a tendency among federal judges , freed to 
apply federal preclusion law, to turn , without thought ,  to preclus ion 
rules announced in a different subs tantive context or  thos e  fash­
ioned in no subs tantive context .  The Supreme Court has  en­
couraged this  phenomenon in i ts  cases on mutuality 4 5 1 and ,  m ore 
generally, in its wholesale borrowings from the Restatement ( Second) of 
judgments _ -I C> :!  
Apart from the problem of unthinking applic.; t ion of  preclusion 
law that is  disembodied because it is  trans -substantive. we have re­
cently seen evidence of preclusion law that is j us t  plain disem­
bodied:t 5 '1 The paradox under the Court ' s  interpretation of  the ful l  
faith and credit s tatute is that  s tate law may· protect both federal 
substantive policies and federal subs tantive rights more effec tively 
than the rules that at least some Jus tices would apply if they were 
free to apply "federal law. "-1 54 A court ' s  power to fashion or apply 
uniform federal common law imports power to cons ider pol icies in 
addition to those animating federal substantive law.  This pmver is  
not ,  however, a license to proceed in d isregard of  those p ol icies or 
of the effect of putative federal common i aw rules o n  subs tan tive 
rights .  
F inally,  the discuss ion of  the exclusive j ur isdic t ion cases has ,  t o  
this  point ,  focused o n  cases like ;\.Jan-est, involving the problem o f  
claim preclusion. When the problem i s  i s sue p recl u s i o n , a s o m e ­
what d ifferent analysis may be appropria te .  
Firs t .  in some cases the question is \vhet.her an i s sue u n der slate 
law l itigated and decided in state court should be given preclusive 
effect so  as to foreclose litigation of a federal clai m within exclusive 
federal jurisdiction . Here too ,  I believe, the ful l  faith and credit stat­
ute plays n o  role, because the same problern of preclus ion c a n n o t  
a n s e  in  su bsequent proceedings in the courts of the s t a t e . -"-"' 
- F> I J  S;•r supm text accompa:wing note :l 7 7 .  
1 :, I Ser suj;m text accom panving notes �05- 1 4 .  
-F>� S'rr. r.g . .  \-fon tana v .  l. ' n i tcd States .  ·HO L S .  1 -r i .  L "> - L  l l i :2 .  Hi -i  n . l l  ( l �l 7 � l )  . .'i>t 
also wpm tex t  accompanying note :l 58 :  note  4 � 0 .  
4 :-, :\  .'ift 511jna text accompam·ing note 3 5 7 .  
-F >·l Srr Burbank.  sujJm n o te 9�. at GG4-6:) 
-l :-"�' On this  view.  t h e  J..:rnnn Court s h ould ha i'C: ckcidccl 11·h c t h c r  t i t le \ T l  1 ·cs t s  cxcl u -
S I IT j u n s (k t i o n  in  t h e  federal c o u r t s  before aclc! rc s :; I n g  t h e  p; c c l u s i o n  p ro b l e m .  Sti' 
krnwr. 4 56 L.S .  at 4 7 0  n .�O:  Sft' also sujnn !ex t  <lt'Co:np;nn i ! ! g  n o i r:  -t � <J.  
Ther e  arc d i s t i n c t ions among cases i twoh· ing the g·cner<d prohicm : rc; I t c ci in t h e  
t e x t  that  nnv be<Jr on the  precl us ion ques t ion .  St'r I R \\' R J C !-n. \ l u .u: ;;: (",- C : o o P E E .  l!tj)l'o 
n o t e  5. � -+4 70 .  at 68 1 - ll ."l .  Thev do not .  ho \-.-cvcr,  a l i 'c c t  t h e  ;m;� h s i ,, con ccrr i i l l g  t h e  
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Whether o r  not that i s  the case ,  i n  the choice, under traditional fed­
eral common law analys is , between u niform federal p reclusion rules 
and federal law-in-reserve ,  I be lieve that the balance l ies again with 
the former. Thus , for example , there not  only  i s ,  but  there can be ,  
no s tate law on the quest ion whether the issue is the  same, and the 
answer to that  ques tion vvi l l  inevitably involve interp retation of fed ­
eral law_r,<; The game is  no t  worth the candle, particularly for l i t i ­
gants . Those prematurely m ourning the death o f  federalism may 
find consolation in the hom o aeneitv o f  modern p reclusion law . -1 '' 7  b ' 
And , again, uniform federal p reclus ion law should not  be equated 
with trans-subs tantive fed eral preclusion law or with a rule of no 
preclus ion .  
Second, as we have seen,  in some cases an i s sue under federal 
law integral to a claim wi th in  exclusive federal j u ri s dict ion,  i s  inci­
dental ly and permissibly a dj udicated in s tate court .�58 I n  this  con­
text ,  the ful l  fai th and credi t  statute may apply . -15�1 But under the 
reinterpreted full  fai th and credit s tatute, one m u s t  s ti l l  consider 
whether s tate law i s  d i sp laced ,  in whole or part , b y  federal law . 
Here ,  i t  i s  more difficult to p redict p roblems as a result of a regime 
of borrowed s tate law than  i t  i s  when s tate courts cannot speak to  
the quest ion.  I t  is a l so  m o re d ifficul t  to suggest in  a dvance what  the  
congress ional grant of  exclusive jur isdiction impl ies  for the source 
of preclusion la;v·:1 60 Dec i s ion  should thus awai t  a part icularis t ic  
sou 1·a of p rec l us i o n L.n,· u n d e r  t h e  rei n terpret ed ful l  fai t h  a n d  c reel i t  s t a t u t e .  T h e  s a m e  i s  
t r u e  "· i t h  respect to i s s ues o f  h i s t o r·i c a l  fact  as opposed to f·i n cl i n gs a p p h· ing �a,,. t o  fac t .  
Sre /d. a t  680-8 1 .  
- I :'> G  (j supra text  J cc om pa m· i n g notes -134--!0 (c laim prec l u s i o n ) .  I am. o f  cours e ,  
:ts s u m i n g-1 hope n o t  u nreas o n a bl y-t h at t h is ,,·oulcl be a req u iremen t o f  cl ! W  j u r i s d i c ­
t i o n ' s  Ia\\ o f  i s s u e  prec l u s i o n  . 
. -\s Pro Cess o r  Cooper h a s  p o i n t ed ou t . i n  an aruh sis  directed to t h e  coment  rather  
t ha n  t h e  s o u rce o f  preclus10n ru l e s  i n  th is  con tex t :  " Indep e n d e n t  n:d e t er m i n,H i o n  of 
issues of Ll\\ appl ica t io n . . m a y  be t h e  onh· su re guarantee t h a t  t h e  s t a t tdards o f  fed ­
era l a n d  s t a t e  Ia"· Jre i n  1:1c t  iden tical . "  18  ·,;\' R I G HT. \l iLLER & C o o P E R ,  SlljJm n o t e  :=> .  
� H / 0 .  a t  GScl .  
-l :Y ;  \ l o re t o  t h e  po i n t ,  t hc1· s h o ul d  h eed J us ti ce Blackm u n ' s  Gl U t lOl t :  " \\'e m u s t 
a1·oid the t e m p t a t i o n  to l e t  ' federa l i s m ' beco me t h e  �antral L1'' of t h e  1 98 0 ' s .  '-l brood­
i n g  onmiprc;ence t o  "·hich d u h· e n a c t ed s tatu tes arc made t o  p;11 h o m a g e . "  B l ack m u n .  
SfCIW!i 1 983 a n d  Ftdeml Protection of !ndi<•uluals H1gh t5- J l '/{{ ihf 5italll!r Remr1111 .·/ {/;•t o r  Fad!' 
.·l<< 'm 1. GO :\ .Y . l'- L Rn.  I .  23  ( 1 985 ) . 
+> s  St�· sujJ III t e x t  accompam· i n g  n o t e s  3 78-80.  
·L '> \l  fhc S l J t U t e  \\' O u J d  app h· w h ere t he preclus ion problem i s  presented i n  a case 
fded in  federal  court  t h a t  could have b e en filed i n  s tate  court . I t  1\ 0 u l d  not  apph in an 
act ion that  could he f i led only i n  federal court . 
There iCma i n s  the p o s s i b i l i t 1· tha t  the s ta t u te conferri ng excl usi1 e  j u r i s d ict ion o n  
t h e  federa l  courts m a '  be fou n d  c x p r e s s l v  o r i n1p l i edly t o  repeal  t h e  fu l i  fa i t h  a n d  cred i t  
.� t a t u t e .  SN s up r a  text accompan v i n g n o t es 4 00-09;  note -!-! :? .  
·Hi(l "Th e b�1 s i c  inconsis tency i s  b e t\\een the s tat u te rnakin g _ j u r i s d i c t i o n  01-cr a n t i t ru � d  
c l a i m s  cxclus l1 ·e!l  f'.:deral a n d  t h e  d e c i s i on t h a t  s t a t e  court s ma\· d e c i d e  a n t i tr u s t  de­
fcn\e.-; . "  C u rrie . .  llljim note 33 1 ,  a t  3 4 7 .  Professor Currie 11·as .  h oi,TI-er. concerned l,· i t h  
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analysis of  the federal s tatute. The inquiry ,  however, should not  be  
confined to  evidence of Congress ' s  specific intention w i th  respect to 
preclus ion .  One should also ask whether the statute implicitl y  and 
plausibly calls for uniform federal preclusion rules .  I f  not ,  s tate pre­
clusion law applies except when i t  i s  hos tile to or inconsistent with 
particular federal substantive policies or where s tate law would have 
the effect of nullifying federal substantive rights .4b 1 
CoNCLUSION 
This  i s  a long article about an exquisi tely difficult subj ect .  In  
part ,  i t s  length has  been determined by  a fel t  need, in suggest ing a 
general approach to problems of inte1jurisdictional preclus ion ,  to 
confront the analysis of component parts by courts and commenta­
tors who have not seen the problems whole. I also thought i t  impor­
tant to support my interpreta tion of  the full fai th and credit s tatute 
rather fully as a prelude to the application of  federal common law 
analysis in the s tate-federal configurat ion .  
I expect that  every reader of  this Article wi l l  find  something,  
perhaps many things , with which to disagree . I hope,  ho·wever, that 
most readers wil l  agree with the follovving proposit ions about fed­
eral judgments : ( l )  The full faith and credi t  s tatute does not apply 
to federal judgments ,  and even i f  i t  d id ,  that  s tatute would not direct 
the application of  the law of the rendering system, i . e . ,  federal la>v .  
( 2 )  Whatever the federal source of the  obligation to  respect a fed­
eral judgment,  i t  nei ther inexorably nor obviously requires that  fed­
eral p reclusion law gO\ ern al l  ques t ions concerning the scope and 
e ffects of  that judgment . ( 3 )  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
cannot  validly provide preclusion rules for federal judgments .  (4) 
Absent federal preclusion law provided by the Consti tution , federal 
s tatutes , or  Federal Rules , the o nly putative federal rules are rules of 
federal common l a w .  (5) r\ subs tantial body of  Supreme Court pre­
cedent addresses the circums tances in  which federal common law 
can b e  validly created or app l ied,  and there i s  no obvious reason 
\vhy  the m ode of analys is  emerging from that body of precedent i s  
resul t s  ra ther t h a n  t h e  la1,· t h J t  -; lwuld determmc t h e m .  Srr s11pm n o t e  ·-1 2 8 ;  s,·r o!so 1 8  
WRIGHT, \l iLLER 8.: CooPER.  ' ilfm: n o te 5 .  � 4..J. 70 .  a t  6 7 8  8.: n . l l . 
4 6 1 This  is another s i w a t ion in "·h ich t h e  precl u s i o n  rules app!ied in s tJ l e <u J d  fed-
e ra l  court may d i iTer. I n  t h a t  ncn t .  the resu l t  \\ OLJ!d be <H trilmtable to an anomaly s imi­
lar to  thaL  presented lw -1 2 LS.C. � i 083 .  Sec supra tc�t  acco mpa ming n o t <:s  398 -�)�) :  
n o t es -! 00 & - H)O .  Thus. in '' s u bscqn r n t  cont ract dction b ro ugh t i n  s t:J te c o u n . p o l 1 c ic'  
a n i m a t i n g  the p<n c n t  Lm·s m i gh t require :1  rule o r  110llllllltllal i t\' .  Sa SII/Jrrl t e x t  JCCornp<l ·· 
n y i n g  notes  :-\7 8-80.  In such '111 anion brought  in federal C O I J rt .  t hose pol ic ies m i g h t  
h J\'C t o  1·i e l d  ! o  pol ic ies i n forming t h e  gra n t  o f  c�clus in· f(·dcral  j ur i s d i c t i O J l .  Sa· i(-) 
\V R I G!!T,  !\ I iLLER & CooPER.  ' 11/'Ui notc  5. � -!-! 70 .  <� t G�H - 8 5 .  In b o t h  c � s c s .  hm,-e\ cr. t h e  
prec lus ion Ln,· appl ied  11 o u l d  h:1 1·c :1 IC·deral  s o u r c e .  
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unsuited to the preclusion context where federal j udgments  are in­
volved, whether the j udgm ents concern federal or  s tate  law ques­
tions . (6) vVhen a federal court s i t t ing in diversi ty adj u di cates rights 
under s tate l2w,  there i s  another body of Supreme C ourt  precedent 
that cannot fa irly be ignored in the preclusion context.  (7) Unless 
one exp l ici t l y  repudiates either or both of the bodies of p recedent 
referred to i n  ( 5 )  and (6) above, it  i s  worth the effort to try to in te­
grate them . 
I also hope that mos t  readers wil l  agree with the fol lowing pro­
p o s i tions about s tate judgments :  (8 )  The ful l  fai th and credit  statute 
does not  choose the domestic preclusion law of the rend ering state ;  
rather, i t  requires the appl ication in interj urisdict ional cases of  the 
law that the courts of the rendering s tate would apply .  (9) The law 
thus  appl ied may be domes tic state law, the law of  another state ,  or  
federa l  law . ( l  0) U n l es s p rovided directly by the Cons ti tut ion o r  a 
fed eral s t a tute ,  the federal law displacing s tate law i n  s tate  courts i s  
fed eral common bw . ( l l )  S tate court j udgments i n  cases of  concur­
rent federal and s ta te j urisdict ion are, according to federa l  common 
law analys i s ,  usual ly  governed by (borrowed) s tate preclus ion law . 
( 1 2) In such cas es , however,  s tate preclusion law must  yield to fed­
era l preclus ion l<nv· d o m e s t i cally when i ts  applicatio n  would be  hos­
t i le  to or inco n s i s t e n t  with part icu la r federal policies , and the fu l l  
fai th and crccl i t  :-; r � t utc makes the domest ic solut ion the national so­
lut ion .  ( 1 3 ) S ta te prec lus ion l av1· must also yield to federal preclu­
sion !2.11· 11·hcn the appl ica t ion of s tate J a,v , viewed as a whole ,  would 
be host i le  to o ,- i nconsis tent  w i th a scheme of federal subs tan tive 
rights \ 1 4 )  The full fa i th and credit s tatute usually plays no role i n  
d e t e rmin ing r he p recl u s i n· effects o f  s tate court j udgrnents on 
claims \l i th in c:--:dusive federal j ur isdiction . ( 1 5 ) In most  c a s e s  
1vithin exclus ive fed eral jurisdict ion,  the preclusion law applied '.vi l l  
be uniform fed crai L:w.  ( 1 6) ' · t:niform federal law" does not  neces ­
sarilv mean t rans-subs L;:m t ive federal law, and a c o urt must  test  
trans-suhstant i  - c  f'eclcral preclusion rules for consis tency with fed­
eral s t;:;tuton• pr! l ic ies  and >vi th the scheme of rights provided by 
federal subs cam in� l<m . 
In s tat ing these  p ro p o s i tions . I have omitted s ome others for 
which I ha\ e argued b u t  \1 ·hich are probably more contro versial . 
Thus ,  l believe t h a t  the R;_d cs of Decision Act speaks directiy t o  the 
circu mstance�; in  \\·h id1 federal  court s can fashion or apply federal 
common l a 11 . I a lsu bel i c�.·c thar consideration of the role o f  fcderzt l  
lzn\ in s t a t e  ( v Ul t  G t s c s  b o t h  helps  to exp la in why that phenomenon 
1 ., ; t •  ) bl . 1 1 . . . !l a s  u <.: e n  trea teG as m s crerc ana suggests pro terns •.v i tn tramtlon�d 
feri �'-'l-� 1  ·"·J ' l.J l  . ., t··· l'  l · l v ·  :' 11 ··, ! · .· , 1· s e, . ,  .. .  1 t· n i t � � 011\' ''n t J. c) rl · · l ap ·l) l l· ,- at J. on s  -� -- . ... � t  l � . � ., _ • L. \ .... <-· � ;• ..... ... Y C. l .. ..J t._ '- , ._  a J 1  ...._ � &  .... , 
' . ' . ' •. , ,. ·� . . ' l b . B I . . pl O O f i.'lllS t !U i. �� 1:{ U ic 'i O f  U e C1 S i O I1 :"\ C t approa c l 0 Vlates . >Ut  L11S 1 5  
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no t  primarily an article about the Rules o f  Decision Act ,  a n d  I a m  
concerned lest  readers who d i s a gree \\· i th me on that p r o p o s i ti o n  
fai l to address my b a s i c  propo s i tions concerning federal p reclu s i o n  
law .  
I a l s o  believe that ,  in sect ion 1 983  actions brought i n  federal  
court ,  there should b e  no need to resort to s tate preclu s i o n  law.  In 
my view , the s trong p reference for a federal forum evinced by the 
C o ngress that  passed the p redece s s o r  of s ection 1 983 i s  irreconcila­
b ly i n  conflict with the rei n terpreted ful l  fai th and credit s tatute ,  
which assumes and uses as a referent subsequent  l i ti gatio n  i n  state 
coun. I n  s uch cas es the federal courts should look d i rectlv t o  fed-
/ 
eral p reclusion law, shaped i n  response to the requirements o f  the 
s u b s tant ive scheme . I recognize,  hov·:ever, that  the legislat ive his­
tory o f  sect ion 1 983  i s  variously  interpre ted . In any even t ,  correct 
interpretation o f  the ful l  faith and credit  s tatute sugge s ts o th er 
means to achieve inore effe c tive p ro tection o f  s u b s tantive rights 
under section 1 983 than that p rovided by the Court 's  essentially in­
coherent decis ions treating the i ssues .  
Apart from pro p o s it ions tha t I d o  n o t  regard. as  basic  to this  
Art icle,  I acknmv ledge that  I have been relatively and uncharaneris ­
ticallv agno s t i c o n  a subj ec t  t h a t  has sharp l y  divided s ch o lars , t o  vvi t ,  
t h e  di lemma that s h o u l d  prc perh be thought t o  confront federal 
courts adjudicating ques t ions  of s ta te  law in diversity act ion s .  Given 
my readiness to cri t icize Lhe C o u rt on other matters , mv fail u re t o  
cri ticize i [s  p o s t-D ie c.1 s e s  and i n s i s t <'ncc that lo�wer kderal courts 
and commenta tors t <1ke those cases s erio u s l y  in the precl u s ion con­
tex t ,  rna;: be though t to s ignal agreeme n t  with them. I n  my defens e ,  
I can o n J v  rei terate tha r ,  fro m  t h e  p erspec tive of federal common 
la'>,v, the Coun \ posL - fn;' c a s e s  arc not the onlv ba rrier to the 
across- the-board app l i c:lt i o n  o f  unifi; rm federal p reclusion rules to 
federal di versity judgmcuts ad judicat ing state law que�: ti o n s .  
j:;' . 1 '  v • ' l . ,. l • l . 1 • m a . ly ,  1 ll opc t nat  mv zma \ S i S  m pro o ! eTns crea.teo tJy tne ap-
plication of t ran::> - S 'I h s t a n t i \  e preclus ion rules will con tri bute  to the 
reconsid era tio il of s o rn c  <:1 f the b a s ic ass u m p t ions of modern proce­
dural sys tern s .  Els ewhere fo r  i n s t a n c e ,  I h;n e s u gges ted " that Con­
gress tocJ rarel \: ad\  crts t ( J  t l 1c  possible _n e ed fo r  s r)ec1al ized '--' < � l 
procedure--a s o p p o s e d  t o  the Lra n s ·<·'IJ b s tamive prGcedure of Fed-
eral RLtles�-·\V b.c11 iL  e n a c t .·� l c g:i s l a tic> t l .  , _q;'_! I h ��tve a1 s o  S lJgg·cs teci 
h , .
• . ) . -j 1 . j • r '  l j ] . t at 1 r1 ccJ1 S 1 Cter1n g l:; rcJlJ O s t�'L. lcg·1 s t a. O cH l ,  !__ , (Jn g·rcss s rl CHJ i C{ ret1ture 
,. D _ __ l ! � _ _ r �  _ _ _ , t� 1 · ' 1 l 1 a � roceuuLli .t mpc.Cl .> Uiemc nt, t. n c  p i..Irpose o r  "'·m e n  w o u 1 c  .J c to 
e n s u re t h: t t  ex i sri n ::: fc·d cr:,d uruccdurc ademLt tel ·; v;i ] ;  s erve a b i l l ' s  •_ J ;. l ' -
on Culu·/,\ , Ci � ' ! l  / . ;/hT.' It \  . -:n �-1 rf;,· .-io';:;' i i / .  fJ/ 
C�ong . . l . ·d \c �,; s .  �l ( l � ·; l'� J J  : _ _  ;.; Li l c ' J : : c n l  n i '  S !  
1-_/ H J 5 5 0  
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subs tantive poli cies . "- Hi:-1 Those responsible for federal procedure 
now recognize a p roblem in  the use  of trans-subs tantive rules of  
procedure ,·Hi-l although their perspective on that  p roblem differs 
from that of  a legis lator .  M oreover, they have yet to  do m ore than 
tinker with the exist ing system in  this aspect. One need not b elieve 
that the label "procedure" i s  usefully applied t o  preclusion l aw to 
believe that i t  is  t ime to stop tinkering with federal procedure and to 
rethink i t :H>c; 
-Hi �\ !d. at :! I n . l 2 .  
-Hi-1 Set. e.g . .  Subrm, The .\'i'U" Lm 1 11 .·llllt'l·imn Ci u/1 l'u](n/urf. 67 .-\ . B . .  -\ .J l --l G8 ( 1 08 1 ) . 
-Hi :-, I ha1·c n o  thought  o f  d is c ussmg "· i t h  You th is  mornin g am p a rt ic u l a r  
rules ,  pr;.Jctices. proced u res or r u l e s  of e1· idencc.  On the con t ran , 1,·hat  ! 
s u b m i i  to nw is ll" h c t h c r  it is enough t o  confine our  s t udies a n d  i n cp t i ri c s  
m t o  rcfmernent o f  o u r  proet"; s c s .  ,,·hen p er h a p s  '-' h < t l  I\"C' rea l h need I I> d o  
is  r a k e  a fresh l o o k  a t  t h e  entire s t ru c t u re \\"C kti"C created to rcsoh-c 
d i s p u t e s .  
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